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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the collection of levies by the state from Colombian 
coffee and Philippine coconut producers and the delegation of authority, to 
mobilise and regulate the uses of the levies, to producers associations in these 
sectors. The thesis suggests that these activities constitute an “institutional 
framework” for state-engineered rents, whereby public authority is appropriated 
by private agents. It asks why similarly-designed institutions for allocating rents 
yielded different outcomes: Colombian coffee levies are associated with growth-
enhancing and producer welfare-promoting investments in coffee production and 
marketing, while Philippine coconut levies are depicted as non-developmental 
rent capture by associates of a president. 
The thesis explains the variation in outcomes by examining the basis in political 
economy of the power exercised by the leading sectoral organisations, 
FEDECAFE in Colombia and COCOFED in the Philippines, and how they 
articulated this power in the mobilisation of the levies. It finds that the conditions 
for collective action and the exercise of power were more robust for Colombian 
coffee than Philippine coconut producers. This meant that while FEDECAFE 
directly intermediated between coffee producers and the state in the mobilisation 
of rents associated with coffee levies, COCOFED shared the power of mobilising 
rents with other individual political brokers. This variation led to differences in 
rent mobilisation: a process that was production-enhancing in Colombia but not 
in the Philippines.  
This work thus shows how variations in the political organisation of rent-seeking 
may be linked to variations in the developmental outcomes associated with the 
collection and deployment of such levies. Doing so, it seeks to contribute to the 
understanding of the political conditions under which state-engineered rents may 
be production-enhancing – an important question in late developing countries, 
where corruption may be endemic, but state-allocated rents nevertheless 
necessary for promoting development. 
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Chapter 1. Rents, producers associations and the politics of rent-seeking: a 
framework for analysis 
 
 
This is a tale of two producers associations, their entanglement with the politics 
of rent-seeking
1
, and the disparate outcomes that followed. Both associations 
were made part of an institutional framework
2
 that legally enabled them to 
control a portion of taxes the state levied on the producers. The portion of the 
taxes purposively allocated to the sector, or retained by the sector through the 
claims of the producers associations on them, are ‘levies’ or state-enforced non-
voluntary contributions, which unlike most taxes did not revert to the national 
coffers for redistribution to the wider economy. The institutional framework that 
gave producers associations the right to mobilise these levies effectively gave 
private agents entitlements to extraordinary income streams, which they would 
not have had access to without the policy intervention. In this sense, it is a ‘rent-
creating’ institutional framework. 3 I will explain how one of the associations 
was successful at appropriating the rents and mobilising them to promote both 
the productive goals and the protection of the welfare of their members; the 
other, less so. By dissecting this tale – particularly asking why similarly designed 
institutions of rent creation were associated with different outcomes – I seek to 
show why politics matters in understanding the developmental consequences of 
state interventions creating rents.  
The two producers associations are the National Federation of Coffee 
Growers of Colombia (FEDECAFE) and the Philippine Coconut Producers 
Federation (COCOFED).  Their involvement in rent appropriation was made 
possible by an institutional arrangement established by the state in the name of 
                                                 
1
 Following Khan & Jomo (2000, p. 5), I define ‘rent-seeking’ as pertaining to all activities that 
seek to “create, maintain and change the rights and institutions on which rents are based”. 
2
 I use ‘institutional framework’ and ‘institutions’ interchangeably and proceed from North’s  
(1995, p. 23) definition of institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction” and “composed of formal rules…informal constraints…and the enforcement 
characteristics of both”. [emphasis mine] I append the term ‘framework’ to emphasize that my 
objects of analysis are not the incentives embedded in a system of taxation (i.e., producer/export 
taxation) but in the institutional arrangement designed to enforce the tax—particularly the 
deputisation of private actors in the appropriation of public functions. 
3
 This approach to rents follows from Khan (2000b), who argues against the homogenization of 
the term “rents” and for the need to categorize different types of state-created rents. In particular, 
I utilise his category of rents as those arising from transfers organised through the political 
mechanism, and effectively converting public property into private property (Khan, 2000b, pp. 
35-36).  
12 
 
developing the coffee sector in Colombia and the coconut sector in the 
Philippines, and with two core features.  First, it involved the collection of levies 
from the respective sectors to build up funds that were legally and/or nominally 
earmarked for purposes of protecting and heightening the competitiveness of the 
sector. Second, the state vested the producer associations with part of the 
authority to mobilise these funds. Thus, the state effectively ceded to private 
agents control of entitlements to a public property (i.e. the proceeds from levies, 
which were non-voluntary contributions collected through the use of the coercive 
power of the state).   The mobilisation of the levies generated further streams of 
incomes and benefits – some of which came in the form of further rents, others 
arising from specific modes of mobilising the levies – that varied significantly in 
Colombia and the Philippines: both in terms of their recipients, and the 
associated outcomes.  
In Colombia, the levies were mobilised  in investments and institutions that 
heightened the competitiveness of the coffee sector in the world market. 
Moreover, they also contributed to enhancing the welfare of Colombia coffee 
producers, by stabilising their income in the face of commodity price volatility 
and providing public goods like roads, health and education facilities in coffee-
growing areas.  The resources to finance these emanated from the use of coffee 
levies to shore up market power in a parastatal ran by FEDECAFE. Beyond the 
sector, this framework also had wider developmental consequences. It also 
enhanced the capacity of the state to mobilise policies around the goals of coffee 
production. However, an enduring puzzle is why this model and its dynamic 
benefits never went beyond the coffee sector. 
Meanwhile, in the Philippines, the way rents were mobilised advanced neither 
the productive goals of the coconut sector nor the welfare of coconut producers. 
Instead, the mobilisation of rents is associated with supporting the personalistic 
goals of a cabal of individuals and an authoritarian president. Here the 
framework yielded the worst aspects of primitive accumulation without dynamic 
benefits accruing to the economy. 
If similarly-articulated institutional frameworks for rent appropriation yielded 
different modes of rent mobilisation – one more development-inducing than the 
other – then the explanation behind the differential outcomes associated with the 
levies collected from Colombian coffee producers and Philippine coconut 
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producers must be found beyond the realm of institutional design. This is why 
politics matter. This dissertation contributes a response to the broader question: 
what political conditions allow for the emergence of production-promoting state-
engineered rents? This comparative case study of Colombia and the Philippines 
provides an occasion for interrogating and potentially constructing hypotheses on 
the ways in which the political underpinnings of rent-seeking may shape the 
developmental impact of rent-creating state interventions.  
In this introductory chapter, I explain the theoretical framework I developed 
and the methodology I used to research the broad question I posed above. In the 
first section, I outline an argument for how specific political conditions – 
particularly, the political organisation of rent-seeking and the relative power 
exercised by producers associations – underpin the variations in rent mobilisation 
in the Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors.  In the second section, I 
will provide a detailed explanation of the institutional frameworks I am 
comparing and how institutional performance has been described and explained 
in literature. Following this, I present the theoretical framework I employed in 
this research. In the final section of this chapter, I describe the research 
methodology I utilised to deploy this theoretical framework. 
 
Why and how politics matters 
In this dissertation, I show the two senses in which politics matters in relation 
to the developmental potential of state-engineered rents: the first relates to the 
power exercised by producers associations – rooted in any given country’s 
political economy and history – in the articulation of productive goals; the 
second, to the political organisation of rent-seeking.  
First, variations in the economic and historical foundations of political power 
of the producers groups explain differences in the organisational robustness of 
COCOFED and FEDECAFE. In the Philippines the foundations were such that 
what emerged was a relatively weak organisation of landlords and local 
politicians, unable to develop internal institutions of accountability. In Colombia, 
regional landlords and politicians also played a key role in building the 
association. However, the federation grew to be a stable organisation with fully 
articulated institutions of representation and accountability. 
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Second, variations in the political organisation of rent-seeking
4
 in Colombia 
and the Philippines may be used to explain differences in the assignment of 
rights to rents and their mobilisation. The organisation of rent-seeking in both 
Philippines and Colombia is characterised by fragmentation, whereby a large 
number of factional groups compete for access to state resources. Political 
intermediaries (brokers) lead these factions and link them to the state in the 
processes of bargaining for access to state-engineered rents.  In both Colombia 
and the Philippines, this has limited the capacity of the state to pursue the 
encompassing goals of development or the generalised consolidation of 
development-inducing rent assignments. But there is an important difference 
within these systems of fragmented clientelism that explain why specific rent 
assignments may have performed differently in the Philippines and Colombia: 
the brokers of the settlement in the sectors under study were institutionalised and 
organised producer classes in Colombia but not in the Philippines.  
In the Philippines, patron-client factions work through family-based networks 
or oligarchs outside of the state, with direct links to executive power. In the case 
of the coconut sector, the rent allocation framework was instituted and developed 
through the intermediation of individual power brokers who had little to do with 
the sector.   
Meanwhile, in Colombia, these factions similarly worked through local or 
family-based networks but within the state through party structures or with an 
organised articulation as in producer associations. In the case of the coffee sector, 
the rent allocation framework was instituted through the intermediation of local 
politicians and within party structures but ultimately worked through a fully 
functioning producers association.  
Taken all together, these meant that the rents associated with coffee levies in 
Colombia was one where rent entitlements were determined by agents 
endogenous to the sector, with an interest to enhance the value created by and to 
retain the rents extracted within the sector, and with political accountability to 
the sector they represented.   In the Philippines, rent entitlements were 
exogenously determined, by agents with no enduring interest to enhance either 
                                                 
4
 Following Khan (2000a, pp. 89-91), I define the ‘political organisation of rent-seeking’ as the 
organisational structure of patron-client networks linking state agents (politicians and 
bureaucrats) to private agents (capitalists and non-capitalists) and the resource flows therein. 
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value or welfare within the sector, and with weaker links of accountability 
between them and the coconut producers. While collective goals of the sector, as 
articulated by the FEDECAFE, motivated the uses of the rent in Colombia; there 
was a constant tension between particularistic goals (of the brokers and political 
leaders) and those of the sector in the Philippines. The weakness of the producers 
association in the Philippines meant that the goals of political entrepreneurs 
overrode those of the coconut producers in the mobilisation of the levies. 
 
Objects of analysis 
The main objects of analysis are the institutional framework employed by the 
state to develop the coffee sector in Colombia and the coconut sector in the 
Philippines. The analysis broadly covers the twentieth century, including the 
historical conditions that led to their establishment in Colombia and the 
Philippines. I provide a close view of rent mobilisation while the levies were 
being collected in the two countries. In the Philippines, the framework was in 
place only from 1970 to 1982, but rent streams were at play until the end of the 
century and so I cover the contest for those rent streams as well. In Colombia, 
levies are still being collected – but I end my analysis at 2000. As previously 
noted, at the centre of the institutional framework are ‘levies’, which in turn are 
essentially specific modes of taxation of the agro-export sector. Normally, agro-
export taxation is a means by which the state extracts surplus from agriculture to 
finance the imperatives of industrialisation as well as to regulate export 
production; it thus represents the use of state power to coordinate production and 
control the agro-export sector. In Colombia and the Philippines, the state chose to 
leave the sector partially autonomous by giving representatives of the agro-
export sector power to determine the uses of the tax proceeds. In turn, these 
organisations used the proceeds primarily to establish post-harvest rent-
generating monopsonies: in marketing, in the case of coffee; and in milling, in 
the case of coconut. 
The institutional framework that I analyse in Colombia and the Philippines 
share three characteristics. 
First, it was a framework that built up public funds for use of a sector through 
the collection of taxes from the same sector. In the Philippines, the tax was levied 
on producers from the first sale of copra. The tax was collected for 10 years, with 
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the rate increasing from PhP5.50 per metric ton (MT) of copra in 1972, to 
PhP150 per MT in 1973, to a peak of PhP600 per MT in 1974. When world 
prices sharply declined in 1980, the tax was suspended and then reinstated for a 
short period in 1982 with a sliding rate that depended on international prices. The 
levy was revoked in 1982. The tax collected was then used to set up investment 
funds, held in trust by the government in the name of coconut producers. It was 
through the investment funds that coconut producers were nominally able to 
invest in shoring up the industrial capacity of the sector. Their ownership of these 
funds was evidenced by the receipts they held of their levy contributions, which 
represented their “shares” in these funds. 
In Colombia, the tax was imposed on coffee exporters and evolved with 
changes in the primary functions of the tax. The first tax, collected from 1927-
1972, was a volume-based general tax on coffee exports. Until 1940, the primary 
function of the tax related to providing the incentives for membership into the 
FEDECAFE and to shore up investments into the sector. With the onset of World 
War II and the spectre of a shrivelling international market in Europe, Latin 
American producers entered into the Inter-American Coffee Agreement whereby 
they divided up shares in the US market.  For the quota system to be enforced, 
the Colombian government had to intervene in the domestic market to regulate 
supply and prices and did so through the FEDECAFE. The Fondo Nacional del 
Café (FNC, from here on the National Coffee Fund) was thus set up in the 
Treasury, and financed the operations of the FEDECAFE to buy, sell and store 
coffee (Palacios, 1980, p. 223). In 1958, the goals of the National Coffee Fund 
evolved to include not just stockpiling for the purposes of fulfilling Colombia’s 
commitment in the Inter-American Coffee Agreement, but also to effect 
domestic price stabilisation.  
The National Coffee Fund, in turn, was funded through a number of additional 
taxes collected from the coffee sector, four of which were particularly important 
(Nash, 1985, pp. 209-211). First, a retention quota, through which private 
exporters were mandated to contribute parchment coffee
5
, delivered to a 
FEDECAFE warehouse. This mechanism has been used to transfer a portion of 
external price increases to the Fund – with rates increasing directly with 
                                                 
5
 Dried coffee beans 
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international prices. Second, the pasilla and ripio taxes (from here on, taxes on 
low-grade coffee), through which private exporters were mandated to sell a 
volume equivalent to 6 per cent of their consignment of green coffee, bought by 
FEDECAFE at a fixed rate. Third, an ad valorem tax, which began as a tax on 
coffee dollars (1935-1944), which was replaced by a ‘coffee differential’, 
whereby dollars earned from coffee exports are exchanged at a lower rate (1951-
1957; 1962-1967). In 1967, this was replaced by an ad valorem tax on coffee 
exports. The rate was set at 26 per cent in 1967, but has waned since then. A 
portion of this tax went directly to the national treasury, but a greater portion 
went to the National Coffee Fund and departmental committees of the 
FEDECAFE. Finally, in 1991, all these taxes, except the retention tax, were 
folded into a single levy called the contribucion cafetera. 
Second, these public funds were nominally established to finance price 
stabilisation schemes and productivity-enhancing investments for the taxed 
sector. 
In the Philippines, the tax proceeds were used for four major purposes 
(Clarete & Roumasset, 1983; Hawes, 1987a; Tiglao, 1981): (a) to subsidise 
domestic consumers of coconut oil products; (b) to subside seed development 
and distribution; (c) to buy a bank that would service the credit needs of coconut 
farmers; and (d) to purchase oil mills and nationalise the oil milling industry. A 
portion of the funds also went directly to the coffers of the COCOFED, which 
the association used chiefly to finance a scholarship programme and for its 
organising requirements. 
In Colombia, the tax proceeds were used for three major purposes (Bentley & 
Baker, 2000; Palacios, 1980): (a) to establish enough domestic market power to 
stabilise prices faced by producers; (b) to set up subsidiary organisations 
including an agronomic research institute
6
, a merchant marine organisation
7
, a 
bank
8
 and storage network of warehouses
9
; and (c) to finance local public 
investments in coffee-growing departments. 
                                                 
6
 Centro Nacional de Investigaciones de Café (National Coffee Research Centre or CENICAFE) 
founded in 1938. 
7
 Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, owns three ships and hires 60 others, plying 60 international 
routes and involved in shipping imports and exports, including coffee. 
8
 Banco Cafétero 
9
 Almacenes Generales de Deposito del Cafe 
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Third, producer groups exercised control over the uses, appropriation and 
management of these funds. The funds were explicitly established to organise 
these producer groups—especially in Colombia.10 
In the Philippines, control was exercised directly and indirectly by 
COCOFED. It exercised direct control through the portion of the fund, no more 
than 10 per cent of the levy collected, that went directly to the organisation and 
its programmes. It exercised indirect control through its membership in the 
governing board of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), the government 
agency tasked with the collection and management of the fund. This governing 
board, in the course of ten years, was whittled down from a board of eleven 
members and mostly government officials, to seven and all of whom were 
COCOFED members or presidential associates (Hawes, 1987a). The investments 
made into the bank and oil mills were authorised through presidential decree, 
upon the recommendation of the PCA.  
In Colombia, the National Coffee Fund was ‘owned’ by the government but 
managed by the FEDECAFE on the basis of a 10-year renewable and 
performance-based contract. The FEDECAFE has a fully-fleshed out 
organisational structure that, in consultation with the government, decides on 
issues related to the Fund (Bentley & Baker, 2000). 
 
Associated outcomes 
In Colombia, the outcomes associated with the mode of coffee taxation I 
described above may be gleaned from three strands of literature. 
First, the performance of the FEDECAFE as a parastatal institution is hailed 
in current literature analysing institutions in Colombia’s coffee economy 
(Bentley & Baker, 2000; Giovannucci, 2002).  It is credited for coordinating 
national coffee policy, improving cultivation practices through an internationally 
renowned research institute, instituting and maintaining rigorous quality control 
standards and building up the only internationally known national coffee brand, 
the “Juan Valdez” logo. The institutional framework in which a private 
organisation was granted regulatory powers is credited for the emergence of 
                                                 
10
 Bates (1997, pp. 61-62) insists that the appropriation of all coffee export tax proceeds to the 
FEDECAFE in 1927 provided the incentives for membership in FEDECAFE in Colombia—in 
other words, incentives for collective action in the coffee sector. 
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FEDECAFE as an “economic institution” that solved market failures within the 
coffee economy—particularly, monitoring and enforcing quality control—that 
was pivotal in building up the international competitiveness of Colombian 
coffee. (Bates, 1997, pp. 62-64) 
It is also described as functioning like a “mini-government” providing 
schools, nursery schools, hospitals, roads and extending power lines in coffee-
growing departments (Thomas, 1985, p. 133). Giovannucci (2002, p. 23) asserts 
that FEDECAFE investments in local public goods account for the superior 
social conditions in coffee-growing departments, where health services are better 
and have greater coverage, access to clean drinking water, utilities and basic 
services are wider, and levels of illiteracy are notably lower than the national 
average. Bentley & Baker (2000, p. 6) claim that nearly all public works in the 
Central Coffee Belt, where one-third of the Colombian population lives, are 
funded by the FEDECAFE. 
Second, literature analysing the performance of FEDECAFE as an institution 
for collective action highlights how it allowed for the incorporation of 
smallholder interest in policymaking in Colombia. Bentley & Baker (2000) 
depict the FEDECAFE as a farmers’ organisation that finds no parallel anywhere 
in Latin America, where coffee producers organisations tend to be dominated by 
wealthy coffee growers. In Colombia, representation in the National Coffee 
Congress, the highest governing body of the FEDECAFE is weighted by an 
area’s volume of production. Since smallholder producers in the Central Coffee 
Belt account for a lion’s share of coffee produced, the organisational structure 
thus favours them (Bates, 1997, p. 60). 
FEDECAFE is structured as a mass organisation, ensuring that the smallest 
producers could join (Bates, 1997, p. 60). The organisation has a democratic 
hierarchy constituted at the grassroots by democratically-elected municipal 
committees. These committees elect departmental committees, which in turn 
elect the National Coffee Congress. The Coffee Congress selects the members of 
the executive committee, who managed the finances and saw to the day-to-day 
operations of the organisation (Bentley & Baker, 2000, p. 4). 
Third, accounts of the functioning of the institutional framework reveal that 
its role in economic development may have evolved.  From 1927 to the 1940s, 
the framework provided incentives for export production.  Bates (1997, pp. 64-
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78) explains that throughout the period before the Second World War, the 
FEDECAFE was able to utilise its strategic political position to successfully 
lobby against the overvaluation of the currency, for control over export taxes and 
against the Colombian government position to collude with Brazil in regulating 
world supply of coffee. In the process, the sector established an economic 
institution that overcame free riding, provisioned the sector with pubic goods and 
maximized the value of exports by creating conditions for building the reputation 
of Colombian coffee for good quality. This resulted in the rapid growth of 
exports and Colombia’s vigorous entry into the world coffee market. 
With the entry of Colombia into international agreements regulating the world 
supply of coffee after the Second World War, FEDECAFE became a tool for 
effecting the quota system and stabilising coffee prices. From 1960-1983, the 
framework was found to have effected the transfer of resources out of the sector 
(García & Llamas, 1989).  Direct intervention in coffee prices had the effect of 
reducing producers’ incomes. Despite interventions in input prices and other 
government expenditures on the coffee sector, direct interventions in coffee 
prices along with the effect of an overvalued exchange rate had the net effect of 
transferring resources away from coffee into the national economy. Coffee 
export taxation also had the effect of increasing national government revenues by 
7 per cent annually from 1960 to 1981. Thus, after the Second World War, the 
sector was clearly a source of development financing.  
In the Philippines, there are three strands of literature from which the 
institutional performance of coconut taxation as described may be gleaned. 
First, it is at the core of the literature depicting the extent of the corruption 
perpetuated under the administration of Ferdinand Marcos, the strongman who 
ruled the country during its period of authoritarianism (1963-1986) and was 
ousted through an unconstitutional uprising, a military coup backed by civilian 
demonstration in Manila in 1986. Included in this literature are descriptive 
accounts of the plunder by Marcos (Aquino, 1999; Manapat, 1991), which 
recount his use of statecraft to amass wealth for his family and his cronies.  
Aquino bases her analysis on the documents left behind in the Presidential 
Palace, when Marcos fled the Philippines in 1986 in the aftermath of an extra-
constitutional uprising, along with the official findings of the Philippine 
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), a government body organised in 
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1986 to investigate the extent of Marcos’ loot. Meanwhile, Manapat first 
published his work as a pamphlet in 1979, at the height of the authoritarian 
regime. Based on a careful examination of journalistic sources, he expands this 
pamphlet into a book that attempts to document in detail how Marcos state power 
was used to intervene in the economy and doing so created wealth and privilege 
for a few individuals. A new addition to this set of literature is an unauthorised 
biography of  Eduardo Conjuangco (Parreño, 2003), which provides an account 
of how this businessman co-opted the institutional framework to his advantage.  
These are predominantly descriptive narratives of how funds were used for 
personalistic ends by a cabal of individuals close to the president. In a nutshell, 
the fund ended up being used for three major undertakings: a coconut replanting 
and seeding programme; the acquisition of a bank; and the vertical integration of 
the coconut milling and exporting industry. These undertakings benefited 
specific individuals, foremost of whom was Conjuangco, who owned the coconut 
plantation from which the seedlings for the replanting programme were bought, 
and whose family owned the bank that was to become the farmers’ bank. A cabal 
of individuals gained control of the industry as they became part of the governing 
boards of the government authority that administered the fund, the bank and the 
milling company. Manapat (1991, pp. 235-239) asserts that the funds were also 
used to buy controlling shares into the largest food  company in the Philippines 
(San Miguel Corporation) while Parreño (2003, pp. 153-166) reports on the 
elaborate corporate-legal means which made this possible.  
Second, Hawes (1987a, pp. 55-82) validates much of the descriptive accounts 
above but pushes the analysis further by depicting the institutional framework as 
a means by which the president weakened his opponents—including provincial 
politicians tied to the coconut industry and old families engaged in the oil milling 
business—and strengthened his political machine. He asserts that at its inception, 
the fund was a victory for leaders of the COCOFED, who lobbied for state 
intervention. But by choosing to work with politicians and personalities with 
close association with the president, they took a calculated risk that in the end 
worked against them: the same personalities worked to solidify their own 
position within the coconut industry and appropriated the surplus generated 
there.  
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Third, economic impact assessments of the price interventions embodied by 
the institutional framework (Clarete & Roumasset, 1983; Intal & Power, 1990) 
uniformly depict the taxes on the coconut sector as depressing the incomes of 
coconut producers and, with an overvalued exchange rate, effecting a transfer of 
resources out of the sector. The sector was also an important source of 
government revenue; the coconut levy along with the export tax translated to an 
average tax of 26 per cent in the period 1974-1981. 
In summary, the same institutional framework that helped the Colombian state 
shore up its developmental capacity—including aiding in processes of national 
economic integration, herding growth-enhancing investments, and improving 
social welfare of a significant part of its rural population— was, in the 
Philippines, co-opted by entrenched interests from outside of the sector to build 
up their personal wealth. In this dissertation, I thus explore the political 
configurations that account for these differences. 
 
‘Rents’ as an analytical framework 
The concept of ‘rent’ invoked here and throughout the dissertation is an 
extension of its conception in neo-classical economics as that part of the payment 
to a resource owner over and above the given resource’s opportunity cost, or 
what it could command in any alternative use under competitive market 
conditions. In this sense, rents can be inducements to production, fuelling the 
dynamic of long-term economic growth through processes of resource 
reallocation, which in turn are governed by calculations of resource owners 
seeking to find or exploit opportunities to earn economic rent (Buchanan, 2008, 
pp. 55-57).   
In this dissertation, I focus on state-mediated rents or rents that rise out of 
state interventions. In the neo-classical economics schema, state interventions 
that regulate entry into a given economic activity—for example, licenses, quotas 
or monopoly rights—give rise to returns for producers in that activity in excess 
of what would be possible through market competition. These interventions give 
rise to these extraordinary returns by impeding potential entrants from 
participating in the activity and thus blocking competitive market forces from 
driving down producer prices, and with them economic rent.  
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I extend this conception of rents in neo-classical economics by utilising 
literature that is critical of the economistic and depoliticised view of rents.   
First, I utilise Khan’s (2000b, 2010, 2013) extension of the very concept of 
rents.  He defines ‘rents’ as incomes higher than the next best opportunity 
available that a person or organisation would have accepted. (Khan 2013, p. 
239). He observes that rents are generated not just by state interventions that 
restrict trade but by also politically-determined redistributive transfers—for 
example selective transfers of taxes, production subsidies or any legal or illegal 
transfer that converts public property into private entitlements. (Khan 2000b, pp 
36-40) These transfers represent extraordinary incomes for their privileged 
recipients, incomes that would not have existed without the intervention of the 
state. Such state interventions thus lend to an incremental change in the 
distribution of incomes.  In general, Khan (2013, p. 250) submits that any policy 
intervention will change income flows, and thus creates rents.11   
Second, I proceed from the view that ‘rents’ perform not just economic (i.e., at 
best, potential inducement to production; at worst, incentive for non-productive 
rent-seeking) but also political functions (i.e., maintaining peace and enforcing 
security by inducing political opponents to cooperate with the governing 
coalition), as suggested  Khan (2000b) and North et al (North, Wallis, Webb, & 
Weingast, 2007; North, Wallis, Webb, & Weingast, 2013; North, Wallis, & 
Weingast, 2009).  Moreover, access to state-mediated rents is an observable 
indicator of relative power exercised by agents who are given the rights to these 
rents.  
Proceeding from these propositions, the institutional framework for the 
collection of levies being investigated in this dissertation can be thought of as a 
rent-creating state intervention. This rent-creating state intervention has a 
peculiar characteristic: the source from which the rents were extracted and the 
targeted beneficiaries of rent mobilisation are – at least nominally – from the 
same sector.  Thus, it could be suggested that what I am investigating is not a 
rent-allocation framework but a politically-administered forced saving scheme, 
not unlike, say, pension funds where contributors benefit out of earlier 
                                                 
11
 The rents could be ‘positive’ or ‘negative’: the former, is received by those who as a result of a 
policy intervention receives a higher than the next best opportunity income; the latter, is an 
extraction from those who lose income (say, as a result of a tax imposition). (Khan, 2013, p. 249)  
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contributions made and where no ‘redistribution’ or ‘transfer’ actually occurs. 
But I will show in this dissertation that unlike in savings schemes, the benefits 
enjoyed by levy contributors were politically determined, and not necessarily in 
proportion to their contribution.  
I utilise an approach to investigating this rent-creating policy intervention that 
hews closely to Khan’s (2013) ‘incremental rents framework’.  I am interested in 
investigating the changes in rents and their distribution associated with the 
imposition of coffee and coconut levies. This framework does not proceed from 
the proposition that the very creation of rents by way of state interventions is 
socially/economically undesirable. Instead what needs to be investigated is 
whether the incremental changes in the distribution of rents are associated with 
the positive or negative incremental outcomes.  I will show that that modes of 
mobilisation of the levies in the Philippines are chiefly characterised by 
redistributive transfers that were detrimental to the goals of production and the 
welfare of the levy contributors. In turn, I will explain how this difference with 
Colombia, where levies were mobilised to benefit the sector, can be explained by 
factors in political economy that resulted in FEDECAFE and COCOFED playing 
markedly different roles in rent mobilisation. 
The dissertation ultimately contributes to the wider debate on the 
developmental consequences of the state involvement in the creation and 
allocation of rents. The next section engages with this debate fully, but a 
summary of the main propositions would be useful at this point.  
On one side of this debate is the neo-classical economics literature on rent-
seeking, which generally proposes that state interventions that have the effect of 
creating and allocating rents generate socially wasteful behaviour and are thus 
always detrimental to long-term development. This is part of the orthodoxy that 
has informed the ‘good governance model’, which seeks to promote zero-rent 
societies featured by the unfettered operation of free markets and governed only 
by liberal democratic states, whose functions are limited to providing law and 
order and fostering conditions for market competition.12  
                                                 
12 Depiction of such a ‘model’ cobbles together what is suggested in World Bank’s (1997) 
conception of ‘minimalist state’, and good governance indicators in Kauffman (1999).  Criticisms 
of the ‘good governance’ as a pre-requisite of economic development are articulated by Khan 
(2005b) and Chang (2003). 
 
25 
 
The main argument goes this way. Under a market structured order, when 
above-cost returns exist in a given economic activity, agents will be drawn into 
participating in that activity. Free entry to participate in the sector fosters 
competition, which in turn drives up output, drives down prices and with them, 
economic rents. Market competition generates Paretian social surplus and the 
free entry of profit-seekers leads to the dissipation of rents. When the state 
intervenes to regulate entry into a given economic activity – as with licenses, 
quotas or the granting of monopoly rights – it effectively assigns the rights to the 
economic rent to a privileged portion of potential market participants. This, in 
turn, foments socially wasteful behaviour by inducing economic agents to 
expend resources in ‘rent-seeking’, or to capture the income streams (Buchanan, 
2008). 
On the other side of this debate lie various strands of literature that are 
cognizant of the important role that state-mediated rents may play in the process 
of economic development and growth.  This notion is explored in connection to 
the historical experience of successful late-developing countries in East Asia 
(Amsden, 1989, 2001; Amsden & Hikino, 1994; Wade, 1990), where specific 
types of rents were crucial in powering processes of industrial upgrading. Further 
back still in the timeline of world economic history, there is a distinct strand of 
literature that attributes the creation of wealth to the subsidisation and protection 
of increasing returns sectors of the economies in Western Europe; and that 
decries that the developing world is currently denied the set of policy tools that 
already successful industrialisers harnessed when they were at similar stages of 
development.  (Chang, 2002; Reinert, 2007) These historical explorations of 
actual development experiences point to the central role that state allocation of 
rents played in the transformation of the productive capacities of the now 
industrialised countries of the world.  
Khan (2000a, 2000b, 2005a) explores why the state plays an important role in 
capitalist development, especially in late developing countries. He suggests that 
redistributive rents may be crucial in the transition from pre-capitalist to 
capitalist societies in developing economies, where productive capitalist classes 
require financing. Khan does not deny that redistributive rents, when directed 
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towards unproductive purposes, could lead to the worst of developmental 
outcomes. But as suggested by the works of Amsden (1989, 2001; Amsden & 
Hikino, 1994) where these state-engineered privileges were disciplined by state-
defined performance-based parameters, they could lead to the most ‘virtuous’ of 
developmental consequences.  
Meanwhile, Khan (2000a, 2000b) also shares with North et al (2007, 2009, 
2013) the notion that in the early stages of development, privileged and 
politically-ascribed access to rents may be crucial for establishing peace that, in 
the context of developing economies, is a necessary condition for the very 
possibility of production.13  
This dissertation weighs in on the debate by examining the mobilisation of 
rents associated with a similarly-designed institutional framework for allocating 
state-mediated rents in the Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors. By 
imposing levies on producers in these sectors and using the proceeds in a very 
specific way – that is by deputising private agents with the authority to decide on 
the uses of the levies – the governments in Colombia and the Philippines 
generated and allocated rents for said private agents and with different 
developmental consequences not accounted for by the explanations of 
neoclassical economics. What explains the differences? 
 
The limits of rent-seeking analysis 
The different outcomes associated with similarly designed rent-creating 
institutional frameworks in Colombia and the Philippines exhibit the limits of the 
explanatory power of the early economic models of rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974; 
Posner, 1975). 
These models purport to show how state intervention, like the distribution of 
import licences (Krueger, 1974) or the creation of a public monopoly (Posner, 
1975), leads to net social welfare losses. The advocates of these models argue 
that the social cost of intervention relate not only to the deadweight losses 
associated with the creation of monopoly rents but, more importantly, the social 
cost of intervention, which pertains to the resources expended on capturing the 
                                                 
13
 The core of their argument about how access to rents could act as an incentive for individuals 
or organisations to be peaceful and cooperate with a given political coalition could be found in 
North et al (2007). These arguments are fully fleshed out in North et al (2009), and applied to a 
series of case studies in North et al (2013). 
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rent, like lobbying and bribery. Resources expended on rent-seeking in turn are 
taken away from productive activities; state interventions thus have the net effect 
of diminishing the productive capacity of an economy. 
Khan (2000b, pp. 36-40) shows how an analysis of rent can be applied to 
transfers made through the political system. When a sector is taxed and the tax is 
transferred to another sector, the transfer represents rent-like income for that 
other sector. The welfare effect of the rent transfer may be positive, negative or 
neutral depending on interpersonal comparisons of the utility of that transfer. The 
net cost of the transfer would be: (i) the deadweight loss arising from the 
diminution of effort and output in the taxed sector; and (ii) and the resources 
spent by society on capturing the transfer. 
There are two senses in which the neo-classical economics framework is 
powerless to explain the puzzle this dissertation presents. 
First, the rent-creating institutional framework in Colombian coffee and 
Philippine coconuts may be postulated to minimise the postulated disincentive 
effects of taxation to the extent that the sector contributing the levies retain some 
control over the mobilisation of the collections and that not all of the levies are 
transferred out of the sector. The economic literature evaluating the incentive 
effects of said levies in Colombia and the Philippines reveal that the framework 
led to the net transfer of resources out of coconut and coffee at specific points in 
time. But the framework of private appropriation of public funds nevertheless led 
to dynamic benefits in Colombia but not in the Philippines, namely enhancing 
the capacity of the coffee sector to compete in the world market and helping 
create the rural base for industrialisation in coffee-growing departments. That 
rents can produce these value-enhancing outcomes are beyond the purview of 
neo-classical rent-seeking models. 
Second, rent was purposively allocated by the state to sections of the agro-
export sector in Colombia and the Philippines. The institutional framework is one 
where rent-seekers were assured of their rights, thereby minimising the cost of 
rent-seeking. It also means that differences in institutional performance in this 
instance cannot be attributed to rent-seeking costs, which tends to be the focus of 
the rent-seeking literature. 
This exhibits the fundamental problem with early neo-classical models of 
rent-seeking: the emphasis on rent-seeking costs and the failure to recognise that 
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there are government-allocated rents that could generate efficiencies in 
production.
14
 (Khan, 2000a, 2000b)  A more holistic approach for measuring the 
over-all effect of rent-seeking would entail conceiving of rent-seeking as a 
process that yields two cost/benefit-components: (i) the net social benefits/costs 
associated with rents as outcomes of the rent-seeking process and (ii) the rent-
seeking cost or the social cost of activities to create, allocate and maintain rents 
(Khan, 2000a). This approach implicitly recognises the possibility of value-
enhancing, development-inducing rent-allocations. 
Khan’s proposition that the key challenge in developing countries is not the 
elimination of rent-seeking or corruption but the creation and management of 
value-enhancing rent emanates from a broader literature that recognises 
processes of rent-seeking and rent-creation as necessary parts of early capitalist 
development.  
Early progenitors of this idea include Gerschenkron (1962) who endorses, in 
the context of “backwardness”, state involvement (as financiers through its 
taxation policies) in assembling wealth in entrepreneurs that will invest in 
industrial ventures. The idea also resonates in Hirschman’s (1958) view that the 
problem in late developing economies is not the absence of capital but inducing 
investments in productive activities. He argues that the state must thus create 
disequilibrating incentives in these economies to induce private capitalists to 
invest and at the same time to alleviate bottlenecks that are causing disincentives 
to investments.  
But it was North (1990) who first recognised, in explicit terms, that rent-
seeking can produce socially beneficial structures of property rights, a key notion 
in new institutional economics. Here, institutional change is a result of 
bargaining among coalitions of economic and political actors observing changes 
in prices and deciding on whether it is possible to maximise their returns under 
existing institutional constellations or spend resources to bargain over a change 
in existing institutions. This bargaining process could be perceived as a rent-
seeking process, whereby interest groups invest resources in influencing 
activities to be able to appropriate rents arising from specific property rights. A 
                                                 
14
 Khan recognises that second generation versions of the neo-classical models account for the 
possibility of varied rent-seeking costs under different institutional structures. He also cites 
Bhagwati (1982) as considering a model where rent-seeking results in the destruction of value-
reducing rents. (Khan, 2000b, p. 76) 
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major concern in the new institutional economics schematic is organising side-
payments for losers in these bargains. Where political transaction costs for 
organising side-payments are low, then the ill-effects of rent-seeking may be 
mitigated.  
Also forming an integral part of this body of literature, and as noted earlier in 
this chapter, are assessments of the East Asian miracle that see the role of 
performance-based state subsidies as central to the development processes (see 
Amsden, 1989; Amsden & Hikino, 1994; Wade, 1990). Here, politically 
engineered transfers and subsidies became an important means by which 
developing countries shepherded the emergence of new capitalist and middle 
classes. 
One final related strand of literature, also noted earlier, relates to those that 
associate the achievement of political stability, the existence of which is a 
necessary condition for production to take place in developing countries, to the 
allocation of property rights and rents to politically powerful groups. Khan 
(2000a, pp. 38-39)  submits that because the process of primitive accumulation is 
inherently unfair, transfers may have to be organised to benefit those with the 
greatest ability to cause political instability. This will be transfers to groups with 
the ability to organise but who are left out in the development process—
including rich peasants, urban petty-bourgeoisie and an emerging middle class. 
Growth implications of the overall structure of transfers will depend on how 
much of the transfers go to groups who have the incentive to make the transition 
to productive capitalism. The configuration of political forces, which determines 
the structure of transfers to political intermediaries and their factions, can also 
have effects on incentives and opportunities.  
North et al (2007) make a similar point when they postulate that in much of 
the developing world, the establishment of a stable political order requires the 
creation of incentives for groups to compete for resources through non-violent 
means.  This entails the creation of what they call “limited access orders”, where 
the dominant political coalitions provide powerful agents with limited and 
privileged access to valuable resources.15 The rent arising from the exercise of the 
                                                 
15 A ‘limited access order’ is a ‘social order’. Social orders are patterns of social organisation for 
limiting and controlling violence. (North et al, 2009, pp. 1-2) ‘Limited access orders’ are 
characterised by social organisations formed on the basis of ‘personal relationships’. They are the 
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politics of privilege provides the incentive for these powerful agents to cooperate 
with the dominant coalition. 
This dissertation thus proceeds from an analytical framework that recognises 
two propositions from the above-summarised literature. First, state intervention 
creating and allocating rents have developmental possibilities. Second, the 
processes that create these rents are decidedly political processes of bargaining 
and thus political variables are likely to circumscribe these developmental 
possibilities. Proceeding from these propositions, the next logical question to ask 
is the question I raised in the beginning of this chapter: what are the political 
conditions that enable the emergence of value-enhancing state-mediated rents? 
This research project ultimately speaks to this broad theoretical question.  Given 
the variations in the role that producers associations played in the mobilisation of 
rents in Colombia and the Philippines, the observed differences in the outcomes 
associated with the levies provide an opportunity for interrogating and potentially 
generating new hypotheses about the political conditions that are conducive for 
the creation of value-enhancing rents. 
 
Competing approaches in researching the politics of rents 
There are four major theoretical approaches to the question of the political 
origins of development-inducing rents.  
The first focuses on the agency of political leadership: when the state acts as a 
utility-maximiser facing a short-run time horizon, it will structure property rights 
in ways that are favourable to its reproduction but not necessarily in consonance 
with goals of economic development.  This derives from earlier iterations of new 
institutional economics (see North 1981), where the state’s provision of rules is 
modelled as an exchange relation between rulers and constituents whereby the 
state trades protection and the enforcement of property rights for taxes. The 
state’s behaviour is shaped by the conflictual goals of achieving social efficiency 
(i.e. lowering transaction costs to maximise the absolute amount it can 
expropriate from society) and maximising short-run revenues for itself, which is 
                                                                                                                                    
opposite of  ‘open access orders’, which are formed on the basis of ‘impersonal relations’. 
Limited access orders create limits on access to valuable political and economic functions as a 
way to generate rents in order to engender the peaceful cooperation  of powerful individuals 
capable of  mounting violent threat. In contrast, ‘open access orders’ rely on competition, open 
access to organisations and the rule of law to hold a society together. (North et al 2007, pp. 3-4) 
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jeopardised where efficient property rights antagonise powerful interest groups 
or entails high transaction costs in monitoring and tax collection. The state 
resolves this dilemma by acting as a discriminating monopolist, privileging these 
interest groups and using the constitution of the state to shore up their economic 
powers through the granting of licenses and monopolies, which also have the 
effect of decreasing tax monitoring and collection costs.  
This problem is mitigated when the time horizon of political leaders is 
lengthened—as in Olson’s (1993) depiction of a ‘stationary bandit’, an autocrat 
or executive authority with an enduring hold on power, whose incentives may be 
aligned with encompassing goals of economic growth to the extent that they 
maximise the resources that the state can tax in the long run. 
The explanatory power of this approach is weakened by casual observations 
about actually existing “stationary bandits”. While some authoritarian regimes 
(e.g., Taiwan’s Kuomintang in the 1950s) pursued encompassing interests, one-
party states in Tanzania and Zambia implemented largely dysfunctional 
economic policies (Di John, 2008, p. 38).  Directly employing these lenses to the 
case studies reveals the same weakness. Khan (1995, p. 79) correctly points out 
that Marcos “behaved until the very end as if he expected to last forever”.  Thus 
it could be argued that there is no variance in regard to time horizons faced by 
executive authority behind the rent-allocating framework in Colombia and the 
Philippines.  
The second focuses on the nature of state power and derives from 
developmental state narratives. Developmental state narratives do not rely 
primarily on the agency of self-interested rulers to describe the conditions that 
enable the state to act beyond the exigencies of short-run goals. Analysing the 
conditions that propelled industrial upgrading in Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, 
successful late developers emerge as those who have power at their disposal, 
which in turn they derived from the organisational characteristics of state 
institutions and the manner in which states craft their relation with producer 
classes. Kohli (2004, p. 22) submits that states that are able to define and pursue 
an agenda for industrial transformation are those with “a narrow commitment to 
economic growth, a close alliance with capital-owning groups, tight control over 
other interest groups from above, and well-developed, professional 
bureaucracies”. Actually existing democracies in developing countries, he 
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observes, tend to be fragmented multi-class states—while in cases of rapid 
industrialisation tended not to be democratic and based on narrow ruling 
coalitions, which enabled the state to maintain narrow economic priorities. 
These narratives have been used to explain overall strategies for industrial 
upgrading, which make them less useful for the case studies in this dissertation, 
which zeroes in on one specific component of broad industrial policy. However, 
the case studies provide the opportunity to interrogate the intuition that state 
power and state autonomy are necessary conditions for development-inducing 
rent allocations, a view that leads to a rather strict conception of developmental 
states. The comparison of Northeast and Southeast Asian late developers 
undertaken by Doner et al (Doner, Ritchie, & Slater, 2005), for example, 
suggests a completely different narrative: that developmental states are not 
necessarily highly autonomous entities that are unconstrained by coalitional 
demands but actually emerge out of constrained political conditions, which they 
collectively describe as ‘systemic vulnerability’. They say that political elites 
pursue developmental institutional arrangements when simultaneously dealing 
with: the credible threat that a deterioration of living standards could trigger mass 
unrest by popular sectors; the increased need for foreign exchange in the face of 
threats to national security; and hard budget constraints that close off easy 
avenues for revenue generation.  (Doner et al., 2005, p. 328)  Meanwhile, even 
Evans (1992) recognises that there is a strong sense in which the East Asian 
developmental states are a conjunctural creation of history—their long tradition 
of bureaucratic capacity, the terms of their integration with the world market, 
weakened agrarian elites while also constrained by a geopolitical context of Cold 
War and external threats—that made possible the rise of an autonomous yet 
socially-embedded state.  
Rent-allocations in the coffee sector yielded developmental outcomes in 
Colombia, where as will be shown in Chapter 2 the condition of state autonomy 
clearly does not hold. Moreover, the same institutional framework did not rise 
out of the state’s narrow commitment to economic growth; as Bates (1997) 
suggests, it had clearly political origins. 
The third approach focuses on the incentives engendered by the structure of 
political organisations. Bates (1995, p. 46) argues that institutions are often not 
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negotiated through voluntary contract, rather “the choice of institutions takes 
place within a pre-existing set of institutions”.  
In his study of markets and states in tropical Africa, Bates (1981) shows that 
patterns of political coalitions, whereby urban and industrial interests superseded 
the diffuse power of peasants, contributed to the rise of institutions that were 
inimical both to the interests of the farmer and long-term growth prospects of 
agriculture. Here, marketing boards, in conjunction with macroeconomic 
policies, were used to squeeze surplus out of the agricultural sector. In contrast to 
this, Bates (1997, pp. 51-89) explains that the coffee sector in Colombia was 
strategically placed so that politicians had the incentive of providing institutions 
protective of the interest of the sector. The political configurations in 
Colombia—particularly competitive elections in the context of a clearly 
delineated party system—meant that the electoral numbers of coffee producers 
were important.  
The approach seems useful for analysing the origins of a given institution but 
ultimately does not explain its developmental impact. The case studies I explore 
show that developmental outcomes could be associated with the types of rent that 
arise, not just how rent streams were assigned. Why was the private 
appropriation of public power in the coffee sector in Colombia associated with 
different modes of rent mobilisation from those in the coconut sector in the 
Philippines? Why was the assignment of rents in the Philippines less stable and 
more susceptible to capture than that in Colombia? I will show that these 
questions are best answered by looking at the political underpinnings of rent-
seeking and not just the structure of political competition.  
One other strand of literature that may be broadly classified under this 
approach is the work of Vishny and Shleifer (1993) on the industrial organisation 
of corruption. Vishny and Shleifer explore a particular case of rents: bribes taken 
as payment by government officials for the sale of ‘government property’ for 
personal gain, where ‘government property’ relates to complementary 
government goods necessary, say, for conducting business. They suggest that the 
organisation of bribe-taking is an important determinant of levels of corruption: 
levels of bribes are highest when bribes for these complementary goods are taken 
by decentralised agents acting independently. Where bribe-taking is centrally 
coordinated – say, by an authoritarian state -- levels of bribe collected are lower 
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compared to those collected when bribe-taking is decentralised, though the total 
bribe-take is also  maximised. It is important to note that Vishny and Shleifer’s 
default starting point is that all forms of state interventions promoting rents (e.g. 
through bribe-taking) are value-reducing; what they are seeking to explain is the 
political structure that will minimise levels of corruption – and by extension, the 
extent of value-reduction.  
Khan (2000a, pp. 131-134) articulates an important critique of Vishny and 
Shleifer that is especially relevant to this dissertation. He proposes that even 
formally centralised institutional structures may behave in a fragmented way, 
where powerful but dispersed groups can prevent coordination by state agencies. 
This is certainly true in the case of rents arising from coconut levies in the 
Philippines, where the entitlements to rents and associated benefits were 
fragmented and highly-contested, despite the fact that Vishny and Shleifer (1993, 
p 604) specifically cite the Marcos regime that oversaw the rent-allocation as an 
example of a ‘monopolistic corruption structure’. 
The final approach focuses on the political and institutional conditions that 
shape state capacities for fostering and managing rent types that lead to dynamic 
capitalist transformation. 
It derives principally from Khan (2000a, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005c), who 
begins from the observation that political contests for rents in developing 
countries are organised through the mobilisation of patron-client factions, rather 
than through class or economic interest groups. This feature of developing 
societies is attributable to the limited scope of viable capitalist economies (Khan, 
2005c, p. 705). In these societies, corruption and clientelism are endemic given 
the limited availability of resources, the limited tax base and the political 
contestation over valuable but scarce resources. A large part of the costs are 
spent within these patron-client networks either as legal expenditures (for 
example, contributions to party formations, election expenditures) or illegal 
outlays (for example, pay-offs to mafia bosses, illegal election expenditures). 
These expenditures maintain the organisational power of patrons or political 
leaders, which is critical in winning rent-seeking contests. Meanwhile, rents are 
created for members of these networks as an outcome of the rent-seeking inputs. 
Part of the rents is used to create further rents in future rounds and sustain the 
organisational power of patron-client factions (Khan, 2000a, pp. 89-91). 
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In this schema, there are two ways in which the creation and allocation of 
rents by the state may play developmental roles. First, it may help in the 
emergence of a productive capitalist class; here, rents are posited to provide 
incentives for production.  Second, it may help establish the political stability 
required to make production possible at all; here, rents are posited to provide 
incentives for politically significant sections of the population to operate 
peacefully within the institutional parameters of the given ruling coalition.  
However, Khan emphasises that for redistributive rents to perform such 
developmental functions, they need to be allocated by a state that has the 
capacity to withdraw the transfers if the recipients do not exhibit indicators of 
productivity within a defined period of time. They also need to be directed 
towards classes with the capacity to transition to productive capitalism. An 
overarching challenge is that these two objectives are not always congruent: the 
political agents who are the most valuable for peace need not be the same agents 
most crucial for making the transition to productive capitalism (Putzel, 2009). 
But the key insight from Khan most relevant to this dissertation is the following: 
that it is emergence of types of rent (not their total eradication) that is crucial for 
development and consequently that the shoring up of state capacities to manage 
and identify such rents is a key challenge. Rents after all are ubiquitous even in 
developed economies—the only difference is that rent-seeking in these 
economies occurs within the framework of legal institutions, where agents can be 
held accountable for rent allocation decisions and can contest these openly.  
Khan (2004a, pp. 56-58) then proposes that four institutional and political 
conditions influence state capacity to create and manage development-inducing 
rent allocation frameworks.  First, the prior degree of capitalist development and 
the organisational power of different factions of capitalists, which determine the 
types of rents that are created. Second, the distribution of organisational power 
within society, including the relative power of capitalists to other social groups, 
which determine the type of rents that different classes demand as well as the 
ability of the state to discipline rent distribution. Third, the institutional structure 
of the state, particularly the ability of central executive to coordinate the 
activities of different state agencies, which determines the ability of the state to 
create developmental rather than just redistributive rents that only benefit 
particular groups.  Fourth, external conditions that Khan suggests may be of 
36 
 
particular importance to small states and states in conflict, where rent allocation 
may be controlled by external powers.
16
  Khan (2004b, p. 58)  clarifies that each 
of these conditions may change over time, with the dynamics of economic 
growth also feeding into these conditions, for example by weakening or 
strengthening particular factions or classes or by allowing state capacity in 
particular areas to collapse or improve. Moreover, in the specific case of 
Palestine, Khan also shows that different types of rent—which may either be 
detrimental to development or proof of emergent developmental state 
capacities—may co-exist at the same point in time.  But he suggests that what is 
crucial for long-term development is the preponderant type of rent and rent 
management capacities, which in turn determine the ‘type of state’ that endures 
(Khan, 2004b, p. 46). 
Khan (2000a, pp. 93-98) uses this approach to show why the same set of state 
interventions—particularly industrial subsidies—yielded dissimilar results in 
South Korea and India. He argues that in India, the preponderant type of state 
was “fragmented clientelism”, where rents are secured and distributed through 
the workings of a large number of factions led by organised intermediate clients 
acting as brokers, meant that producer classes have had to indulge in two types of 
rent-seeking. First, they have had to undertake straightforward rent-seeking to 
secure redistributive transfer rents. Second, they have had to engage in political 
rent-seeking, which relates to purchasing political protection for their rents from 
organised powerbrokers. The organisational power of these brokers meant that 
they were strategically important both to political leaders and rent-seeking 
producer classes. Khan suggests that this has important implications for rent-
outcomes. Subsidies granted to producers backed by powerful brokers cannot be 
withdrawn based on performance-criteria. He contrasts this situation with that in 
South Korea, where no such decentralised centres of organisational and political 
power intermediated the rent-seeking process.  
It is proposed that Khan’s approach, as summarised above, overcomes 
weaknesses of the competing and previously-described approaches. It yields 
explanations that go beyond the agency of political leaders, and thus allows for 
                                                 
16
 Khan proposed to use this as a methodology for assessing state performance in Palestine, where 
the actions of Israel are obviously an important external variable. In the context of this 
dissertation’s case studies, ‘external constraints’ can of course be expanded to mean global 
market conditions and institutions influencing the coffee and coconut sectors. 
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the interrogation of objective political and institutional conditions in Colombia 
and the Philippines. It relaxes assumptions about state autonomy and in fact 
begins from the assumption that rent-seeking occurs within the framework of 
patron-client relations. Finally, it allows for establishing connections between 
political conditions and performance/outcomes of rent allocation frameworks, 
not just institutional origins.  
This dissertation utilises key aspects of Khan’s approach only as a starting 
point for its analysis.  Khan’s framework of analysis—as with developmental 
state narratives in Kohli (2004; Kohli, Moon, & Sørensen, 2003)—more ideally 
applies to preponderant rent allocation frameworks embedded in policies 
designed to promote over-all economic growth and development. In contrast, this 
dissertation zeroes in on specific rent-allocating institutions governing particular 
sectors in the economy.  The specific ways in which Khan’s approach is used in 
this dissertation should contribute to testing the empirical robustness and 
deepening understanding of Khan’s propositions about the political conditions 
for the emergence of value-enhancing rent allocation frameworks. But by zeroing 
in on rent mobilisation in specific sectors, I can also explain why value-
enhancing rent allocation can happen in one sector but not another, within a 
polity dominated by patron-client networks, a much more common situation in 
the developing world. An understanding of the politics of sectoral rent 
mobilisation and their differential outcomes, in turn, lends to establishing the 
specific conditions that lead to favouring productive types of rent seeking and 
discouraging non-productive types. 
 
Methodology 
Research framework: key ‘variables’ 
In assessing why the private appropriation of public power in the Colombian 
coffee and the Philippine coconut sectors produced more developmental 
outcomes for Colombia but not the Philippines, this dissertation investigates how 
variations in ‘political organisation of rent-seeking’ affect the ‘rent settlement’ 
that obtains at the sectoral level. 
The ‘political organisation of rent-seeking’, as extrapolated from Khan’s 
schema (2000a, 2000b), relates to the organisational structure of patron-client 
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networks linking state agents (politicians and bureaucrats) to private agents 
(capitalists and non-capitalists) and the resource flows therein.  Using this 
definition of ‘political organisation’, this dissertation contrasts the direct 
participation of the Colombian coffee producers association in the regulation of 
the rent settlement and the oligarchy-mediated rent settlement in the Philippine 
coconut sector.  Meanwhile ‘rent settlement’ is a term I devised to refer to the 
distribution of rents and associated ‘rent entitlements’ concomitant to rent-
creating policy interventions by the state.
17
 ‘Rent entitlements’ are streams of 
benefits emanating from the mobilisation of rents.   
In this dissertation, I will show that the more direct link between the coffee-
producing class and the state made possible the emergence of an associated rent 
settlement that lent to creating conditions that promoted the competitiveness of 
coffee exports and protected the welfare of coffee producers, as well as the 
coordination of macroeconomic policies around the goals of coffee exportation. 
In contrast, the oligarchy-mediated link between the coconut-producing class and 
the state meant that the same could not happen in the Philippines as the rent 
settlement was reduced to a division of spoils between the leading agents of the 
producer class and the oligarchy. In a nutshell, I thus analyse the effect of the 
political organisation of rent-seeking on the rent settlement that obtains by 
looking at the variations in the role played by producers associations in the 
                                                 
17 A ‘rent settlement’ is also underpinned by a distribution of power across claimants of the 
entitlements, and at the same time embedded in a wider distribution of power across society. My 
conception of ‘rent settlement’ proceeds from Putzel and di John’s (2009) conception of ‘political 
settlement’ as relating to the distribution of power underpinning a given state, but is principally  
rooted in Khan’s conception of the same, as a combination of ‘power and institutions that are 
mutually compatible and sustainable in terms of economic and political viability’. (Khan, 2010, 
p. 4) However while a ‘political settlement’ mirrors a distribution of income and political power  
across society, a ‘rent settlement’ relates to a distribution of rents and power specific to a given 
policy intervention. My conception of a ‘rent settlement’ can then be used as a means for 
unpacking Khan’s ‘political settlements’, and lend to an understanding of how they evolve to 
become reproducible and viable over time.  Khan (2010, p. 4) says that a reproducible political 
settlement is one that has institutions which are consistent with the distribution of organisational 
power and that achieves minimal levels of political stability and economic performance to be 
viable. I propose that a given political settlement can be observed by looking at the matrix of rent 
settlements that a state forges in key wealth-creating sectors, or with key political actors.  Rent 
settlements that embed a distribution of rents and associated benefits that are compatible with 
configurations of organisational power can evolve to become a central part of a reproducible 
political settlement. Those that do not are re-negotiated, unstable and unviable. Moreover, my 
view of a rent settlement allows for another means for observing the exercise of organisational 
power, in terms of the ability of organisations not just to lay claim on rents but also to deploy 
chosen strategies for mobilising them. 
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‘regulation of the rent settlement’, which in this dissertation  refers to the means 
by which access to rent entitlements are determined, regulated and enforced.  
 
Research strategy 
I undertook a structured and focused comparison of two case studies, where 
variations in the rent settlement were traced to variations in the political 
organisation of rent seeking.  
I employed a two-step research strategy, involving: first, the analysis of the 
comparative history and political economy underpinning producer collective 
action in the Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors; and second, the 
analysis of the assignment and uses of the rents associated with the coffee and 
coconut levies and the means by which these were regulated. In the first step of 
research, I ask the following question: What can a historical view of the political 
economy teach us about the variation in the power exercised by Colombian 
coffee producers and Philippine coconut producers in the determination and 
regulation of rent streams? (henceforth, the ‘political economy question’) In the 
second step of research, I ask the following two interrelated questions: What are 
the key features of the rent settlement associated with coffee levies in Colombia 
and coconut levies in the Philippines, in terms of the mobilisation of the levies, 
the associated rent entitlements, and the claimants to these? (henceforth, the 
‘rent settlement question’) And to what extent did the producers associations 
shape the rent settlement in these countries? (henceforth, the ‘regulatory 
question’) 
The ‘political economy question’ relates to establishing the basis for the 
variations in the patterns of political organisation underpinning the institutional 
framework, particularly the power exercised by producers associations in 
contests for state-engineered rents. For this aspect of the analysis, the time period 
under review is a broad sweep of the twentieth century, the century in which the 
coconut and coffee sectors rose and fell as important wealth-generating sectors in 
the Philippines and Colombia, respectively.  Analysing variations in political 
organisation through the lenses of comparative historical analysis allows a 
conception of political organisation not as a static occurrence taking place at a 
specific point in time but as a process that unfolds over time and in time and 
embedded in the evolving political economy of production (Mahoney & 
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Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 12). A complete rendering of this broad historical 
tapestry allows me to construct hypotheses about why the institutional 
framework was adopted earlier in Colombia and much later in the Philippines; 
the political conditions under which incentives for production were established 
by the state in these two countries; and the over-all impact of sector-specific 
structural conditions on the patterns of political organisation.  
The ‘rent settlement and regulatory questions’ are what I use to explore what 
the variations in the patterns of the political organisation of rent-seeking meant to 
the rent settlement that obtained. The ‘rent settlement question’ relates to the 
chief characteristics of the rent settlement:  modes of rent mobilisation and the 
claimants of the rent streams; as well as the means by which the producers 
associations regulated the rent settlement. In the Philippines, the periods chiefly 
covered are: 1970-1982, the years in which said framework was in place; and the 
period from 1986-2007, when ownership of some assets associated with the rent 
settlement were contested.  In Colombia, the period covered by the analysis is 
1927-2000, focusing on how it evolved over two periods: from 1927-1940, when 
coffee levies were collected principally for the purposes of production and 
marketing support; and the period 1958-1991, when market interventions to 
regulate the supply of exports and to promote price stabilisation became the 
dominant functions.  
Meanwhile, the ‘regulatory question’ relates to the extent to which 
COCOFED and FEDECAFE shaped the rent settlement through their complicity 
in the mechanisms that determined and enforced the assignment and uses of the 
rents associated with the levies. Exploring this question then allows me to 
explore the association between the ‘political organisation of rent seeking’ and 
the ‘rent settlement’ through an intervening variable, the ‘regulation of the rent 
settlement’.  
By responding to these three questions, I aim to observe two types of 
interactions affecting the ‘rent settlement’ associated with the Colombian coffee 
levies and Philippine coconut levies. First, by responding to the ‘political 
economy question’, I examine how historical conditions in the organisation of 
political and economic activity in the Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut 
sectors explain the variations in the roles played by the respective producers 
association in the shaping the rent settlement. Second, by responding to the ‘rent 
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settlement and regulatory questions’, I examine the ways by which variations in 
the participation of producers association in the mobilisation of rents then affect 
the distribution of rents and rent entitlements. These two interactions are deeply 
linked and cannot be viewed independent of one another:  the variations in 
characteristics of the rent settlement are connected to observed differences in 
political economy conditions through the ways these conditions shape the 
possibilities for the exercise of political power by the producers association. 
The two steps were undertaken first through the systematic review of 
literature pertaining to the collection and use of coffee levies in Colombia and 
coconut levies in the Philippines.  This was followed by field research in 
Colombia and the Philippines totalling 12 months, undertaken discontinuously 
over a period of two years from 2008 to 2010.
18
  In Colombia and the 
Philippines, I collated primary sources on the uses of the levies and who 
benefitted from them. In the Philippines, where the legality of the mobilisation of 
the coconut levies was subjected to court cases after Marcos had been removed 
from power in 1986, the sources of information were a series of the audit reports 
undertaken between 1986 and 1997 by a government agency, the Commission on 
Audit (COA). I closely examined presidential decrees promulgated to authorise 
the collection and uses of the coconut levies. I also explored material from the 
legal cases – including court decisions by and legal pleadings filed in the 
Supreme Court and the Sandiganbayan19 from 1986 to 2007.   In Colombia, I 
collated information on the uses of the coffee levies from 1930 to 1940 from the 
published FEDECAFE conference proceedings in the Revista Cafetera, the 
association’s trade magazine that has been published since the inception of the 
Federation in 1927. For later years, I relied on the work of Junguito and Pizano 
(1997), to which I was referred by various academics and coffee industry players 
that I interviewed in Colombia as the most complete historical documentation of 
the coffee levies in Colombia at the time I was undertaking research.  During the 
field research, I also conducted focused and structured interviews with 
academics, industry players, politicians and government officials (see Appendix 
                                                 
18
 I undertook a scoping exercise in Colombia from September to October, 2008. This was 
followed by a longer research trip, when the bulk of the data collation and interviews in 
Colombia were done, from October 2009 to March 2010.  In the Philippines, I undertook field 
research from April to July 2009. 
19
A special court in the Philippines established in 1987 and that has jurisdiction over civil and 
criminal cases involving graft and corruption. 
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1 for a complete list). In the interviews in Colombia, I sought primarily to 
validate propositions in literature, and to attain guidance on to the secondary 
resources that I needed to gather. In the Philippines, I did the same, but also used 
the interviews to generate information on negotiations on the uses of the levy 
after the Marcos period.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
This dissertation is written in five parts. In Chapter 2, I synthesize my key 
findings in regard to the historical and political economy foundations of producer 
organising in the Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors. In Chapters 3 
and 4, I explain the chief characteristics of the rent settlement associated with 
coconut levies in the Philippines and coffee levies in Colombia, respectively. 
Here, I discuss my findings on the modes of rent mobilisation and the chief 
beneficiaries of the same. In Chapters 5 and 6, I describe the means by which the 
rent settlement was regulated in the Philippines and Colombia, respectively.  
Here, I discuss my findings about the means by which the rent settlement was 
enforced and controlled, including the extent to which COCOFED and 
FEDECAFE took part in these. In Chapter 7, I synthesize the key findings, and 
present their significance, including their ramifications for future research.  
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Chapter 2.  Producers’ power and organisation in Colombia and the 
Philippines: comparative history and political economy 
 
 
In this chapter, I explore the historical and political economy foundations of the 
power of producers associations in the Colombia coffee and the Philippine 
coconut sectors. What can a historical view of both the broad and sector-specific 
political economy teach us about the variation in the power exercised by 
Colombian  coffee and Philippine coconut producers associations in the 
determination and regulation of rent streams associated with the levies? I 
respond to this question in three parts, each corresponding to the sections of this 
chapter: the first explores the question from a national perspective; the second 
and third, from the perspective of the respective sectors. 
In the first section, I lay out relevant aspects of the political economy of 
Colombian and Philippine economic development, writ large. One of the original 
impulses behind my work was to understand the important differences among 
late developers like Colombia and the Philippines, which have exhibited 
productive resilience and periods of growth, but otherwise have been broadly 
lumped together as having failed against the yardstick of the “East Asian 
miracle”.  In particular, both: had average growth rates that until 2005 never 
reached the sustained high growth paths exhibited by the East Asian tigers; were 
unable to generate levels of savings necessary to finance these high-growth 
orbits; and had a laggard rate of industrial transformation. I am interested in 
generating a nuanced view of the political obstacles that inhibited countries like 
Colombia and the Philippines from getting into sustained high-growth orbits. 
This is the broader puzzle in the political economy of late development against 
which my exploration of sectoral rent settlements is set.  Thus, I begin the 
analysis in this chapter with an analysis of Colombia and the Philippines’ 
struggles in late development and their political roots.    
In the second and third sections, I then turn to the micro-foundations of 
collective action and political power of the Colombian coffee and Philippine 
coconut sectors. In the second section, I explore the sector-specific conditions 
that fostered the emergence of a politically significant producers association in 
Colombia but not the Philippines. In the third section, I examine the political 
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origins of the rent settlement – explaining the circumstances that led to the 
appropriation of public power by private agents in both these countries.  
By laying down the political economy foundations from both a broad 
economy-wide perspective, and a narrow sector-specific view, I seek to explain 
the historical and political conditions that made the Philippine rent settlement in 
the coconut sector susceptible to capture and contestation; and the one in the 
Colombian coffee sector, stable, producer-centred and production-enhancing. 
 
Political economy writ large: struggles in late development 
The Philippines and Colombia are both middle-income countries facing broadly 
similar economic challenges in late development. In both these countries, the 
state tasked with coordinating the problems of late development has been 
labelled as neo-patrimonial and permeable to vested interests.
20
 Interestingly, 
both have also exhibited economic resilience, and indeed, the ability to grow and 
thrive amidst very difficult global economic conditions during the financial crisis 
that gripped industrialised economies towards the tail-end of the first decade of 
the new millennium  However, looking further back before this conjuncture, 
particularly their development trajectories heretofore and since the end of the 
Second World War, neither of these two countries was counted among successful 
late developers, by the yardstick of dramatic and sustained transformation of 
economic bases of growth. This failure in the Philippines and Colombia is 
exhibited by data on economic growth, savings mobilisation and industrial 
production.  
 
 
 
                                                 
20
A neo-patrimonial state is underpinned by patron-client relations between the ruler and the 
ruled: one where rulers utilize state resources to secure the support of clients in the general 
population. It is characterized by the co-existence of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic 
domination—that is, personalistic power relations between the ruler and the ruled occur within 
the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy.  (Erdmann & Engel, 2006, p. 
18)  Under such a political order, the capacity of the state to pursue the encompassing goals of 
industrialisation is weakened in two related senses. First, the state is reduced to an arena for 
securing the personal interests of the ruling class. Here, personal greed, the need to build short-
term political support or a combination of both motivates state intervention. (Kohli, 2004, p. 15)  
Second, the co-existence of patrimonial and legal-rational logic renders the behaviour and role of 
the state and its agents highly incalculable. Under neo-patrimonialism, state-led efforts to 
promote growth and industry are thus stymied by political instability, inconsistent policies and 
the use of public resources for particularistic interests. (Kohli, 2004, pp. 15-16) 
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Figure 2.1 Real GDP (in $US bn, at costant 2000 prices) 
 
As could be seen from Figure 2.1, Colombia and the Philippines are similarly 
sized middle-income economies roughly growing at the same pace, except in the 
1980s, when the Philippines suffered from a severe economic crisis. Table 2.1 
shows that neither of the economies exhibits the stellar rates of growth like those 
in East Asia – for example, Singapore and South Korea – considered more 
successful at late development. 
Second, they both face difficulties in mobilising domestic savings. Table 2.2 
shows that they have among the lowest average ratios of savings to GDP in their 
respective regions, especially from the 1980s onwards. 
  
46 
 
  
Table 2.1.Average growth of per capita GDP (in per cent) 
Countries  1961-1970   1971-1980   1981-1990   1991-2000   2000-2005  
Latin America      
Argentina           2.45            1.41           (2.83)           3.38            0.82  
Brazil           3.29            5.97           (0.42)           1.16            1.13  
Chile           1.83            1.50            2.24            4.80            3.24  
Colombia           2.24            3.11            1.48            0.66            1.70  
Mexico           3.45            3.67           (0.22)           1.86            1.51  
Venezuela           1.52           (0.70)          (1.75)           0.08            1.12  
Asia Pacific      
Indonesia           1.88            5.40            4.47            2.91            3.36  
Korea, Rep.           5.65            5.41            7.48            5.21            4.56  
Malaysia           3.47            5.34            3.31            4.55            3.15  
Philippines           1.82            3.06           (0.61)           0.88            2.78  
Singapore           7.37            7.20            4.99            4.70            3.35  
Thailand           4.88            4.30            6.13            3.41            4.04  
Source: 2007 World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2007)  
 
 
Table 2.2 Gross Domestic Savings as % of GDP 
Countries 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2000-2005 
Latin America      
Argentina       22.70        27.05        21.94        16.62        24.31  
Brazil       19.88        20.91        23.23        20.30        23.27  
Chile       17.90        16.50        20.18        25.44        27.06  
Colombia       18.60        19.47        20.71        17.46        16.37  
Mexico       17.37        21.75        25.37        21.27        19.32  
Venezuela       34.63        37.47        24.64        27.13        35.13  
Asia Pacific      
Indonesia         8.17        27.34        31.01        30.22        28.87  
Korea, Rep.         9.88        23.00        32.13        36.07        32.33  
Malaysia       21.66        27.65        30.72        41.93        42.87  
Philippines       19.10        25.12        19.99        16.69        13.46  
Singapore        (3.04)       30.60        42.43        48.59        44.30  
Thailand       19.37        22.43        27.56        35.03        30.93  
Source: 2007 World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2007) 
 
Third, both have also been struggling with processes of industrial 
transformation. Figure 2.2 shows that these economies are no longer dominated 
by the agriculture sector, which now constitutes no more than 15 per cent of the 
total gross value added.  But Figure 2.2 also suggests that the share of industry 
has stagnated between 30-40 per cent of total value added since the 1970s and it 
has mostly been the service sector taking up the slack in agricultural production. 
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Figure 2.2 Sectoral Shares in GDP: Colombia and the Philippines,  
(in per cent) 1960-2006 
 
 
Source of basic data:  2007 World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2007) 
 
In both the Philippines and Colombia, the permeability of a neo-patrimonial 
state to vested interests has featured prominently in explanations of the political 
roots of their struggles with late development.  In the Philippines, Hutchcroft 
(1998) asserts that the nature of the relations between the state and dominant 
economic interests, specifically the relative weakness of the state vis-à-vis 
business interests, explains the country’s continued underdevelopment. The 
historical basis of state formation in the Philippines led to a weakly-structured 
state, with highly dysfunctional administrative structures and a pattern of 
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political competition based on localistic patronage-based networks (Hutchcroft, 
2003; Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003; Sidel & Hedman, 2000). What took root 
was a polity where formal features of liberal democracy coincided with the 
preponderance of informal norms underpinned by the culture of patronage, which 
Putzel (1999) correctly observes as explaining both the shallowness and fragility 
of democratic tradition in the Philippines. The highly personalistic and localist 
political system is underpinned by a strong executive branch.  Even as the central 
administrative structures are weak, the first post-independence Constitution 
(1935) bestowed the executive branch with strong powers. These powers 
persisted and evolved to become ironically superior to those of the American 
presidency after which the Philippine version is modelled. This system gave the 
president and his political party  significant power to determine the political 
fortunes of local politicians. It explained why, soon after every presidential 
election, members of opposition parties gravitated to the party of the President 
(Rocamora, 1998, p. 4). 
The Colombian state has also been described as “historically weak, poorly 
financed and supported by networks of people receiving patronage from the 
professional politicians who perform the job of politics…this gives them the 
right to make personal use of public resources, as was done by those who 
regarded the state as their private property” (Kalmanovitz, 2000, p. 252). This 
description of Colombian politics—particularly the preponderance of patron-
client relations—is supported by Archer (1990), who explains that stability of the 
democratic regime in Colombia, in the face of high levels of social violence, can 
be partly traced to the primary mechanisms employed by traditional parties for 
mobilizing political support: a number of “relatively limited and poorly 
aggregated broker clientele networks which mobilize support through the 
downward distribution of state and party resources”. Meanwhile, Juárez (1995) 
submits that  business interests greatly influence the shape of resource 
mobilization strategies employed by the state. He depicts the relations between 
business and the state as close and institutionalised, which leaves the state 
relatively fragmented and penetrable by a private sector possessing multiple 
points of access and means to pressure the state.  
In summary, we find in Colombia and the Philippines two economies both 
burdened with difficulties in late development transitions—particularly in the 
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sphere of industrial transformation—in the context of neo-patrimonial polities. 
However, the next section shows that while there is certainly parallelism in 
regard to the preponderance of patronage politics in these two countries, a 
sectoral view of rent settlements reveals curious differences in how private 
agents penetrate the permeable state – particularly the more pronounced role that 
the coffee producers’ association played in the aggregation of interest in 
Colombia and the power they exercised in the mobilisation of the rents. The next 
section explores the historical and politico-economic foundations of these 
differences. 
Micro- and historical foundations of collective action and political power  
Variations in the relative importance of the Colombian coffee and Philippine 
coconut sectors within their respective national milieus, and the conditions of 
production and its expansion provide clues as to why the producers association in 
Colombia was better placed to shape the rent settlement than their counterpart in 
the Philippines. In this section, I call attention to the sector-specific differences 
that contextualised the prospects for collective action in the Colombian coffee 
and Philippine coconut sectors and for the exercise of political power by the 
producers association each representing these sectors. I unpack three features of 
the sectors: their significance in the national economy; their common 
characteristic as smallholding agricultural sectors; and the historical basis of 
productive expansion – and outline what each of these reveal about the 
possibilities for collective action and the exercise of power by the Colombian 
coffee and Philippine coconut producers. 
 
Relative importance in the national economy 
The significance of the Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors in their 
respective national milieus stem from their role as traditional exporters: 
providing foreign exchange earnings to finance wider processes of 
industrialisation, and providing agriculture-based employment and thereby 
helping enliven the rural base for these processes.  
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In the Philippines, coconut products21 persist as the country’s most important 
traditional exports.  In 2011, the sector brought in export earnings in the amount 
of US$ 1.8 bn, representing 79 per cent of the total value of the Philippines’ 
agricultural exports (BSP, 2013).  However, its relative importance has also 
largely diminished as its export earnings in that year only accounted for only 
about 4 per cent of total export earnings. The country’s export sector is currently 
dominated by manufactures, taking up 84 per cent of the value of export shares. 
Exports of mineral products – with a share of about 6 per cent in 2011 – has 
overtaken the coconuts sector as the second most important export sector. Even 
then, the sector also still persists as a significant economic base generating the 
means of income for rural households. Based on the latest completed Census of 
Agriculture (2002) in the Philippines, 2.6 million farms, equivalent to 53.9 per 
cent of all farms in the country are currently devoted to coconut.  Coconut trees 
are grown in 3.2 million hectares of land, which is about 70 per cent of the area 
planted to permanent crops, and about 33 per cent of the total agricultural land 
area (BAS, 2004).  Production was historically centred in the Southern Tagalog, 
Bicol and Eastern Visayas regions.
22
 Beginning in the 1980s, Western Mindanao 
and Southern Mindanao became important centres of production, too. Coconut is 
now grown in 67 of the country’s 77 provinces. These mean that coconut is 
produced in all three major island groups in the Philippines. Coconut lands are 
concentrated in areas that are among the poorest and the central sites of conflict 
in the Philippines.  
In Colombia, coffee is also an important but waning source of foreign 
exchange earnings. In 2011, the country’s export earnings from coffee amounted 
to US$ 2.7bn, representing about 5 per cent of total exports. In Colombia, it is 
not manufactured exports – accounting for 29 per cent of the value of total 
Colombian exports in 2011 – but petroleum and oil – accounting for 50 per cent 
of the value of total Colombian exports that has overtaken coffee as the country’s 
most important export sector. Relative to Philippine coconuts, Colombian coffee 
takes up a smaller share of the land planted to permanent crops, being grown in 
                                                 
21
 These include coconut oil, copra and dessicated coconut. Of the three, coconut oil account for 
the largest  share of exports. 
22
 The Philippines is divided into 13 regions, which are composed of provinces (provinces are 
equivalent to departments in Colombia). The region is purely a geographical and statistical, and 
not a political unit—except for two regions (CAR and ARMM), which are autonomous regions 
granted with the right to organise a local government. 
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740,000 hectares of land, representing 27 per cent of area planted to permanent 
crops but only 1 per cent of Colombia’s vast agricultural hectarage. (DANE, 
2004) Half a million families, constituting 18 per cent of rural households relied 
on the coffee sector for their livelihood in 2004. As with Philippine coconut, 
Colombian coffee is relatively dispersed across the country, as it is grown in 16 
of 32 departments.
23
 Of these 16, six can be found in a contiguous region located 
in the Andes range, known as the Central Coffee Belt and best-suited for coffee 
but not much else. The Coffee Belt accounts for 61 per cent of area planted to 
coffee (Bentley & Baker, 2000, p. 1).   
These snapshots do not give an adequate indication of the historical role these 
sectors played in the two economies. It is when the long view of the place of 
these sectors in their national economies is taken that the variances in the relative 
importance of the sectors become more apparent. In general, the Philippine 
coconut sector never really achieved the singular dominance that the coffee 
sector enjoyed over a long period of time in Colombia. 
Table 2.3 features data comparing the share of the respective sectors in each 
of the country’s total export earnings during years for which comparable data is 
available from 1900 to 2000.  It could be deduced from this table that coffee in 
Colombia generally accounted for a bigger share of total export earnings and for 
a longer period of time. Data in the table reveals, in particular, that for a period 
of 85 years, from 1915 to 1985, coffee exports accounted for more than 50 per 
cent of total export revenues in all years except in 1940 and 1975.  In the first 
decade preceding the Second World War, coffee exports accounted for more than 
three quarters of Colombia’s export earnings. To be sure, we are only able to 
compare in this table Colombian and Philippine data from after the Second 
World War. We could conclude from the table that in the fifty year period from 
1950 to 2000, Philippine coconut exports only achieved what Colombian coffee 
– in terms of accounting for at least half of export earnings – in 1950. But 
Nyberg (1968), who wrote a PhD thesis on the Philippine coconut sector 
covering 1900-1965, provides an indication of trends in export shares in the 
period before the 1950s that is useful to extend the analysis beyond the data 
presented in Table 2.3. He calculated that total export earnings of the Philippine 
                                                 
23A ‘department’ is a sub-national level of government, composed of a group of municipalities.  
Each department has a governor and legislative council elected at large. 
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coconut sector from 1900 to 1965 was US$ 4.6  bn , accounting for one-third of  
the country’s total export earnings of US$ 13.6 bn (Nyberg, 1968, p. 179).  He 
also asserts that prior to the Second World War, exports of coconut products 
accounted for about 25 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings.24 
These figures indicate that even in the first 50 years of the twentieth century, it 
would be reasonable to conclude that Philippine coconut exports did not exhibit 
the same supremacy that Colombian coffee exports did in the national economy.  
While both sectors were historically significant contributors of export earnings, 
the fortunes of Colombia’s national economy was more strongly linked with that 
of the coffee sector. 
 
Table 2.3 Share of Philippine coconut and Colombian coffee export earnings  
in total (in per cent): selected years, 1900-2000 
 
Year Colombian coffee Philippine coconuts 
1905 40.9  
1910 31.0  
1915 57.9  
1920 51.2  
1925 78.4  
1930 54.4  
1935 55.5  
1940 44.1  
1945 74.0  
1950 77.8 52.1 
1955 81.7 37.0 
1960 69.3 33.1 
1965 62.5 35.6 
1970 62.9 20.2 
1975 44.8 20.4 
1980 55.9 14.6 
1985 45.2 10.0 
1990 19.9 6.1 
1995 17.6 5.7 
2000 4.6 1.5 
Source of Colombian data: for 1905-1995, GRECO (1999), and for 2000, DANE (2013); Source of Philippine data: author’s computation based on 
coconut export data from Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research (1980) for 1950-1975, and United Coconut Associations of the 
Philippines (1987, 1997) for  1975-2000, and Philippine export data from the International Monetary Fund (2013) 
                                                 
24
In contrast, between 1920 to 1940,  sugar exports in the Philippines accounted for an average of 
50 per cent of the country’s total export earnings (my computation based on data from the US 
House Committee on Insular Affairs (1946), in Hawes (1987, p. 175). In general, in the early 
years of the twentieth century before the Second World War, it was sugar that played a role in the 
Philippines that was more akin to coffee in Colombia as the main means by which the country 
integrated into the world economy. 
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Questioning the ‘logic of collective action’ in smallholder agriculture 
Based on Olson’s (1971) thesis concerning the logic of collective action – 
particularly the idea that the larger a given group, the less the incentive for 
individuals to engage in group-oriented action because benefits from cooperation 
are watered down by the size of the group – incentives were stacked against the 
establishment of an effective and working producers associations in both the 
Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors, which are both constituted by 
a large number of smallholding producers.  In this schema, the failure of 
collective action in the Philippine coconuts sector would be a confirmation of the 
theory; the Colombian coffee case, an aberration. It is thus important to verify 
and unpack the evidence on smallholding agricultural structures in these sectors 
at analytically crucial junctures: in the first instance, in the years before the 
establishment of the producers associations, to capture the ‘initial conditions’ 
under which these associations emerged; and also during the years the levies 
were imposed and mobilised by these associations, to verify the base of their 
power while associations endeavoured to influence the mobilisation of the levies.  
In the Philippines, the extent to which the coconut sector was constituted by 
smallholding producers before the coconut levies were imposed can be analysed 
using data from the Philippine government’s Census of Agriculture.  The Census 
data on farm size in the period from after the end of the Second World War up 
until 1970, when the first of the coconut levies were collected and mobilised, 
seem to support the proposition that the sector was predominantly smallholder-
based.  As can be seen in Table 2.4, more than 90 per cent of farms were less 
than 10 hectares in size, and accounted for more than 50 per cent of coconut 
hectarage. Between 1948 and 1960, there appears to have been a move towards a 
more equitable distribution of farm sizes, as the share of both farms less than 10-
hectares in size increased, while that of farms 50-hectares or bigger in size 
diminished. There was a bit of a reversal in 1970, when the share of bigger farms 
in total hectarage and total number of farms increased; in the aftermath of forex 
decontrols, expansion of coconut hectarage seems to have occurred in farms that 
were already large to begin with (Boyce, 1993, p. 190).  Still, based on the 
census data presented in the table, and unlike most tree crops in tropical 
54 
 
agriculture, coconut production in the Philippines was never dominated by large 
plantations – at least in the years before the imposition of the levies. 
 
Table 2.4.  Farms and coconut hectarage shares, by farm size,  
before the imposition of coconut levies (in per cent): 1948, 1960, 1970 
 
 1948 
 1960  1970 
Farm size Farms Hectarage  Farms Hectarage  Farms Hectarage 
Under 5 has 75.7 31.9  72.1 34.3  72.7 35.0 
5 and under 10 has 15.1 20.7  18.5 27.4  17.5 22.8 
10 and under 50 has 8.7 31.8  9.2 30.1  9.4 31.9 
50 has and over 0.5 15.6  0.2 8.2  0.4 10.2 
Source: Census of Agriculture, 1948, 1960, 1970  
 
Based on the census data on coconut farm sizes presented above, one could 
conclude that if average land sizes of farms were a measure of the ‘base of 
power’ of coconut producers, then they had a weak base, and incentives were 
indeed stacked against collective action. But, there are important caveats to be 
made when reflecting on the political implications of characterising coconut 
production in the Philippines as predominantly smallholder.  For one, census data 
on farm sizes are based on operational land holdings, rather than land ownership.  
For example, several operational farms, in which land is cultivated by tenants, 
will each be counted in the census as separate farm holdings even if they are 
owned by just one landholder. That is to say, the data actually masks degrees of 
concentration in land ownership. (Boyce, 1993, p. 190; Putzel, 1992, pp. 27-29).  
Farm size data thus has to be cross-referenced with land tenure data. In 1970, 74 
per cent of the coconut farms in Philippines were owner-operated (Census of 
Agriculture, 1970 in Tiglao, 1983, p. 256), which buttresses the claim that 
coconuts are a smallholders’ crop. However, it must be noted that the coconut 
sector in the Philippines had a significantly higher rate of tenancy than in the 
Colombian coffee sector in 1970: while 20 per cent of coconut farms in the 
Philippines were operated by a tenant (Census of Agriculture, 1970 in Tiglao, 
1983, p. 256), in Colombia it was less than 1 per cent of the coffee farms that 
were under this tenurial arrangement in the same year (Censo Cafetero in 
Junguito and Pizano, 1991, p. 69).  Putzel and Cunnington (1989, pp. 13, 15) 
observe that the landlords of these tenanted coconut farms in the Philippines 
were mostly absentee ones – including teachers, managers, military officers and 
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professionals based in urban centres. These trends imply that a significant 
segment of those who had the potential to form the base for collective action 
were not as strongly rooted in the sector in the Philippines as they were in 
Colombia. 
 Meanwhile, when the coconut levies were being collected and mobilised in 
the 1970s and 1980s, important structural changes were happening in the sector -
- changes that embody another caveat in the analysis of the base of power of the 
producers attempting to influence the uses of rents from the levies. This caveat 
has partly to do with regional disparities in farm sizes. In the Philippines, larger 
farms and estates were found in Mindanao, where farms also tended to be 
farmer-operated, in contrast to Southern Luzon, where tenancy was more wide-
spread. (Boyce, 1993, p. 190)  In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a marked 
expansion of land grown to coconuts  in Mindanao, which was accounted for by 
the establishment of large commercial farms and plantations (Putzel, 1992, p. 
31).  Leaders of the producers association in the Philippines, particularly those 
who influenced the mobilisation of the coconut levies, were from this region. 
This means that those who would turn out to be decisive in the Philippine rent 
settlement were not smallholders with a limited land base but came from the 
regions where land ownership was relatively more concentrated. 
In the case of the Colombian coffee sector, the relevant period for the analysis 
of initial conditions for collective action is the period before 1927. 
Unfortunately, agriculture census data in Colombia were not yet collected at this 
time. But coffee production in the early 20
th
 century is typified in literature 
(Bates, 1997; Griffin, 1968) as being predominantly based on peasant 
smallholder economy. This is a trend that began in the late 19
th
 century as 
cultivation expanded from the east of the Andes mountains, which was more 
estate-based and where production was centred in much of the 19
th
 century, to 
the western and central portions of Colombia, mountainous areas where land was 
cheap and production was smallholder-based.  Soon after the first of the coffee 
levies were collected, in 1932, Junguito and Pizano (1991, 58) cite data from 
FAO to suggest that at least 86 per cent of coffee production was concentrated in 
farms less than 5 hectares in size.  
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Table 2.5.  Farms and coffee hectarage shares, by farm size, (in per cent): 
1955-56 and 1970 
 
 1955-56 
 1970  
Farm size  Farms Hectarage  Farms Hectarage  
0-1 ha 36.3 7.1  33.5 4.7  
1-10 has 58.1 56.9  59.4 51.9  
10-50 has 5.4 28.1  6.6 33.9  
                Source: Junguito and Pizano (1991), p. 59 
 
But as in the Philippine coconut sector, important changes were occurring in 
the production of Colombian coffee as the rent settlement associated with coffee 
levies evolved. For example, Table 2.5 gives an indication of some of these 
changes from 1956 to 1970. This is an important period in regard to the coffee 
rent settlement because, as will be shown in Chapter 5, this was a period when 
the resources over which the FEDECAFE increased due to new coffee types of 
levies collected and in which the uses of the levies were shifted to domestic price 
stabilisation.  Data in the table shows that the area coffee farms of the size 10 
hectares and more were accounting for a growing portion of the coffee hectarage 
between 1956 and 1970, as those of farms of the size 10 hectares and smaller 
were accounting for less. Junguito and Pizano (1991, p. 73) confirm that while 
the expansion of coffee hectarage was centred around farms under 10 hectares in 
size in the period between 1932 and 1956, between 1956 and 1970, the same was 
centred in larger farms.  
However, as in the Philippines coconut sector, data used to illustrate the 
extent of smallholding in the Colombian coffee sector needs to be treated with 
care. In the Colombian case, the issue has to do with the importance of 
differentiating between the ‘coffee farm’ (cafetales) from the ‘coffee estate’ 
(finca). The ‘coffee farm’ relates to an operational landholding in which solely 
coffee is grown. The ‘coffee estate’ is an enterprise in which coffee production is 
an important but not necessarily sole source of income. Here other income 
sources, unlike in the absentee landlord farms in the Philippines, would be farm-
based too (for example, the cultivation of other crops, or cattle stock). In 
Colombia, ‘coffee farms’ can actually be operating within large ‘coffee estates’, 
implying that Colombian coffee production is less of a monoculture than 
Philippine coconut production. Therefore in the Colombian case, it would be 
57 
 
important to verify not just the average size and distribution of the ‘coffee farm’, 
but also those of ‘coffee estate’.  
Data surveyed by Junguito and Pizano (1991, pp. 50-56) differentiating these 
two categories reveal information that bear important comparative insights with 
the Philippines. They found that the average size of the ‘coffee estate’ has been 
decreasing: from 20.1 hectares in 1955-56
25
, to 14.8 hectares in 1969-70
26
, and 
11.8 hectares in 1980-81.
27
  Meanwhile, the average size of the ‘coffee farm’ has 
been increasing: 3.3 hectares in 1955-56
28
, to 3.5 hectares in 1969-70
29
, and 4.6 
hectares in 1980-81.
30
  Based on these figures, while the average coffee farm size 
in Colombia was indeed within the range of smallholder production at less than 5 
hectares in the period 1955 to 1981, it is still entirely possible that said 
production was undertaken within larger coffee estates.  It is notable that 56 per 
cent of the coffee estates in 1970 were less than 4 hectares in size; while 28 per 
cent were between 4 and 12. This means that, even in terms of ‘coffee estates’, 
data supports the proposition that coffee production was smallholder based.  
But from a comparative perspective, it is this distribution (i.e., distribution of 
coffee estate sizes in Colombia) that we need to compare with the distribution of 
coconut farm sizes in the Philippines, to gauge the comparative strength of the 
‘land bases’ of the respective producers association. When this exercise is 
undertaken, as I did in Table 2.6, it could be inferred that in 1970, while both the 
Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors could indeed be largely typified 
as smallholder-based, coffee producers in Colombia had comparatively larger 
landholdings than coconut producers.  
From a comparative perspective – particularly in terms of indicators of access 
to land as the base of political strength – the ‘puzzle’ of the power exercised by 
the ‘numerous’ Colombian coffee producers through successful collective action 
and the relative weakness of the Philippine coconut producers becomes less of a 
conundrum. From the discussion above, coffee producers in Colombia had a 
                                                 
25
 From Estudio CEPAL-FAO, 1956 in Junguito and Pizano 1991, p. 51 
26
 From Censo Cafetero, 1970 in Junguito and Pizano, 1991, p. 51 
27
 From Censo Cafetero, 1980 in Junguito and Pizano, 1991, p. 51 
28
 From Estudio CEPAL-FAO, 1956 in Junguito and Pizano 1991, p. 51 
29
 From Censo Cafetero, 1970 in Junguito and Pizano, 1991, p. 51 
30
 From Censo Cafetero, 1980 in Junguito and Pizano, 1991, p. 51 
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comparatively stronger ‘land base’ – in terms of relatively larger landholdings of 
the coffee estates and significantly lower rates of tenancy.  
 
Table 2.6 Distribution of Philippine ‘coconut farms’ and  
Colombian ‘coffee estates’, by size: 1970 
 
Size % of coconut farms Size % of coffee estates 
0 to 5 hectares 72.7 0 to under 4 hectares 46.0 
5 to under 10 17.5 4 to under 12 27.8 
10 to under 50 9.4 12 to under 50  20.5 
50 and over 0.4 50 and over 5.7 
Source: Philippine data from Census of Agriculture (1970); Colombian data from Censo Cafetero (1970) 
 
Historical roots of productive expansion 
Historical differences in the basis of productive expansion of these two sectors 
also provide clues about why a stronger producers association took root in 
Colombia and not the Philippines. In the Philippines, the American colonial 
legacy left two important imprints in the coconut sector: incentives for 
productive expansion based on a prolonged protected access to the US market, 
and the absence of a tradition fostering planters associations like those found in 
European colonies in Southeast Asia.  In contrast, the expansion of coffee in 
Colombia in the twentieth century was mostly an indigenous process powered by 
the cultivation of frontier lands in the western part of the coffee zone, and 
financed by an emergent commercial class. While coconut producers were 
coddled by a protected US market and had neither the incentive nor tradition to 
come together to solve problems of production for much of the twentieth century, 
Colombian coffee openly competed in the international market for coffee from 
early in the century until 1940, when Colombia signed the Inter-American Coffee 
Agreement (more on this in Chapter 4). As will be shown in Chapter 4, the 
earliest uses of the coffee levies in Colombia related to solving production and 
marketing bottlenecks in this competitive environment. 
In general, the coconut industry in the Philippines – its place in the political 
economy and dominance in the world market – was mostly shaped by American 
colonial and neo-colonial policies. In particular, the Philippines’ protected access 
to the US markets for coconut oil and desiccated coconut, effected through 
policies circumscribing an ‘economy of special relations’ between the 
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Philippines and the US, provided the incentives for Philippine agro-export 
production for close to three-quarters of the twentieth century.  
From 1909 to 1934, the Philippines and the US entered into a regime of free 
trade in all products traded, except Philippine tobacco and sugar, which were 
initially subjected to import quotas in the US.  This regime was first enacted 
through the US Tariff Act of 1909 and the Philippine Tariff Act of the same year, 
which designated a regime of reciprocal free trade, with some limitations.
31
  The 
US Tariff Act of 1913 removed the restrictions on duty-free sugar and tobacco 
(Jenkins, 1954, p. 33) and governed commercial relations between the US and 
the Philippines until 1934 (Hawes, 1987b, p. 25). It should be underlined that 
under this trade regime, of the three major exported coconut products – copra, 
coconut oil and desiccated coconut – it was only the latter two that enjoyed 
special advantage in the US markets. This is because copra from all other 
countries could enter the US market duty-free. In contrast, beginning in 1922, 
Philippine coconut oil producers were not subjected to a two cent per pound 
tariff duty that was levied on all other coconut oil imports into the US (Rice, 
1935, p. 157).  Meanwhile, duty on desiccated coconut increased from two to 
three and one-half cents per pound in the same year—a trade tax from which the 
Philippines was also exempted (Hawes, 1987b, p. 61).  
Pressures from competing agricultural interests in the US – including dairy 
and cottonseed farmers, and vegetable oil producers, who all formed part of the 
core of US pressure groups espousing Philippine Independence – pushed to 
lessen the privileges afforded to the Philippine coconut sector. In fact, two laws 
were passed during the Commonwealth period
32
 of 1935-1946 that were meant to 
wean the sector away from these privileges.   
                                                 
31
 The limitations were in the following form: (1) restricted but generous quotas on duty free 
Philippine sugar and tobacco products entering the US; (2) a cap of 20 percent on non-Philippine 
or non-US content in the total value of Philippine manufactures entering the US duty free; and (3) 
the exemption of rice from duty-free status. (Jenkins, 1954, pp. 32-33) 
32 The Commonwealth government administered the Philippines in 1935-1946, in what was 
intended as a 10-year transition period from it being a US colony to its attainment of full 
independence. Largely patterned after the US model, the commonwealth government was 
comprised of locally elected officials led by a President and a bicameral legislature, along with a 
supreme court. The Commonwealth government went into exile when Japanese forces occupied 
the Philippines in 1942-1945 during the Second World War. The Commonwealth government 
ended when the Philippines became a republic following independence from US rule in 1946. 
   When it was formed in 1935, the Commonwealth government replaced the Insular Government 
of the Philippine Islands, the US colonial government led by an American governor-general 
created more than three decades earlier in 1901, which was the year before the official end of 
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First, the Philippine Independence Act, a law passed in the US Congress in 
1934, subjected coconut oil exports to a quota and directed the Philippine 
government to collect export taxes on the same at rates that progressively 
increased as the country approached Independence in 1946.
33
 However, the quota 
was set at 200,000 MT, which was way below the average amount of coconut oil 
exported at that time. What was more problematic for the coconut sector was the 
imposition of the export taxes, clearly a concession to coconut oil and competing 
vegetable oil producers in the US. The export tax to be levied during the tenth 
year of the Commonwealth equivalent to 25 per cent of the US import duty 
would still leave Philippine coconut oil exporters with a one-and-a-half cent per 
pound advantage against the other world coconut oil exporters, but left them in a 
less competitive position than US-based producers of competing vegetable oils.  
Second, the US Internal Revenue Act was also enacted in 1934, which levied 
an excise tax of US$ 0.03 per pound on coconut oil imports from the Philippines. 
On one hand, this represents a two cent differential with the rest of the coconut 
oil producing world facing a levy of five cents per pound. On the other hand, 
much like the export tax collected on coconut oil, this processing duty lowered 
the competitiveness of Philippine coconut oil relative to its substitutes. In the 
first two years it was imposed, the tax had the effect of doubling the price of 
Philippine coconut oil in the US as the prevailing market price ex-tax was 2.42 
cents per pound.  (Rice, 1935, p. 157) 
Despite these developments, the regime of ‘special relations’ was extended in 
1946 as a result of the devastation wrought by the Second World War, which 
destroyed vital infrastructure in the country, including many of the coconut mills.  
The regime was to last until soon after the imposition of the coconut levies in 
1974. Through the Tydings Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the United States 
committed US$ 620 million for post-war reconstruction in the Philippines, 
subject to the condition the two countries had entered an agreement governing 
                                                                                                                                    
hostilities in the Philippine-American War of 1899-1902. That war broke out when the US 
acquired the Philippines, then a colony of Spain, in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War 
of 1898 and refused to recognise the declaration of independence by Philippine revolutionary 
forces that had risen up against the Spanish colonial government.  
33
 Section 6E of the Act directs the Philippine government to collect an export tax on all exported 
Philippine products –even those on duty-free quotas—an amount equivalent to 5 percent of the 
US import duty  in the sixth year of the Commonwealth government; 10 percent, on the seventh 
year; increasingly uniformly to 25 percent of the duty in the tenth year of the Commonwealth 
(Rice, 1935, p. 157) 
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trade relations. The trade accord, in turn, was embodied in the US Bell Trade Act 
of 1946 and the Philippine Trade Act of the same year. This agreement
34
 
extended the duty-free trade regime until July 1954 – later further extended by 15 
months to December 1955
35
 – after which most exports from Philippine goods 
were to be subjected to progressively increasing percentage of US duties until 
1974, when preferential treatment for all Philippine exports in the US would be 
terminated. But Philippine coconut oil, along with seven other commodities
36
, 
was given the privilege of duty-free quotas, subjected to a decreasing schedule 
until 1974, when they were completely eradicated. The initial quota for coconut 
oil was 200,000 long tons, decreasing by 5 per cent every year from 1955 until 
the quota was totally eliminated in 1974.  
Thus, for almost three-quarters of the twentieth century from 1909 to 1974, 
American colonial and neo-colonial policies provided pivotal incentives for the 
development of the industry and fostered the dominance of the Philippines in the 
world market for coconut exports in much of the twentieth century. The effects 
of the policies outlined above are illustrated Table 2.7, which provides a long-run 
view of coconut exports from the Philippines. The table shows the dramatic 
increase in exports of copra and coconut oil occurring from the start of American 
occupation until the eve of the Second World War.  At the beginning of 
American occupation, the Philippines was exporting an average of 71,444 MT of 
copra and 723 MT of coconut oil in the period 1901-1910.
37
 The average 
quantity of copra exported rose to 272,814 MT in the period 1931-1940, 
representing a four-fold increase from the average at the start of the American 
                                                 
34 This was not a ‘benign accord’ and necessitated the re-drafting of he Philippine constitution. 
Aside from the agreement on tariffs and quotas governing trade relations, the Bell Trade Act also 
granted the following: (1) parity rights to US citizens in the exploitation and development of 
natural resources in the public domain; (2)  the tying of the Philippines to the US dollar at the rate 
of PhP1 : US$2, with no restrictions on capital transfers from the Philippines to the US,  except 
with the agreement of the US President; (3) power to the US president to withdraw economic 
concessions if US interests called for the same; and (4) prohibition on the Philippines to impose 
export taxes on all goods exported to the US until 1956. (Hawes, 1987b, pp. 28-29) 
35
 This was enacted in July 1954 by virtue of RA No 1137 in the Philippines and Public Law 474 
in the US. 
36
 They were: sugar, cordage, rice, tobacco, cigars, coconut oil and buttons of pearl or shell. 
(Jenkins, 1954, p. 65) 
37
The Philippines and the US could not enter into a trade agreement 10 years from the signing of 
Treaty of Paris in 1898 because the treaty provides that Spanish ships and goods would be 
admitted to Philippine ports on the same terms as ships and goods from the US (thus a trade 
agreement with the US would have forced that Spanish goods be treated the same way) (Jenkins, 
1954, p. 30) 
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occupation. The increase in coconut oil export production was even more 
dramatic: an average quantity of 158,402 MT exported in the period 1931 to 
1940 or a 219-fold increase relative to the average in the first 10 years of the 
occupation.   
The degree of dependence of Philippine coconut exports on the US markets is 
also indicative of the extent to which American colonial policies influenced 
production in the industry. Before 1909, the little that was exported of coconuts – 
mostly in copra form – went to Europe, where the oil was extracted and re-
exported to the United States (American Council Institute of Pacific Relations, 
1934, p. 1). But by the 1930s, almost all of the coconut oil and more than two-
thirds of the copra exported from the Philippines went to the United States. And 
at this point, the Philippines accounted for one-third of world exports of copra 
and its derivative oil (Rice, 1935, p. 157).  To extend the analysis, Table 2.7 
depicts the share of Philippine coconut exports going to the US after the Second 
World War.  It shows that by the 1950s, more than three-quarters of Philippine 
coconut oil exports and almost all of its desiccated coconut exports were going to 
the US. However, by then, less than half of copra exports were going to the US. 
In the 1960s, the shares of coconut oil and desiccated coconut exports going to 
the US still exceeded three-quarters of the total, but by then shares had begun to 
decline. By the time the free trade arrangement of the Philippines with the US 
had ended in the 1970s, the shares of coconut exports destined for the US market 
had gone down further. 
Meanwhile, Corpuz (1997) noted another important implication of having the 
US as coloniser shaping the operations of Philippine export agriculture and a 
feature that resonates sharply in the coconut sector. He observed that Americans 
did not leave a tradition typically found in European colonies in the region, 
where planters’ associations  were organised and maintained research and 
experimental stations for their respective crops, working closely with 
government stations. These associations supported study teams working on the 
feasibility of diversification and on the export potential of various crops. For 
example, activities of planters associations in Siam, Java and French Indochina 
led to advances in production technology in rice. As a result of these 
associations' early establishment and activities in these countries and the absence 
of the same in the Philippines, science and technology support for agriculture in 
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the Philippines was thirty to forty years behind the system in Java. In the period 
1914-1929, rice yields in these regions averaged at 2,200 kilos per hectare while 
productivity in the Philippines was 1,225 kilos per hectare.  (Corpuz, 1997, p. 
253) 
 
Table 2.7. Ten-year average Philippine exports and US share,  
by type of coconut product: 1900-2000 
 
 Quantity exported (in thousand kilos)  US share in exports (in per cent) 
 Copra 
Coconut 
oil 
Desiccated 
coconut 
 
Copra 
Coconut 
oil 
Desiccated 
coconut 
1900-1910 71,444 723      
1911-1920 87,239 47,164      
1921-1930 178,962 124,466      
1931-1940 272,814 158,402      
1941-1950 no data no data no data     
1951-1960 782,765 77,812 49,321  41.66 86.47 97.14 
1961-1970 738,183 241,337 64,084  36.51 82.12 81.70 
1971-1980 548,664 669,055 81,118  3.30 61.96 48.69 
1981-1990 101,799 925,907 79,737  - 42.79 47.36 
1991-2000 23,778 964,855 78,295  - 44.44 46.15 
Source of basic data: for 1900-1940, Hawes (1987, p. 170), for  1950-1975, Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research (1980), for 
1975-2000 UCAP (1987, 1997) for  1975-2000 
 
In a nutshell, the absence of a colonial tradition of planters organising in the 
agriculture export sector in the Philippines coupled with the coconut sector's 
assured and protected access to the US market– with the latter, probably 
lessening the incentives for producers to come together to collectively respond to 
the challenge of enhancing productivity –shaped a shallow history of organising 
in the sector. 
Meanwhile, in Colombia, growth in coffee production in the twentieth century 
was driven by much more internal processes of expansion.  The terms with which 
the sector integrated with the international coffee market became an object of 
debate in national politics early in the twentieth century. The preferred strategy 
of Colombian coffee producers in this debate – conducted before the Grand 
Depression in 1930 led to a spiralling down of international coffee prices – was 
to openly compete with Brazil, the world leader in coffee production, rather than 
to collude with it to suppress international supply. This position was shaped by 
the conditions of production in the geographic centres of productive expansion. 
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Elucidating on this requires explaining the historical features of coffee expansion 
in Colombia 
Junguito and Pizano (1991, pp. 7-15) explain that there were two episodes of 
productive growth spurts in the coffee sector with their own distinct drivers. The 
first growth spurt happened late in the 19
th
 century, in the period 1880 to 1898, 
when national production increased five-fold from about 100,000 60-kilo sacks 
of coffee to about 500,000 sacks. Productive expansion during this period was 
centred in the eastern parts of the coffee zone – primarily in the department of 
Norte Santander, but also minimally in Santander and Cundinamarca – which 
were largely characterised by large coffee estates. Junguito and Pizano explain 
that the concentration of coffee production in this region during the late 19
th
 
century is explained by its proximity to Venezuela, a key hub of trade at that 
time, and its well-connected transportation facilities. Civic conflict erupted from 
1899 to 1902 that disrupted this period of growth.
 38
 In the peaceful interlude that 
followed, a second period of growth happened from 1902 to 1930. In this period, 
the expansion of production became even more dramatic – with production 
almost doubling every ten years.  
 
Table 2.8 Coffee production (in tons), by size of coffee farms 
and geographic zone, 1923-1932 
 
Size of coffee 
farm (in hectares) 
 Western zone  Eastern zone 
 
1923 1932 % change 
 
1923 1932 % change 
Less than 3  20,540 37,434 82.2  6,333 16,030 153.1 
3 – 12  26,572 44,074 65.9  8,865 24,151 178.1 
12 – 15  14,649 30,640 109.2  7,586 15,138 99.6 
Greater than 35  9,815 14.384 46.6  15,789 22,473 42.3 
Total  71,576 126,532 76.8  38,393 77,792 102.6 
Source: Machado, Absalon. (1994). El Café: De la aparceria al capitalism, p. 123.  Bogota: Tercer Mundo Editores. 
 
It is this second period of growth that had important implications for the 
conditions for collective action and the accretion of political power by coffee 
producers.  In contrast to the growth spurt in the late 19
th
 century, productive 
expansion in the coffee sector in the early 20
th
 century happened not in large 
coffee estates east of the Andes mountains, but in the western and central parts of 
                                                 
38
A civil armed conflict between the radical factions of the Conservative and Liberal, partly 
precipitated by falling coffee prices in the international market. 
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the coffee zone, during the peak of a process of settler colonization of frontier 
lands in the departments of Antioquia, Caldas and Tolima. Production structures 
in this area were very different from the big coffee estates in the east: they were 
small-holder based and mobilising family labour much more. The agronomic 
conditions in this region were ideal for smallholder production with no 
economies of scale, and for combining coffee production with other subsistence 
crops. Here, coffee was grown in steep slopes, where land had few alternative 
uses and was thus cheap (Bates, 1997, p. 55).  Data in Table 2.8 exhibits how 
smallholder coffee farms were accounting for productive expansion in the early 
part of the 20
th
 century – with much more of the growth in production occurring 
in the eastern part of the coffee region, particularly the smaller farms there. 
Against these two episodes of productive expansion, coffee exports were also 
accounting for a growing share of Colombia’s exports.  In the first growth 
period, the share of coffee in Colombia’s total exports rose from 20 per cent in 
1880-84 to 55 per cent in 1890-94, and 49 per cent in 1895-99 (José Antonio 
Ocampo, 1984, pp. 100-101). In the second growth period, after the downturn in 
the face of the conflict at the end of the 19
th
 century, coffee exports growth 
recovered from 1910 and grew steadily, if not as dramatically as the first period. 
The sector’s share in national exports stood at 39 per cent in 1905-09 rising 
steadily in the following periods:  to 48 per cent in 1910-14, 51 per cent in 1915-
19, and 69 per cent in 1920-24  (Beyer, 1947, pp. 359-363).  Moreover, 
Colombia increased its share of the world market from less than 300,000 60 kilo-
bags in the early 1890s to over 3 million bags in the early 1930s  (Bates, 1997, p. 
51). 
As a testament to the growing importance of the coffee sector in the 
Colombian political economy, the debate on the country’s strategy for integration 
in the world market was a matter of high politics. Junguito and Pizano (1991, p. 
6) depict the principal characters of this debate in the 1930s to be the Liberal 
president Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo with familial links to the country’s principal 
coffee exporters, and Mariano Ospina Perez, then the president of the recently 
formed FEDECAFE and also coming from a family with economic interests in 
coffee growing.  Lopez-Pumarejo was a staunch supporter of quantitative 
restrictions to delimit the supply of coffee and championed entering into an 
agreement with then world-leading producer, Brazil. Ospina Perez, speaking on 
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behalf of the coffee producers through the FEDECAFE, believed that the long-
run interests of the coffee sector were best served by fomenting production and 
increasing its share in the world market. How this debate played out gives a good 
insight about the political origins of the rent settlement associated with coffee 
levies, which I will explore in the final section of this chapter. But what I want to 
flag now is the idea that the preferred position of the coffee producers of trading 
freely and competing openly in the world market at that crucial time of 
productive expansion in the early 20
th
 century has to do with the small-holding 
eastern coffee zone being the hub of coffee growth. Bates (1997, pp. 60-61, 69-
74) suggests that the FEDECAFE was, in its early years, a proponent of 
competitive marketing policies, choosing to be a 'vigorous entrant' in the world 
market. While the government wanted to collude with the other leading coffee 
exporter, Brazil, to delimit world supplies of coffee, the FEDECAFE initially 
preferred to free-ride on Brazil's international marketing strategy. He says that 
FEDECAFE believed that Colombian coffee producers could thrive in open 
competition "owing to the small size of the coffee farms in Colombia, the diverse 
crops grown on each farm"  -- that is to say that they could withstand the 
competitive onslaught by consuming food products in their farms while tending 
to their coffee (Bates, 1997, p 73).  
But competing in the world market meant that the sector had to continuously 
innovate and deal with production bottlenecks to survive. And part of how 
Colombian coffee producers achieved this was coming together in the 
FEDECAFE, allowing themselves to be taxed, and then mobilising the 
collections to deal with these bottlenecks. In Chapter 6, I explain how the coffee 
levies were mobilised in pursuit of these ends in the early years of the federation.  
In contrast to the Philippine coconut producers, whose terms of engagement with 
the international market were defined by the US and did not provide incentives 
for collective action, the Colombian coffee producers chose a competitive 
strategy – borne out of the dominant structure of production – that forced them to 
come together. 
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Political drivers of the rent settlement 
In this final section, I compare and contrast the origins of the rent settlement in 
the Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors. In particular, I examine the 
political conditions that led to the establishment by the state of an institutional 
framework allowing private agents – particularly producers associations – to 
mobilise the levies..   
 
Coconut levies as a ‘strongman’s’ political project 
The governance of the Philippine coconut sector before the imposition of the 
coconut levies in 1970 was marked by a history of largely ineffective state 
policies, and of failed attempts by the COCOFED to influence the same. 
Nyberg (1968, pp. 45-49) provides an insightful account of the failed attempts 
by the newly independent Philippine state to intervene in the coconut sector 
during the post-American colonial period,  after the Second World War up to the 
1960s. I can categorise these attempts into three.  First, there were earlier 
attempts to establish government organisations funded out of collections from the 
coconut producers and tasked with overseeing the development of the sector. 
These organisations were besieged with charges of corruption and received less 
than stellar reviews, in terms of performance. 
39
 Second, the state attempted to 
infuse capital into the sector by issuing government bonds to be used for 
financing the development of manufactured coconut products and providing 
credit for coconut cooperatives and producers.  Again Nyberg (1966) depicts 
these as having failed due to low absorption rates of the funds that were made 
available for credit and mobilisation.
40
 Third, state attempts to regulate the 
                                                 
39
 The National Coconut Corporation was the very first public corporation established by the state 
in 1940 to maintain and operate post-harvest facilities, and to improve the marketability of 
Philippine copra. Interestingly, this corporation was funded out of the excise taxes collected by 
the US government from the Philippine coconut oil exporters in the Commonwealth period.  The 
corporation went bankrupt. (Eleazar, Ignacio, Nael, & Agustin, 1980, p. 14; Nyberg, 1968, p. 45). 
The organisation was renamed the Philippine Coconut Authority in 1954 and similarly funded 
through levies collected from producers of desiccated coconut, coconut oil and copra. The levy 
was in the amount of Ph10 centavos per 10 kilos and paid into a special fund known as the 
‘Coconut Development Fund’.  Eleazar et al (1980, p. 15) estimates that collections averaged 
PhP2 million annually. Unlike the coconut levy funds, this was never declared private, nor did it 
reach the scale collected during the Marcos-years. 
40
 In 1955, RA No. 1639 was signed into law appropriating PhP30 million from the sales of 
bonds to be used for financing the development of manufactured coconut products. Nyberg 
(1966, p 47) says that as of 1966 or eleven years into the implementation of the scheme, less than 
PhP2 million had been loaned out under the provisions of this act. Four years later in 1959, the 
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quality of copra by requiring copra buyers to use moisture metres suffered from 
low enforcement rates.
41
 In general, attempts by the state to directly foster 
production in the coconut sector thus far described had largely been deemed 
ineffective at meeting their objectives. Economic studies
42
 evaluating state 
policies embodying incentives for coconut production also found interventions 
from the 1950s insignificant. 
Meanwhile, the COCOFED also has a history of failed attempts at influencing 
state policy. But before turning to this, a brief account of the federation’s history 
can help contextualise these failures. To begin with, this organisational history 
was, unlike that of Colombia’s FEDECAFE, very difficult to trace43 -- and I take 
this to be an indication of the less than robust foundations of the producers 
association in the Philippines.   In comparison to Colombia’s FEDECAFE, the 
COCOFED was a young organisation. It was founded in 1947 and originally 
called the “Philippine Coconut Planters Association”.  The organisation changed 
its name to COCOFED in 1956.  David (1977, p. 101) suggests that the original 
name was more reflective of the nature of the Federation as essentially an 
organisation of landowners. He supported this claim by analysing the list of the 
organisation’s original incorporators, as well as the composition of leaders in 
1956 and 1977. He found that the original incorporators were planters and 
politicians mostly from Southern Tagalog, which at that that time was the region 
                                                                                                                                    
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) was directed, under RA No. 2282, to administer 
PhP30 million in funds to be made available to coconut cooperatives and coconut producers. 
Again, the programme suffered from low rates of borrowing – with only PhP5 million lent as of 
1966. 
41
 In 1955, RA NO. 1365 was enacted for this end. Nyberg (1966, p 46) estimates that less than 5 
percent of the copra traded was subjected to this method of establishing moisture content. 
42
 See for example, Clarete and Roumasset (1983) and Intal and Power (1990).  
43
 At the time of the research, legal cases in relation to the coconut levies and the role played by 
COCOFED in their disposition, were still under litigation in courts (to be discussed further in 
Chapter 4) and none of the officers were willing to be interviewed for this study. For historical 
accounts on COCOFED, I relied heavily on three principle sources. First, an ‘insiders’ view of 
COCOFED and its efforts in lobbying policies for the sector by Eleazar et al (1980), written and 
published when Marcos was still in power and COCOFED was heavily involved in the 
disposition of the coconut levy funds. Unsurprisingly, the book provides a very positive account 
of COCOFED as a representative of copra producers, the levies and the organisation’s role in the 
establishment of these levies. The second and third sources are both by David  (1977, 1992), who 
as a military colonel was assigned as the military adviser to the coconut sector when Martial Law 
was declared and as a military general became administrator of the  PCA under the Ramos 
government. He wrote an MBA thesis (David, 1977) that attempted to ground an analysis of the 
history and nature of COCOFED on empirical data to which he had unique access due to his 
position in the Marcos government. He published a shortened version of the thesis (David, 1992) 
when he was already PCA administrator. His account is more critical of the levies and 
COCOFED. 
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that accounted for a major share of copra production in the Philippines. David 
(1977, p. 103) wrote that half of the founders actually resided in the capital city 
of Manila, while the rest were based in the coconut-producing provinces of 
Laguna and Quezon in Southern Tagalog.  The leadership of the organisation had 
traditionally been dominated by planters and politicians from Luzon. However, 
by the early 1960s leadership of the organisation shifted to planters in Mindanao 
(David 1977, p. 102) – probably a reflection of the increasing share of the island 
in total national copra production. 
The COCOFED was coming from a string of policy defeats during the term of 
Diosdado Macapagal, who was the president immediately before Marcos and 
was in power from 1961 to 1965, and even under the first years of the Marcos 
administration. Eleazar, et al. (1980, pp. 16-38) reported the major policy battles 
copra producers lost before they finally ‘won’ with the passage of the RA NO. 
6260.  
First, in 1962, the COCOFED lobbied for ‘Project COBONTER’, which 
stands for ‘copra bonded terminals’. To help address inefficiencies in the 
marketing system, the federation proposed the establishment of joint ventures 
between government and farmers’ cooperatives for running terminal facilities in 
ports to provide warehousing and stevedoring facilities.  This could be seen as 
the earliest attempt for centralisation of copra trading operations, with the direct 
involvement of the farmers. Eleazar et al (1977, pp. 18-19) reported that 
technocrats of the administration supported the project, but it never really got off 
the ground beyond being incorporated into a plan for a PhP70 million-integrated 
coco-chemical complex, to be funded by the National Investment Development 
Corporation and to be established in Iligan City, a coconut-trading and port city 
in Mindanao– a plan trumpeted during the presidential elections of 1965. Marcos 
won that election and the complex was moved to Lucena City, in the province of 
Quezon but with the plan for COBONTER ultimately set aside. 
Second, the COCOFED also failed to stop the Philippine government from 
entering into an agreement with Indonesia fostering a trading partnership in 
copra between the two countries. The agreement committed both countries to 
coordinated action in promoting coconut production and processing and 
effectively bestowed upon Indonesia access to Philippine copra export markets 
by allowing the transhipment of Indonesian copra from Philippine ports.  
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Eleazar, et al. (1977,  p. 21) wrote that COCOFED tried to influence negotiations 
in 1963 by taking part in the Philippine-Indonesian Coconut Commission (PICC) 
and succeeded there in delaying the signing of the treaty by convincing the 
Commission to undertake a survey of coconut situations in both countries before 
entering into any agreement. However, before the treaty was even signed, 
Indonesia successfully used the Philippines as a transhipment point for 3000 tons 
worth of copra, which the federation tried unsuccessfully to stop. The 
federation’s representative resigned from the PICC and dialogue between the 
Macapagal administration and the federation effectively ended. Officers of the 
federation were more hopeful about Marcos and even reactivated the 
organisation’s participation in the PICC. Even then, the COCOFED’s relations 
with the new government soured when the latter allowed the entry of cheap 
Indonesian copra to help resuscitate the operations of the Batjak Oil Mills, which 
was owned by the government through its stake in the Philippine National Bank 
and the NIDC. Relations soured even further when, in 1969, the Philippine 
government under Marcos went ahead to sign the Philippine-Indonesia Copra 
Agreement (Eleazar, et al., 1977, pp. 22-26). 
When, under the Marcos government, RA NO. 6260 was passed by the 
Philippine  Congress in 1971,  authorising the collection of the Coconut 
Investment Fund levy,  Eleazar, et al. (1980, p. 78) argued that coconut industry 
“won its major battle for a development mechanism that is both industry-
financed and industry-directed.” RA NO. 6260 stipulated the collection of a levy 
to be used by the government to underwrite the Coconut Investment Company 
(CIC). The CIC was set up to allow coconut farmers to invest in shoring up the 
commercial and industrial capacity of the sector and for them to directly 
participate in related activities. It is also important to note that very much like the 
coffee levies in Colombia, part of the levy collections – a small one, at PhP30 
centavos per MT of copra – was earmarked for the use of the producers’ 
association, at this point unnamed. 
 The COCOFED had been lobbying for the concept of the levy since 1968 and 
it was mostly their version of the bill that was ultimately introduced by Senator 
Dominador Aytona in the Senate and Congressman Moises Escueta in the House 
of Representatives – both from the coconut-producing province of Quezon – and  
then legislated into law in 1971. The bill faced opposition from the 
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Congressional Planning Office (CEPO), which questioned – among others – the 
legality of establishing a private corporation like CIC, in turn authorised to 
mobilise and collect levies. CEPO technocrats also found the accreditation of the 
federation’s National Coconut Congress by law as highly irregular (Eleazar, et 
al., 1980, p. 80). In the end, the House of Representatives deleted allusions to 
COCOFED as the ‘recognised national association of coconut producers’ in the 
draft bill.   Even with this significant amendment, the bill was effectively the 
copra producers’ first policy victory.  
However, this levy was merely used as a template for a series of other levies 
collected from the sector. From 1971 to 1982, President Ferdinand Marcos 
utilised the expansive executive authority accorded to him under Martial Law
44
 
to promulgate a spate of presidential decrees that led to the dramatic increase in 
the amounts levied, the expansion of the levies’ authorised uses, and the 
centralisation of control of levy collections by a delimited set of individuals, 
including representatives of the COCOFED.  The authorised uses, in turn, of the 
levies included the following: (1) raising capital investments to shore up 
industrial capacity in the coconut sector, make farmers direct participants in 
industrialisation, and rationalise the milling sector; stabilising coconut oil 
consumer prices; (2) subsidising premium duties paid by exporters; financing a 
coconut replanting programme; (3) financing the organisational operations and 
welfare projects of COCOFED; (4) financing research and administrative 
expenses of PCA; and (5) purchasing shares in a commercial bank to address the 
credit needs of coconut producers.   
In Chapter 3, a detailed explanation of how these levies came to be 
legitimised is provided. What is important to note at this stage of the analysis is 
that within a span of ten years, Marcos penned ten decrees that legalised the 
collection of levies, which were remitted to funds that represented a substantial 
infusion of capital into the coconut sector, and that nominally allowed the 
coconut producers – through the COCOFED– to mobilise the funds. The 
collection and modes of mobilising coconut levies during the Marcos years 
represent a scale of direct state interventions that the industry had not seen for 
                                                 
44
 Marcos declared Martial Law in the Philippines from 1972-1983, using exaggerated threats 
posed by Communist and Muslim insurgencies as justification. He ruled by decree, abolishing 
Congress,  closing down media establishments and arresting key opposition figures. 
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much of the twentieth century and did not see again after Marcos’ fall from 
power. Thus, the collection and mobilisation of these levies may be seen as 
representing a true shift in the governance of the Philippine coconut sector in two 
senses. First, the levies constituted a scale of public resources that was never 
before made available for the sole use of the sector. Second, the policy deployed 
to mobilise these resource involved, on paper, the direct participation of the 
coconut producers. The next question to ask, then, is what accounted for this shift 
in nature and scale of state intervention in the sector? 
One explanation relates to the elite fissures wrought by the evolution of 
industrial policy after independence in the Philippines. As shown in an earlier 
section, American colonial policies nurtured wealth accumulation in the export 
of agricultural commodities—including sugar, coconut, abaca, indigo and 
tobacco products. This also had had the effect of making these sectors central to 
the evolving political economy as the economic base of the land-holding elite 
that dominated much of Philippine politics in its history as an independent 
republic. The political importance of these sectors emanated not only from the 
tremendous wealth that they generated for the agrarian elite, but also because of 
the sizeable electoral base they constituted, with these sectors employing a major 
share of the population up until the 1970s. Unlike Taiwan and South Korea, 
where land reform weakened the power of the land-holding class, in the 
Philippines this dominance was never completely broken.  
However, the social and economic bases of the elite diversified as the country 
began to experiment in import-substitution in the 1950s. The devastation 
wrought by the Second World War brought the national treasury to the brink of 
bankruptcy and signalled the origins of import substitution in the Philippines– 
beginning with the imposition of import and export controls.  
Hawes (1987b, p. 20) noted that the rise in production of manufactures behind 
the walls of protection afforded by ISI brought along with it the rise of political 
conflict about who would bear the burden of financing industrialisation, the 
acceptable levels of foreign control and the degree of protection for domestic 
entrepreneurs.  He suggested that this conflict underpinned a stalemate between 
pro-agriculture and export-led growth versus nationalist and populist import-
substituting interests and explained why the Philippines transitioned to export-
oriented industrialisation much later than its neighbours in the region. 
73 
 
In a nutshell, the rent settlement in the coconut sector was devised at the point 
where import-substituting elite interests were challenging the hegemony of 
outward-looking agrarian interests. Hawes (1987) suggested that Marcos – by 
employing the policies he did in the agro-export sector, including through the 
imposition and mobilisation of coconut levies – effectively broke down elite 
cohesion in favour of the exporting sectors.  
I propose a different take on why Marcos, utilising state power, elected to 
favour certain handpicked sections of the elite.  Coconut levies could be 
understood as a rent-allocating tool used by Marcos to consolidate his political 
base under Martial Law – doling out what North et al (2007) and Khan (2004a) 
would call ‘rents for political stability’. Against a political landscape dominated 
by a relatively small number of wealthy families, Marcos was a political 
‘outsider’, who was not part of the traditional elite – although coming from a 
wealthy family in the Ilocos region of Northern Luzon.  His declaration of 
Martial Law could thus be seen as a political project for undermining the 
political structure of traditional families and cutting their networks of influence 
(Dohner & Intal, 1989, pp. 387-388) and centralising political power in the 
executive. Marcos achieved this by disbanding Congress, the hub of locally-
rooted traditional families and suspending all local elections. Government also 
seized and closed all newspapers, radio and television stations to deprive 
opposition their voice. Private armies were disbanded and control of local police 
placed under the Philippine Army.  
The same logic of undermining traditional elites and establishing and 
consolidating a base of his own underpinned Marcos’ strategy in allocating rents 
in the agro-export sector. Here, he used state power to secure control of the 
coconut sector in the hands of ‘presidential cronies’ (Boyce, 1993, p. 190). 
Coconut levies were the resources used to establish monopoly control of the 
processing and exporting of copra by agents among those chosen by Marcos to 
underpin his political base, along with other opportunities for wealth 
accumulation for agents benefitting from the rent settlement.  
In summary, the settlement in the coconut sector was governed by political 
calculations of an authoritarian leader. In Chapters 3 and 5, I show that the 
COCOFED did not have the organisational power to influence those calculations 
in a major way. Because of this, the rent settlement redistributed income to 
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presidential associates and just some leaders of the COCOFED, acting within this 
settlement as individuals rather than as representatives of producers. The 
COCOFED, with its shallow historical base, did not evolve organisational 
processes that would have held these leaders accountable to the ‘mass members’ 
of the federation, who bore the burden of the levies.  
 
Coffee levies and the private appropriation of public power 
If the rent settlement associated with coconut levies in the Philippines was 
governed by a logic external to the productive goals of the sector, having been 
primarily borne out of a strongman’s project to build his political base and 
consolidate his authoritarian rule, in Colombia the rent settlement associated with 
the coffee levies was driven, at the very onset, by the logic of enabling a key 
wealth-generating economic sector to survive the vagaries of an unstable 
international market.  It mattered a lot that this sector also happened to be the 
economy’s singularly dominant source of foreign exchange. 
In Colombia, two crisis points brought coffee producers together, in two 
separate attempts to form a federation – the first was a failure; the second, led to 
the birth of the highly successful FEDECAFE.  
The first attempt happened in 1920, when the New York price of Colombian 
coffee fell from 31 to 18 cents per pound.  At this time, coffee producers looked 
to a broader organisation, the Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC, but 
from here on the Colombian Agricultural Society) to represent their interests – 
and it was the Board of Directors of this organisation that convened the First 
Coffee Congress to address the troubled market conditions. Based on the account 
by Koffman (1969, pp. 73-78), this first national congress was attended by 41 
delegates, with the largest contingent from Cundinamarca.  As has been 
previously explained, coffee production in this department was chiefly 
undertaken in large coffee estates; it is also where the national capital, Bogota is 
situated. The first congress can then be construed to have been driven by coffee 
growers with large estates in the eastern part of the coffee zone and commercial 
interests from the national capital. The chief concern raised in the congress was 
the ‘valorisation’ of coffee – which meant raising its price in the international 
market – and related to this, dealing with the primary productive bottlenecks of 
the sector: transportation facilities connecting the production centres to the 
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market, and access to credit. The government was represented by a functionary 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, who is said to have articulated the need for 
coffee producers to finance an international campaign to promote Colombian 
coffee. This congress formed a ‘delegatory board’ (Junta Delegatoria), a smaller 
committee composed of six chosen congressional delegates, to continue the work 
of the First Coffee Congress to deal with the issues identified above. However, 
nothing came out of this first attempt – Koffman says the body just “disappeared 
without a trace” (Koffman, 1969, p. 77). 
It was seven years later in 1927, after another episode of falling international 
prices – the New York price of Colombian coffee had recovered to 31 cents per 
pound sometime in 1926, but crashed to 22 cent in 1927 – that a second congress 
was called. Again based on Koffman (1969, pp. 77-83) , this time the initiative 
for this conference came not from the large planters represented by the 
Agricultural Society based in the eastern departments, but from producers and 
exporters of Medellin and Manizales, the capitals of Antioquia and Caldas, 
respectively. As noted in the previous section, these departments in the western 
side of the coffee zone were part of the region where the smallholder-driven 
productive expansion of the early 20
th
 century happened. However, the role of 
the Colombian Agricultural Society in this second attempt cannot be denied. It 
was the Antioquian Agricultural Society president, Rafael Ospina Perez – brother 
of the first FEDECAFE president that featured in the debate about Colombian 
strategy for world market integration and future Colombian president Mariano – 
who issued the formal call for this national congress.  Moreover, the 
departmental government of Antioquia was also involved – acting as joint 
sponsors with the Agricultural Society and financially supporting the 
departmental delegates. In the call for the Second National Coffee Congress, 
governors of the coffee departments in Colombia were asked to choose two 
delegates from a list of three to be submitted by the departmental Agricultural 
Society. 
The FEDECAFE that is known today was created by this Second National 
Congress. Koffman (1969, p. 79) says that this congress was constituted by 29 
delegates, including representatives from 15 coffee-growing departments in the 
country, the Ministry of Industry, and the departmental Agricultural Societies of 
Antioquia, Caldas and Magdalena. The federation’s goals, which were specified 
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in the ‘accord’ (Acuerdo Numero 2) that created the association, were the 
defence and protection of the interest of the coffee industry through the 
establishment of warehouses granting credit on deposits, setting  of standardized 
grades of coffee, the coordination of international promotion, the generation of 
market statistics and seeing to the reduction of transportation costs. The 
provision of agricultural extension support and distribution of inputs were also 
specified as potential activities. In Chapter 4, the discussion of the federation’s 
budget in the 1930s will reveal that the FEDECAFE saw to this mandate.  
What made the fulfilment of the founding mandate of the FEDECAFE 
possible – and indeed, its continued existence until the present – is the very 
object of study in this dissertation: that the federation was authorised to mobilise 
coffee levies collected on their behalf by the state.  Unlike the COCOFED in the 
Philippines, the FEDECAFE did not actively lobby for the levies. According to 
Koffman (1969, p. 82), it was a functionary  from the Ministry of Industries, who 
was representing the government in the National Committee – the working 
committee authorised by the national coffee congress to develop and implement 
the programme to meet the goals of the FEDECAFE specified above – who 
actively developed and pushed the idea to collect export taxes from the sector for 
its own exclusive use. It was an idea that was initially resisted, but a debate that 
was ultimately won by the government.  
In the year the FEDECAFE was founded, Law 72 of 1927 was also enacted, 
which had provisions for the collection of a 10 centavo tax per every 60 
kilogram-sack of coffee exported, and for the entrustment of the collections to 
the FEDECAFE,  to be used in the activities related to the association’s goals 
specified above. The law also provided that these services that the FEDECAFE 
were to render, were to be enshrined in a contract signed between the 
government and the federation. As will be shown in Chapter 4 – and as in the 
case of the Philippines –the coffee levies collected would expand, rate of taxation 
would increase, and the authorised uses would expand to include price 
stabilisation and allow for the investment of the levies. But unlike the 
Philippines, the producers association in Colombia remained the central and only 
conduit in the mobilisation of these levies.  The institutional framework first 
established in 1927 in which the FEDECAFE was contracted for services 
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promoting production and the commercialisation of Colombian coffee in 
exchange for which it received the levies was to endure.  
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that it was state action that 
created a strong coffee producers association in Colombia. For one, local 
politicians played a key role choosing the departmental delegates and financing 
their participation in the national congress.  But more importantly, the central 
government enacted a law that provided the FEDECAFE with the means to 
control and mobilise substantial financial resources, arguably the most important 
factor why it was the second attempt at forming the federation that ultimately 
succeeded. It was because of this access to the coffee levies in 1927 that the 
FEDECAFE was “born strong” (Schneider, 2004, p. 133).  
What political conditions underpinned state action that shored up the power of 
the FEDECAFE in Colombia? If in the Philippines, a strongman trying to build 
his own political coalition was behind the rent settlement in the coconut sector, in 
Colombia, it was a coalition that established the rent settlement in the coffee 
sector. The nature of this coalition in Colombia is thus key to understanding the 
political conditions that underpinned state action in the coffee sector. 
The founding of the FEDECAFE was brought about by a coalition that 
involved coffee growers and businessmen in the smallholder-dominated 
department in Antioquia, members of the Colombian Agricultural Society and a 
socially conservative but economically liberal wing of the party in power when 
the FEDECAFE was founded, the Conservative Party. This could be deduced 
from the work of Saether (1999), who closely examined the published lists of the 
FEDECAFE’s founding members. He identified – contrary to Koffman’s account 
that there were 29 founding members –33 names in the published list of the 
federation’s founding members. 45 He examined the biographical data of 25 of 
these names and concluded that while all coffee departments were represented  in 
the founding congress, this did not mean that the founding congress represented 
                                                 
45
 Saether examined founding members lists contained in the following: Revista Cafetera 1928, 
Revista Cafetera 1968, a photo of the founding members found also found in Revista Cafetera 
1968, but including three names that are not in the list, and a Conference registry published in the 
Revista Cafetera and included in a Coffee Federation Report (Los Propositos de la Industria 
Cafetera Colombiana, 1987), listing participants of the final session of the founding congress. In 
summary, he found that majority of the names appeared in at least one list; 20 names, all four 
lists; and 4, in just one list. From an examination of these lists, he found there were 33 identified 
founding members of the Federation. (Saether, 1999, pp. 146-147) 
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‘national interests’. He provided empirical evidence for Koffman’s description of 
the founding congress being driven by coffee growers from the eastern part of 
the coffee zone: of the 25 founding delegates, 16 had strong links with the coffee 
industry in Antioquia, as owners of land in the said department or with business 
interests in the coffee industry as exporters or processors in Medellin, the capital 
of the department.  For example, among the 16 were three, who were listed as 
representatives of the Colombian Agricultural Society, but also involved in the 
coffee industry, not as coffee growers, but as coffee processors based in 
Medellin; and five other departmental representatives had similar business 
interests in the capital city of Antioquia. He also found very strong connections 
of the founding delegates with a wing of the Conservative Party called the 
‘historicos’, a faction of the party that favoured cooperation with moderate 
liberals to promote peace and economic development. This included Carlos 
Restrepo, who was a president of Colombia from 1910 to 1914, and Pedro Nel 
Ospina  (also uncle of Mariano and Rafael), who were both part of the said 
faction. Mariano Ospina Perez, who I mentioned earlier as having championed 
the strategy of competition in international coffee trade and became president of 
the FEDECAFE, was also a founding member and Conservative senator 
supportive of the ideas of ‘historicos’. His family owned coffee haciendas and 
businesses in Medellin that exported coffee and produced textiles. Other 
founding members with links to this family included Mariano’s brother Rafael, 
and the lawyer of Pedro Ospina, Santiago Razo. In a nutshell, based on Saether’s 
(1999, pp. 147-153) examination of the lists, one could conclude that the 
majority of the founding members of the FEDECAFE had Antioquian links 
either as coffee growers or businessmen, and that many had links with the Ospina 
family, and through them, a specific wing of the conservative party.  That such a 
coalition underpins the founding of the FEDECAFE has a number of significant 
implications about the political origins of state support for the private 
appropriation of public power by the federation in Colombia. 
The nature of the coalition underpinning the FEDECAFE in the crucial first 
years of the federation’s establishment, in turn, explains the power it 
consequently exercised (and relatedly, that which was not achieved by the 
COCOFED in the Philippines), and also enables me to forward an interpretation 
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of the rent settlement in the Colombian coffee sector that could be directly 
compared with that in the Philippine coconut sector. 
 Bates (1997) offers a compelling explanation of why the FEDECAFE 
gathered power in Colombia that could be extended to include the implications of 
the nature of the coalition behind the federation’s founding. His explanation is 
focused on the structure of political competition in Colombia, and the place of 
the coffee sector therein.  Bates (1997, p. 81) begins from the assertion that the 
structure of power in Colombia is highly centralised (not federalist). In this 
context, the coffee sector had inherent potential to exercise tremendous electoral 
muscle, as production – including not just the numerous coffee growers but also 
the banks and trading houses dependent on the coffee economy – was 
geographically dispersed.  But what amplified the sector’s potential electoral 
power was the coffee sector’s strategic location in a two-party political system 
where "partisan cleavages tended to fall along a single, well-defined dimension, 
one captured in the names of the parties”. This strategic location, in turn, was due 
to the important place held in the sector by Antioquia-based economic and 
political agents, who stood as a pivot in a two-party political system and had the 
ability to broker coalitions between moderate factions within the Conservative 
and Liberal parties. Bates argues that the coffee sector could thereby make or 
unmake national governments, and concluded that its strategic place in political 
competition rendered it to be in the interests of politicians to serve the economic 
interests of coffee producers – particularly the smallholders of the eastern coffee 
zone, where Antioquia is to be found (Bates, 1997, pp. 81-86).  But another way 
of casting his conclusion is this: that it was the political coalition behind the 
FEDECAFE that propelled it to its position as a fulcrum in national political 
competition. 
Another function of a moderate coalition backing the FEDECAFE could be 
deduced from a view forwarded by Schneider (2004) about the Colombian state’s 
motivations for shoring up the power of the federation.  His analysis proceeds not 
from the political significance of the coffee sector, but from its economic place. 
He observes that at the founding of FEDECAFE, international prices were falling 
at a time when the economy was becoming increasingly dependent on coffee. On 
one hand, and because state capacity was weak, the costs for exclusive state 
action in collecting information, setting standards, and promoting Colombian 
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coffee were high.  The more relevant point he raises relates to his perception that 
the executive branch in Colombia was concerned about subjecting coffee policy 
(including taxation) to intense partisan conflict of the major parties.  By 
extension, empowering the FEDECAFE backed by the coalition I described 
enabled the Colombian state to insulate policy-making in such an important 
economic sector against partisan conflict. 
But there is another implication of the Antioquia conservative base of the 
FEDECAFE that allows me to forward an interpretation of the rent settlement in 
Colombia as one in which the state had a view to establish political stability, as 
was Marcos’ objective in the Philippines.  The coalition that secured the rent 
streams represented by the coffee levies in Colombia was essentially a coalition 
that championed production through smallholders in order to address the social 
problems that coffee-estate-based production systems wrought: including those 
arising from land concentration and the living conditions of landless hired 
labourers, upon which large coffee haciendas were based. Saether posits that 
among Antioqueno politicians and intellectuals, there was a belief that the large 
coffee estate-based system was the root cause of the unrest, and that it was 
essential to create independent smallholders. He proposes that the creation of an 
agrarian structure based on smallholding producers was of utmost important for 
the conservative government of the 1920s. He said that, for example, the minister 
of industry in the late 1920s believed that it was better for the landowners in 
central coffee zones to sell off their land to settlers and tenants and concentrate 
on the business of commercialising coffee (Saether, 1999, pp. 143-144).   
Examining the historical origins of the institutional framework for the collection 
of  levies from the Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors reveals an 
important variation in the political economy underpinning the respective rent 
settlements:  the extent of the alignment between the political motivations of the 
original purveyors of the rent-creating institutional framework and the productive 
uses of the rents arising. In the Philippines, the motivations of an authoritarian 
leader wishing to consolidate his political base and stabilise his regime was the 
political basis for the rent settlement in the coconut sector. While I have argued 
that the motivation for establishing political stability could not be discounted in 
Colombia, the stability that the rent settlement fostered in Colombia emanated 
from the productive uses of the coffee levies in the smallholding coffee sector. In 
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the Philippines, Marcos did not need for the rents to be mobilised productively to 
achieve his political ends, he only needed his chosen political agents to have 
exclusive access to the rents.  But perhaps even more importantly, the analysis in 
this section hints at variations in broader structures of power that explain why 
producers associations can set the agenda for productive rent allocation in 
Colombia, but not in the Philippines. In Colombia, the coffee producers were 
central to the political coalition establishing the rent-creating institutional 
framework: because of their position as a fulcrum in national political contests, 
the politicians in the coalition needed to accommodate them and incorporate their 
interests in rent allocation strategies. In the Philippines, coconut producers were 
not as significant to Marcos’ political project. 46 In other words, it is evident from 
examining the origins of the rent settlement that Colombian coffee producers 
possessed political autonomy and bargaining power that  Philippine coconut 
producers did not. 
 
Conclusion 
I have explored in this chapter the political economy foundations of the power 
exercised by Philippine coconut and Colombia coffee producers. I explained the 
historical origins of the power exercised by COCOFED in the Philippines and 
FEDECAFE in Colombia – from the perspective of the national political 
economy, and from the sectoral perspective. Based on a political economy 
perspective writ large, I explained how the political power of these producers 
associations was articulated within national economies where states faced similar 
struggles with economic transformation typified by late developers.  
I have provided evidence for four important sector-specific variations in the 
Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors that help explain differences in 
the power and organisational robustness of the producers associations in these 
sectors. First, while both were important sources of foreign exchange earnings, 
Colombian coffee earnings accounted for a larger share of national export 
earnings for a longer time.  Thus, the political power consequently exercised by 
                                                 
46
 In Chapter 5, it will be revealed that the lack of political muscle exercised by coconut 
producers is not specific to the period under Marcos. In the period during which the rent 
settlement was contested, coconut producers continued to rely on political intermediaries to 
exercise influence on the regulation of continuing rent streams. This hints at a broader political 
puzzle that will need to be explored: what it is about the structure of power in the Philippines that 
leaves small coconut producers  reliant on political intermediaries from outside the sector.  
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the FEDECAFE could be partly explained by the sector’s intimate links with 
Colombia’s broader national economic interests, including macroeconomic 
stability. Second, while production in these sectors both can be largely typified as 
smallholder-based, Colombian coffee producers had relatively larger 
landholdings and lower rates of tenancy. This meant that the land size and 
ownership, as indicators of the base of political power were more significant in 
Colombia. Third, the historical basis of productive expansion in the two sectors 
provided different conditions for collective action. The imprints of the American 
colonial legacy in the Philippine coconut sector were such that collective action 
was not necessary for the sector to compete internationally. In the Colombian 
coffee sector, the terms of engagement with the international market in the early 
20
th
 century were vigorous and competitive, and formed an important 
background in the formation of the FEDECAFE, and as such in securing 
collective action among coffee producers.  Finally, I have also shown how 
variations in the political origins of the rent settlement in the two sectors meant 
that the one that obtained in the Philippines was governed mainly by the political 
calculations of a strongman president, while in Colombia there was a political 
coalition that wanted to see the coffee sector prosper through the organisation of 
production around smallholders.  
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Chapter 3. The mobilisation of coconut levies in the Philippines: rents, 
wealth and their claimants 
 
 
How were the levies mobilised, what rent entitlements were generated as a result 
and who laid claims to them? In this chapter and the next, I explain the chief 
features of the ‘rent settlement’ associated with levies, including: the sources of 
rent streams, the types of rents created and the beneficiaries of these rent streams. 
This chapter presents Philippine case; the next, the Colombian case. 
In the Philippines, coconut levy funds were invested in enterprises within and 
beyond the coconut sector; and used in programmes that transferred income from 
coconut producers to various economic sectors as well as individuals – all in the 
name of promoting the development of the coconut sector and the welfare of 
coconut farmers.  In this chapter, I recount the story of how the original goals 
were subverted to cause redistributive transfers. In a nutshell, I thus characterise 
in this chapter the objects and subjects of the rent settlement: the types of rents 
generated as a result of the modes of mobilising the coconut levies in the 
Philippines and claimants to the rent streams. 
In the first two sections of this chapter, I provide an overview of how coconut 
levies came to be collected and mobilised. In the first section, I explain how in a 
span of ten years, mostly through presidential decrees, Ferdinand Marcos 
engineered the collection of the levies. In the second section, I provide an 
overview of how they were mobilised from 1970 to 1982, based on official 
reports of the Philippine government, which were released after Marcos had been 
ousted from power in 1986. Then, in the following sections, I describe major 
groups of rent streams that could be associated with key modes of fund 
mobilisation, and the claimants to these. The first of these are rents arising from 
the use of coconut levies in a state-led bid to concentrate power in coconut oil 
milling and trade.  The second set relates to transfers purposively allocated to an 
associate of Marcos, who was not originally from the coconut sector but 
benefitted immensely from the Marcos period rent settlement. The third relates to 
capital accumulated as a result of the investment decisions of firms established 
through the mobilisation of coconut levies. 
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Aside from being associated with among the most important uses of the 
levies, in terms of their shares in disbursements, I propose that three groups of 
rent streams I highlight in this chapter are most illustrative of the nature of the 
rent settlement that obtained. In particular, they illustrate how rents associated 
with coconut levies in the Philippines mostly led to a process of wealth creation 
that was linked to conditions for neither expanding production nor the real 
income of coconut producers.  Being so they underpin a process of agricultural 
surplus extraction of the worst kind, where the wealth created out of the forced 
contributions of coconut producers was the kind that did not expand the 
productive capacity of  the sector – in sharp contrast to what happened with the 
modes of coffee levy mobilisation in Colombia.  
 
Purposive rent allocation by a strongman president: an overview 
President Ferdinand Marcos utilised the expansive executive authority accorded 
to him under Martial Law to engineer the collection and mobilisation of the 
coconut levies. Through a raft of presidential decrees, he effected the collection 
of levies from 1970-1982 in the amount of PhP9.7bn (£138mn)  (Commission on 
Audit, 1997).  To be sure, the story of coconut levies begins more than a year 
before Martial Law was declared in September 1972. But the series of 
presidential decrees and executive orders penned by Marcos between 1973 and 
1982 made three things possible: the dramatic increase in the amounts levied, the 
expansion of the levies’ authorised uses, and the centralisation of control of levy 
collections by a delimited set of individuals.  
The levies collectively called ‘coconut levies’ in this dissertation pertain to the 
levies that constituted the following special funds; the Coconut Industry Fund 
(CIF), the Coconut Consumer Stabilisation Fund (CCSF), the Coconut Industry 
Development Fund (CIDF), and the Coconut Industry Stabilisation Fund (CISF). 
These levies all came in the form of taxes that were borne by coconut producers. 
They are distinct but inter-related, and their key features are summarised in Table 
3.1, all elements of which I explain fully in this section. The breakdown of the 
collections throughout the period they were being collected is presented in Table 
3.2. It shows that the CCSF levy accounts for about 70 per cent of the collection, 
while the CIDF levy accounts for about 25 per cent. 
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Table 3.1 Four Coconut Levies Collected during the Marcos Years:  
Legal Basis and Key Elements of the Relevant Laws 
 
Levy Legal basis Date 
enacted 
Amount of levy and 
contributor 
Purposes of the levy 
Coconut Investment 
Fund (CIF) levy 
RA No. 6260. An 
Act Instituting a 
Coconut 
Investment Fund 
and Creating a 
Coconut 
Investment for the 
Administration 
Thereof 
June 1971 PhP 55 centavos for every 
100 kilos of copra or its 
equivalent in coconut 
products levied on farmers 
o Establish a private company owned by 
farmers to invest in coconut-based 
agricultural and industrial enterprises  
o Shoulder the administrative costs of fund 
collection 
o Support the organisational activities of 
the duly recognised national coconut 
farmers’ federation 
Coconut Consumer 
Stabilisation Fund 
(CCSF) levy 
PD No. 276. 
Establishing a 
Coconut 
Consumers 
Stabilization Fund 
August 
1973 
PhP 15 for every 100 kilos of 
copra or its equivalent in 
coconut products (initial rate, 
may be revised by the PCA) 
levied on farmers 
o Subsidize the sale of coconut-based 
products 
 PD No. 414. 
Amending PD 232 
or the Act Creating 
a Philippine 
Coconut Authority 
April 1974  In addition to item above: 
o Refund premium export duties collected 
on copra 
o Invest in processing plants, research and 
development extension services to the 
coconut industry 
 PD No. 755. 
Approving the 
Credit Policy for 
the Coconut 
Industry as 
Recommended by 
the Philippine 
Coconut Authority 
and Providing 
Funds Therefor 
July 1975  In addition to items above:  
o Pay for the acquisition of a commercial 
bank to be owned by coconut farmers and 
established for their benefit  
 PD No. 961. An 
Act to Codify the 
Laws Dealing with 
the Development 
of the Coconut and 
Other Palm Oil 
Industry and for 
Other Purposes 
July 1976 Levied on copra exporters, 
oil millers, desiccators and 
other end-users of copra 
In addition to items above: 
o Finance the development and operating 
expenses of the COCOFED 
o Finance the establishment and operation 
of industries and commercial enterprises 
in the coconut and other palm oil industry 
o Finance establishment of the Coconut 
Industry Development Fund (CIDF) and 
thereafter allocate a portion of CCSF 
collection to CIDF 
 PD No. 1468. 
Revising PD 961 
June 1978  o Same as those specified in PD 961, 
except that entitlement to consumer 
subsidies now limited to oil mills and/or 
refineries owned and controlled by 
coconut farmers thru the commercial 
bank acquired under PD 755 
Coconut Industry 
Development Fund 
(CIDF) levy 
PD No. 582 November 
1974 
PhP 20 per 100 kilos of 
copra or its equivalent in 
products, levied on farmers 
o Finance the establishment, operation and 
maintenance of a hybrid coconut seed nut 
farm, including purchasing all the seed 
nuts produced by this farm produces by 
the said farm 
o Defray the cost of implementing the 
nationwide replanting programme 
 PD No. 961 July 1976 Levied on copra exporters, 
oil millers, desiccators and 
other end-users of copra in 
the event that CCSF levy is 
lifted 
In addition to items above: 
o Utilise any balance after seed nut farm 
and replanting programme costs to invest 
for the benefit of coconut farmers 
 PD No. 1468 June 1978  o Specifically authorises bank to undertake 
investment for any balance left after 
financing farm and replanting programme 
costs.  
(continued in the next page) 
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Table 3.1 Four Coconut Levies Collected during the Marcos Years:  
Legal Basis and Key Elements of the Relevant Laws (cont’d) 
 
Levy 
 
Legal basis Date 
enacted 
Amount of levy and 
contributor 
Purposes of the levy 
Coconut Industry 
Stabilisation Fund 
(CISF) levy 
PD No. 1841. 
Prescribing a 
System of 
Financing the 
Socio-Economic 
and Developmental 
Program for the 
Benefit of the 
Coconut Farmers 
and Accordingly 
Amending the 
Laws Thereon 
October 
1981 
PhP 50 per 100 kilos of 
copra or its equivalent, levied 
on copra exporters, oil 
millers, refiners, desiccators 
and other end-users for the 
first five years, PhP 41.50 
thereafter (see item (f) in the 
next column for reason) 
o Finance cost of coconut replanting 
programme  
o Defray the cost of the scholarship 
programme of COCOFED 
o Defray the cost of the life and accident 
insurance for coconut farmers 
o Defray the operating expenses of 
COCOFED  
o Defray the operating expenses of PCA 
o Defray the costs of the coconut industry 
rationalisation programme for five years 
 PD No. 1842. 
Amending Certain 
Provisions of PD 
1841 and Creating 
a Coconut Reserve 
Fund 
 A percentage of the 
prevailing copra equivalent 
of the world market price of 
coconut oil, levied on copra 
exporters, oil millers, 
refiners, desiccators and 
other end-users  
o Support socio-economic and 
developmental programmes for the 
benefit of coconut farmers and the 
coconut industry 
o Support the Coconut Reserve Fund, used 
to support socio-economic and 
developmental programmes at times of 
depressed world prices for coconut 
Source: Presidential Decrees specified 
 
Table 3.2 Total Coconut Levies Collected (excluding CIF Levy),  
as of 1997, by Type of Levy 
 
Type of levy 
Collection 
(in PhP bn) 
Share in total 
(in %) 
CCSF 6.67 68.90 
CIDF 2.37 24.48 
CISF 0.62 6.40 
Others 0.02 2.00 
Total 9.68  
Source: Commission on Audit (1997) 
 
The CIF levy: setting the pattern  
The story begins in June 1971, when Philippine Congress passed Republic Act 
(RA) No. 6260, promulgating the collection of the Coconut Investment Fund 
levy, a levy of PhP 5.5 per metric ton (MT) of copra charged on the first 
domestic sale of copra.  This is the only statute related to the collection of 
coconut levies that was enacted by Philippine Congress; the rest were 
presidential decrees and executive orders.  
RA No. 6260 stipulated that CIF levy collections were to be used by the 
government to underwrite the Coconut Investment Company (CIC), a company 
to be capitalised in the amount of PhP 100 mn through the levy collections, and 
also established under RA No. 6260 to administer the CIF. The goal of collecting 
PhP 100 mn was achieved in 1982 and the CIC was thus formally constituted. As 
can be seen from Table 3.1, the purpose of the fund in setting up the CIC was to 
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allow coconut farmers to invest in shoring up the commercial and industrial 
capacity of the sector and for them to directly participate in related activities. 
Only a part of the levy collections –PhP30 centavos per MT of copra – was 
earmarked for the direct use of the producers’ association, at this point unnamed.  
The defunct Philippine Coconut Administration (PHILCOA) was identified in 
RA No. 6260 as the agency responsible for administering the collection. The 
system of collection devised by PHILCOA is one whereby coconut farmers were 
charged the levy during the first domestic sale of copra but it was the last 
domestic buyers in the trading chain (i.e., desiccators, millers, oil processors and 
exporters) that remitted the levy to the PCA (Manapat, 1991, p 174; David, 1992, 
pp. 16-18). The coconut farmer was thus paid a farm gate price with the levy 
deducted, and buyers passed the levy down through the marketing chain until 
they reached the farmer. 
 The CIF levy represented a miniscule portion of total coconut levies collected 
during the Marcos years – the PhP100mn CIF levy collected from 1972 to 1982 
accounted for only one per cent of the total coconut levies collected. But it was 
important as it set the template for the design of the more substantial levies that 
followed: its mode of collection, its designation as coconut farmer-owned funds 
held in trust by the government, and the legal access to the fund bestowed upon a 
private producers’ association, which in later laws would be explicitly identified 
as COCOFED. 
 
Increasing the rate of taxation, expanding the uses 
The first of the coconut levies-related presidential decrees enacted during the 
Martial Law period was Presidential Decree (PD) No. 276, which was signed 
into law in July 1973. PD No. 276 promulgated what would turn out to be the 
more substantial coconut levy and the source of the contested rent streams in the 
post-Marcos years: the Coconut Consumer Stabilisation Fund (CCSF) levy, 
collected from August 1973 to May 1981.  
Unlike the CIF levy, which was primarily collected for investment purposes, 
the CCSF levy was initially collected to subsidise consumer prices of coconut-
based products like cooking oil at a time when world prices for oils and fats were 
very high. But a more important distinction between the two was the amount of 
the levy: PhP 150 per MT of copra, or a tax rate that is more than 900 times 
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larger than the original levy, and specified as an ‘initial rate’ subject to changes. 
Throughout the period of implementation, the CCSF levy increased from this 
initial rate to a peak of PhP 1000 per copra MT in 1974; its annual weighted 
average rate vacillating between PhP 300-800 (Clarete & Roumasset, 1983, p. 
15)  
The CCSF levy was supposed to be temporary and used only to subsidise 
consumers of coconut products like cooking oils and detergents. As could be 
seen in Table 3.1, a series of presidential decrees issued by Marcos between 1974 
until 1978 had the effect of making it a permanent levy and expanding its uses 
beyond subsidising consumers of coconut products.  In particular, not even one 
year into the implementation of the levy, PD No. 414 was signed into law in 
April 1974 authorising the use of the CCSF levy for refunding premium duties 
paid by exporters and investing in processing plants, research and development 
and extension services. Then, just a little over a year later, in May 1975, its use 
for the acquisition of a commercial bank ‘for the benefit of coconut farmers’ was 
authorised through PD No. 755. This bank was what came to be the United 
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), whose board became the most important 
conduit for controlling the rent settlement. And when coconut levies-related 
decrees were consolidated in July 1975 into PD No. 961, also known as the 
Coconut Industry Code, COCOFED was explicitly named for the first time as the 
producers’ organisation that had an authorised share in the levy collections.  PD 
No. 961 also streamlined the bureaucracy governing the coconut sector, by 
creating a public corporation named the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), 
whose administration was put directly under the Office of the President, and 
abolishing three other agencies
47
, whose functions were transferred to the PCA. 
Meanwhile, the collection of a third levy, the Coconut Industry Development 
Fund levy, was authorised in November 1974 through PD No. 582.
48
 As can be 
seen in Table 3.1, its original mandate was to finance a re-planting programme 
                                                 
47
The three agencies were the Coconut Coordinating Council, the Philippine Coconut 
Administration, and the Philippines Coconut Research Institute. 
48 This decree essentially carved the CIDF out of CCSF levy collections, directing PCA to take 
PhP100mn out of the CCSF to provide the initial funds for the CIDF and then thereafter remit to 
the fund at least PhP20 per copra MT of the CCSF levy collected. It could be seen as a distinct 
levy because the decree also directed the continued and permanent collection of the CIDF levy if 
and when the CCSF levy ceased to be collected. 
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and the establishment and operations of a coconut seed nut farm established for 
the same programme.  But, as also shown in the table, some of the decrees that 
expanded the uses of the CCSF levy did the same for CIDF levy. In particular, 
PD No. 961 allowed the use of fund balances in excess of what was necessary for 
the re-planting programme for investment in coconut-based economic 
enterprises. Meanwhile, PD No. 1468 specifically authorised UCPB to undertake 
these very investments. It was this mandate that the UCPB then fulfilled when it 
established the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF), which in turn was used 
to purchase shares of stocks in companies whose ownership would be the object 
of legal contestation after 1986.   
In May 1981, Marcos enacted PD No. 1699, which suspended the collection 
of CIDF and CCSF levies. To continue financing the activities funded by the 
levies, the decree directed the PCA to collect equivalent contributions from 
coconut exporters. However, just about five months after he enacted this decree, 
Marcos signed into law PD No. 1841, which re-imposed the levies under a new 
name, the Coconut Industry Stabilisation Fund (CISF) levy. The decree further 
increased the minimum rate of the levy to PhP500 per MT of copra. Again, as 
shown in Table 3.1, the funds’ specified uses encompassed coconut farmer 
welfare, organisational and investment objectives and the continued contribution 
to the CIDF.  
In summary, in a span of ten years from 1971 to 1982, Marcos penned ten 
decrees that legalised the collection of levies, which were remitted to funds with 
specified purposes that included: consumer subsidisation, financing the 
development and organisational activities of the COCOFED and PCA, as well as 
investments in commercial, industrial and financial activities that effected the 
monopolisation of exporting and processing ends of production.   
 
An accounting of the coconut levies 
Collections of the coconut levies described above, as shown in Table 3.3 
amounting to almost PhP 10 bn– having also been inscribed in Marcos’ 
presidential decrees as ‘privately owned’ – were never subjected to public audit 
during the twelve years that they were collected from 1970 to 1982.  It was only 
after Marcos had already been deposed from power when the uses of these funds 
were officially scrutinised. In 1986, the Commission on Audit (COA) reviewed 
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the disbursements of the funds administered by the UCPB and the United 
Coconut Oil Mills (UNICOM).
49
 In 1993, both the COA
50
 and a specially formed 
committee
51
 under then president Fidel Ramos also did an official accounting of 
the total collections as they were disbursed by the UCPB, PCA and COCOFED. 
Finally, in 1997
52
, COA released audit reports on the operations of the Coconut 
Industry Investment Fund. Of the government reports on the uses of coconut levy 
funds published since 1986, only those released in 1993 provided a full picture of 
exactly how total collections were mobilised.
53
  In this section, I utilise the 
unique insights that this report contains to provide an overview of the key modes 
of fund mobilisation of the coconut levies. 
The audited disbursement figures published by COA in 1993 are featured in 
Table 3.3. I grouped together these disbursements into four categories: 
investments, support for coconut production and producers welfare, support for 
price stabilisation, and extra-sectoral transfers. In what follows, I will explain 
how each of these category of uses were rationalised. 
 
Investments 
Investments in the establishment and/or operation of a slew of enterprises in and 
beyond the coconut sector accounted for the biggest share of the disbursements: 
PhP 4.1 billion or almost 42 per cent of total allocations, as shown in Table 3.3 
These disbursements could be further classified into two, namely funds to: 
purchase a commercial bank; and establish and operate enterprises in the name of 
rationalising the coconut milling sector. 
 
                                                 
49
 The findings were published as a five-volume government document, ‘Reports on the Audit of 
the Coconut Levy Allocations administered by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and 
the United Coconut Mills, Inc (UNICOM)’ (Commission on Audit, 1986d) 
50
 SAO Report 93-02.  
51
 Herein after the ‘Pelaez Report’, an audit report done by the Presidential Ad-Hoc Coconut 
Levy Funds Audit Committee, headed by former Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez. Pelaez faced 
attempted assassination incident under Marcos, at a time when he was questioning uses of 
coconut levy funds. 
52
 This government document is entitled ‘SAO Report 97-10 on the Audit of the Coconut 
Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) in Oil Mills’. (Commission on Audit, 1997) 
53
 Arturo Liquete, a PCA official whom I interviewed in the Philippines on May 3, 2009, raised 
an important caveat about the reliability of the data in these reports: the figures relate to the 
monies disbursed, but not necessarily all that was collected. Note also that the reports do not 
include the CIF levy. 
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The technical rationale for the purchase of a bank was articulated in PD No. 
755, a presidential decree promulgated by Marcos in 1975: the bank was to be a 
means for providing the “permanent solution to their [coconut farmers’] 
perennial credit problems” (in the preamble of "Approving the Credit Policy for 
the Coconut Industry as Recommended by the Philippine Coconut Authority and 
Providing Funds Therefor," 1975, p. 164; de la Rosa, 2000).  In support of this 
Table 3.3 Audited Disbursements of the Coconut Levy Funds: 1970-1982 
Disbursements
a 
 Amount % of total 
Investments 4,061,291,669.17 41.88 
  Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF)
b
 2,572,143,884.69 26.53 
  UNICOM operations
 c
 1,189,735,210.94 12.27 
  Copra Price Stabilization Fund (CPSF)
p
 144,922,064.14 1.49 
  Acquisition of controlling interest at UCPB
q
 115,520,000.00 1.19 
  Debt service for 16 mothballed oil mills
d
 38,970,509.40 0.40 
Production and farmers' welfare
e
 3,223,798,245.34 33.25 
  Replanting
f0
 1,147,176,054.75 11.83 
  Insurance Fund
g
 994,941,396.29 10.26 
  Development and Socioeconomic Projects for Coco Farmers
h
 759,911,891.34 7.84 
  PCA Research and Development [R and D and operating    
   expenses]
i
 
242,892,132.30 2.51 
  Fertiliser Distribution Program
j
 52,521,977.03 0.54 
  Census Committee
k
 23,000,000.00 0.24 
  Hagenmaier Aqueous Coconut Processing Project
l
 2,659,959.82 0.03 
  Distribution of Stock Certificate of UCPB to Coco Farmers
m
 694,833.81 0.01 
Price stabilisation 2,320,349,835.16 23.94 
  Subsidy
n
 2,147,207,603.38 22.15 
  Premium Duty
o
 173,142,231.78 1.79 
Extra-sectoral transfers 90,000,000.00 0.93 
  Donation to Lungsod ng Kabataan [Children’s Hospital]
 r
 50,000,000.00 0.52 
  Donation to Ang Tahanan Maharlika [Coconut Palace]
 s
 40,000,000.00 0.41 
Total 9,695,439,749.67 100.00 
 Source of basic data: Commission on Audit, 1997 
a
Main categories of disbursements are mine, but specific items are as they appear in the COA 1997 report 
b
Investment fund established to procure shares of stocks in corporations involved in post-production activities in the coconut sector. But also   
ultimately used for investments not strictly related to vertical integration, including: establishment of an insurance company, a management firm, 
and a cocoa plantation. 
c
Used to establish the Coconut Industry Rationalisation Fund (CIRF), a fund mobilised for the use of the United Coconut Oil Mills Inc (UNICOM).  
includes expenditures on price subsidies for copra procurement by CIIF-owned oil mills 
d
Used to service the debts of mothballed private coconut mills bought by UNICOM as part of the vertical integration programme  
e
Includes administrative costs, see footnotes j, l, n of this table 
f
Used to finance a nationwide replanting programme 
g
Used to pay out insurance premiums and death claims of coconut farmers 
h
Used by COCOFED for scholarship programmes to children of coconut farmers and as capital for income-generating projects  
i
Used to fund PCA’s operating expenses, including research and development programmes 
j
Used by PCA for a fertiliser distribution programme 
k
Funded nationwide survey to determine qualified coconut farmers entitled to shares of stock of UCPB and CIIF-funded companies; also used to  
finance conventions of COCOFED chapters and the distribution of stock dividends of UCPB and insurance certificates 
l
Technical research project on the viability of extracting water  while extracting oil and protein materials from fresh coconut, administered by PCA 
m
Fund for COCOFED to print and distribute stock certificates to coconut farmers 
n
Paid out to oil millers and manufacturers of coconut-based consumer products to enable them to sell the same at government controlled prices 
o
Paid out to exporters to reimburse them for premium duties levied on them 
p
Disbursed to COCOFED to set-up copra buying stations, to help stabilise copra prices in 1973
  
q
Cost of acquiring  controlling interest in the First United Bank (FUB), later re-named United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)  and additional  
infusion to meet the capitalisation requirement of the Central Bank for turning UCPB into a universal bank 
r
Paid out as donation for building a hospital, one of the pet projects of Imelda Marcos, wife of the president 
s
Paid out as donation for building Coconut Palace,another pet project of Imelda Marcos 
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aim, the presidential decree specified that all collections of coconut levies unused 
by PCA for their operations and for the purposes of price stabilisation were to be 
deposited interest-free in the bank. That coconut levies collected from farmers 
were deposited interest-free meant that the bank had access to significant and 
virtually free capital that it could then deploy as loanable funds. The official 
purpose was to mobilise these as production loans for coconut producers at 
preferential rates of interest. While this investment accounted for only about one 
per cent of total levy collections, the purchase of this bank was important for two 
reasons, which I want to flag now but will be explaining at length both in the 
forthcoming sections of this chapter and in Chapter 5. First, the bank became an 
important controlling conduit of the rent settlement as its board was assigned the 
important task of administratively controlling investments of the coconut levies. 
Second, it solidified the place in controlling the rent settlement of a presidential 
associate, Eduardo Cojuangco, who also negotiated the deal to purchase the 
bank. 
The UCPB was in fact at the helm of administering the bulk of investments of 
coconut levies that were made in the name of vertical integration and the 
rationalisation of the coconut milling sector, the group of disbursements that 
accounted for a lion’s share of the uses of the coconut levy funds.54  Raising 
capital to develop the capacity for higher value-added coconut production had 
been one of the objectives of imposing the first coconut levy collected in 1970. 
But by the mid-1970s, the problem besetting the sector was one of over-capacity 
in the coconut oil milling sector.
55
  This resulted in cut-throat competition for 
copra, and marketing inefficiencies, which in turn severely weakened the 
country’s competitive position in the world market for coconut products. In this 
                                                 
54
 The bank’s  authority to undertake such investments was first specified in 1976 in the Coconut 
Industry Code (PD 961, and as revised in PD 1468), particularly Article 3, Section 9, which 
states: 
“…the bank acquired for the benefit of the coconut farmers under PD 755 is hereby given full power and 
authority to make investments in the form of shares of stock in corporations organized for the purpose of 
engaging in the establishment and the operation of industries and commercial activities and other allied 
business undertakings relating to the coconut and other palm oils industry.”  
55
 In the 1960s, the lifting of exchange rate controls in the Philippines and external factors like 
advances in transportation in the 1960s enhanced incentives for coconut export production. The 
1960s and 1970s was thus a period of rapid expansion of coconut production. In the 1970s, the 
Board of Investments (BOI) offered incentives for new investment in coconut mills. Hawes 
(1987, p. 67) suggests that BOI severely overestimated projected copra production, leading to the 
rate of increase in the country’s milling capacity far outstripping the rate of coconut production. 
For example, between 1974 and 1978, the average rate of increase in copra production was only 3 
percent per annum while milling capacity rose by 19 percent. 
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context, investments in post-production processing and trading enterprises took 
on a new logic: ‘vertical integration’ to rationalise the milling sector and 
effectively centralise market power in these sections of the value chain.  The 
Marcos government posited that the crisis of over-capacity in the milling sector 
required the establishment of UNICOM, which would pool and coordinate the 
resources of coconut farmers and oil millers in buying, milling and marketing 
coconut and its by-products  ("Letter of Intent Regarding the Rationalisation of 
the Coconut Oil Milling Industry," 1979). The idea of ‘vertical integration’ was 
operationalized through the mobilisation of coconut levies in investments that 
effectively nationalised the milling and trading of coconut by-products.  
To undertake said investments, the bank established the Coconut Industry 
Investment Fund, for which, as shown in Table 3.3, UCPB mobilised PhP 2.57 
billion. Table 3.4 shows a breakdown of the investments made through the 
investment fund. It shows that almost 90 per cent or PhP 2.31 billion of the fund 
was used to procure shares of stocks to buy out owners of or establish 
corporations involved in: the processing of coconut oil (‘oil mills and 
subsidiaries’), the manufacture of coconut oil-based chemical products (‘United 
Coconut Chemical Incorporated’),  the trading of unprocessed coconut (‘copra 
trading companies’), and the transportation and marketing of coconut-based 
exports (‘United Coconut Planters International’ and ‘Iligan Bay Express 
Corporation’). Interestingly, the rest was invested in corporations not directly 
related to the goal of vertical integration, including: a cocoa plantation (‘United 
Cocoa Plantation’), a management firm (‘United Coconut Planters 
Management’) and an insurance firm (‘United Coconut Planters Life Assurance 
Corporation’). 
UNICOM was established in 1977, with PhP 544.2 million from the CIIF (as 
shown in Table 3.4) infused as equity; and an additional PhP 1.9 billion from the 
coconut levy collections (as shown in Table 3.3), to finance its copra buying 
operations. This additional PhP 1.9 bn went to a fund called the Coconut Industry 
Rationalisation Fund (CIRF), set up in 1980 to support the goals of vertical 
integration. The official remit of the CIRF were the following: (1) to purchase 
copra, coconuts and husked nuts; (2) to acquire or lease property and equipment 
necessary for purchasing copra; (3) to reimburse UNICOM for the difference 
between the price at which it bought copra and the price at which the equivalent 
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coconut oil was sold in the open market from 1979 to 1980; and (4) to reimburse 
CIIF-owned trading companies for the difference between the price at which they 
purchased copra and the price at which copra was sold to the mills from 1976 to 
1980 (Commission on Audit, 1986c, pp. 2-4).  Strictly speaking then, a portion of 
the CIRF was utilised as price subsidies to cushion UNICOM and CIIF-owned 
trading companies against price fluctuations in the markets for coconut oil and 
copra, respectively. The COA audit of CIRF indicates that a maximum of PhP 85 
mn for UNICOM reimbursements and PhP 35 million for CIIF-owned trading 
companies were to be set aside.
56
 (Commission on Audit, 1986c, p. 4)  
The audit report also shows that it was the CIRF that was used by UNICOM 
to acquire 16 privately owned mills in the amount of PhP 184.94 mn, and for the 
sole purpose of mothballing them. The vertical integration-related disbursement 
in the amount of PhP 39 mn for ‘debt service’ shown in Table 3.3 was used to 
pay off the debts of these mothballed mills.  
Meanwhile, PhP 144 mn of coconut levy funds were also utilised to set up the 
Copra Price Stabilization Fund (CPSF), as shown in Table 3.3. This is the only 
allocation under the heading of investments that was not controlled by UCPB and 
UNICOM. The name of the fund is a bit of a misnomer as one would surmise 
that this allocation was better categorised under ‘price subsidies’. However, the 
fund was used not to subsidise copra prices but to establish the COCOFED 
Marketing Corporation (COCOMARK), which in turn capitalised 40 copra 
marketing centres. The technical justification for these copra buying points was 
to delimit the role of traders and middlemen in the marketing chain and for 
coconut farmers to be engaged in the direct buying of copra. 
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 Unfortunately, the COA report did not provide a breakdown of actual disbursements made for 
these functions. 
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 Table 3.4 CIIF Investments: 1977-1980  
Companies Amount invested (in PhP) 
Oil mills and subsidiaries   1,176,915,801.55 
  United Coconut Oil Mills Inc. (UNICOM) 544,200,000.00  
  Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEX) 246,710,383.60  
  Legaspi Oil Company and Subsidiaries (LEGOIL) 210,199,472.50  
  San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) 132,607,461.00  
  Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mill, Inc. (SOLCOM) 43,198,484.45  
United Coconut Chemicals Incorporated (UNICHEM)  864,250,000.00 
Copra Trading Companies  258,000,000.00 
  Philippine Coconut Planters Trading Group 158,000,000.00  
  Ten Trading Companies 100,000,000.00  
United Coconut Planters International  147,610,000.00 
United Cocoa Plantation Incorporated  90,000,000.00 
United Coconut Planters Life Assurance Corporation  16,250,100.00 
United Coconut Planters Management  10,000,000.00 
Iligan Bay Express Corporation  9,000,000.00 
Total  2,572,025,901.55 
Source: COA, 1986 
 
In summary, a total of PhP 4.1 bn of coconut levy collections were mobilised 
for investments. Of that amount, PhP 115 mn was used to establish a bank, which 
in turn was – on paper at least – tasked to leverage coconut levy deposits to serve 
the credit needs of the sector and was authorised to administer the portion of the 
coconut levies that were invested further.   PhP 3.89 bn was mobilised in support 
of shoring up monopoly power in the trading and processing of coconut products.  
PhP 2.31 bn of this amount was administered by the UCPB, PhP 145 mn by 
COCOFED and PhP 1.23 bn by UNICOM.  A little over PhP 100 mn was 
invested outside the coconut sector – in contravention of the levies avowed aims 
– in a cocoa plantation.   
 
Production and farmers’ welfare-related disbursements 
Production-related and/or coconut farmer welfare-related one-off projects 
constituted about one-third of the disbursements, or PhP 3.22 bn as shown in 
Table 3.3. Of this total amount, the biggest disbursement – PhP 1.15 bn – was 
used for a replanting programme administered by the Philippine Coconut 
Authority. 
From 1974 to 1982, coconut levies were also used to finance the 
administrative and operational costs (including research and development and the 
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provision of extension services) of PCA in the amount of PhP 759 mn. As shown 
in Table 3.3 PCA also used PhP 52.52 million of the coconut levy funds for a 
fertiliser distribution programme and PhP 2.7 million for technical research 
project on coconut processing.  
The remaining balance of these welfare-oriented disbursements were 
administered by either the UCPB or COCOFED, and related to two major types 
of expenditures: an insurance scheme for coconut farmers and socio-economic 
projects, primarily scholarship programmes for children of coconut farmers. As 
show in Table 3.4, UCPB used CIIF to invest PhP 16.25 mn in an insurance firm, 
the United Coconut Planters Life Assurance Corporation (COCOLIFE). The 
disbursement of PhP 994 mn for ‘insurance fund’ shown in Table 3.3 was then 
used by the UCPB to pay out insurance premiums of coconut farmers. 
Meanwhile, the item ‘development and socioeconomic projects for coconut 
farmers’ in Table 3.3 relate to the aforementioned scholarship programme 
overseen by COCOFED.  
I also categorised disbursements related to the distribution of UCPB stock 
certificates and COCOLIFE insurance certificates, shown in Table 3.3 as 
totalling the amount of PhP 2.67 million, in this category of investments. These 
expenditures were overseen by COCOFED and relate to the processes conducted 
(e.g. survey and conventions) to determine coconut farmers entitled to shares of 
stocks, and the associated administrative costs of distributing said stock 
certificates and insurance certificates. Because these expenditures related to the 
ability of coconut farmers to lay claim on the investments they made through the 
coconut levies, I classed them as ‘welfare’-related disbursements.  
 
Subsidies 
Price subsidies accounted for PhP 2.47 bn of the coconut levy fund uses, 
representing 25 per cent of the total disbursements. Table 3.3 shows that 87 per 
cent of these disbursements or PhP 2.15 bn, which is also the second biggest 
single use of the funds next to the CIIF investments.  There were two versions of 
this subsidy scheme funded through the use of CCSF levies. What was supposed 
to be a temporary measure to address extraordinary fluctuations in the world 
price of coconut oil was extended and later on implemented for a different 
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purpose – the shoring up of market power in the ‘farmer-owned’ coconut oil 
mills and refineries.  
The first was a direct subsidy to manufacturers of coconut oil-based products. 
Between 1973 and 1974, the price of coconut oil in the world market increased 
by 651 per cent. This trend was mirrored in the domestic price of coconut oil in 
the Philippines, where the price of coconut oil increased by 576 per cent (Oniki, 
1992, p. 80). As coconut oil is an input to consumer goods like cooking oil and 
laundry soap, this led to an equivalent increase in the price of these essential 
coconut oil-based household goods. The Marcos government responded to this 
situation by imposing price controls on their retail prices, and compensating 
manufacturers of said goods for the losses they incurred from selling at 
government-controlled prices. This subsidisation programme was implemented 
from 1973 to 1979. 
The second was a subsidy given to only coconut-farmer owned mills and 
refineries, established under the mantle of vertical integration and implemented 
from 1979-1982. Whereas before, manufacturers of coconut-based products 
could buy their copra and coconut oil requirements from the open market and be 
reimbursed the difference between the open market and PCA-determined base 
price, they became constrained to buy the same from UNICOM and its affiliates, 
as well as from COCOMARK, which offered the raw materials at the base price 
and were the only entities that received the direct subsidy payments from 
collections of the coconut levies (Tiglao, 1981, p. 89).
57
 
Meanwhile, the government also reimbursed copra and coconut oil exporters 
for payments made for a premium duty levied on them from 1974 to 1980. 
Marcos issued EO No. 425, imposing a tax rate of 30 per cent for copra exporters 
and 20 per cent for processed coconut products. This duty was imposed to enable 
the government to capture windfall gains made by exporters from any favourable 
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 Article III, Section 2a of the Revised Coconut Industry Code (PD No. 1468)  specifies the 
following: 
“When the national interest so requires, to provide a subsidy for coconut-based 
products the amount of which subsidy shall be determined on the basis of the base 
price of copra or its equivalent as fixed by the authority and the prices of coconut-
based products as fixed by the Price Control Council; provided however, that when the 
coconut farmers, who in effect shoulder the burden of the levies herein imposed, shall 
have owned or controlled … oil mills and/or refineries which manufacture coconut-
based consumer products, only such oil mills and/or refineries shall be entitled to the 
subsidy herein authorized” (underscoring mine) 
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market situation (Clarete & Roumasset, 1983, p. 17). Table 3.3 shows that PhP 
173 million was mobilised for the purpose of reimbursing exporters what they 
paid for the premium duties imposed on them, which in turn signified that 
coconut farmers paying the levies ended up bearing the burden of the premium 
duty. 
 
Extra-sectoral transfers 
Finally, PhP 90 mn of the coconut levy funds was mobilised to finance ‘vanity 
projects’ of Imelda Marcos, wife of the president – projects that had nothing to 
do with enhancing productivity in the coconut sector or the welfare of coconut 
farmers. As shown in Table 3.3, about PhP 50 mn of the funds was donated for 
building the ‘Coconut Palace’, described as a building made of coconut materials 
and used by the First Lady to entertain friends (Manapat, 1991, p. 184). Note 
from Table 3.3 that while this specific donation represented a miniscule share of 
coconut levy collections,  in absolute terms this is only PhP 2 mn-shy of the 
disbursement  for PCA’s fertiliser distribution programme. I propose that this is 
emblematic of the profligacy in the use of coconut levy funds – the extent to 
which it was treated as a ‘kitty fund’ for pet projects of those in power.  
In conclusion, I explained in this section how the mobilisation of coconut levy 
funds were during the time of Marcos was officially accounted for, and described 
the technocratic terms in which most of them were rationalised. I showed that 
investments to effect vertical integration accounted for a lion’s share of the 
disbursement. While expenditures for farmers’ welfare and productivity would 
appear to come second, I will show in the penultimate section of this chapter that 
at least one-third of that actually went to a presidential associate as a direct 
transfer. This implies that price subsidies actually accounted for the second most 
important node of fund mobilisation. Initially meant as a temporary measure to 
address an extraordinary fluctuation of world price of coconut oil, it instead 
became an important complement of the vertical integration programme.  If the 
discussion ended with these de jure uses of the coconut levies, it would appear 
like much of the coconut levies was mobilised around the productive goals of the 
sector, and indeed the welfare of coconut producers.  But in the section that 
follows, I document how these de jure uses were subverted to generate rents, and 
for whom. 
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Rents from state-engineered concentration of market power 
From 1979 to 1985, as a result of some of the investments of coconut levies 
described in the previous section, a group of coconut levy-financed enterprises 
dominated coconut oil milling and trade, and exercised concentrated market 
power in this top-end section of the value chain. As explained in the previous 
section, coconut levies were mobilised to either directly establish these 
enterprises or acquire majority shares of their stocks. The significance of these 
investments is best understood in light of the oligopolistic structure of the 
coconut processing and exporting markets in the Philippines.  
Even before the establishment of the coconut levy-funded quasi-state 
monopoly in coconut processing and trading, these ends of the value chain 
always had only a few agents – mostly foreign-owned firms – engaged in milling 
and manufacturing coconut oil and other by-products, and exporting coconut 
products. For example, Nyberg (1968, pp. 109-110) found that in 1965 there 
were 26 copra exporting firms. Of these, only 6 were Filipino-owned, which in 
turn accounted for only 19 per cent of the export volume. Hawes (1987b, pp. 62-
64) also showed how more than 95 per cent of the oil-milling capacity in 1965 
was accounted for by 9 firms, all of which were foreign-owned. In this context, 
the investments of coconut levy funds in five major coconut oil mills in the 
Philippines, seven oil mills based abroad, and 17 copra trading firms represented 
not only a major attempt to concentrate market power at the top-end of the value 
chain even further but also to nationalise ownership of – in the analysis of Intal 
and Power (1990, p. 184), even ‘dis-alienate’ [sic] or diminish foreign presence 
in – the industrial ends of the sector.  
Below, I explain details of exactly how coconut levy funds were mobilised to 
establish state-engineered monopoly power in the industrial end of the coconut 
sector and present evidence about how rents obtained were transferred and 
mobilised. 
 
Centralisation of market power 
From 1977 to 1980, a series of steps were undertaken by the state to centralise 
market power at the industrial end of the coconut sector, power that on paper was 
to be vested in a conglomerate of ‘farmer-owned’ enterprises. At the very core of 
all these was the use of coconut levy collections to buy among the biggest 
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coconut oil mills and refineries in the country and to subsidise their operations – 
underwriting the rise of monopsonist power in the domestic trading of copra and 
monopoly power in the international trading of coconut oil. To complement this 
strategy, state sponsored-policies embodying incentives that encouraged owners 
of private coconut oil mills to divest ownership and that barred further entry to 
the coconut oil manufacturing and exporting sectors were enforced. Hawes 
(1987b, pp. 55, 68-76) describes all these as constituting the “takeover” of the 
coconut industry, whereby Marcos effectively “transformed the coconut industry 
from one with little government regulation to one dominated by a quasi-state 
monopoly over both the milling of the raw material and the export of oil and 
other coconut products”.  Below I summarise the steps that were undertaken to 
effect this transformation.  
First, coconut levy funds were used to buy major coconut oil mills in the 
country.  The first acquisition was made in 1977: the Orcar Development 
Corporation Oil Mill, located in Mulanay, Quezon
58
  (Eleazar et al., 1980, p. 122; 
Manapat, 1991, p. 189) and later re-named the Southern Luzon Coconut Oil 
Mills. As shown in Table 3.4, PhP 43.2 mn of the CIIF was used to invest in this 
corporation (Commission on Audit, 1986a, p. 4; 1997, p. 15), of which PhP 13 
mn was used to pay the owner of the mill, the Teodoro Regala Group and PhP 30 
mn was infused as capital stock (Commission on Audit, 1986a, pp. Appendix C-
5). The deal to buy this corporation was modest compared to three other buy-outs 
funded by the coconut levies in 1979-1980. These acquisitions would be most 
illustrative of how profoundly coconut levy investments restructured the 
industry. 
The first of the three major acquisitions was that of the Legaspi Oil Company 
(LEGOIL) in February 1979. Tiglao (1981, p. 88) describes this as “one of the 
largest corporate takeovers in Philippine history”.  LEGOIL was bought in 
February 1979 from Japanese firm Mitsubishi Corporation, Philippine business 
conglomerate Ayala Corporation, and an individual named Dominador Lim 
(Commission on Audit, 1986a, pp. Appendix C-3) The sale involved all the 
assets of LEGOIL, including five subsidiaries engaged in coconut oil milling 
(including the Cagayan de Oro Oil Company), logging, barging operations and 
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 Mulanay, Quezon is a major centre of coconut production in northern Philippines. 
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international trading  (Tiglao, 1981, p. 88). LEGOIL alone milled a quarter of the 
total volume exported by the Philippines in 1965 (Boyce, 1993, p. 206; Hawes, 
1987b, p. 64).  Both Hawes (1987, p. 74) and Tiglao (1981, p. 88) claim that 
UCPB paid the owners PhP 158 mn in cash. One can deduce that a further PhP 
52 mn was infused in equity as the official audit report of the CIIF investment, as 
shown in Table 3.4, indicates a total investment of PhP 210 million. 
The second of the three acquisitions utilising coconut levies was that of 
Granexport Corporation and its subsidiaries, including coconut oil mills, 
refineries and a shipping firm, the Iligan Bay Express Corporation – all of which 
were sold to UNICOM in November 1979. Granexport was owned by the US-
based multinational Cargill Corporation. Like the LEGOIL mills, Granexport oil 
mills had a daily rated milling capacity of 1,000 MT, the only two corporations at 
that time with such a capacity and the biggest in the country (Hawes, 1987, pp. 
168-169).  A total of PhP 305 million of coconut levy funds were mobilised for 
this investment.
59
 
The third acquisition was that of the San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation 
(SPMC), a refinery that unlike LEGOIL mills could produce refined, edible 
coconut oil. SPMC was a subsidiary of the US-based Pacific Vegetable Oil 
Company and at the point of acquisition the largest processer and marketer of 
edible cooking oil in the Philippines (Eleazar et al., 1980, p. 129).  SPMC was 
purchased in 1980 and, as shown in Table 3.4, PhP 132.61 million of the coconut 
levy funds were invested in the corporation. 
LEGOIL and Granexport, along with a third private mill that, I will show 
below, was also going to be under the control of UNICOM, were considered “the 
big three” in the coconut oil milling industry in the Philippines and accounted for 
at least 60 per cent of milling capacity in 1980. With the further acquisition and 
corporate takeover that UNICOM oversaw, estimates of control of coconut oil 
volume exported exercised by coconut levy-funded enterprises ranged from 80 
per cent to 93 per cent (Tiglao, 1981, p. 88).  In summary, coconut levies, by way 
of funding the acquisition of the biggest oil mills in the country, were used to 
concentrate market power in the coconut oil milling sector. 
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 In Table 3.4, the amount invested of CIIF into Granexport is calculated at PhP 247.61 million. 
PhP 49.2 million of the investment is credited to UNICOM. PhP 9 million is credited to Iligan 
Bay Express Company, infused as equity consequently used by IBEC to invest in another 
subsidiary. 
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Second, UNICOM was established as a conglomerate of mills and trading 
companies, effectively acting as a ‘cartel’ that controlled both the milling and 
international trade of coconut oil (Manapat, 1991, p. 189).  UNICOM was 
originally incorporated in 1977 by lawyers from an established law firm in the 
Philippines called ACCRA
60
, which figured prominently not only in the ‘legal 
engineering’ of the ‘industry takeover’ but also in a take-over of a major blue-
chip corporation in the Philippines, in which coconut levy funded enterprises 
were mobilised and which will be explained in the last section of this chapter.  
In 1979, after LOI No. 925 was decreed by Marcos, coconut levy funds in the 
amount of PhP 495 mn were infused as equity capital into UNICOM, which at 
point of sale only had PhP 5 mn in paid-up capital. As has been pointed out, its 
avowed role was to address the underutilisation of installed oil milling capacities 
in the Philippines and to coordinate the marketing of coconut oil in the 
international market (Eleazar et al., 1980, p. 125).  Its investments into coconut 
oil mills and refineries in the Philippines and abroad, and its copra buying 
operations were the main instruments of the concentration of market power in the 
industry.  
UNICOM took charge of further acquisitions of coconut oil mills and 
refineries made after September 1979, in the Philippines and abroad.  It was 
UNICOM that took charge of the deal with Granexport described above. In 
general, UNICOM targeted for acquisition and take-over in the Philippines 
foreign-owned mills, and newer and modern Filipino-owned mills.
61
  (Hawes, 
1987b, p. 76) To soak up excess milling capacity in the country, UNICOM even 
bought non-operating oil mills for the sole purpose of mothballing them. The 
1986 COA report on the CIRF suggests that 16 of such mills were bought by 
UNICOM utilising PhP184.35 mn of the CIRF (Commission on Audit, 1986c, p. 
7).  A further PhP 35 mn of the coconut levy collections were used to pay for the 
debts of seven of these mills, shown in Table 3.3 as the item ‘debt service’.  
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 ACCRA is the acronym for the company’s name taken from its founding law partners: Angara 
Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (currently known as ACCRALAW). From a 
company founded in 1972 only a few months before President Ferdinand Marcos declared 
Martial Law, ACCRA rapidly grew in around a decade to become recognized by the 1980s as one 
of the country’s leading law firms. The law firm has also produced leading Philippine politicians 
that included founder Edgardo Angara who became Senate President and a number of others who 
went to hold Cabinet positions in various administrations. 
61
 These mills were the recipients of BOI incentives in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Aside from the Philippine-based mills, UNICOM also saw to the acquisition 
of at least seven foreign-based mills and refineries (Manapat, 1991, pp. 194-195). 
Two of these were acquired as subsidiaries of LEGOIL (i.e., Pan Pacific 
Commodities in the US and Legaspi Oil International in Hong Kong), one as a 
subsidiary of Granexport (i.e., Granexport Corporation USA), two were based in 
France (Nouvelles Huileries et Reffineries and Societe Anonyme de Produit 
Excel) and the rest were based in the US (i.e., Crown Oil Corporation and 
Coastal American Traders).
62
  
Meanwhile, UNICOM also set up a system for ‘affiliating’ privately owned 
mills based in the Philippines -- collectively called ‘participating mills’ (LOI No. 
926, Section 2b) Affiliation entailed a form of ‘corporate takeover’, whereby 
their operations were controlled by UNICOM, in exchange for access to state 
subsidies and privileges otherwise only available to ‘coconut farmer-owned’ 
enterprises. An example of a participating mill is the Lu Du and Lu Ym Mill, 
which along with LEGOIL and Granexport constituted among the three biggest 
mills in the country. It remained independently owned but nevertheless directly 
managed by UNICOM. According to its owner, Douglas Lu Ym, he placed the 
company under the direct control of UNICOM in “obedience to the orders of the 
Philippine government” (Manapat, 1991, p. 190).   
The impulse guiding the spate of acquisitions and corporate take-overs 
described above was the centralisation of copra-buying operations in the country, 
and thus the control of copra prices. UNICOM control of such a huge share of 
the coconut oil milling capacity in the country meant that it had the advantage of 
economies of scale that smaller unaffiliated mills could not compete with. As I 
have pointed out earlier, UNICOM had access to a little over PhP 1 bn, in the 
form of the CIRF, to purchase copra.  
But aside from controlling copra prices as the country’s monopsonist buyer, 
UNICOM also attempted to control the supply of coconut oil in the world 
market. According to Manapat (1991, p. 195), details of this only came to light 
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 According to the Pelaez audit report, the CIIF allocation in the amount of PhP 147.6 million for 
the United Coconut Planters International, as shown in Table 4.2, was used to capitalise said 
company, which was located in France. This company, in turn, invested stocks in a number of 
France-based trading firms, including the French mills and refineries specified here. (Pelaez, 
1993, p. 3) Manapat suggests that the rationale given for these investments in Europe-based mills 
was to escape the 7 per cent and 2.5 per cent tax imposed in Western Europe on edible and 
technical grade coconut oil imports, respectively. (Manapat, 1991, p. 194) 
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when an anti-trust case was filed against UNICOM and its allied corporations in 
1981 in the US, where, at that point, the Philippines supplied 95 per cent of 
coconut oil consumed. In the COA report on the CIRF (Commission on Audit, 
1986c, pp. 11-13), it is explained that a case was filed against UNICOM, UCPB, 
Lu Do Ym Corporation, Granex Corporation USA, Crown Oil Corporation and 
Pan Pacific Commodities by a California-based company named PVO 
International Incorporated. PVO was a buyer, refiner and seller of coconut oil in 
the US and alleged that UNICOM and the rest of the aforementioned firms 
refused to sell crude coconut oil and other coconut products to the world market 
at a price lower than that fixed by the Philippine government.
63
 PVO thus 
claimed damages in the amount of US$ 75 mn for, among others, lost revenues 
incurred as a result of this attempt at price-fixing by UNICOM and its allied 
corporations. UNICOM successfully negotiated an out-of-court settlement with 
PVO in the amount of US$10 million. The UCPB board then passed a resolution 
authorising UNICOM to utilise PhP 90 mn of the CIRF to finance the 
settlement.
64
 This means that coconut farmers bore the burden of UNICOM’s ill-
fated attempt to control the export price in the US market. 
Third, copra trading corporations and buying stations were also established to 
further tighten the control on copra trade. As early as 1978 – that is a few years 
before major investments into coconut mills and refineries were made – coconut 
levy funds were already used to invest in a group of copra trading corporations. 
This was an investment of PhP 158 mn into the ‘Philippine Coconut Planters 
Trading Group’, as shown in Table 3.4. This is a group of seven companies65 
with the same set of officers and in which CIIF investment bought a 51 per cent 
stake. However, when COA audited the companies in 1986, they found that these 
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 Manapat (1991, pp. 194-198)  has a slightly different account of this.  He suggests that the 
attempt to drive up the price of coconut oil in the US market was undertaken by the hoarding of 
43,000 tons of coconut oil by UNICOM and its allied corporations  -- and it was this act of 
hoarding supplies that prompted the US government (not the PVO) to file the civil anti-trust suit 
against the said companies. He claims that the attempt at ‘cartelisation’ was ultimately 
unsuccessful because coconut oil had many substitutes. In the end, UNICOM could not find 
buyers for the coconut oil they hoarded and sold the inventory at a loss of an estimated US$10  
million. 
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 In 1982, US$10 million was equivalent to about  PhP 80 million, based on the official 
exchange rate of PhP 7.9 to US$ 1. (World Development Indicators, 2012) 
65
 The seven companies were: Davao Coconut Planters Trading, Zamboanga Coconut Planters 
Trading, Leyte Coconut Planters Trading, Northern Mindanao Planters Trading, Visayas Coconut 
Planters Trading, Bicol Coconut Planters Trading and Tagalog Coconut Planters Trading. 
(Commission on Audit, 1986a, pp. 12-13) 
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companies were no longer in full operation by 1981 (Commission on Audit, 
1986a, p. 13). 
COCOFED was also given a piece of the monopoly operations when the 
Copra Stabilisation Fund budget in the amount of PhP 144.92 million, as shown 
in Table 3.3, was allocated to COCOFED to set up copra buying stations. 
COCOFED founded the COCOMARK Corporation to establish these stations 
across the country. Reports of how many of these stations were set up vary. The 
Pelaez report submits that 40 stations were set up throughout the country.
 
But, an 
undated report of the PCA, prepared during the time of Marcos, indicate that 255 
collection centres in 38 provinces, two cities and 213 municipalities – covering 
10 to 15 per cent of the country’s copra traded – were established with the CPSF 
(Philippine Coconut Authority CISF Assessment and Collection Department, 
undated). With the group of seven trading companies no longer fully operational 
in 1981, one can deduce that COCOMARK buying stations became the favoured 
source of copra for UNICOM and its allied mills.
66
  
Fourth, in an attempt to extend the vertical integration of the industry to the 
production of higher value-added coconut-based chemicals (i.e., glycerine, fatty 
acids and fatty alcohol products) that are used for the manufacture of cosmetics, 
pharmaceutical products and explosives, PhP 864.25 mn of the CIIF was 
invested to establish the United Coconut Chemicals (UNICHEM) in 1981. 
UNICHEM was a joint venture between UCPB and a German partner, the Lurgi 
Umwelt und Chemotechnik. It took the corporation more than four years to build 
and operate a modern plan to manufacture the chemicals (Commission on Audit, 
1986a, p. 13).  CIIF investment in this end of the value chain is especially 
significant because prior to the establishment of the UNICHEM plant, most 
coco-chemical plants in the Philippines were owned by foreign multinational 
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 In 1985, after UNICOM had been dissolved, a further PhP100 mn of the CIIF was used to 
establish ten other copra trading corporations, into each of which PhP 10 mn was infused as 
equity. The 1986 COA report on the CIIF says that they were established to ensure the copra 
supply of still operating CIIF oil mills (Commission on Audit, 1986a, p. 16).  However, Pelaez 
(1993, p. 3) suggests that given the “marginal profit” the companies earned during its first year of 
operations, there may be reason to believe they were organised only as conduits for investments 
into the San Miguel Corporation, which I shall explain further in the last section of this chapter.  
For this reason, and because the companies were established after UNICOM had already 
dissolved, I did not deem these investments as part of the systematic efforts to concentrate market 
power in the industry.  
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companies like Colgate-Palmolive, Proctor and Gamble and Pilipinas Kao 
(Oniki, 1992, p. 89). 
Finally, all these four steps were complemented by state action that enhanced 
the incentives for private millers to give up ownership of their businesses and/or 
provided privileges that only coconut levy-funded enterprises enjoyed.   
The former relates to ‘sell or perish’ state interventions imposed upon private 
oil mills. For example, in October 1978 – a few months before the procurement 
of LEGOIL in February 1979 – PCA issued a memorandum that effectively 
withdrew the subsidy enjoyed by exporters on premium duties. Tiglao (1981, p. 
89) suggests that this was one of the major reasons why Mitsubishi and Ayala 
Corporation let go of their interest in the LEGOIL. Based on his calculations of 
LEGOIL’s monthly average importation volume of 10,688 MT, the withdrawal 
of the subsidy meant an increase of premium duties bill from US $19,014 to US 
$ 380,000 – an almost 2,000 per cent increase that severely cut into the profit 
margins of the company. Soon after UCPB and/or UNICOM had taken over the 
private coconut oil mills, export duties were reduced. Moreover, Tiglao (1981, p. 
88) proposes that LEGOIL was not allowed to import machinery necessary for 
the firm to maximise its plant scale. These prodded Mitsubishi and Ayala 
Corporation to divest their interest in LEGOIL – despite its extensive 
international coconut trading network in the US and a local copra trading 
network that it built after 23 years of operations. (Tiglao, 1981, pp. 88-90) 
The latter relates to changes to the subsidy scheme and barriers to entry that 
privileged ‘coconut-farmer owned’ enterprises. As stated in the previous section, 
coinciding with the establishment of UNICOM, changes to the coconut oil 
consumers price subsidy scheme were put into effect in 1979 that delimited 
access to subsidies to only UNICOM-affiliated coconut oil mills and refineries. 
Meanwhile, the expansion of existing coconut oil mills and the establishment of 
new ones were prohibited by the same presidential promulgation that authorised 
the use of coconut levies to establish UNICOM.
67
  This decree also stated that 
even when the coconut supply situation warranted additional national milling 
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 In particular, Section 3 of LOI 926 (1979) states that: 
“No government agency or instrumentality shall hereafter authorize, approve or grant any permit or 
license to establish, import and/or operate any coconut oil mill in addition to those in operation in the 
country.” 
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capacities, only UNICOM and its affiliated mills had the authority to expand 
facilities.
68
,
69
 
UNICHEM was also granted similar special privileges by the state to gain 
market power. It was declared as one of the Marcos’ government’s 11 major 
industrial projects (de la Rosa, 2000, p. 100) and given the status of ‘preferred 
pioneer’, which in turn meant that it enjoyed a range of tax exemptions.70 A 
series of presidential edicts were passed in 1983 especially for UNICHEM. It 
was given a broad range of tax-exemptions, going beyond those given to firms 
with ‘pioneer status’.71 To promote the utilisation of coco-based chemicals it 
manufactured, Marcos granted all companies utilising said products ‘pioneer 
status’ as well. 72  Perhaps most important of all, an import ban was imposed on 
all petrochemical products, which competed with UNICHEM manufactures – 
unless there was a shortage of locally-produced coco-chemicals, in which case 
only UNICHEM was allowed to import the same.
73
  
A quote from Marcos (Tiglao, 1981, p 92) evokes how all the moves to 
concentrate market power in coconut-levy funded enterprises summarised above 
were publicly justified: 
“For half a century, the coconut farmers were the forgotten men of the country. 
Now you are no longer just coconut planters, you are bankers, owners of a coco 
mill complex” 
But what does evidence say about who benefitted from these investments, 
specifically the rents emanating from concentrated market power? 
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 In particular, Section 3 of LOI 926 (1979)  states that: 
“In the event that there is a use to establish a new coconut oil mill, or to expand the capacity of an 
existing mill, or to relocate an existing mill…the private corporation authorized to be organized shall 
have the priority to establish and operate such new mill….” 
69
 Section 3 of PD no 1644 also limited the right to export coconut products to socialist countries 
to UNICOM and its affiliates. 
70
 Articles 43-44 in PD 1789  Philippines ("Omnibus Investment Code," 1981) specifies the 
incentives accorded, including: protection of patents and other proprietary rights, capital gains tax 
exemption,  tax allowance for investments; and tax exemption on sale of stock dividends  
 
71
 Marcos ordered through Section 3 of EO No. 880 ("Declaring the Establishment of a Coconut 
Chemical Industry as a Means to Rationalize the Coconut Industry of the Philippines and 
Granting Additional Incentives Therefor," 1983) that all purchases from abroad – including 
technology, machinery, equipment and services – necessary to establish UNICHEM plant 
facilities be considered tax-exempt. Moreover, UNICHEM was granted tax exemptions, for a 
period of ten years, for fees paid to foreign personnel supply technology, services; for interest 
payable on foreign currency loans. and all real property tax (PD 1863, Section 4). 
72
 This was enforced through Section 2 of PD No. 1826 ("An Act to Promote and Expand the 
Utilization of Chemicals Derived from Coconut Oil and for Other Purposes," 1983) . 
73
 This as enforced through Sections 5-6 of PD No. 1826. 
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Power and privilege: who benefitted? 
Evidence derived from evaluations of the economic effects of policies and 
regulations described above suggests that coconut levy-funded enterprises had 
access to super-normal profits  as a result of the constricted entry to coconut 
post-harvest trading, processing and marketing in the Philippines.  
Through econometric modelling, Buschena and Perloff (1991)  estimated the 
degree of market power exercised in the world market by the Philippines before 
and after these market regulations were put in place.  Based on price and market 
data from 1957-1987, they concluded that the interventions allowed the 
Philippine coconut oil export industry to begin exercising monopoly power in the 
world market for coconut.  In particular, as a result of these interventions, they 
found that the Philippine coconut oil export industry’s mark-up over marginal 
costs more than doubled after 1973(Buschena & Perloff, 1991, p. 1008).
74
 
However, they also found three factors affecting world demand for coconut oil 
that were delimiting the full exercise of this power. First, technological advances 
had increasingly led to the substitution of coconut oil for other vegetable oils. 
Second, health concerns in the US – until the late 1980s the most important 
export market for Philippine coconut oil – about the consumption of saturated 
fats was expected to lead to a drop in demand for coconut oil. Third, decreasing 
demand for Philippine coconut oil in the US was expected as the lagged effect of 
preferential trade treatment in that market wore off completely. (Buschena & 
Perloff, 1991, pp. 1001-1002) The international structure of production and 
demand thus seriously curtailed the Philippines’ exercise of monopoly power in 
the world market for coconut oil. 
However, there is evidence to support the proposition that what was never 
fully achieved in the world market was attained in the domestic market for copra. 
Clarete and Roumasset (1983) compared marketing profits before and after the 
first two years of UNICOM operations. They suggested that the price differential 
between (post-levies and post-export tax) predicted border price of copra in 
Manila based on the New York price of coconut oil
75
, and the actual price of 
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 Under perfectly competitive markets marginal costs are equal to price. Deviations from the 
marginal costs are thus a reflection of monopoly power. 
75
 They assume that copra price in Manila should closely follow the price of crude coconut oil in 
New York, given that 50 per cent of coconut production is exported as coconut oil and coconut 
oil exporters base their buying price of copra on the said New York price.  
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copra in Manila reflected potential marketing profits. They found that from 1970 
to 1979 – that is, the period before milling capacities were concentrated in the 
quasi-monopoly and thus assumed to be under relatively competitive conditions 
– the deviation averaged at PhP 10 per 100 kilos. In 1980 and 1981, the first two 
years of UNICOM operations, this differential rose to PhP 45 and PhP 23, 
respectively. They concluded that copra producer prices were thus depressed 
below competitive levels due to UNICOM operations.(Clarete & Roumasset, 
1983, pp. 32-35) Assuming that UNICOM absorbed 80 per cent of local 
production during these years, then that would have been equivalent to 
monopsony rents of PhP 12.8 million in 1980 and  PhP 4.48 million in 1981, 
from UNICOM’s copra procurement operations alone.76 Interestingly, this 
evidence of extraordinary marketing profits in the domestic market is supported 
by what Boyce (1993) unearthed from US government cables, which he obtained 
under the US Freedom of Information Act. He said that a 1984 US Embassy 
cable reported that UNICOM established profit margins of PhP 2-3 per kilo in 
1983. (Boyce, 1993, p. 207) At PhP 200-300 per 100 kilos, this estimate is much 
higher than Clarete and Roumasset’s estimates in 1981-1982. Based on copra 
produced in the Philippines in 1983
77
 and the assumption that UNICOM 
absorbed 80 per cent of this, monopsony rents would have amounted to PhP 55 
million in one year alone.     
There is no evidence that any of these monopoly profits were ploughed back 
to the coconut industry in any major or systematic way. Instead, the picture that 
emerges from official government audits that reported on the operations of 
coconut levy-funded enterprises and on the uses of funds that they controlled is 
one indicative of the profligate use of resources and of a pronounced 
redistribution of benefits away from the coconut sector, especially coconut 
producers. Moreover, the evidence indicates that rent opportunities arose not just 
from the operations of the quasi-monopoly but as a result of the corruption of the 
means employed to install monopoly power. 
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 This is based on official local copra production figures from the Philippine National Statistical 
Coordination Board (NSCB). Copra produced in the Philippines was 4,570.2 metric tons in 1980 
and 4,312.1 metric tons in 1981. I arrived at the rent estimates by multiplying the production 
figures with 80 per cent and Clarete and Roumasset’s (1983) computed differential between 
expected and actual copra price in Manila. 
77
 NSCB (1984) reports this figure to be 3,494 metric tons. 
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For example, the 1986 COA audit report on the CIRF point to irregularities in 
the acquisition by UNICOM of sixteen floundering and privately owned oil 
mills. It found that some of these oil mills were owned by individuals with close 
links to Marcos. (Commission on Audit, 1986c, pp. 7-9) The Pelaez audit also 
questioned the establishment of the Debt Service Fund to pay all the outstanding 
debts and obligations that seven of these mills incurred in their private capacity. 
(Pelaez, 1993, p. 5) This suggests that the use of coconut levy funds to 
effectively bail out these unprofitable mills can be seen as a politically 
engineered transfer from coconut farmers to some cronies of the president. To be 
sure, one could argue that a ‘public purpose’ could have been served: preserving 
the viability of the sector by mopping up excess capacity. However, as the COA 
report suggests, these mills – left on their own – would have closed down 
anyway. (Commission on Audit, 1986c, p. 8)  
This theme of the usurpation of public purpose for private gains reverberates 
in the findings of COA about the operations of the seven copra trading 
companies under the Philippine Coconut Planters Traders Group.   As has been 
pointed out, these companies were established before the vertical integration 
policy was in place. They were nevertheless given a right to claim subsidies from 
the CIRF, for the copra they bought in 1976-1980, a period when subsidies were 
supposed to have been given directly to manufacturers of coconut oil-based 
consumer goods. COA found two further aberrations in the subsidy claims made 
by these firms from CIRF. First, they overstated the price at which they 
purchased their copra by adding overhead costs
78
  to the reported purchase price. 
Second, included in these reported overhead costs were salaries and expenses of 
three officials of the companies, who performed the same functions across the 
seven companies but drew from each of these companies for said expenses 
nevertheless.  
The Pelaez (1993) audit report also provides interesting insights about how 
marketing profits of COCOFED’s COCOMARK may have been mobilised. As 
in the case of the seven copra trading companies, he reported a story of 
profligacy and corruption. For example, cash advances in the amount of PhP 64 
mn made by company directors, officers and employees between 1982 and 1985, 
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 These included ‘contracted services’, ‘transportation and travel’ and ‘salaries, wages and 
allowances’. 
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a substantial amount of which was unliquidated. (Pelaez, 1993, p. 7) But even 
more significantly, it is claimed in this report that COCOMARK  invested PhP 
95 mn of its resources in two private real estate companies between 1980 and 
1983. (Pelaez, 1993, p. 7) This is significant for two reasons. First, it shows that 
surplus extracted from coconut farmers were channelled to activities with no 
productive value for the coconut sector.  Second, given that COCOMARK was 
operated by COCOFED, it is evocative of the producers organisation’s disturbing 
lack of interest to invest in its own sector’s productive capacity– in stark contrast 
to FEDECAFE in Colombia. As for the claims of the coconut producers on these 
profits based on their ownership of the corporation, Pelaez found that only one 
per cent of the shares of stocks were issued to coconut farmers, even if all 
authorised shares of stocks were paid out of the coconut levy funds. (Pelaez, 
1993, p. 7) 
In summary, these official audit reports offer snapshots of how rent transfers 
were made as a result of observed irregularities in the implementation of policies 
establishing monopoly power in the coconut sector and in the operations of 
coconut levy-funded enterprises, including the mobilisation of their resources 
and profits. In the case of COCOMARK, the Pelaez report gives a glimpse of re-
investment of profits away in speculative economic activities and away from the 
coconut sector. These patterns were neither isolated nor unrelated; I propose that 
the extraction of surplus from coconut producers for the enrichment of private 
individuals was systematic and coordinated. This proposition is supported not 
only by the analysis of coconut levies in Hawes (1987b), Boyce (1993), Manapat 
(1991) and David (1977, 1992), but by the very acts of the Philippine 
government, soon after Marcos was booted out of power in 1986.  
In 1986, soon after Marcos was unseated from power, the Philippine 
government ordered the sequestration of all coconut-levy funded corporations – 
including UCPB, COCOMARK and all companies established in the name of 
vertical integration – on grounds that they were part of ill-gotten wealth amassed 
by the president and his cronies and relatives. In July 1987, the government of 
Corazon Aquino consequently filed a case in the Sandiganbayan, a court of law 
for cases related to violations of the Philippines’ anti-graft and corruption code, 
against sixty individuals -- including Eduardo Cojuangco, Juan Ponce Enrile, 
national leaders of COCOFED, lawyers of ACCRA, Ferdinand Marcos and 
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Imelda Marcos. These individuals were accused of conniving and abusing power 
and authority to convert government owned corporations into assets for their own 
benefit, and of having been awarded contracts with government with conditions 
that were disadvantageous to the government.
79
 I will show in Chapter 5 
evidence of how said individuals ‘acted in concert’ to control and manage the 
rent through the interlocking directorates of PCA, UCPB, and COCOFED. But 
what is salient to the analysis at this point is that this court case implicated 
individuals – particularly close Marcos associates like Eduardo Cojuangco and 
Juan Ponce Enrile, as well as leaders of COCOFED –as having coordinated 
access to rent streams obtaining from policies to concentrate market power in the 
coconut sector, in particular, and from all other modes of coconut levy 
mobilisation, in general.  
Of the personalities implicated in the case, the names of Cojuangco and Enrile 
stand out. Enrile was the Defence Minister during the time of Marcos and was 
credited to have ‘drafted the blueprint for the coconut monopoly’. (Parreño, 
2003, p. 125) Cojuangco was the rumoured investment manager of  Marcos, the 
regional chairman of Marcos’ political party – the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan 
(KBL) – in Central Luzon, a vote-rich region in  northern Philippines. As the rent 
settlement evolved, Cojuangco’s role grew to be more pronounced than Enrile’s 
and indeed than the COCOFED’s, as will be shown in Chapter 5. Enrile was said 
to have told colleagues in a political party that he could not understand why 
Cojuangco was left to control the coconut levy funds when he was the one who 
originally formulated it. (Parreño, 2003, p. 128) 
 In the court case filed in 1987, Cojuangco was specifically charged with 
responsibility for the use of coconut levies – with the collaboration of Marcos, 
Enrile and named national leaders of COCOFED – for the establishment of 
UNICOM, which he is said to have “beneficially controlled”. (GR No 96073, p 
16). 80  He was accused of coordinating the anomalous procurement of 16 
mothballed oil mills described above – including the questionable assumption of 
debts of seven of them – with the express consent of Marcos and to control the 
                                                 
79
 The coconut levy case was docketed as Case No 0033 and was one of twenty cases filed 
against Marcos and his cronies by the Philippine government, in an attempt to recover ‘ill-gotten 
wealth’ amassed during the Martial Regime in the Philippines. The case was later further 
subdivided into 8 distinct cases.  
80
 From the court document: ("Republic of the Philippines versus Sandiganbayan, etc. (Re: 
Sequestration Orders Revoked by Sandiganbayan)," 1995, p. 16) 
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prices of copra and other coconut products, and establish a monopoly “for their 
own benefit”.  
This charge of private gains from the operations of UNICOM by Cojuangco is 
echoed in another US Embassy Cable, entitled ‘The Philippine Coconut 
Monopoly’ acquired under the US Freedom of Information and cited by Boyce 
(1993, p. 207). In the Cable, the US Embassy in the Philippines alleged that 
Cojuangco found many indirect methods of profiting from the monopoly. For 
example, equipment and materials purchased made by the firm were said to have 
been routed to a company operated by Cojuangco’s son, “who takes 10 per cent 
commission on all purchases”. The embassy estimated that income personally 
accumulated by Cojuangco through the monopoly – but also through other 
purposively allocated rent streams as well as capital accumulated through 
investments associated with coconut levy enterprises, both of which as explained 
in the next sections of this Chapter – ranged from “several hundred million 
dollars to over a billion”. (Boyce, 1993, p. 207)  
From the audit reports, research accounts and court case documents surveyed 
in this section, I conclude that the mobilisation of coconut levies to establish a 
quasi-monopoly in the post-harvest end of the sector generated two types of 
rents. First, monopsony rents were generated in the domestic trade of copra 
through the operations of UNICOM and its allied enterprises, as well as 
COCOMARK. In this sense, coconut levies were a burden on coconut farmers 
not just as a form of taxation but also by providing the means of establishing 
post-production firms that extracted maximal surplus from them. Related to this, 
monopoly rents in the international trade of coconut oil were also generated, but 
delimited by the structure of world production and demand for vegetable oils. 
Second, redistributive transfers were also made as a result of the implementation 
of policies to establish monopoly power, as well as through the corrupt use of 
resources associated with the operations of the coconut levy-funded enterprises. 
These rents were appropriated by a cabal of individuals, linked with Marcos and 
COCOFED, and there is no evidence to suggest that any of these were ploughed 
back to the coconut industry in ways that would enhance production in the sector. 
What I have presented so far is an account of the re-investment of what could be 
interpreted as returns from copra-buying operations of COCOMARK into real 
estate projects. There is no evidence that any of the marketing profits at the time 
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of concentrated market power were invested into enhancing the productive 
capacity of the coconut sector.  
In an interview
81
, Joey Faustino, executive director of a non-government 
organisation involved in the movement for the recovery of coconut levy funds, 
evocatively summarises the situation that obtained for the coconut producers 
paying these levies: “Ginisa ang magsasaka sa sariling mantika.” [The coconut 
farmers were ‘sauteed’ in their ‘own fat’.] 
 
Purposive allocations for the “coconut king” 
Aside from access to the rent streams generated as a result of the state-led bid to 
vertically integrate the coconut industry, Cojuangco also enjoyed purposively 
allocated redistributive transfers resulting from the use of coconut levies to 
finance a re-planting programme and to buy UCPB. The first signalled his ‘entry’ 
into the rent settlement; the second solidified his position within it. 
 
Contract marking ‘entry’ to the rent settlement  
As shown in Table 3.3, the lion’s share of the production and welfare-related 
disbursements of the levies was allocated for a coconut re-planting programme. 
This programme, which was administered by the PCA, accounted for almost 12 
per cent of the disbursements, a share that is almost at par with what was 
allocated for UNICOM operations.  
Production statistics from FAO
82
 for the period leading and up to 1974, when 
Marcos promulgated the decree to implement this programme, suggest that this 
programme was urgent for the purposes of enhancing the competitiveness of the 
Philippine coconut sector. At the time the programme was implemented, for 
example, coconut trees in Southern Luzon – a major hub of coconut production – 
were fifty years old and nearing their non-productive age. (MacDougald in 
Parreño, 2003, p. 132) And even as the Philippines was the world’s leading 
coconut oil exporter in this period, Figure 3.1 shows that productivity in the 
sector did not compare favourably with competitors like Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Sri Lanka: on average, the Philippines had the lowest level of productivity 
among these coconut-producing countries. While the average productivity of the 
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 Interviewed on April 22, 2009 in Manila, Philippines. 
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 Data on coconut production and hectarage from faostat.fao.org, accessed on 6 November 2012.  
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Philippine coconut sector from 1961 to 1975 was 3.93 tons per hectare, 
productivity in Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka was 4.99, 4.03 and 4.19, 
respectively. Clarete and Roumasset (1983, p. 9) say that the growth in 
production in this period was largely accounted for by growth in hectarage rather 
than increases in productivity.    
 
Figure 3.1 Coconut sector productivity (in tons/hectare), 1961-1990: 
Philippines and selected competitors 
 
 
Source of basic data: FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 2012) 
 
Against this backdrop, Marcos promulgated PD No. 582, which as discussed 
in the first section led to the establishment of the Coconut Industry Development 
Fund (CIDF), for the purpose of financing a coconut replanting programme. 
CIDF was to be used for the establishment, operation and maintenance of a 
hybrid coconut seed nut farm, the produce of which was to be distributed for free 
to coconut farmers. The seed nut farm was owned by Cojuangco. Interestingly, it 
was not COCOFED that pitched the mode of implementation of a project so vital 
to the coconut sector. Parreño (2003, p. 132), based on an interview with an 
unnamed ‘close political ally’ of Cojuangco, suggests that it was Cojuangco 
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himself who approached Marcos with the idea of implementing this programme.  
The contract that Cojuangco secured in relation to this programme was his way 
into the rent settlement – not only as the first successful ‘deal’ he negotiated in 
relation with the use of coconut levies, but also because his place in the 
governing board of the PCA was justified in terms of his ownership of the seed 
farm.  
To implement the replanting programme, the government – through the 
National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary of the 
Philippine National Bank, which in turn was the depository of CIDF and CCSF 
collections at the onset of the replanting programme – contracted the services of 
a corporation wholly owned by Cojuangco, the Agricultural Investors 
Incorporated (AII), which was given the exclusive license to distribute a hybrid 
variety of coconuts chosen for the replanting programme. When UCPB was 
established in 1975 and became the depository of the coconut levy collections, it 
took over from NIDC in administering the contract.  
Under the terms of the contract
83
, AII was obligated to develop a parcel of 
land in Bugsuk Island, Palawan
84
 and to “exert best efforts” to put a seed garden 
in productive operation within five years and attain an annual production of 
19,173,000 seed nuts. AII was obliged to sell its entire production to the PCA, 
and to pay NIDC 25 per cent of its net operating income before taxes for forty 
years, the entire duration of the contract, for the cash advances to be made by 
government in the amount of PhP 426.26 mn, which in turn was to be used to 
develop the property. Said ‘developmental costs’ included the cost of 
establishing and maintaining the seed garden – for which PhP 259.26 mn was 
disbursed – but also expenditures in the amount of PhP 167 million that 
enhanced the value of the property, including the establishment road networks, 
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 The account of the terms of the contract described in this section is from the 1986 COA audit 
of the CIDF (Comission on Audit, 1986, pp. 22-29). 
84
Manapat (1991, pp. 229-235)  offers an interesting account of the circumstances that led to the 
acquisition of the island in Palawan, used to establish the farm producing the coconut seeds for 
the re-planting programme. Cojuangco is said to have acquired this island through an 
arrangement with the Marcos government that allowed him to swap some of his lands in Central 
Luzon – then under the threat of land reform – for land in the public domain at a ratio of 1:10. 
Under this arrangement, Cojuangco acquired landholdings in Romblon, along with four islands in 
Palawan. Citing Henares (1986), Manapat suggests that Bugsuk Island was acquired for reasons 
beyond its use for the re-planting programme. The island is very near areas where Marcos-
connected firms had been involved in oil exploration. Moreover, Henares claims the island was 
used by Cojuangco to establish a lucrative pearl farm business, under a company that still trades 
at the time of writing. 
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housing units, a public market, school houses and recreation facilities to service 
the island. The government – through NIDC, and later UCPB – was in turn 
obliged to advance the development costs, to buy the entire production of the 
farm at the price of PhP10 per nut.  
Upon examination of the contract in 1986, COA found a number of onerous 
provisions that were detrimental to the interests of government, and by extension 
coconut producers, who were financing this contract through the levies they were 
paying. First, government bore all the risk of failure to meet contractual 
obligations from causes “beyond reasonable control” – like force majeure and/or 
by virtue of consequent government statues, regulations or policies. AII was 
given the exclusive right to terminate the contract under said conditions, without 
any obligation to pay damages. In contrast, if government was unable to perform 
its obligations under the contract due to the same causes, it would forfeit its 
rights to the developmental costs it advanced and was obliged to pay AII 
damages in the amount of PhP 958.65 mn, equivalent to the expected value of the 
seed garden’s production for five years.  Second, it did not specify performance 
obligations on the part of AII. The targeted production was to be achieved, as I 
underlined above, “under best efforts” of AII. Meanwhile, the terms of the 
contract were such that AII was only required to make payments for the advances 
made by government on developmental costs on years it made a net profit. 
Clearly, all these provisions meant that government bore most of the risk of 
default. 
As it turned out, there came a point when government could no longer honour 
its obligations under the contract: this was when Marcos suspended the collection 
of coconut levies in 1982. At this time UCPB had taken over from NIDC in 
administering the contract. When UCPB terminated the contract with AII in 
November 1982, on grounds that it could no longer finance the replanting 
programme, AII disputed the move. It demanded the forfeiture of the PhP 426.26 
mn worth of developmental costs shouldered by the government, and payment of 
damages as stipulated by the contract. What came after this was a highly 
irregular arbitration process, in which parties to the case were one and the same.  
To illustrate this point, one need only look at the name of some of the officers of 
UCPB and AII at the time of arbitration. COA (1986, p. 30) found that in 1982, 
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Enrile was chairman of the board of both UCPB and AII while Cojuangco was 
president of both organisations.  
In December 1982, AII was awarded damages in the amount of PhP 958.65 
million, as stipulated in the contract. Of this amount, PhP 840.86 was fully paid 
by government.  AII waived its right to forfeiting the developmental costs, and 
instead merely subtracted the amount of PhP 426.26 mn from what the 
government owed them. To cover part of the balance, government used  PhP 
414.60 mn of CIDF collections.
85
 
This means that of the PhP 1.15 bn shown in Table 3.3 as having been spent 
for the benefit of coconut farmers in the form of a replanting programme, PhP 
840.86 mn or 73 per cent of that amount went to Cojuangco’s corporation as 
payment for damages for a terminated contract or for coconut seed nuts that were 
not even delivered to the farmers.  
The rent streams here then relate not only to the monopoly rents enjoyed by 
AII as the exclusive supplier of seed nuts that government was obliged to buy, 
but transfers due to an arbitration process that awarded AII with access to a 
significant portion of coconut levy funds – PhP 840 mn or the equivalent of 
about 8 per cent of the total levies collected. Coconut levies were effectively 
transferred to Cojuangco, who as a result of this deal became the absolute owner 
of a seed farm, with facilities worth PhP 426 mon, and whose company received 
more than PhP 500 mn in damages. 
What did coconut farmers get out of this deal? To be sure, what was not 
transferred to Cojuangco’s company – or the remaining 26 per cent of the PhP 
1.15 billion specified in Table 3.3 – was actually mobilised to implement the re-
planting  programme from 1977-1982 in three phases: piloting, surveying and 
actual seed distribution. COA (1986, pp. 10-13) reported that in 1977, three years 
after the establishment of the seed garden, PCA piloted the re-planting 
programme in 133 farms (equivalent to 327 hectares) established throughout the 
country – an initiative for which PhP 13.97  mn of CIDF was mobilised. In that 
same year, PCA recorded a further allocation of PhP 23.617 mn to survey 3.6 
million hectares of coconut land in the Philippines and determine their suitability 
for the programme. Finally, between 1980 and 1982, PCA saw to the actual 
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 COA (1986, p. 35) found that it could not pay the remaining amount of PhP 117.79 million to 
AII because as of March 1986, the total assets of CIDF only amounted to about PhP30 million. 
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implementation of the programme, for which it mobilised PhP 309.80 mn of 
CIDF to buy seed nuts from AII, as well as to provide free inputs and cash grants 
to 7,456 farms covering more than 52,000 hectares of coconut land in the 
country.  
The evidence gathered by COA – particularly as it related to the 
implementation phase of the programme – raise questions about the extent to 
which the programme actually benefitted coconut producers. For example, of the 
17,410,452 coconut seeds purchased from AII between 1979 and 1982, COA 
(1986, p 40) found that only 73 per cent was suitable for distribution.  The 
contract with AII specified that it was only responsible for delivering the seed 
nuts to an AII-designated warehouse in Bugsuk Island and for which government 
ostensibly had to pay warehousing charges. However, government shouldered all 
risks of loss – from the deterioration  of stocks due to the conditions of storage, 
as well as damages and losses incurred in transporting the from Palawan to the 
beneficiary farms all over the Philippines. The 26 per cent rate of loss from all 
these cost the government PhP 44.89 million.
86
 The burden of this onerous 
feature of the contract with AII was of course borne by the producers, through 
their levy contributions to the CIDF. COA (1986, p 47) also discovered spurious 
patterns in the choice beneficiaries of the re-planting programme. In particular, 
31 per cent of the benefits (i.e., free inputs and cash grants) under the programme 
were distributed to only 33 out of the more than 7,000 beneficiaries.  
Meanwhile, a further processing of productivity data from FAO shown in 
Figure 3.2 indicates that average productivity actually worsened, twenty years 
after the implementation of the programme. Instead of improving, the ten year 
average productivity went down from 4 tons per hectare in the 1970s, to 3.58 in 
the 1980s and further down to 2.86 in the 1990s. These trends in productivity 
could be seen as supporting the proposition that the variety of introduced by the 
programme and imported from Africa was probably not suitable to local 
conditions. (Parreño, 2003, p. 133) But one could also argue that the programme 
was not undertaken extensively enough – covering only 52,000 hectares of the 
possible 3.8 million hectare-coconut area.  Still in all, the coconut re-planting 
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 Equivalent to the 4,489,013 seednuts lost multiplied by the cost, PhP 10 per seednut. 
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programme effected substantial transfers accruing to Cojuangco, without 
palpable benefits to the coconut sector.
87
  
 
Brokering the deal to buy UCPB 
If the exclusive rights to growing and distributing the seeds for the national 
coconut replanting programme was Cojuangco’s way into the coconut levy-
associated rent settlement, the deal he brokered to acquire a bank was his means 
to solidify his place in it. Based on the 1993 COA report and as shown in Table 
3.3, PhP 115 mn was disbursed from the coconut levy funds to see to the fruition 
of this deal to buy controlling shares in the First Union Bank (FUB), which was 
to become the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). Of this total amount, PhP 
109.74 mn was used to acquire and establish controlling shares of the bank; and 
PhP 5.776 million, made as a subscription deposit. (Commission on Audit, 1997, 
p. 7).   
Manapat (1991, pp. 221-229) and Parreño (2003, pp. 134-141) narrate broadly 
similar accounts of the acquisition of  the FUB and its transformation into UCPB. 
The story goes that one of FUB’s incorporators was Cojuangco’s uncle, Jose 
Cojuangco Sr. The uncle offered the nephew 72 per cent of the capital stock of 
FUB in 1974, at a time when the bank was a floundering enterprise for two 
reasons. First, Parreño (2003, p. 135) proposes that the bank was losing 
important clients for being identified as an ‘anti-Marcos’ establishment. 
Cojuangco Sr was the father-in-law of key opposition figure Benigno Aquino, 
Jr.
88
 Second, FUB could not meet a new regulation imposed by the Central Bank 
requiring commercial banks a minimum capitalisation of PhP 100 mn – a move 
to force the consolidation of the country’s banks. To effect the sale, Cojuangco 
entered into an agreement with his uncle to buy said shares in the amount of PhP 
27.51 mn. Cojuangco, in turn, entered into an agreement with PCA to sell the 
same shares to PCA. Maria Clara Lobregat, the president of COCOFED and who 
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 In the case filed by the Aquino government against Cojuangco et al, as described in the section 
on UNICOM, he was also charged with misappropriating , misusing and dissipating PhP840 
million of the CIDF in connection with the development of the Bugsuk Island seedgarden. 
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 Aquino’s assassination in 1983 triggered the popular uprising that ultimately brought Marcos 
out of power in 1986. Aquino was the husband of Corazon Aquino, who in turn was the daughter 
of Jose Sr, and became the president of the Philippines after Marcos. It was Aquino’s government 
who oversaw the sequestration orders on the coconut levy assets and filed charges against 
Cojuangco and COCOFED.  
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was also a board member at the PCA, signed this agreement on behalf of PCA. 
The contract price was paid in full by PCA, mobilising the funds from the CCSF 
collection; Cojuangco did not utilise any of his own private funds and thus 
merely brokered the deal. (Parreño, 2003, pp. 136-137) Moreover, the contract 
price was equivalent to twice the market value of bank shares bought. (Manapat, 
1991, p. 221; Parreño, 2003, p. 136) In return for brokering the deal, Cojuangco 
was given 7.2 per cent of the shares bought by PCA ‘in behalf of coconut 
farmers’. He was also awarded a management contract, renewable every five 
years and that made him president and chief executive officer of the bank. 
Finally, he was given the power to designate three of the 11 directors in the board 
of directors of the bank. (Parreño, 2003, p. 137) 
This deal generated a number of rent streams. For Jose Cojuangco Jr, the rents 
came in the form of above-market purchase price of his shares in what was a 
floundering bank, sold at double its market price. As for the nephew Cojuangco, 
he was bestowed shares of ownership in a bank, without mobilising a centavo of 
his own personal funds and simply by acting as the ‘go-between’ the government 
and his uncle. In the case filed by the Aquino government against Cojuangco et 
al in 1986 – the same case filed in the anti-graft court and alluded to in the 
previous section – he was specifically accused of causing Marcos to issue two 
presidential decrees related to this deal: PD No. 755, which directly incorporated 
and thus legalised the private commercial agreement he brokered; and PD No. 
1468, which directed PCA to deposit all coconut levy funds collected in UCPB, 
interest-free.  
The significance for Cojuangco of the purchase and operation of the UCPB 
goes beyond the rent streams described above. For one, whoever controlled the 
bank controlled access to significant interest-free capital, in the form of coconut 
levies.  These deposits were so vital that in less than eight years after its 
organisation, it became the third largest bank in the country. (Parreño, 2003, p. 
138)  Moreover, the bank became the central controlling conduit of the rent 
settlement as the designated administrator of coconut levy funds from 1975. The 
power of controlling the settlement thus transferred from the board of PCA to the 
board of the bank. From 1975 onwards, those at the helm of the bank controlled 
the uses of the fund and thus determined the rent streams generated. In Chapter 5, 
I will explain how this signalled the further weakening of COCOFED in the 
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determination of the rent settlement and the equivalent increase in the power of 
agents from outside the coconut sector, particularly Cojuangco.  
Meanwhile, what did the levy contributors get out of this deal?  It could be 
recalled that the technical rationale for the procurement of the bank was to 
address the credit problems faced by coconut producers. This was the 
justification for the bank’s interest-free access to deposits of coconut levies 
collected from farmers. The idea was to mobilise these deposits as production 
loans to the levy contributors at preferential rates of interest. But the government 
audit of UCPB in 1986 (Commission on Audit, 1986b) found that UCPB only 
provided interest-free loans until 1982. All loans granted to coconut farmers after 
that were subjected to the prevailing interest rates.
89
  
What about the direct claims of coconut farmers on the rent settlement as 
‘residual owners’ of the bank? A fraction of coconut farmers – 1.2 million of the 
estimated 6 million coconut farmers in 1975 – received shares of stocks in the 
bank.
90
  However, under the rules of stock distribution devised by PCA, 
recipients of UCPB shares of stocks were required to execute proxy power to the 
bank manager, who was Cojuangco, to vote their shares.91  This meant that the 
claims of ownership of coconut farmers on the bank had no operational meaning: 
they delegated all their power to govern their bank to an individual, not even the 
COCOFED. Moreover, in the case filed by the government, the validity of the 
process for identifying farmers qualified to own shares of stocks in the bank was 
questioned. It was pointed out that the defendants in the case – including 
Cojuangco, Enrile and Lobregat – were at the helm of PCA when it undertook 
the ‘national survey’ to generate the list of coconut farmers who qualified for the 
stock distribution programme. The government proposed that it was thus, “no 
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One of the coconut levy-related court cases filed against Cojuangco pertained to loans given by 
UCPB to companies associated with or owned by him. See Civil Case No. 33-F, Re: Behest 
Loans and Contract. 
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 In the related case filed by the government in the anti-graft court, it questioned the validity of 
the process for identifying these farmers. They pointed out that the defendants in the case – 
including Cojuangco, Enrile and Lobregat – were at the helm of PCA when it undertook the 
‘national survey’ to ascertain owners of UCPB. The government proposed that it was thus, “no 
wonder…that out of a possible 6 million coconut farmer population, COCOFED et al claim the 
subject of UCPB shares for a measly 1.4 million…” (Sandiganbayan Partial Summary Judgment, 
2003, p 29) 
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 From the court document: ("Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo M. Cojuangco, et al, 
COCOFED, et al, Ballares, et al,  Re: The Anomolous Purchase and use of the First Union Bank, 
now United Coconut Planters Bank," 2003, pp. 52-53) 
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wonder…that out of a possible 6 million coconut farmer population, COCOFED 
et al claim the subject of UCPB shares for a measly 1.4 million…”92  
In 1975, PCA distributed 85,773,600 shares of the ‘mother UCPB stocks’ 
with a par value of PhP 1. PCA did this in two waves. In the first wave, PCA 
distributed a total of 34,572,794; the remaining stocks were distributed in a 
second wave. In the case filed by the government in the anti-graft court in 1986, 
the court noted two further irregularities in the distribution of these shares.93  
First, while the first wave of distribution was based on the coconut farmers’ 
holdings of coconut levy receipt payments, no such rule applied when the second 
round of stock distribution was undertaken. Instead, those who received stocks in 
the first round just received additional stocks in proportion to what they were 
previously given. All undistributed shares thereafter were transferred to 
COCOFED for distribution to those who they deemed ‘bonafide coconut 
farmers’. The government described this as a ‘bonanza’ received by a fraction of 
the coconut farmers, who were given additional stocks without regard to actual 
coconut levies they paid.  
Second, the stocks were distributed on the basis of holdings of payments of 
CIF levies not CCSF levies. This was problematic – not to mention a 
contravention of the law – because the bank was purchased out of coconut 
farmers’ payments of CCSF levies, and not CIF levies. These were the receipts 
used because coconut farmers were not given receipts of CCSF payments.
94
  
The anti-graft court questioned whether such a distribution of stocks, 
undertaken under such dubious conditions, truly advanced the coconut sector’s 
development, which in turn was how the acquisition of the bank was justified in 
law. Partly on this basis, the government’s sequestration of said shares -- along 
with Cojuangco’s shares in the bank -- was upheld by the court.  
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 From the court document: ("Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo M. Cojuangco, et al, 
COCOFED, et al, Ballares, et al,  Re: The Anomolous Purchase and use of the First Union Bank, 
now United Coconut Planters Bank," 2003, p. 29) 
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 From the court document ("Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo M. Cojuangco, et al, 
COCOFED, et al, Ballares, et al,  Re: The Anomolous Purchase and use of the First Union Bank, 
now United Coconut Planters Bank," 2003, pp. 49-51) 
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 From the court document: ("Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo M. Cojuangco, et al, 
COCOFED, et al, Ballares, et al,  Re: The Anomolous Purchase and use of the First Union Bank, 
now United Coconut Planters Bank," 2003, pp. 49-51)  
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In his defence pleadings in the anti-graft court, Cojuangco asserted that it was 
‘enterprise’ that had brought about the deal to acquire UCPB95. But from the 
evidence presented in this section, one could conclude that the ‘enterprise’ 
Cojuangco exercised – in both brokering the UCPB deal and attaining the 
contract on Bugsuk Island seed garden – was accompanied by neither productive 
innovation nor risk-taking attendant to Schumpeterian norms of 
entrepreneurship, but merely the skill to gain privileged access to resources 
raised by the state. It thus represented primitive accumulation of the worst kind: 
with the state expropriating surplus from coconut producers and purposively 
allocating the resultant rents, without creating the incentives for valuable 
production. 
 
Coconut levies as extractions in aid of capital accumulation 
I have presented some of the modes of mobilising coconut levies in the 
Philippines that generated one-off rent streams, which have been either already 
distributed or fully dissipated during the time of Marcos. These include, for 
example, monopsony rents, which ceased when UNICOM was dismantled in 
1988. Rents from one-off deals – like rent transfers from the purchase of 
unprofitable mills – provide another example. However, some uses of coconut 
levies fomented capital accumulation – and with that continuing wealth streams 
that extended beyond the life of the levy, and indeed the time of Marcos in 
power. The investments of coconut levies and the continuing wealth streams they 
fomented became the object of contestation after Marcos was ousted from power 
– and discussed at length in Chapter 5. The subjects of contestation have to do 
with those presented in Table 3.3 as ‘investments’. Some of these enterprises are 
still operational and have over the years grown their net worth. But much of the 
continuing value was generated through investments made, using the coconut 
levy-funded coconut oil mills as investment vehicles, in a blue-chip company in 
the Philippines: the San Miguel Corporation (SMC). SMC is a business 
conglomerate whose core business includes food processing, packaging and 
                                                 
95 In court, Cojuangco’s lawyer says in his defense: 
“It amuses that Plaintiff [the Philippine government] belittles the value of ‘enterprise’ or of the 
‘entrepreneurial spirit’. Apparently, plaintiff has overlooked that the great wealth in this world was the 
product of the ‘enterprise of entrepreneurs’” ("Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo M. 
Cojuangco, et al, COCOFED, et al, Ballares, et al,  Re: The Anomolous Purchase and use of the First 
Union Bank, now United Coconut Planters Bank," 2003, p. 62) 
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distribution, but has since expanded its interest in real estate development, 
banking, power, fuel and telecommunications.
96
  
I focus the final part of this chapter on explaining how coconut levy 
enterprises were mobilised to acquire shares in San Miguel Corporation, in a deal 
again brokered by Cojuangco. I propose that the use of access to coconut levies 
as leverage for brokering a corporate deal that had nothing to do with the 
productive goals of the coconut sector, and that now accounts for a large part of 
the coconut levies-associated ‘value’ or ‘wealth’ created, is representative of just 
how enterprises funded by the levies were used as vehicles for private wealth 
creation and transfer, but not for the benefit of the levy contributors.  
 
The deal to acquire San Miguel shares 
The bargain brokered by Cojuangco in 1983 to purchase shares of stock in San 
Miguel was essentially a deal for the control of what has been described as the 
“crown jewel” of Philippine business: a blue-chip corporation that at that time 
was the largest food, beverage and packaging firm in the country. (Parreño, 2003, 
p. 153) Cojuangco utilised his position in UCPB and control he exercised over 
the coconut levy funds to engineer a deal that vested in him personal control of 
the corporation.  
The deal involved the acquisition of about 47 per cent of the outstanding 
shares of stock in SMC in 1983. Of this, 31 per cent was acquired through CIIF 
companies (from hereon, the COCOFED shares) – and thus of which, ‘coconut 
farmers’ were residual claimants – and 16 per cent (from hereon, the Cojuangco 
shares), by Cojuangco himself.  
Cojuangco acquired his shares from Enrique Zobel
97
 in April 1983: about 17 
million shares at the market price of PhP 22 per share or a total of PhP 374 
million. Parreño (2003, p. 153) suggests that Cojuangco and Marcos wanted 
more shares in order to obtain control of the corporation. Cojuangco thus 
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 This description is from http://www.sanmiguel.com.ph/businesses/, accessed on November 15, 
2012. 
97 Enrique Zobel was a prominent Filipino businessman (1927-2004) who belonged to the Zobel 
de Ayala family, recognised as one of the Philippines’ richest and most influential families. He 
was until 1983, CEO of Ayala Corporation, a conglomerate with businesses in real estate, retail, 
banking and several other sectors. 
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negotiated with another group
98
 – that of Andres Soriano, Jr   – to purchase a 
further 33 million of the group’s 43 million shares in SMC.  Later that same year, 
the Soriano group agreed to sell to these shares to UCPB, at PhP 50 per share or 
more than twice the market price that Cojuangco paid for his own shares. In 
exchange for agreeing to sell these shares at the total price of PhP 1.65 billion, 
Soriano retained management control of the corporation for a period of five years 
after the acquisition. This was effected through a voting trust agreement in which 
Soriano was vested proxy voting power for both the Cojuangco and COCOFED 
shares. ("Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo M. Cojuangco Jr, et al, Re: 
Acquisition of San Miguel Corporation Shares of Stock," 2007, p. 5) But Soriano 
also agreed to invest about US$ 45 mn in non-voting preferred shares in UCPB –
at that time equivalent to about PhP 500 mn, in exchange for which he was given 
the vice-chairman seat in the UCPB board. Parreño (2003, p. 159) suggests that 
Soriano also made a time deposit in UPCB in the amount of PhP 1.15 bn and that 
he was guaranteed a 15 per cent rate of return on these investments.  These 
capital infusions of Soriano into UCPB thus look to have financed the 
COCOFED shares acquisition. Meanwhile, Cojuangco was named Vice-
Chairman of SMC and given the option to appoint nominees to the SMC board.  
In effect, Cojuangco engineered a deal that made it feasible to have a 
significant portion of SMC shares under the ambit of his influence. To do so, he 
made it possible for Soriano to gain extraordinary profits or rents from the 
above- market valuation of his SMC shares. And even as it may be proposed that 
Soriano funded the purchase of his own shares, he did so with a guaranteed 
return on his investments in UCPB. Moreover, he secured a deal that allowed 
him to retain control of the corporation for at least five more years after the 
finalisation of the sale of his group’s shares. Moreover, with Cojuangco’s entry 
in SMC, the company began to get favours from the Marcos government in the 
form of lowered excises taxes on beer, one of SMC’s main products. ("Republic 
of the Philippines versus Eduardo M. Cojuangco Jr, et al, Re: Acquisition of San 
Miguel Corporation Shares of Stock," 2007, p. 8) 
Meanwhile, Cojuangco secured his access to the SMC business. And with 
Soriano passing away in February 1984, he gained control of the corporation as 
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 Group includes Andres Soriano Sr, Francisco Eizmendi Jr, Benigno Toda Jr, Eduardo Soriano, 
Antonio Roxas and Antonio Prieto (Parreño, 2003, p. 158). 
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chief executive and president of the board sooner than the five year- grace period 
for the Soriano group specified in the voting trust agreement.  
The ACCRA lawyers, who I have shown earlier were also behind the legal 
engineering of UNICOM, were also given the task of setting up the legal 
infrastructure for the transfer and acquisition of the COCOFED shares. In a 
nutshell, the lawyers set up the corporate infrastructure to allow for the 
acquisition of the shares through a PhP 1.656 bn-loan made by ‘farmer-owned 
companies’ from UCPB.  In particular, ACCRA set up 14 holding companies 
solely for acquiring and holding said shares. UCPB then loaned the six CIIF oil 
mills the amount of PhP 976 million. The mills, in turn, invested PhP 247 million 
as equity in the 14 holding companies. They re-lent the remaining PhP 729 mn to 
these companies.  Meanwhile, UCPB directly loaned out PhP 680 mn to the 14 
holding companies.
99
 The system of financing was made deliberately complex 
and obscure, Parreño (Parreño, 2003, p. 160) suggests, to hide the identity of the 
shares’ ‘buyer’.  
Meanwhile, the Cojuangco shares were placed in the name of three 
corporations.
100
 Interestingly, the articles of incorporation had the name of Jose 
Concepion, a lawyer from ACCRA as owner of 99.6 per cent of these 
corporations’ shares. Concepcion later declared in court that he was just a 
‘nominee stockholder’; and the corporations were ultimately identified as 
Cojuangco corporations. ("Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo M. 
Cojuangco Jr, et al, Re: Acquisition of San Miguel Corporation Shares of Stock," 
2007, p. 6)  Concepcion also averred that he signed a voting trust agreement that 
gave Cojuangco the right to vote the shares bought in the name of said 
corporations.  
In a pre-trial brief of Cojuangco, he appears to have admitted funding the 
procurement through the UCPB loans and CIIF oil mill advances. The brief was 
used in the case filed against him on the matter of the SMC shares. There he 
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 Parreño says that UCPB tried to remove direct exposure to the companies by later on lending 
the PhP680 million to 10 copra trading companies owned by CTCs, who then re-lent the money 
to the holding companies. This enabled the companies to re-pay their debt to UCPB and transfer 
the same to the CTCs (Parreño, 2003, pp. 152-166). 
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  Meadow Lark Plantations, Silver Leaf Plantations and Primavera Farms.  
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proposed to present witnesses and records to show that he financed the purchase 
of the shares through UCPB loans and CIIF oil mills advances.101  
 
The burden of the deal: the COCOFED shares 
What is germane to my analysis is the question of who ultimately bore the 
burden of the investments in the SMC stocks; and whether said investments led 
to palpable returns to the sector. The Philippine government averred, in the case 
it filed in the anti-graft court in 1986, that the deal engineered by Cojuangco in 
the acquisition of both his shares and the COCOFED shares represented a misuse 
of coconut levy funds – implying that coconut levy funds were directly used for 
the purchase of these shares.102 This extrapolation is difficult to substantiate given 
that nowhere in the COA reports I have closely examined in this chapter does it 
show that coconut levy funds were directly disbursed for financing this deal 
However, I will explain below how there is enough evidence to suggest that 
coconut farmers ultimately bore most of the burden of this deal. 
This point is easier to substantiate with reference to the COCOFED shares. It 
is important to underline that the cost of investment here was not just the price of 
acquiring the stocks, but also the carrying cost of the loan used to finance the 
acquisition. For example, in 1997, COA found that the total annual interest 
payments from 1983 to 1996, on the above-described loans made by oil mills to 
finance the deal, amounted to PhP 5.2 bn. PhP 4.07 bn of this was paid using 
cash dividends from the stocks (PhP 2.11 bn), the sale of some shares of stocks 
(PhP 500 mn), and income from oil milling operations (PhP 1.46 mn). 
(Commission on Audit, 1997, p. 28) This means that for the first thirteen years 
since the deal was brokered by Cojuangco, the dividends from the investment 
were not enjoyed by the residual claimants of the stocks – the coconut farmer-
owned oil mills – but simply used to finance the loan made to purchase the 
stocks. Worse, oil milling income was also re-invested into the sector but used to 
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 Based on information from the following court documents: ("Republic of the Philippines vs. 
Sandiganbayan (First Division), Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., et al. Re: Acquisition of San Miguel 
Corporation Shares of Stocks -  Dissenting Opinion of Justice  Brion," 2011, pp. 21-26; 
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., et al. 
Re: Acquisition of San Miguel Corporation Shares of Stocks  -  Dissenting Opinion of Justice 
Carpio Morales," 2011, pp. 32-42) 
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 Based on information from the following court documents: ("Republic of the Philippines 
versus Eduardo M. Cojuangco Jr, et al, Re: Acquisition of San Miguel Corporation Shares of 
Stock," 2007, p. 5) 
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service the debt. A high ranking CIIF official that I interviewed in 2009
103
 
asserted that it was only in 2004 that the debt was completely paid by the mills 
and dividends could be ploughed back to the sector. At this point, the shares of 
stock had already been sequestered and deemed government-owned, and thus 
coconut farmer groups had to negotiate the uses of the dividends with the 
executive agencies – the subject of Chapter 5.  
In summary, the risk and cost of financing the COCOFED shares were 
ultimately borne by coconut farmers through their ownership of the enterprises 
that procured the shares. While their investments may have led to the accretion of 
value (i.e. in the form of the increasing market value of the SMC shares), I 
propose they were detrimental to coconut levy contributors for two reasons. 
First, the investment in COCOFED shares did not lead to palpable benefits to the 
coconut sector, in terms of re-investments of profit into productivity.  Instead, 
returns from the investment in the form of dividends, and even income from 
coconut oil mills were used to service the cost of the investment in the form of 
interest payments. Second, even if the investment led to the creation of wealth– 
i.e., the current market value of the COCOFED shares – the rent settlement that 
obtained was one where coconut producers had tenuous claims on the value 
created. In the end, COCOFED lost its claim on the stocks in a court decision in 
2004, which will be explored in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Cojuangco shares: ill-gotten wealth? 
In regard to the Cojuangco shares, the bone of contention is whether personal 
loans he made from UCPB to finance the acquisition of his shares were 
constitutive of illegally obtained wealth acquired through abuse of authority in 
the use of coconut levies.  In 2011, the Supreme Court decided that Cojuangco’s 
pre-trial briefing statement in which he proposed to present witnesses and 
records to prove that he borrowed money from UCPB and got advances from 
coconut oil mills, did not constitute as admission that he actually incurred the 
loans and obtained the advances, only a proposal to provide evidence.104 Two 
justices provided dissenting opinions. Justice Brion, said  
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 Interviewed on May 15, 2009 in the Philippines.  
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 Based on information from the court document: ("Republic of the Philippines vs. 
Sandiganbayan (First Division), Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., et al. Re: Acquisition of San Miguel 
Corporation Shares of Stocks ", 2011, p. 61) 
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“It is ridiculous for a party to stipulate documents and witnesses he would present 
as evidence if these were not intended to support his position … At the very least 
Atty. Mendoza’s statement [Cojuangco’s lawyer] was an admission that UCPB 
loans were used as funding to purchase a portion of the subject SMC shares.” 105  
 
Justice Carpio Morales concurred with Brion, saying the statements were a clear 
admission that the Cojuangco shares were paid, either in whole or part, out of 
loans and credit advances from the UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills.106 Moreover, he 
opines that this was a violation of his fiduciary obligations as administrator of 
UCPB.  According to him: 
“…his acquisition of the SMC shares amounted to his depriving the coconut 
farmers of a business opportunity which rightfully belonged to them, i.e., access to 
the coco levy funds, and his gain profits therefrom to the detriment of the intended 
beneficiaries. By no stretch of one’s imagination can it be assumed that the 
purchase of SMC shares directly or even indirectly redounded to the benefit of 
coconut farmers.”107  
 
Moreover, Carpio Morales argues that Cojuangco violated the General 
Banking Law, which prohibited officers of a banking institution to directly or 
indirectly borrow any deposits of funds except with the written approval of all 
directors of the bank. He said Cojuangco did not use the trial to show he obtained 
such authority from UCPB directors when he admitted to have obtained loans 
from the bank.108  
Meanwhile, Parreño (2003, pp. 163-164) cites a document that does not only 
substantiate the claim that Cojuangco borrowed money from UCPB to  finance 
the purchase of his SMC shares but that he actually mobilised UCPB, UNICOM 
and CIIF mills income to pay for carrying costs of his personal loan in 1983 and 
1984. The document is an affidavit of a human rights lawyer, Potenciano Roque, 
who gained access to presidential vaults in Malacanang, the Philippines 
presidential residence and office, soon after Marcos fled it in February 1986. 
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Based on information from the court document: ("Republic of the Philippines vs. 
Sandiganbayan (First Division), Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., et al. Re: Acquisition of San 
Miguel Corporation Shares of Stocks -  Dissenting Opinion of Justice  Brion," 2011, pp. 
23-24) 
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 Based on information from the court document: ("Republic of the Philippines vs. 
Sandiganbayan (First Division), Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., et al. Re: Acquisition of San Miguel 
Corporation Shares of Stocks  -  Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio Morales," 2011, p. 34) 
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 Based on information from the court document: ("Republic of the Philippines vs. 
Sandiganbayan (First Division), Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., et al. Re: Acquisition of San Miguel 
Corporation Shares of Stocks  -  Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio Morales," 2011, p. 66) 
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 Based on information from the court document: ("Republic of the Philippines vs. 
Sandiganbayan (First Division), Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., et al. Re: Acquisition of San Miguel 
Corporation Shares of Stocks  -  Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio Morales," 2011, p. 66) 
131 
 
Parreño claims that documents
109
 Roque found in Marcos’ room revealed that the 
loans used to acquire both the Cojuangco and COCOFED shares were being 
amortised as a single loan. The document indicated that annual interest costs 
were estimated at PhP 300 mn, based on a loan with the base figure of P2.02 bn, 
which in turn is the sum of price of the COCOFED shares and the Cojuangco 
shares. These costs were to be funded out of estimated annual incomes of UCPB 
(PhP 130 mn), UNICOM (PhP 50 mn) and CIIF mills (PhP 20 mn), as well as the 
dividends from the acquired SMC shares. 
Based on the expert opinion of two Supreme Court judges and the Roque 
affidavit, I therefore propose that there is plausible basis to claim that Cojuangco, 
at the very least, obtained resources from coconut levy funded enterprises to 
finance the purchase of his SMC shares and having done so, utilised his position 
in the organisations controlling the rent settlement to raise the resources for 
funding his personal shares. At worst, levy contributors bore part of the burden 
of financing this investment, to the extent that incomes of levy funded enterprises 
were used to settle the personal obligations of Cojuangco in relation to the UCPB 
loan he used to acquire personal shares.  
In closing, what I have shown in this section is that the deal brokered by 
Cojuangco to secure controlling shares in SMC is iconic of the use of coconut 
levies in the process of surplus extraction for capital accumulation. This process 
was not only completely delinked from building up productive capacity in the 
coconut sector, but served to benefit an associate of president Marcos.  
 
Conclusion 
I have explained in this chapter the main features of the rent settlement 
associated with coconut levies in the Philippines. I explained the main ways by 
which coconut levy funds were mobilised. Of the PhP 9.7 bn collected, PhP 7 bn 
was fully expended as investments that failed, price subsidy programmes or one-
off projects and/or deals that did not generate further income streams or profits. 
Meanwhile, PhP 2.7 bn was invested in assets that generated value and/or income 
streams even after the levies had ceased to be collected.  
                                                 
109
 These include “several sheets of accounting computations of the amount of the coconut levy 
and its disbursements, including a sheet showing the funding scheme for the acquisition of 50 
million San Miguel shares” (Parreño, 2003). 
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I show how the captured rent settlement profited a presidential associate the 
most. He did not only obtain purposively allocated rent transfers but was able to 
accumulate capital by leveraging his authority to control the levies. Meanwhile, 
there is no compelling evidence to suggest that COCOFED acted in the best 
interests of its members or that the same motivated its leaders. There was no 
effort to systematically plough back rents to the sector. The welfare and 
productivity programmes represented a miniscule portion of levies disbursed. 
The bank that was set-up to provide credit to farmers became the node for 
administering a monopoly that extracted surplus from them.  And the greatest 
value created associated with the coconut levies had to do with a 
financial/corporate deal that had nothing to do with production in the coconut 
sector.  
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Chapter 4. ‘From the producers, for the producers’: The Colombia coffee 
rent settlement as counterpoint 
 
 
In this chapter, I present the rent settlement associated with coffee levies in 
Colombia as a counterpoint to that of the coconut levies in the Philippines. 
Explaining the rent settlement in Colombia is a relatively straightforward task 
because the history and uses of the coffee levies are better documented than 
those of coconut levies. There exists in Colombia a rich historiography110 of 
coffee: its production, trade, and governance.  The FEDECAFE generated their 
own historical archives – including the Revista Cafetera, a trade magazine that 
began being published soon after the federation was founded in 1927 and 
regularly featured organisational agreements, including annual budgets and 
congress proceedings. In this chapter, I explore these historical and archival 
resources to analyse how coffee levies were mobilised and thereby present a 
synthesis of the rent settlement that I can compare with that of the Philippines. 
In this chapter, I highlight two features of the rent settlement in Colombia that 
are in sharp contrast to the Philippine case: the breadth of resources made 
available for the use of coffee producers through the FEDECAFE; and the key 
modes of rent mobilisation showing how coffee producers were the chief 
beneficiaries of the rent settlement. These features show that the pronounced 
justification for the extraction of coffee levies in Colombia was not the mere 
formality that it was in the case of coconut levies in the Philippines. As I have 
shown in Chapter 3, the subversion of the avowed goals of coconut levies in the 
Philippines meant that piecing together the story of the rent settlement associated 
with the coconut levies entailed comparing their de jure and de facto uses, 
explaining the means by which they were subverted and analysing who 
benefitted from the manipulation of the legal goals of the levies. In contrast, the 
defence and protection of the coffee sector in Colombia were the enduring logic 
that governed the actual mobilisation of the coffee levies, from the time the first 
                                                 
110 Junguito and Pizano (1993, 1996, 1997) have a three-volume history – covering the twentieth 
century – of Colombian coffee production, the policies and institutions governing the sector, and 
its terms of engagement in the world market for coffee. Before them, Palacios (1980) wrote an 
economic, social and political history of coffee covering 1875 to 1970. Koffman (1969) narrates 
the history of the federation. Bacca (2010) critically reviews specialised historiography of the 
coffee industry, covering a comprehensive view of the field form the 1950s to 2010. 
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coffee levy – the general tax on export – was collected in 1927 until 2000. 
Following this logic, the levies were deployed for the purposes of stabilising 
domestic coffee prices, maximising coffee producers’ income and protecting 
their welfare. These objectives were achieved by mobilising the coffee levies to 
enable market interventions that regulated prices and thus stabilised producer 
income, to finance investments promoting production and international 
competitiveness, and to establish a range of Federation-owned enterprises within 
and beyond the sector. While these bear familiar echoes to the Philippine story 
that I have already told, in the case of Colombia, the coffee producers, through 
the FEDECAFE, had a clear and enduring claim on the emergent rent streams, 
which coconut producers in the Philippines never had. 
In this chapter, I relate the story of the Colombian rent settlement in three 
sections. In the first section, I provide an overview of the resources extracted 
through the use of the state's coercive power to tax but made available for the use 
of the FEDECAFE. I showcase the breadth of resources that the federation could 
mobilise. To give an indication of how the levies were actually mobilised, I first 
review the uses of the levies in the early years of the federation, from 1927 to 
1940, when the levies directly entered the federation’s budget as an income 
stream. Two main uses of the funds after 1940 are then explained in the second 
and third sections of this chapter.  In 1940, the National Coffee Fund (Fondo 
Nacional del Café, from here on the Coffee Fund) was established and became 
the main mechanism for mobilising coffee levies. Though the coffee levies were 
no longer directly transferred to the federation's budget as an income stream, the 
federation still exercised control over the uses of the levies as the Coffee Fund's 
administrator. In the second section, I explain the way levies were used as a 
resource for effecting market interventions that at first were targeted at regulating 
the export market, but later on effected to stabilise producer income. In the third 
section, I describe how the levies and the revenues arising from their 
mobilisation in the Federation’s marketing board operations were invested in 
support of the goals of stabilisation and enhancing producer income and welfare.  
 
Purposive rent allocation for a federation: an overview 
Explaining the modes of mobilisation of coffee levies in Colombia necessarily 
begins with making sense of the complex set of taxes collected from the sector. 
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In the case of the coconut levies in the Philippines, these were constituted by a 
limited set of specific taxes borne by producers, nominally allocated for use by 
the coconut sector, collected over a relatively limited period of time and whose 
uses evolved quickly over the same time period. In contrast, coffee levies in 
Colombia were constituted by a complex range of taxes, some of which are still 
being collected; their uses, evolving with the needs of the sector and – if not 
always perfectly synchronised111 – with international market conditions.  In the 
Philippines, I estimated the levy collections by utilising the audit data on how 
they were used. In Colombia, I did not need to take this circuitous route: the 
relevant tax collections were publicly reported annually and estimating the levies 
from this was thus straightforward.  I therefore begin the story of the coffee rent 
settlement in Colombia, with the taxes that constituted the levies: how much did 
the federation really control and how did the levies evolve over time to finance 
the operations of the FEDECAFE? 
 
Levies as purposive surplus extraction  
From 1927 to 2000 coffee producers were levied a range of taxes112, collected 
in the first instance from exporters but borne by producers, to whom the burden 
of the taxes was ultimately passed on as a cost deducted by exporters from their 
offer price. Data for the period 1950 to 1996, collected by Junguito and Pizano 
(1997, pp. 309, 315), suggest that coffee taxes represented an average of about 
24 per cent of the coffee producers' income during this period.   As can be seen in 
Figure 4.1, the tax burden was all the time increasing from 1950 to the 1970s, 
and peaked in 1979. Also based on Junguito and Pizano’s data, these taxes 
accounted for an average of about 7 per cent of total government tax revenues in 
the period from 1950 to 1996. The sector’s average share in government’s taxes 
was about 10 per cent in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, but has thereafter 
significantly decreased.  
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This point was made by La Comision de Ajuste de la Institucionalidad Cafetera, in an 
influential report (Ramirez, Silva, Valenzuela, Villegas, & Villegas, 2002) examining the future 
of Colombian coffee policies in the face of changing world market conditions, rooted in the 
collapse of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989, and the chronic overproduction that now 
afflicts the sector, with the expansion of production that followed in countries like Vietnam and 
Brazil.  
112
The characteristics, nature and history of these taxes are discussed comprehensively by 
Junguito and Pizano (1997, pp. 249-320), who are the main sources for the descriptive material 
on the taxes presented in this sub-section. 
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Figure 4.1 Coffee taxes as a percentage of income and  
total government revenues: 1950-1996 
 
 
Source of basic data: Junguito and Pizano, 1997, pp. 309-310, p. 315 
 
The full range of taxes collected from Colombian coffee producers are 
presented in Table 4.1. In this section, I will first provide a macro and long-run 
perspective of the 'coffee levies', the types and portions of the coffee taxes 
collected from 1927 to 2000 that were retained for use by the sector 
The coffee levies in Colombia were mostly constituted by export taxes of 
various forms – paid in cash based on volume or value, and in kind as retention 
quotas. They were ‘taxes’ in name only as they were purposively collected to 
finance the activities of the FEDECAFE and never fully channelled to the 
treasury for redistribution to the wider economy.  Table 4.1 reveals how the 
coffee sector fully retained all but three of the export taxes imposed on the 
sector:  the tax on international payments levied from 1957 to 1962, various 
exchange rate differential regimes in the 1960s and 1970s, and the ad valorem 
tax levied from 1967 to 1991. Of the sector-retained taxes, those paid in 
monetary form – the specific and various types of ad valorem taxes – were either 
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directly transferred to the organisational budget of the FEDECAFE113 or 
channelled as a financial resource for the Coffee Fund once it was established.  
From 1940 onwards, the Coffee Fund, in turn, transferred resources for the direct 
use of the FEDECAFE, but was primarily mobilised to regulate internal coffee 
market conditions as well as Colombia’s participation in the external coffee 
market.  
Meanwhile, the retention quotas applied to export-grade and low-grade coffee 
– effectively taxes paid in kind – were stocks accumulated by the FEDECAFE, 
enabling them to engage in marketing operations in the domestic and 
international coffee markets, and thereby regulate prices and producers’ income. 
In a nutshell, the general tax on coffee exports collected from 1927 to 1972, two 
taxes on international receipts collected from 1940 to 1946, the tax on low grade 
coffee collected from 1940 to 1991, the retention duty collected from 1958 to the 
present and the coffee contribution collected from 1991 to present were all 
‘forced contributions’ from producers, collected expressly to finance the 
activities of the FEDECAFE in protecting and defending the coffee sector.   
Aside from these export taxes, coffee levies also included types of taxes, 
which quite tellingly were also collected from the coconut sector in the 
Philippines but fully remitted to the national coffers (and thus not part of coconut 
levies). In Colombia, the coffee sector retained a part of even these types of 
taxes. Table 4.1 shows the taxes imposed, for which the coffee sector shared 
proceeds with the Colombian government – mostly taxes collected in line with 
macroeconomic objectives and channelled to form part of the national foreign 
exchange reserves. These included the ad valorem tax collected from 1957 to 
1991, and implicit taxes embodied in a number of exchange rate differential 
regimes at various periods between 1935 and 1980. 114 Indicative of the power 
possessed by the FEDECAFE, the nominal rates of these 'shared taxes' either 
progressively declined or the Federation successfully negotiated an increased 
                                                 
113
As will be shown in forthcoming sections, these were transferred by the Coffee Federation to 
be channelled to Municipal Committees, whose shares in the levies were determined by levels of 
production. 
114
 Proceeds from the tax on international trade collected from 1957 to 1962 were fully remitted 
to the national government. During this period, the government wanted to capture part of the 
windfall from a significant devaluation of the Colombian peso, which fell from Col$ 2.50 to 6.70 
to the US dollar (Junguito & Pizano, 1997, p. 289).  In the first three years of this period, I 
calculate based on data from Junguito and Pizano (1997, p. 315) that government enjoyed from 
56 to 84 per cent of the total coffee taxes collected. 
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Table 4.1 Taxes collected from the coffee sector: period collected, rate of 
taxation and recipients 
 
Taxes collected 
Period 
collected 
Description Recipient 
General tax on 
coffee exports 
(impuesto general 
de exportación de 
café) 
1927 to 1972 
A specific export tax of Col$0.10 per 60 
kilo-sack exported (1927-1937), increased to 
Col$0.25 per 70 kilo-sack exported (1937-
1972) 
FEDECAFE 
Tax on international 
receipts  
1935 to 1939 
Impuesto de giros, an ad valorem export tax 
applied to 12% of the value of exports, 
exchange at a lower exchange rate 
FEDECAFE, 
and 
Government 
1940 to 1946 
Impuesto de giros, an ad valorem export tax 
of Col$0.05 per US$ of export sales 
National 
Coffee Fund 
1940 to 1944 
Impuesto de valorizacion, an ad valorem  
export tax that functioned as an exchange 
rate differential; effected through forced sale 
of export receipts in excess of government-
determined base price to Central Bank at a 
discounted exchange rate, equivalent to 43% 
rate of taxation 
National 
Coffee Fund 
1957 to 1962 
Impuesto de giros, an ad valorem export tax 
of 9 to 15% of the value of coffee exports 
Government 
Tax on low-grade  
coffee (impuesto de 
pasillo y ripio) 
1940 to 1991 
A specific export tax of Col$ 5 per 70 kilos 
of sub-premium coffee exported (1940), 
amended as a retention quota on low-grade 
coffee equivalent to  6% of export volume 
sold at a fixed price (or its corresponding 
value  paid to) to the federation (1941-1991) 
FEDECAFE, 
and National 
Coffee Fund 
Retention duty 
(retencion cafetera) 
1958 to 
present 
A retention quota on export-grade coffee, 
ranging  from 4 to 85% of export volume 
National 
Coffee Fund 
Ad valorem tax 
(impuesto de ad 
valorem) 
1967 to  1991 
An ad valorem  export tax, ranging from 6.5 
to 26% of the coffee export surrender price  
Government, 
FEDECAFE, 
and National 
Coffee Fund 
Coffee contribution 
(contribucion 
cafetera) 
1991 to 
present 
An ad valorem export tax,  5% of 
representative per pound price of café suave 
de colombiana plus a specific tax of US$.02 
per pound of exported coffee (when the price 
of coffee is more than US$0.60 per pound 
until 2005, and more than US$0.95 from 
2006) 
National 
Coffee Fund 
Exchange rate 
differentials 
1951 to 1955 
A lower exchange rate of Col$1.95 per US$ 
imposed on 75% of coffee export revenues, 
with the rest exchanged at the official 
exchange rate of Col$2.50; the share of 
revenues exchanged at the lower rate was to 
decrease progressively until it reached 0%.  
National 
Coffee Fund 
1958 to 1967 
An obligation for coffee exporters to 
exchange forex earnings at a pre-determined 
exchange rate, changed periodically  
National 
Coffee Fund 
(1958-1962) 
 
National 
Coffee Fund, 
and 
Government 
(1962-1967) 
1977 to 1980 
A system for discounting forex from coffee 
exports 
Government 
         Source of basic data: Junguito and Pizano (1997, pp. 36, 142, 280-293) 
 
 
  
139 
 
share in the proceeds. In the case of the ad valorem tax, the rate of taxation 
declined from a high of 26.5 per cent in 1967 to 6.5 per cent in1984115, even as 
the share of the FEDECAFE, 4 per cent of this rate, remained unchanged 
throughout.  In summary, ‘coffee levies’ in Colombia were thus constituted by a 
range of explicit taxes purposively allocated for the exclusive use of the coffee 
sector in addition to proceeds from other taxes which the sector shared with the 
national government.  
 
Table 4.2 Distribution of coffee taxes collected, by type (in per cent) 
 
 1927/40 1941/44 1945/49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-96 
General tax on 
export 
25.0 4.2 50.0 2.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Taxes on 
international receipts 
62.5 92.6 0.0 21.1 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tax on low-grade 
coffee 
12.5 3.2 50.0 31.0 4.2 1.9 1.8 2.1 
Exchange rate 
differential 
0.0 0.0 0.0 39.5 33.2 3.0 0.8 0.0 
Retention duty 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 37.2 53.7 74.0 30.6 
Ad valorem tax 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 41.3 23.4 13.2 
Coffee contribution   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54.1 
Source of basic data: Junguito and Pizano, 1997, pp 309-310 
 
Not only did the coffee sector in Colombia have a wide base of tax sources 
constituting the levies, it also retained a significant proportion of the surplus 
extracted through the taxes. This could be seen by analysing the distribution of 
coffee taxes collected from 1927 to 1996, as shown in Table 4.2.  The table 
reveals that there were only three decades when the types of taxes collected that 
dominated the collections (i.e. exchange rate differentials, tax on international 
payments and ad valorem tax) were those for which the coffee sector shared 
proceeds with the government: the 1930s, 1950s and 1960s. In particular, it could 
                                                 
115
 Meanwhile, The ad valorem  tax collected from 1967 was initially set at a rate of 26 per cent 
of the coffee surrender price, reduced by .25 per cent per month from 1967 to 1968. Various 
decrees were passed after that to further lower the rate to: 20 per cent (1969-1974); 19 per cent, 
decreasing by 1 per cent annually until 1979; 15.2 per cent (1980); 11.3 per cent (1972); 8.3 per 
cent (1983), and 6.5 per cent (1984-1991) (Junguito & Pizano, 1997, pp. 289-290).  
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be seen that in the early years of the Federation, between 1927 and 1940, taxes 
on international receipts accounted for the lion's share of the coffee taxes. In the 
1950s, exchange rate differentials and taxes on international payments together 
accounted for more than half of the coffee taxes collected.  Finally, in the 1960s, 
exchange rate differentials and the ad valorem tax, together accounted for almost 
half the collections. In all the other decades, much of what was collected was 
retained by the sector.  
 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of taxes on coffee between  
the national government and the coffee sector, in per cent 1950-1996 
 
 
Source of basic data: Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p. 315 
 
That the coffee sector retained a significant portion of the funds extracted 
from it is also exhibited by Figure 4.2, a graphical representation of the ‘coffee 
levies’, which shows the division of coffee taxes collected between the national 
government and the coffee sector in the period 1950-1996. The figure shows that, 
during this period, the sector retained for its own use more than half of the taxes 
on coffee producers, except for a number of years in the 1950s and 1960s (i.e. the 
periods 1951-1954, 1957-1960, 1964-1966) – notably during periods when, as 
explained above, exchange rate differentials were in place and/or the proceeds 
from the impuesto de giros were fully remitted to the government. Put another 
way, in 35 of the 46 years between 1950 and 1996, more than half of the taxes 
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imposed on the sector were actually coffee levies retained by the sector. In 
particular, based on the data from Junguito and Pizano (1997, p. 315),  I calculate 
that the sector retained an increasing share of the collections, with ten-year 
average shares of 53 per cent in the 1950s,  64 per cent in the 1960s, 86 per cent 
in the 1980s, and 93.8 in the 1990s. Given that before the period covered by the 
data presented in Figure 4.2, all but one tax – the impuesto de giros collected 
from 1935 to 1937, which was shared between the government and the sector –
were remitted fully to the coffee sector, one can conclude that throughout the 
period under study in this dissertation, the coffee producers retained a major and 
increasing portion of the taxes collected from them. 
 
The early days of rent mobilisation: setting what would endure 
The period before the establishment of the Coffee Fund covers the early years 
of the FEDECAFE from 1927 to 1940, during which the coffee levies – as could 
be seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 – were constituted by the general export tax, a 
temporary tax on international payments, and an early version of the tax on low-
grade coffee. These levies were remitted to the FEDECAFE and entered its 
budget as an income stream, to which it gained rights in exchange for a range of 
deliverables – including the promotion of Colombia's coffee in world markets, 
and the provision of specified services to growers – that the federation rendered 
to "protect and defend the coffee industry". This arrangement was enshrined as a 
set of obligations in legally binding and renewable contracts covering a period of 
ten years signed by both the government and the FEDECAFE. The first of these 
contracts was signed in 1928, and every ten years since. This contractual 
arrangement will be analysed at length in Chapter 6 as a key institution for 
regulating the rent settlement in Colombia, but at this stage I would like to flag 
how this defining feature was clearly in place in the earliest days that the 
FEDECAFE mobilised the coffee levies.  
Table 4.3 features the budget allocations made by the federation from 1930 to 
1940 and approved by its National Congress.116 It provides a window to see how 
the FEDECAFE mobilised the state-engineered income streams it was given 
                                                 
116
I collated the figures in this table from the data featured in the acuerdos or agreements that the 
federation reached in their annual National Congress, convened annually and the highest policy-
making body of the FEDECAFE.   
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legal claim to during the early years of the federation. In Colombia, the 
federation did not only have claims on the levies, but also all the income 
generated through the mobilisation of the same. The budget allocations featured 
in the table are thus based on both expected collections of levies and relevant 
incomes generated – for example, income from the operation of the federation’s 
warehouses and experimental farms, all of which were established through the 
levies. The data presented here reveal two sets of important insights: the first, 
revelatory of how the FEDECAFE responded to the conditions specific to the 
period; the other, of the enduring features of rent mobilisation that were to be 
found beyond this period. 
The key challenge faced by the FEDECAFE in its early days and one of the 
precipitating factors for producers to agree to what Junguito (1996, pp. 3-4) calls 
"self-imposed taxes"  was the slump in international prices that the sector faced: 
first,  in the aftermath of the First World War, and then the diminution of prices 
during the Great Depression in the United States. After an unprecedented 
expansion of the sector from 1875 to 1925, by which time coffee exports 
accounted for 75 per cent of Colombia's total exports, the early part of the 1920s 
saw a tumbling of international coffee prices. While prices partially recovered 
from then until the mid-1920s, these suffered from a decline in 1928 to 1929 due 
to a bumper harvest in Brazil (Palacios, 1980, p. 214), and a sustained decline 
during the Great Depression in the 1930s (Junguito, 1996, pp. 3-4), a period 
when sources of credit and financing also dried up.  
Coffee producers thus began to recognise their vulnerability to external 
market conditions – a vulnerability sharpened by two additional problems: (1) 
the coffee sector (much like the Philippine coconut sector) did not have 
warehousing facilities, technical support or access to credit facilities; and (2) 
foreign-owned trading firms dominated the post-harvest market and captured as 
much as 50 per cent of the external price of coffee. (Junguito & Pizano, 1997, p. 
3) 
The data in Table 4.3 suggests the means by which the FEDECAFE sought to 
deal with some of these problems, among which I would like to highlight four 
key trends. 
First, it could be seen from the table that the federation was utilising 
departmental committees as a key node for the mobilisation of levies. Data in 
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Table 4.3 indicates that allocations for the committees were increasing except in 
1936-1938, which was a period of declining international prices. The role these 
committees played in mobilising levies for investments will be discussed at 
length later in Chapter 6, but here it is worth noting how – in contrast to the 
Philippine case study – local chapters of the federation were active participants in 
the mobilisation of levies from the earliest days of the FEDECAFE. 
 
Table 4.3 Budget allocations made by the FEDECAFE: 1930-1940 
 
Budgeted allocations for: 1930-32 1932-34 1934-36 1936-38 1938 1939-40 
FEDECAFE Departmental Committees 213,379 259,406 252,140 190,000 210,000 560,000 
Research development and extension 31,000 90,000 85,000 37,000 144,920 423,600 
  Establishment and maintenance of departmental 
farms 
31,000 70,000 60,000 25,000 79,600 135,600 
  Estacion Central de Investigacion - 20,000 25,000 12,000 65,320 250,000 
  Allocation for FEDECAFE agronomists - - - - - 38,000 
Public health campaign - - - - 180,000 500,000 
Warehousing facilities 30,000 90,000 302,712 461,800 300,000 1,060,000 
Promotional activities 160,000 195,000 192,000 165,000 140,000 1,160,000 
  Office and advertisement costs, international 150,000 170,000 170,000 150,000 120,000 1,120,000 
  Revista Cafetera, bulletins and other internal 
propaganda 
10,000 25,000 22,000 15,000 20,000 40,000 
Production-related expenditures 80,000 35,000 95,000 25,000 149,000 130,000 
  To develop production in departments with 
smallholders 
30,000 35,000 35,000 25,000 30,000 60,000 
  Credit Agrario and credit cooperatives 50,000 - 60,000  100,000  
  Anti-pest campaign - - - - 9,000 20,000 
  Establishment of thresher in selected  localities  - - - - 10,000 50,000 
Information system - 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 34,000 
  Subscription to international data, magazines - 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 10,000 
  Library services (encuadernaciones, archivo, 
timbre) 
- - - - - 4,000 
  Censo Cafetero - - - - - 20,000 
FEDECAFE National Congress costs - - 12,000 - 12,000 30,000 
Office and administrative costs 113,320 149,400 156,400 155,700 158,000 353,000 
  Office costs (incl. rent, office supplies, furniture, 
etc) 
34,320 34,500 22,200 24,500 19,000 46,000 
  Personnel salary, incl. transport and per diem 69,000 99,900 121,200 119,200 119,000 262,000 
  Communications 10,000 15,000 13,000 12,000 20,000 45,000 
Others 130,570 141,971 253,298 81,300 204,120 842,392 
  Rotating funds and reserves 100,000 50,000 50,000 - 100,000 - 
  Unbudgeted costs, including those carried over 30,570 91,971 203,298 81,300 104,120 42,392 
  Capital infusion - - - - - 800,000 
Total 758,269 961,777 1,350,550 1,118,800 1,502,040 5,092,992 
Source of basic information: Revista Cafetera (1931, pp. 746-748; 1932, pp. 1500-1502; 1934, pp. 1891-1892; 1935, pp. 
1962-1963; 1937, pp. 2213-2214; 1938, pp. 2493-2495) 
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Second, the budget allocations also reveal that the FEDECAFE was actively 
responding to perceived production bottlenecks of the period. Budget allocations 
for research and development – including the establishment of a research 
centre117 and experimental farms118, and a budget to hire agronomists – were 
increasing throughout the period. Production-related investments were being 
made, including access to credit facilities119 and – in support of Thorp's (2000, p. 
5) observation that the federation supported smallholders from the very 
beginning – targeted allocations for departments with smallholder producers.  
Third, from its earliest days, the FEDECAFE began to build up storage 
capacity with the establishment of a network of warehousing facilities120 – in the 
table, seen as budget allocations for 'warehousing facilities' – in coffee-growing 
departments of the country. This budget allocation was important for a number of 
reasons. For one, it could be seen as an early attempt at intervening in coffee 
trading in Colombia. Coffee producers could obtain bonos de prenda (pledge 
bonds) against the produce they opted to store here, against which they could 
obtain an advance of 75 per cent of the value. (Junguito & Pizano, 1997, pp. 51-
52) They could thus wait out releasing the stock to the market during times of 
especially low prices. Related to this, during its early days, the FEDECAFE 
began using the levies to establish a system for  providing timely market 
information, reflected in Table 4.3 as budget allocations for setting up an 
'information system'. In other words, the allocations for warehousing facilities as 
well as for setting up information facilities were early attempts at contending 
with the power of traders in the post-production market.  But aside from 
representing an early foray into commercial operations, the network of 
warehouses enabled the federation to classify coffee produced in Colombia, and 
thereby set-up a system for a registry of marks of origins. As noted by Bates 
(1997, p. 63), the FEDECAFE was able to secure regulatory powers during this 
period that enabled them to assign brand names to coffee produced in particular 
regions, and impose a price premium on superior coffee from regions reputed to 
                                                 
117
 This is what was to become the CENICAFE, explained in Chapter 1. 
118
 These were called ‘granjas’.  
119
 Caja Agraria.  
120
 This is what was to become the Almacenes Generales, described in Chapter 1, and discussed 
further in this chapter. 
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produce higher quality coffee. This was a cornerstone for enhancing the 
reputation for the quality of Colombian coffee, in an international market where 
information on origins is priced and given a premium.121 
Fourth, the Federation also allocated a significant portion of its budget to 
promote Colombian coffee internationally. As can be seen in Table 4.3, the 
budget for promotional activities from 1930 to 1936, accounted for the second 
biggest allocation next to transfers to the departmental committees. From 1938 it 
had overtaken these transfers, and by 1940 was allocated the biggest share of the 
budget. Bates (1997, pp. 60-61, 69-74) suggests that the Federation was, in its 
early years, a proponent of competitive marketing policies, choosing to be a 
'vigorous entrant' in the world market. While the government wanted to collude 
with the other leading coffee exporter, Brazil, to delimit world supplies of coffee, 
the Federation initially preferred to free-ride on Brazil's international marketing 
strategy. He says that the Federation believed that Colombian coffee producers 
could thrive in open competition "owing to the small size of the coffee farms in 
Colombia, the diverse crops grown on each farm"  -- that is to say that they could 
withstand the competitive onslaught by consuming food products in their farms 
while tending to their coffee. (Bates, 1997, p 73) The budget allocations for 
international promotions could be seen as reflecting this commitment to compete 
openly and vigorously. The relative importance of these budget items can be seen 
in Figure 4.3, which depicts the data in terms of shares in total allocations for 
specific periods. As has been noted, transfers to the departmental committees and 
promotional activities constituted the biggest share of allocations in the first half 
of the period, from 1930 to 1934. Research and development allocations also 
received a significant portion of the budget, certainly more than the 2.5 per cent 
share in the case of Philippine coconut levies. The figure also reveals that 
allocations for warehousing facilities were increasingly cornering a bigger 
                                                 
121
 Bates (1997, pp 62-63) explains why this is so. In a nutshell, it allows for Colombia to 
capitalise on a unique feature of coffee production in the country: the wide diversity of coffee, 
with variations in taste depending on the conditions (i.e., soil type, length of growing season, 
temperature under which it ripens) of the localities. Purchasers value this diversity as it allows 
them to cater to markets segmented by taste, and also allows them to mix distinctive blends. In 
turn, accurate marks of origins are the most economical way to determine the 'taste' of specific 
varieties, as taste cannot be deduced from the physical attributes of the coffee beans. "A given 
amount of coffee, sorted by origin, is therefore worth more than the same amount in which the 
types have been mixed together in unknown proportions. It was therefore to the industry's 
collective advantage to segregate its coffee by origin before market[ing] it abroad." (Bates, 1997, 
p. 62) 
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portion of the budget – presaging the increasing use of the levies to intervene in 
the domestic market. As I have earlier noted, these budget allocations provide 
insights into how the federation attempted to shore up the competitiveness of the 
sector in an era of declining international prices – that is, they give a sense of 
how it responded to conjunctural challenges of the period. But beyond this, I will 
show in the following sections of this chapter that they also lay out features of 
rent mobilisation that will endure. For one, we see the beginnings of how levies 
were to be used for the creation of conditions enhancing the international 
competitiveness of the sector – for example, through investments in what would 
become a vast network of warehousing facilities servicing the logistical needs of 
the sector and of infrastructure for research and extension services, and a well-
regarded international promotional drive establishing a premium on the brand of 
Colombian coffee. We also see, with its early investments in research and 
information services, the federation establishing what Thorp (2000) describes as 
the technical authority that will draw it into the heart of coffee policy making at 
the national level. Finally, we note the of use departmental committees as 
conduits of fund mobilisation, and budget outlays targeted at smallholder 
production. 
 
Resources for stabilising producers' income 
The FEDECAFE's budget allocations presented in the previous section give an 
indication of the various uses of the coffee levies during the federation’s early 
years, but do not depict what was probably the most important use of the 
collections in the years that followed: domestic and international market 
interventions meant to regulate coffee price volatility and thereby maximise 
producer income.  
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Figure 4.3 FEDECAFE's Budget Allocations, by shares: 1930-1940 
(continued in the next page) 
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Figure 4.3 FEDECAFE's Budget Allocations, by shares: 1930-1940 
(continued from the previous page) 
 
 
 
 
Source of basic data: Revista Cafetera (1931, pp. 746-748; 1932, pp. 1500-1502; 1934, pp. 1891-1892; 1935, pp. 1962-1963; 1937, pp. 2213-2214; 1938, 
pp. 2493-2495) 
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In particular, coffee levies were mobilised for two related purposes. First, they 
were used as a means to procure, retain and store surplus coffee production with 
the end goal of regulating export volumes and thereby helping stabilise external 
prices. This was done in conjunction with a number of international treaties that 
Colombia signed into, agreements that regulated world coffee exports from 1940 
to 1989. Second, they were also used to procure domestic production at a 
guaranteed minimum – first imposed in 1955 and at a rate jointly determined by 
the government and the FEDECAFE – thereby regulating domestic farmgate 
prices. By guaranteeing the procurement of domestic production, the 
FEDECAFE thus functioned as the buyer of last resort.  Moreover, they were 
authorised to sell, export and/or store the stocks they procured, depending on 
market conditions.  Thus, the FEDECAFE effectively mobilised the coffee levies 
as a marketing board, managing the distribution of income through the usual 
peaks and troughs of the coffee commodity cycle.  
With this shift to price stabilisation as a key mobilising objective of the coffee 
levies, the Coffee Fund was established in 1940 initially for the purposes of 
handling surplus production in compliance with the international treaties 
regulating exports. From 1940 onwards, the Coffee Fund became the main 
conduit of the coffee levies.122 Moreover, the resources of the Fund came to 
include not only coffee levy collections but also all earnings from the marketing 
of stocks.123 As the Coffee Fund grew – along with the economic importance of 
the coffee sector and the power of the FEDECAFE – its mandate broadened to 
allow for its mobilisation to stabilise domestic prices. In this section, I will 
explain how the primary objectives of the Coffee Fund – and through it the 
mobilisation of coffee levies – evolved to include the financing of the 
FEDECAFE’s functioning as a marketing board. I will give an indication of the 
breadth of resources made available for this function, explain the policy levers 
deployed to effect stabilisation, and outline the consequences of these 
interventions. In a nutshell, this section will show that coffee levies were 
effectively mobilised to shore up the market power of the FEDECAFE, 
                                                 
122
 The general export tax still went directly to the Federation’s budget as payment for services it 
rendered, but as shown in the previous section, collections of this tax represented a miniscule 
portion of total collections. By 1972 collections of these taxes stopped. 
123
 As explained by Junguito and Pizano (1997, p. 81) the contract between the government and 
the Coffee Federation already allowed the latter to ‘liquidate’ coffee stocks – within the bounds 
of international agreements – and retain earnings from the same. 
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functioning as a marketing board. This could be understood as a means by which 
the Federation was given access to monopoly rents, as was the case in the 
Philippines. In sharp contrast to the Philippine experience, however, the 
extraordinary returns on marketing operations were ploughed back to the sector 
primarily to further build the capability of the Federation in order to maximise 
producer income. 
 
The stabilisation function: Evolution and resources 
For the first twenty years or so of the Coffee Fund from the 1940 to the 1950s, it 
functioned primarily to provide the resources for the procurement of domestic 
coffee inventories that allowed Colombia to retain surplus stocks and comply 
with its commitments to international treaties regulating the supply of coffee 
exports. That is to say that coffee levies were initially mobilised to help stabilise 
international coffee prices, rather than domestic producer prices. There were two 
types of international agreements124: (1) mostly short-term agreements addressing 
conjunctural world market conditions and entered into by Colombia along with 
other Latin American producers from 1940 to the end of the 1950s125; and, (2) 
multilateral agreements involving both coffee-consuming and producing nations, 
first established in 1962 under the auspices of the newly formed International 
Coffee Organisation, and renewed intermittently thereafter.126 In contrast to the 
earlier treaties, the latter set were meant to address fundamental market 
disequilibria underpinning price volatility, and involved producers beyond Latin 
America,. 
 The immediate conditions that led the FEDECAFE to actively seek the 
establishment of multilateral treaties to regulate the world supply of coffee are 
best summarised by depicting the trends in the New York price of Colombian 
coffee in the period 1930-1960, as shown in Figure 4.4.  The figure shows two 
sub-periods of prices declining: (1) the period between 1930 and 1940, when 
price fell by a little more than 50 per cent from US$17 cents per pound in 1930 
to US$8 cents in 1940; and (2) the period between 1954 and 1960, when after a 
                                                 
124
 All the international treaties entered into by Colombia from 1940 to 1993 are extensively 
described and analysed by Junguito and Pizano (1993) – particularly Chapters 7 to 9.  
125
These included the Inter-American Coffee Agreement (1940-1945); Pacto de Caballeros 
(October 1954); Plan de Emergencia (1957); Washington Conventions (1958); Pact of 1959.  
126
 ICO agreements were signed in 1962, 1968, 1976, 1994, 2001, 2007, and 2011. However, 
from 1989 onwards, the agreements no longer included provisions for regulating export supplies. 
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period of rapid recovery in the 1950s, prices fell by the same magnitude from 
US$80 cents per pound in 1954 to US$40 cents in 1960.  
The first period of decline – particularly the latter part of the 1930s, when the 
Second World War erupted – provides the backdrop to the first multilateral treaty 
entered into by Colombia: the Inter-American Coffee Agreement, also the first 
international treaty of its kind regulating the supply of coffee exports.127  This 
treaty was meant to deal with the specific wartime problem of shrivelling 
European markets. As explained by Bates (1997, p. 88), at the point when the 
Second World War erupted, 9 million of the 25 million bags of coffee exported 
from the Latin America were being consumed in Europe. Prices would have 
collapsed further if Latin American coffee exports had had to be diverted and 
allowed to saturate the US market, in the face of difficult trading conditions in 
Europe. To deal with this problem, Latin American producers agreed to an 
orderly rationing of the US market, establishing a quota system from 1941 to 
1948. In this treaty, the US also agreed to limit imports from non-member 
countries (Bilder, 1963, p. 336).  Figure 4.4 shows that prices quickly recovered 
in 1941 –from US$8 per pound in 1940, the lowest in the thirty year period 
featured in Figure 4.4, to US$15 per pound in 1941. It can also be seen that 
prices remained relatively stable during the war years until 1945, and were even 
rising towards the end of the period of the treaty’s effectivity. This supports the 
assessment of Bilder (1963, p. 336)  that the Inter-American Agreement was 
largely successful at stemming the fall of prices amidst difficult wartime 
conditions. 
  
                                                 
127
 Prior to this international agreement, Brazil shouldered the onus of supply regulation (See 
Bilder, 1963, pp. 335-336). As noted earlier and discussed in Bates (1997), FEDECAFE opposed 
colluding with Brazil before 1940.   
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Figure 4.4 External Coffee Prices (US$ per pound): 1930-1960 
 
Source of basic data: Junguito (1996, pp. 24-25) 
 
The second period of price decline – the one commencing from 1954 and 
ending in 1960 in Figure 4.4 – coincided with a series of treaties128 Colombia 
entered into, again with fellow Latin American producers. Immediately 
preceding this period was a period of rapidly increasing external prices for 
Colombian coffee in the early1950s, again as can be seen in Figure 4.4. This was 
buttressed, on one hand, by the differential exchange rate regime levied on coffee 
exports discussed in the previous section, which could be interpreted as having a 
dampening effect on Colombian exports; and on the other, by severe weather 
conditions in Brazil in 1953, which in turn constricted world supply at that point. 
Ironically, the resulting price increase during that period in turn encouraged the 
expansion of world production and the price decline in the second half of the 
1950s. That prices declined persistently during this period, despite the 
interventions of Latin American producers, support Bilder's (1963, pp 336-337) 
observation that the transitory treaties were not as successful as the first treaty 
described above as curbing exports effectively. 
                                                 
128
 Refer to Footnote 129. 
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During this second period of price decline, talks were already underway for 
managing over a longer time horizon the volatility of coffee prices and 
expanding treaties to include producers from beyond Latin America. In 1958, the 
US led in the formation of the Coffee Study Group, comprised of over 20 
producing and consuming countries to address not just the immediate problem of 
rapidly eroding prices characteristic of the period, but the long-run 
disequilibrium in supply and demand afflicting the coffee market – and to 
explore solutions to deal with these two separate but interrelated problems. By 
1959, the group had been proposing the establishment of a broader if still short-
term agreement on export quotas that included other coffee producing countries 
outside Latin America. This came to fruition in 1960, with a new short-term 
agreement that included other coffee producing nations outside of Latin America 
– with France and Portugal signing on behalf of their African and overseas 
territories – 28 in all and representing 90 per cent of world production. (Bilder, 
1963, pp. 337-338) And by 1962, under the auspices of the then newly formed 
International Coffee Organisation, which was an offshoot of the Coffee Study 
Group,  the first of a series of agreements establishing an export quota system for 
five year periods was put in place. From its inception and within the time frame 
of my study, the International Coffee Agreement was renewed in 1968, 1976, 
1983, and 1994. However, by 1989, provisions on export quotas were already 
being questioned by some signatories. The 1994 Agreement no longer contained 
these provisions and 1989 marks a watershed in the global regulation of coffee 
exports as the era or regulated coffee export supplies ended.129 
The FEDECAFE was at the forefront of the international negotiations to 
establish these treaties– from the more regionally localised agreements in the 
period 1940-1960, to the geographically broader treaties from 1960s onwards – 
with the Federation’s representatives authorised to negotiate on behalf of the 
Colombian government.  If, as pointed out in an earlier section, the perceived 
vulnerability to external market conditions encouraged coffee producers to form 
a federation and led them to agree to 'self-imposed' levies in the 1920s, the 
                                                 
129
 An overview of the contents of these agreements is available in the International Coffee 
Organisation web site (International Cofee Organisation, 2013). Junguito and Pizano (Junguito & 
Pizano, 1993) provide a comprehensive view of the content of these agreements. Bates (1997) 
explores the political economy of the rise and fall of such a treaty regulating world coffee export 
supplies.  
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subsequent market conditions beginning from the outbreak of the Second World 
War to the post-war period also led them to shift their preferences in marketing 
strategies from competition to cooperation with world coffee producers. This, in 
turn, signalled a shift in the uses of the levies, which became a key resource for 
delivering on Colombia’s commitment to regulate supply of exports and thereby 
stabilise external prices.  
 
Figure 4.5 Share of the FEDECAFE in Procurement and Exports 
 
Source of basic data: Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p. 331 
 
Trends in the volume of local production procured by the FEDECAFE and the 
federation's share in total exports, as shown in Figure 4.5, provide an indicative 
idea of the historical evolution of the extent to which coffee levies were used in 
buying and selling operations of coffee. It could be seen here that in the 1940s, 
the federation's share in procurement peaked, as might be expected, soon after 
Colombia signed the International Inter-American Agreement in 1941, when they 
bought 51 per cent of domestic production. However, throughout the decade of 
the 1940s, the federation accounted for only an average of 22 per cent of 
domestic production procured, and only 4 per cent of exports. In the 1950s, its 
average share in procurement went down to 15 per cent, although its share in 
exports went up to 11 per cent. The rise in export shares may indicate that the 
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federation was liquidating its stocks at a time of rising prices. But the federation's 
shares in exports and procurement only really began taking off from the 1960s: 
in the period covering 1960-1996, the federation's average share in domestic 
production procured was 47 per cent; their share in exports, 45 per cent.  
The pronounced increase of the federation's share in procurement and exports 
from the 1960s onwards signals that it was mobilising the levies, no longer just 
to comply with international commitments to withhold supplies, but also to more 
actively regulate the internal market for coffee and thereby stabilise domestic 
prices. The federation's early procurement operations in support of international 
treaties enabled the organisation to build up stocks, as well as make the necessary 
investments for warehousing and transporting these stocks, placing them in a 
good position to perform the functions of marketing board.  
The use of coffee levies in support of the goal of domestic price stabilisation 
was already emerging in legal norms governing the federation's procurement 
operations as soon as the Coffee Fund was established. But it was not until 1967, 
when Ley 444 de 1967 was passed, when the regulation of internal coffee 
markets was legislated in no uncertain terms: authorising again the use of 
retention duties for this objective, as well as authorising the use of the Coffee 
Fund to finance commercial operations in support of the same objective. By 
1978, the goal of domestic price stabilisation was also spelled out in the contract 
between the government and the Federation. 
An analysis of historical data on coffee levy collections and actual 
expenditures of the Coffee Fund reveals that domestic price stabilisation came to 
constitute the most important use of the levy from the 1960s onwards. Going 
back to data in Table 4.2, it could be seen that the retention duty – a percentage 
of coffee exported surrendered by the exporter either in cash or kind to the 
Federations’ warehouses network of warehouses and principally used to regulate 
supply – represented an increasing and major share of the levies collected: from 
37 per cent in the 1960s, to 54 per cent in the 1970s, and a high of 74 per cent in 
the 1980s. By the 1990s, its share went down to 31 per cent, but this was when 
the tax was folded into the coffee contribution, which in turn represented 54 per 
cent of total coffee levy collections in the 1990s. These trends imply that a major 
portion of what was extracted from the producers was destined for meeting the 
function of market regulation. 
  
156 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Coffee Fund Budget Executed: Major Expenditures 
(shares in per cent): 1979-1996 
 
 
Source: Junguito and Pizano, 1997, pp. 204-205 
 
   Meanwhile, the same conclusion could be drawn from analysing the trends 
in the Coffee Fund budget execution, as shown in Figure 4.6. This figure reveals 
that from the time that the regulation of the internal market came to be formally 
recognised in 1978 as a function of the Coffee Fund – and by extension the 
FEDECAFE –expenditures to procure coffee and commercially market the 
coffee constituted a major portion of the Coffee Fund’s executed budget. As 
could be seen from Figure 4.6, between 1979 and 1996, there were only three 
years when said expenditures were less than 50 per cent of total expenditures: 
1985, 1986 and 1994. On average, said expenditures accounted for 63 per cent of 
the total, with the rest taken up by expenditures on production support and other 
investments. 
The goal of domestic price stabilisation engendered not just a new mode of 
coffee levy mobilisation, but also led to commercial trading activities generating 
additional resources for the Coffee Fund. Just as the procurement of coffee for 
purposes of stabilisation constituted a major share of Coffee Fund expenditures, 
the sale of these very stocks was also a source of revenues for the Fund.  Figure 
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4.7 depicts the revenue side of the Fund's budget executed from 1979 to 1996, 
and clearly shows that sales of coffee constituted a lion's share of the Fund's 
revenue streams, averaging at 73 per cent of total revenues in this period. The 
data presented here underestimates the value of the coffee levies the Fund had 
access to because budget execution accounted for neither the levies that the 
Federation was liable to pay for its own exports of coffee nor retention duties in 
kind130 until 1991, which explains the apparent jump in the share of coffee taxes 
in total revenues in the 1990s. However, this does not diminish the bigger 
argument I make:  that the use of coffee levies in market regulating activities 
fomented further revenue streams, all of which were channelled back to grow the 
Fund. 
 
Figure 4.7 Coffee Fund Budget Executed: Major Revenue Sources  
(shares in per cent),  1979-1996 
 
 
Source: Junguito and Pizano, 1997, pp. 204-205 
  
                                                 
130
 That is to say, budget execution data only accounts for the movement of 'liquid resources'. The 
levies that the Federation is liable for represent a 'fiscal transaction' (not a cash transaction) for 
which the Fund is both the payer and the receiver.  
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Levers for domestic price stabilisation 
In a nutshell, there were two important ways by which coffee levies figured in 
the promotion of domestic price stabilisation: as mobilisable resource, and as a 
directly deployable policy instrument.  
First, the resources of the Coffee Fund, as we saw in the previous discussion, 
were used to finance the procurement of significant volumes of domestic 
production. Utilising the Coffee Fund, the Federation purchased farm-dried 
coffee (of a specified Federation-type quality) at a minimum guaranteed price – a 
price the Federation also played a central role in determining.131 The significant 
volumes of domestic production purchased by the Federation at a guaranteed 
price meant that a major part of the income in the internal market was captured 
by producers by establishing a reference price that limited the margins of other 
commercial buyers. (Ramirez et al., 2002, p. 65) This enabled the Federation to 
extract the oligopolistic rents that would have gone to private commercial traders 
in an internal market that, as I have explained in Chapter 2, is quite concentrated. 
Moreover, the Federation utilised coffee levies and revenues from commercial 
operations to establish the requisite logistical infrastructure for coffee trading: 
including investments in transportation, financial intermediation and 
warehousing. That is to say, the Federation systematically built its capacity to 
function as buyer of last resort and Colombia's largest single exporter of coffee. 
These investments of Coffee Fund resources will be more comprehensively 
                                                 
131 The system of guaranteed floor prices in which the Coffee Federation figured prominently was 
first decreed in 1955  (Decreto 332 de febrero 15 de 1955), a law that directed all buying agents 
to purchase coffee at a fixed set of prices for five different  quality-based 'types' of coffee: café 
trillado, tipo maragogipe, pergamino limpio Federacion, pergamino corriente, pergamino 
inferior al corriente.  The law further stipulated that the Coffee Federation was to guarantee a set 
of prices applied to these same types of coffee at  higher – by no more than 10 per cent – rates 
than the fixed minimum set applied to the purchases of  private individual buying agents, and that 
the Federation's purchase at these rates were to be backed by Treasury. Junguito and Pizano 
(1997, p. 334) explain that the government believed that potential losses from the Federation's 
buying operations that it was effectively guaranteeing could be recuperated from the export taxes 
collected. The Federation was empowered to fully determine any changes to these minimum 
prices. In 1967, the system was simplified and the floor price was fixed only for one type of 
coffee, called the 'federation type', a mark of good quality. Under the Estatuto Cambiario de 
marzo de 1967, this minimum price was to be guaranteed by the Coffee Fund, and at a rate 
determined by a committee composed of the ministers of Finance and Agriculture, as well as the 
general manager of the Coffee Federation (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, pp 334-336). While the 
establishment of this committee suggests that the floor prices were from then on jointly 
determined by the government and the Federation, Junguito and Pizano (1997, p. 336) suggest 
that in reality it was the Federation's National Committee that still determined the prices, and the 
rates were just referred to the committee for approval. 
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analysed in the following section, but it is important to flag at this point that 
economic returns emanating from the Federation's position as the single biggest 
buyer and exporter of coffee in Colombia were ploughed back to strengthen their 
position to regulate coffee price volatility and thereby benefit the levy 
contributors – a stark contrast to the Philippine case study, where the 
mobilisation of economic returns from concentrated market power was not 
governed by such a logic. 
The FEDECAFE's warehousing capacity and network of buying agents 
provide a good illustration of the kinds of investments it made in support of its 
procurement operations.  As has already been shown in the first section of this 
chapter, from the very early years, the Federation used the levies to establish 
warehousing facilities. But this mode of levy mobilisation took on a new vitality 
when the Federation was authorised to perform market regulating functions.  In 
1965, the Federation centralised control of these facilities under the 
ALMACAFE (Almacenes Generales de Deposito de Café), which it established 
as an autonomous business. By 1994, ALMACAFE had the capacity to store 
16.6 million 60-kilo sacks of coffee – representing about 70 per cent of average 
domestic production – distributed in 90 warehouses. Their operations were 
supported by more than 59 producers' cooperatives and more than 600 buying 
stations. These producer cooperatives were also first piloted and funded by the 
Federation in 1959. (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, pp. 52-53, 58)  Ramirez et al. 
(2002, pp. 64-65) emphasize that this network of cooperatives and warehousing 
facilities  forms the backbone of the system of guaranteed purchase: they are 
typically located where private exporters have no incentives to locate, and 
guarantee that all producers have easy access to points of sale. 
Second, coffee levies were directly deployed as instruments to support the 
goal of domestic price stabilisation. Coffee levies were a cost that private 
exporters needed to factor into the determination of their offer price. (Nash, 
1985, p. 211) A rise in, say ad valorem tax or retention duty rates, constituted a 
rise in exporters' cost and thus had a dampening effect on their offer prices. In 
periods of rising external prices, coffee levies were consequently policy levers 
that could be activated to: (1) push down private offer prices relative to that of 
the Federation, to induce producers to sell to the Federation; and (2) also allow 
the Federation to lower the minimum support price. Put another way, coffee 
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levies were an instrument for transferring the windfall from rising external prices 
to the Coffee Fund, so that in consequent periods of falling external prices it 
would have the wherewithal to maintain real coffee income.  
Of the various types of coffee levies, it was the retention duty that was 
manipulated most in conjunction with domestic price stabilisation objectives. 
Interestingly, as with the guaranteed support price, the Federation played a key 
role in the determination of rates of retention duty. Decreto Legislativo 102 de 
abril de 1958, the law that put the duty in place stipulated that the Federation's 
National Committee had the power to modify the rate, with the approval of the 
Ministry of Finance. (Junguito and Pizano, 1996, p. 250) As with the 
Federation's procurement operations, the retention duty was initially conceived in 
conjunction with external price stabilisation in mind – that is, as a mechanism to 
facilitate the storage of coffee, in line with the quota agreements that Colombia 
signed into.132 But similarly, the retention duty also evolved to become an 
instrument for domestic price stabilisation along with the emergence of the 
domestic market regulating functions of the Coffee Fund in the late 1960s. 
The price stabilisation function of retention duties are best shown in Figure 
4.8, which charts the movement of external prices along with effective retention 
rates. Before discussing this, it is worth looking at the trends in retention rates.  
The data shows relatively low rates of retention were in place between 1958 to 
1965 – ranging from 5 to 15 per cent.133 Rates of retention begin to take stride 
from 1966, and from that year until 1988, rates ranged from a low of 18 per cent 
to a high of 124 per cent. Since then and until 1995, rates of retention petered 
out, ranging from 0 to 10 per cent. 
  
                                                 
132
 Here, retention duties perform the function of building up stockpiles and withholding supplies 
in periods of low prices. 
133
 Junguito and Pizano (1997, p 262) explain that retention duties during this period merely 
helped finance the accumulation of physical stock in line with the international quota agreements 
previously described. 
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Figure 4.8 External prices and effective rate of retention: 1958-1995 
 
         Source of basic data: External prices data from Junguito (1996, pp. 24-25); Effective retention rate data from Junguito and Pizano (1997, p. 271)  
 
 
These periods also reflect the changing conditions behind the collection of 
levies. The first period corresponds with the years that the Coffee Fund was 
principally being mobilised to support commitments to the international quota 
agreements; the second period, the years when coffee levies were the main 
resource for the activities of the FEDECAFE as a marketing board; and the third 
period, with the demise of the international treaties and the liberalisation of 
international coffee markets.  What the data presented shows is that during the 
period that the Federation was heavily involved in domestic price stabilisation, 
retention duty rates also increased significantly, signalling the important role the 
coffee levy played as a policy instrument. 
Even more germane to my analysis are the movements of the retention rates in 
conjunction with external prices. Figure 4.8 shows that rates of taxation tended to 
increase with external prices – in line with the theory that this coffee levy was 
used as an instrument for transferring part of the increase in external prices to the 
Coffee Fund. In particular, the years registering highest effective rates of 
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retention – 124 per cent in the 'coffee year'134 1976 and 125 per cent in the 'coffee 
year' 1986 – coincide with years of the highest external prices for the period.  
 
Associated outcomes 
The mobilisation of the resources of the Coffee Fund for procurement and 
marketing activities is generally associated with two related outcomes.  
First, it is seen to have been successful at helping bring about relative stability 
in domestic prices, which means, in turn, that it also helped stabilise producer 
incomes.  A study by the World Bank  – not a natural ally of interventionist 
stabilisation policies – recognises in 2002 that the operations of the Coffee Fund 
had been "reasonably effective at stabilisation, with internal domestic price 
volatility only half of the world price volatility in the past 26 years". 
(Giovannucci, 2002, p. 56)  Junguito and Pizano (1997, 358-359) generate a 
similar finding. They computed and compared indices of stability135 of both real 
internal and external prices136 of Colombian coffee and found that in the period 
covering January 1957 to December 1996, the index of instability of internal 
prices was 22, which was a little less than half of 45, which applied to external 
prices. Meanwhile, in an earlier study, Cardenas (1994) carried out an analysis of 
coffee price stability and the distribution of coffee revenues in the context of the 
operations of marketing boards in Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire and 
Kenya. He found that Colombia had among the smoothest domestic prices137 and 
paid its coffee growers a relatively constant amount in nominal dollar terms in 
the period 1961-1989. (Cardenas, 1994, pp 364-365) Another way of measuring 
the relative stability of prices is suggested by Jaramillo, et al (1999, p. 7): 
considering the relationship between prices paid to producers and external prices 
as an implicit exchange rate applicable to coffee and then comparing this with 
the real exchange rate. Ocampo (1989 in Jaramillo, et al., 1999) found this 
                                                 
134
 Note that the data on effective retention rates refer to the 'coffee year' . This means that data 
for, say, 1975, refers to the period July 1975 to June 1976. The apparent lag shown in Figure 5.7 
between retention rates and external prices is misleading. Going back to the example of data for 
1975, the retention rate for the year 1975, actually applies to part of 1976, until June. 
135
 They took the ratio of standard deviation to average prices. 
136
 The internal price refers to the guaranteed purchase price in US$ per pound; the external price, 
the price of 'suaves colombianos'-type of coffee in New York in US$ centavos per pound. They 
deflated in terms of consumer prices in Colombia and the US, respectively, to obtain the real 
internal and external prices. 
137
 Measured in terms of the variance of the log of prices. 
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implicit exchange rate to have been more stable than the effective real exchange 
rate during the period 1950-1988. 
Second, it successfully embodied a counter-cyclical instrument for managing 
external price fluctuations: allowing producers to save and invest during times of 
price bonanzas by transferring part of the price to the Coffee Fund; and to be 
then subsidised by the Fund, in times of price downturns.  Figure 4.9 shows the 
comportment of external and internal prices from 1950 to 1996. Keeping in mind 
that domestic price stabilisation only became an explicit policy in the late 1960s, 
though was emergent as a policy thrust from the late 1950s, it can be clearly seen 
from the figure that the ratios were historically lowest when external prices 
where highest, and vice versa. This shows that a lower share of the external 
prices was transferred to producers when these prices were high. For example, 
during the period 1977-1980 when average price was one and a half times higher 
than that of 1976, internal prices were on average only 43 per cent of external 
prices. Similarly, in the period 1984-1986, when the average external price was 
one and a quarter times higher than that of 1983, the internal price reflected only 
40 per cent of the external price. In contrast to these periods of high prices, 
during 1958-1967, a period of stable but low prices, an average of 67 per cent of 
external prices was transferred to producers. As explained by Junguito and 
Pizano (1997, p. 365), the domestic prices paid to the producer had a 
fundamental impact on coffee income distribution. The course followed by 
domestic prices has been such that the Colombian coffee farmer captured an 
average of 60 per cent of the external price during the period 1950-1996, a share 
that, as could be seen in Figure 4.9, has tended to be higher in times of low 
external prices than in those times of price bonanzas.  
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Figure 4.9 External prices (in US$ per 70 kilos) and ratio of internal (in US$ 
per 70 kilos) to external prices: 1950-1996 
 
 
 
Source of basic data: Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p. 343 
 
The picture that emerges at the end of my period of analysis – 1990-2000 – 
has not been as stellar.  The end of international treaties that included provisions 
for a quota system in 1989 saw a decline in world coffee prices in the years that 
followed – evidence of which is partially shown in the trends in external prices 
shown in Figure 4.8. As I have already pointed out, export sales of coffee had 
become the most important source of revenues for the Coffee Fund; and the 
value of coffee stocks, a significant portion of its assets. The decline in world 
coffee prices during this period severely affected the financial conditions of the 
fund, a situation worsened by the fact that institutional costs – including 
production support programmes, which will be described in the forthcoming 
section – had outpaced coffee levies, which at this point came in the form of the 
coffee contribution. Thorp (2000, p. 15) succinctly describes the dilemma faced 
by the Federation in this period marked by the collapse of international 
agreements and low coffee prices: it was only able to play its role at the expense 
of the Fund. In a related vein, Ramirez et al. (2002) published an influential 
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report that laid bare the challenges the Fund faced at a time of changed world 
market conditions. They raised questions about the sustainability and efficiency 
of integrating the functions of stabilisation and production support in terms of 
execution and financing.  But what is apparent from their criticism is that while it 
questions the means by which stabilisation is pursued given the context of 
liberalised international trade, they never really questioned the role it played 
historically. 
In summary, in this section I have explained how the Coffee Fund – including 
coffee levy collections and the resources arising from their mobilisation – came 
to be used for stabilising domestic coffee prices. From a comparative perspective 
and as a final point for this section, I call attention to the important welfare and 
productive implications of a largely successful use of the coffee levies to 
promote domestic coffee price stabilisation for a good part of the twentieth 
century in Colombia.  In terms of welfare implications, Thorp (2000, p. 17) 
reminds us that stable incomes were particularly vital for the poorest coffee 
producers. For these producers, guaranteed floor prices were a lifeline during 
periods of low world prices.  Meanwhile, in productive terms, Junguito and 
Pizano (1997, p. 365) emphasize that the expectation of stable prices had been an 
important tool for directly stimulating production. They say this played an 
important role in the 1970s, when investments in technological innovation had to 
be incentivised in the face of coffee farms reaching the productive frontiers of 
traditional technologies. These are examples of virtuous ends associated with the 
most important mode of coffee levy mobilisation that find no resonance in the 
case of coconut levies in the Philippines, and reflect vital welfare- and 
production-enhancing functions of levies in Colombia that were never realised in 
the Philippines. This broad conclusion can also be drawn from another mode of 
levy mobilisation: their investment. In the section that follows, I analyse the 
patterns of investment of coffee levies and the logic that governed them. 
 
 
Investing to benefit the contributors  
Levies were mobilised to enable coffee producers to invest surplus in ways that 
enhanced their productive and income-earning capacity, and supported the goals 
of income stabilisation. These goals were not always complementary. 
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Investments inducing production, for example, may have a detrimental effect on 
stabilising incomes to the extent that increasing supply may dampen prices. But 
the FEDECAFE, and by extension the levy contributors, had a decisive say in the 
balancing of these objectives – a point that should be made clearer when I 
discuss the means by which they took part in regulating the rent settlement. In 
this section, I first explore the two categories of investments associated with the 
coffee levies. 
The first category relates to investments made directly by the FEDECAFE out 
of the levies. These include the statutory shares of the departmental committees 
in the coffee levies collected which, in turn, were mostly mobilised for social and 
local public goods in the coffee departments. It also includes the FEDECAFE’s 
investments in research and development, extension services, the international 
promotion of coffee and, production and marketing support.  
The second category relates to investments made through the Coffee Fund – 
including what could be construed as re-investments of oligopolistic rents from 
the FEDECAFE’s commercial operations as a marketing board. These comprise 
a range of investments – including financial instruments, and other permanent 
investments – not necessarily limited to the coffee sector. These were made with 
the goal of strengthening the asset base of the Fund beyond the coffee inventories 
it held, and with that, its ability to intervene in the market as well as invest 
further in support of coffee production and the welfare of coffee producers. 
In contrast to the Philippine case, the impulse behind investment decisions 
could be more systematically linked to the interests of the Federation and its 
members. Through these investments, the coffee producers were able to retain a 
significant share of the rents mobilised. Moreover, investment activities were tied 
to the exigencies of domestic price stabilisation in two senses: as a counter-
cyclical measure for saving in times of good external prices and as a means to 
grow the Coffee Fund, and thereby grow the resources for the FEDECAFE to 
undertake marketing operations. Finally, investments in the coffee growing areas 
and in goods and services promoting production and welfare were crucial in 
developing what Thorp (2000) would call a ‘culture of loyalty’ among the 
federation’s members. This loyalty, in turn, promoted ‘buy-in’ for the sacrifice – 
through the price policy and/or adjustments in coffee levies (particularly the 
retention quota) – asked of them during boom periods. They also acted as 
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incentives for them to sell stocks to the FEDECAFE and thereby allow the 
federation’s income from commercial operations to grow. 
In general, the mobilisation of coffee levies in investments stands in stark 
contrast to that of coconut levies, where the fruits of capital accumulation were 
largely delinked from the coconut producers and the productive goals of the 
sector. 
 
Investing in coffee producers and coffee areas 
With the establishment of the Coffee Fund in 1940 and the enlargement of the 
stabilisation function over the years  – and with these, the FEDECAFE's 
involvement in marketing and commercialisation activities – the resources that 
the Federation was authorised to mobilise also expanded. Aside from the coffee 
levies138 that directly entered its budget as a revenue stream from 1927 onwards, 
the Federation also mobilised resources139 that, from 1940 onwards, first entered 
the account of the Coffee Fund before being transferred to the Federation for the 
following purposes: (1) as a fee for administering the Fund; and (2) to deliver 
goods and services to coffee producers through the Federation's Departmental 
Committees and other 'coffee enterprises' established by the Federation. 
Moreover, the Federation engaged in income-generating activities from which it 
derived additional revenues, among the most important of which were its role as 
the main source of all semi-processed coffee marketed for internal 
consumption.140 The Federation also generated income from investing in financial 
instruments, and was involved in selling agricultural inputs for the use of coffee 
                                                 
138
 Just to review, the following coffee levies directly entered the budget of the Coffee Federation 
historically: the export tax collected  from 1927 to 1972; the tax on international payments 
imposed between 1935 and 1939; and the statutory shares of the Coffee Federation – particularly 
the Departmental Committees – in the tax on low-grade coffee from 1940 to 1991 (Junguito & 
Pizano, 1997, p. 36). 
139
 This in turn was constituted by the other coffee levies that first entered the Coffee Fund before 
being devolved to the Federation's budget, chief of which were a portion of the ad valorem tax 
from 1967 to 1991, and the coffee contribution, from 1991 to the present. But it should also be 
obvious by now that these transfers were not solely constituted by the levies – in particular,  
revenues from commercial operations and the mobilisation of stocks collected in the form of 
retention duties; and later on, with the decline in this source of revenues from the 1990s, returns 
from the liquidation of investments also formed part of these transfers. 
140
 As explained by Junguito and Pizano (1997, p. 37), the Federation was given access by the 
Coffee Fund to coffee grains at prices below market rates. After semi-processing these grains, the 
Federation sold them for further processing to domestic firms that then sold the finished product 
to the domestic market. Before the internal market was liberalised in 1991, the Federation thus 
acted as a monopolist in the domestic consumer market.  
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farms. (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p 37) Table 4.4 gives a picture of the relative 
shares of these resources in the budget appropriated by the Federation from 1975 
to 1994, expressed in real terms and indexed to 1996 prices. The data indicates 
that the 'fee' the Federation received in exchange for administering the Coffee 
Fund constituted from 50 to 58 per cent of its income during this period. Until 
the period 1990-1994, its income from commercial operations – in particular, 
from its participation in the marketing of coffee consumed domestically – was 
the second most important income source. But with the liberalisation of the 
coffee market, the statutory shares of the producers in their own contributions 
took over this position, and accounted for close to a third of the revenue streams. 
 
Table 4.4 The FEDECAFE's Appropriated Budget: 1975-1994 
Five-year averages: value in Col$ mil, per cent 
share in parentheses  
1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 
Income 101,350 147,721 214,508 171,014 
  Taxes and transfers earmarked for the 
Departmental Committees 
16,795 
(16.5) 
16,668 
(11.8) 
22,245 
(10.3) 
51,286 
(31.2) 
  Administration of the Coffee Fund 
50,920 
(49.9) 
79,154 
(54.0) 
124,385 
(58.1) 
100,130 
(58.4) 
  Commercial operations 
23,915 
(24.0) 
40,762 
(26.6) 
51,556 
(24.0) 
12,710 
(6.6) 
  Other income 
9,721 
(9.6) 
11,137 
(7.6) 
16,322 
(7.6) 
6,888 
(3.7) 
Expenditures 101,350 147,721 214,508 171,014 
  Transfers to the Departmental Committees 
54,168 
(53.6) 
70,439 
(48.8) 
109,824 
(51.3) 
96,647 
(56.6) 
  Production programmes 
12,793 
(12.5) 
16,489 
(11.4) 
20,723 
(9.7) 
18,800 
(11.0) 
  Commercial operations 
11,758 
(11.8) 
31,451 
(19.6) 
43,375 
(20.1) 
23,989 
(13.9) 
   Administration, reserves and investments 
22,630 
(22.1) 
29,342 
(20.1) 
40,586 
(18.9) 
31,578 
(18.6) 
       Source of basic data: Junguito and Pizano, 1997, pp. 40-41 
 
The expenditure-side data in Table 4.4 reveals insights even more germane to 
my analysis, as it relates to how the FEDECAFE allocated the resources it 
controlled. As can be seen from the table, in the period 1975-1994, transfers to 
departmental committees accounted for more than half of the Federation’s 
appropriated expenditures. During this period, the Federation was allocating to 
these committees more than their statutory shares in the coffee levies: on 
average, only 20 per cent of income were taxes and transfers earmarked for the 
committees, but 53 per cent of the expenditures were budgeted for them. 
Moreover, even if the budget in real terms declined by 20 per cent between the 
periods 1985-1989 and 1990-1994, the share of the committees in the budget 
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appropriations increased from 51 to 57 per cent. That the Federation's 
departmental committees cornered a significant portion of the Federation's 
budget is symbolic of the extent to which the rent settlement associated with 
coffee levies was geared to support coffee production and the welfare of coffee 
producers. This is because departmental committees primarily used the resources 
to provide local public goods and services in coffee departments. Based on 
Junguito and Pizano's (1997, p. 47-50) comprehensive account of how these 
committees mobilised the resources made available to them in the period 1979-
1996, 55 per cent of their budget executed was spent on community works and 
services. Of the spending on community works, 74 per cent was spent on projects 
related to education, health, the environment, rural electrification and 
infrastructure. Meanwhile, in terms of community services rendered, about 50 
per cent was spent on agricultural extension services. 
 
Figure 4.10 Average distribution of 'institutional costs'  
per pound exported (in per cent): 1991-2001 
 
 
Source of basic data: Ramirez et al, 2002, p. 74 
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The conclusion that coffee levies are associated with investments supportive 
of coffee production and the welfare of producers can also be drawn from a 
different data set explored by Ramirez, et al (2002), who presented the various 
types of 'institutional costs' financed by the producers through the Coffee Fund.  
The data they presented is interesting because the period they review pertains to 
the time when, as previously suggested, the Coffee Fund was no longer as robust 
due to significant changes in world market conditions. Even at this time, 
investments in public goods and transfers to departmental committees still 
constituted an average of 68 per cent of costs per pound exported. The public 
goods, as shown in Figure 4.10, include investments in extension services, 
research and development, production support and the international promotion of 
Colombian coffee. 
The quantitative data on historical budget and costs I have thus far presented 
are borne out by accounts of ‘coffee enterprises’ and programmes that are 
historically associated with the FEDECAFE. These enterprises and programmes 
can be grouped into three – and below I provide a synoptic account of what 
constitutes them, based on a comprehensive description of the enterprises and 
programmes provided by Junguito and Pizano (1997, pp 50-67).  
The first group relates to enterprises and programmes that promote the 
commercialisation and marketing of coffee – including investments in 
warehousing facilities, buying agents, a shipping fleet, and a much praised 
program for national and international promotion of Colombian coffee. 
Supporting the Federation’s buying and selling operations, as already mentioned, 
is the ALMACAFE, which in turn owns a network of warehouses that enables 
the Federation or its agents to buy coffee directly from producers. This is an 
independent business enterprise of the Federation established in 1985, but which 
finds its roots in the early investments of the Federation in the Almacenes 
Generales de Deposito, which was mentioned in the first section of this chapter. 
The Federation also helped establish and finance the operations of a network of 
producers’ cooperatives, principally acting as agents of ALMACAFE in the 
buying of pergamino coffee. In 1985, these cooperatives came together to form 
EXPOCAFE, and became themselves exporters of coffee. In 1969, US$135 m of 
the Coffee Fund resources were invested in a factory producing freeze-dried 
coffee, with an initial capacity of producing 1,800 tons of soluble coffee per year. 
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Over the years, more investments were pumped into the plant, which by 1994 
had a capacity of from 4,500 to 7,800 tons. Meanwhile, the Federation also 
expended resources to promote Colombian coffee through a campaign that 
developed the ‘brand’ of Colombian coffee – represented by the logo of ‘Juan 
Valdez’ from 1989 – as a high-quality and premium product.  
The second group relates to initiatives that promote coffee production.  The 
most iconic of production-promoting investments of the Federation is the 
research centre, Centro Nacional de Investigaciones de Café (CENICAFE). The 
Centre finds its roots in the investments made by the Federation as early as 1938. 
It is credited for successful campaigns to conserve soil and natural resources in 
the coffee zone, promote new technologies for production and preventing pests 
and disease. It was the first to develop a variety of Colombian coffee that was 
resistant to roya, a disease that afflicted coffee farms in the 1980s and that the 
Centre helped farmers successfully overcome.  The work of CENICAFE is 
complemented by investments made by the Federation into providing agricultural 
extension services. As of 2002, the Federation had a network of 1,300 extension 
workers, who were involved in organising communities in the coffee region and 
became the main agents for communication of the Federation. The Federation 
also established a foundation, the Fundacion Manuel Mejia, to train young 
leaders in rural areas, particularly in the management of coffee farms as well as 
coffee-growing technologies. This has helped train the Federation's network of 
extension workers.  
The third and final group relate to services and infrastructure largely 
implemented through and determined by the Federation’s Departmental 
Committees. To provide an indication of the extent of their involvement in 
delivering infrastructure typically delivered by the government in non-coffee 
areas, as of 1994, Departmental Committees were credited for providing 
electrification for 204,359 households and water for 1.7 million beneficiaries; 
building 16,923 classrooms; and constructing 12,882 kilometres of roads and 
improving 50,672 kilometres of the same – all in the coffee growing regions. 
(Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p. 49) Another example of welfare-related 
interventions of the Federation is the use of US$ 33 m in 1977, and an additional 
US$ 12 m of the coffee ad valorem tax in 1987, for health programmes in the 
coffee regions. (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p. 64) 
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Unlike the production and welfare-promoting programmes in the Philippines 
associated with the coconut levies, those of the coffee levies are recognised for 
excellence and effectiveness. The continuing work of the ‘coffee enterprises’ 
involved in commercial operations, in stark contrast to their counterpart in the 
Philippines is a testament to this.  The outcomes of some of the initiatives 
described here are also widely recognised. The work of CENICAFE, for 
example, developing disease-resistant varieties, has achieved for its scientists the 
Colombian Premio Nacional de Ciencias medal in 1986. In 2003, the Juan 
Valdez brand was deemed the third most recognised brand in Latin America. 
Meanwhile, the involvement of the Federation in delivering services in coffee 
regions is credited for not only relatively better quality of life indicators in the 
region, but also keeping the coffee zones relatively peaceful. (Rettberg, 2010)  
 
Investing to grow the Coffee Fund 
The revenue streams emanating from the Federation’s involvement in marketing 
board operations were channelled to the Coffee Fund and, as explained above, 
part of these along with the coffee levies were transferred back to the Federation 
– and through them, the levy contributors – in the form of producer welfare-
enhancing and coffee income-maximising investments. But periods of rising 
prices – for example in the first half of the 1950s and the second half of the 
1980s – brought extra-ordinary streams of resources to the Fund that were 
transferred to the producers neither immediately nor in their entirety. The 
windfall during the bonanza periods emanated from two sources. First, as 
explained in the section on stabilisation, extraordinary profits were generated in 
the Federation’s exporting operations – as the policy lever of minimum support 
price could be used to push down the Federation’s buying price, while they could 
sell at the prevailing high external price.  Second, coffee levy collections 
increased the rising coffee export values, and because retention rates could be 
deliberately increased. In a nutshell, excess liquidity during periods of high 
external prices generated resources available for investment – a counter-cyclical 
mechanism for saving surplus in preparation for market downturns.  
Even during the 1940s and 1950s, when the primary function of the Coffee 
Fund related not to stabilisation but to stockpiling operations necessitated by 
international agreements, the Federation was already authorised to dispose of 
  
173 
 
stocks procured and retained coffee, and to earn from these operations. Recall 
that during a good part of these decades international prices were rising, in no 
small part due to the agreement among Latin American producers to regulate 
world exports. Even during this period, the Federation already channelled the 
excess liquidity generated by the sale of some of the stocks they held to 
investments in both financial instruments and capital shares in business 
enterprises.  Junguito and Pizano (1997, p. 164) explain that these investments in 
the first two decades of the Coffee Fund set the normative template for the 
mobilisation of revenues from coffee stock operations for purposes of investment 
in the years that followed.  
Since its inception in 1940, the Coffee Fund was thus mobilised to acquire 
assets and thereby capitalise and enhance the value of the Fund. Junguito and 
Pizano (1997, pp.163-189) provide an in-depth historical account of these 
investments: from the time assets were first acquired in the 1940s, when 
domestic stabilisation function was not a principal preoccupation, to the difficult 
years after 1989, when some of the investments have had to be liquidated to 
enable the Fund to fulfil its mandate, up until 1996. I utilise their analysis of key 
trends in investments of Coffee Fund resources to reflect on the role investment 
activities played in the Colombian rent settlement that did not obtain in the 
Philippines. 
In a nutshell, Junguito and Pizano (1997) explain that the investments of the 
Coffee Fund came in three forms:  (1) capital investments in a range of 
companies with and without links to the coffee sector; (2) special funds held in 
trust by commercial banks mostly for the credit needs of the coffee sector; and 
(3) investments in financial instruments. Capital investments were historically 
distributed in 43 companies involved in a range of activities that included 
financial intermediation, transport, insurance, coffee marketing and distribution, 
and the promotion of regional development. As of 1996 the historical cost of 
capital investments was estimated at Col$122 billion (about US$122 million in 
terms of 1996 Col$ to US$ exchange rate). 98 per cent of the capital investments 
was concentrated in 13 of these companies – and the three most important, 
accounting for 73 per cent of the historical cost of investments by the following 
three: the bank Banco Cafetero, merchant fleet Flota Mercante, and the credit 
institution Caja Agraria. (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p. 180) 
  
174 
 
Meanwhile, special funds were directed to various lines of credit made available 
to support coffee production, diversification in coffee zones, agro-industrial 
development, smallholder producers in the coffee sector. (Junguito and Pizano 
1997, p. 170). Finally, investments in financial instruments mostly came in the 
form of bonds and securities issued by the Central Bank. These were mostly low-
yielding, low-risk government bonds, issued as a means by which the coffee 
sector supported projects of national interest. (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, pp. 
168, 170) 
 
Figure 4.11 FEDECAFE Investments, by type (shares in per cent):  
1975-1995 
 
 
Source of basic data: Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p. 169 
 
Figure 4.11 shows the breakdown of Coffee Fund investments from 1975 to 
1995. In the period covered by the data in the figure, capital investments 
accounted for an average of 43 per cent of the total; special funds, 31 per cent; 
and financial investments, 25 per cent. Moreover, the figure reveals three sub-
periods in which the relative importance of each of these three shifted. In the 
period 1975-1984, capital investments were most ascendant and accounted for an 
average of 57 per cent of total investments. Then investments shifted to financial 
instruments, at average of 61 per cent of investments in the period 1985-1990. 
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Finally, in the period 1991-1996, special funds dominated shares of investments, 
accounting for an average of 51 per cent of the total; but capital investments 
staged a comeback at 45 per cent of the total.  These shifts are revelatory of how 
resources generated during the different bonanza periods between 1975 and 1995 
were invested. The windfall from bonanza of the 1970s appears to have been 
channelled to long-term capital investments, while that of the 1980s, to lower 
risk financial investments that, as noted above, also helped finance wider 
development goals.  
 
Figure 4.12 Real Value of Coffee Fund Investments and External Coffee 
Prices: 1975-1995 
 
 
Source of basic data: Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p. 169 
 
When the comportment of investments made out of the Coffee Fund resources 
is tracked against external price movements, as I have done in Figure 4.12, it 
becomes clear that fund investments played a counter-cyclical function between 
1975 and 1989. For example, between 1975 and 1977, when external prices 
almost quadrupled, investments of Coffee Fund resources consequently doubled. 
Between 1984 and 1986, external prices rose by 34 per cent; investments, 
dramatically by 984 per cent. Interestingly, these trends seem to imply that 
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producers saved more during the price bonanza in 1986 than in 1977. This 
supports the proposition of Jaramillo et al that more of the price rise of the 1970s 
was transferred back to coffee producers than in that of the 1980s. Meanwhile, as 
could be expected, we see this association between investment behaviour and 
external prices ceasing after 1990, with the deregulation of world exports and a 
period marked by long-run decline in world prices.  For example, in the bonanza 
of 1994, when prices doubled compared to 1992, investments did not increase 
but dropped by 22 per cent – perhaps indicative of the difficulties encountered by 
the Coffee Fund. 
 Notwithstanding the changes after 1990, what this figure provides evidence 
for is that, before the breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989, 
investments of the Fund tended to rise with external prices. And while the 
magnitude of the coffee producers’ ‘sacrifice’– in the form of the windfall not 
being transferred to them but being invested  – may have varied across different 
bonanza periods, the Fund, in general, was used as a mechanism for coffee 
producers to invest during good times, and doing so raise potential resources that 
allowed the Fund to help them during periods of falling prices. Junguito and 
Pizano (1997) suggest that this was exactly what happened when prices fell in 
the 1990s: the financial investments made by the Coffee Fund during the boom 
of the 1980s were liquidated, as were some of the capital investments, so that the 
investments supportive of coffee production, welfare and commercialisation 
could continue. 
 
Impulse and consequences 
To close this section, I wish to highlight how the investments of coffee levies and 
of the resources arising out of their mobilisation in marketing operations by the 
FEDECAFE may be interpreted to have supported the interests of the coffee 
sector in ways that do not find resonance in the Philippine case. 
First, a significant portion of the state-engineered rents were mobilised and 
retained within sector, in the form of: community works and services 
administered and implemented by the Federation’s departmental committees in 
coffee-growing areas; the network of ‘coffee enterprises’ involved in research 
and development and the provision of agricultural extension services, marketing 
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and international promotions; and lines of credit made available for the various 
needs of the coffee producers.  
Second, investments – particularly those made through the Coffee Fund – 
were clearly tied to the exigencies of domestic price stabilisation. This is the 
most important insight that could be gained from Junguito and Pizano’s survey of 
historical data on investments, salient highlights of which I captured above. In 
particular, investments were undertaken to strengthen the wherewithal of the 
FEDECAFE to readily and continually finance, even when external market 
conditions were not good, both the procurement of stocks at the guaranteed 
minimum support price and the programmes providing goods and services to 
coffee producers.  
Even the Federation’s investments in community works and services in coffee 
areas can be plausibly linked to the wider goals of stabilisation. I echo this 
insight from Thorp (2000), who articulates a potent interpretation of the link 
between the Federation’s macroeconomic role in price stabilisation and its efforts 
to build robust micro foundations of the coffee sector, including investing in 
welfare- and production-enhancing initiatives and giving departmental 
committees a central role in these: it needed to develop loyalty among its 
members, committed to selling to the federation, without using the obvious route 
of increasing the price margin going to producers, which would have undermined 
the international quota system as that would have induced increasing production. 
She reminds us that private exporters had the ability to purchase at a better price 
when prices were high, something that would have undermined the Federation’s 
role as a marketing board because the fiscal situation of the Coffee Fund 
depended on the management of the minimum support price that both stabilised 
prices but also allowed a margin of useful income for the Fund. That this threat 
did not come to pass and that the Federation historically accounted for a 
significant share of procurement indicated that it was successful at developing a 
“culture of loyalty” among coffee producers. (Thorp, 2000, pp. 12, 14) 
Moreover, through the departmental committees, the Federation “developed a 
local presence, as ‘our’ organisation, spending ‘our’ money for ‘our good’”. 
(Thorp, 2000, p 13).  This interplay between the Federation’s market-regulating 
function and investments in support of production and welfare are best 
summarised thus:  
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"The principal relationship was the sale of coffee, a monetary transaction in 
which a below-free-market price is accepted in good times because of the 
perceived benefits arising from the wide range of other relationships with 
the federation, namely price support in bad times, access to technical help 
and credit, and the value perceived by the more aware members in the 
federation's macro claims functions, both nationally and internationally."  
(Thorp, 2000, p. 14) 
 
 
Conclusion  
I have presented the rent settlement associated with coffee levies in Colombia as 
a counterpoint to the Philippine case study. Based on the breadth of resources 
made available for the use of FEDECAFE in the form of different types of coffee 
levies collected from 1927 to 2000, I showed that from a comparative 
perspective, Colombian coffee producers had access to more resources extracted 
on their behalf by the state – both in terms of the proportion of levies directly 
mobilised by their association, the FEDECAFE, and also in terms of the share of 
the levies retained for the sole use of the sector – and for a longer period of time 
than the Philippine coconut producers. 
 I have also shown the three main modes by which the levies and all resources 
generated through their mobilisation were used. First, they have been historically 
used to respond to specific production bottlenecks in the sector, to enhance 
export competitiveness, and to provide goods enhancing the welfare of coffee 
producers. Second, they have been used to stabilise producer income through 
interventions in the domestic and international markets. This mode of levy 
mobilisation produced further income streams for FEDECAFE, part of which can 
be construed as rents from functioning as a marketing board with concentrated 
market power in both the domestic procurement of coffee, and its exportation. 
Third, both the levies and the resources from their operations as marketing board 
have been invested in enterprises directly supporting coffee production, and 
capital accumulation to further strengthen the Coffee Fund.  
Therefore, rent mobilisation in Colombia was geared towards the productive 
goals of the coffee sector. Again from a comparative perspective, rents from the 
concentration of market power – through the operations of FEDECAFE as a 
marketing board – benefitted coffee producers in ways that did not obtain in the 
Philippines. In Colombia, they were ploughed back as investments to strengthen 
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the ability of FEDECAFE to intervene in the market and stabilise the producer 
prices. The market interventions that generated these rents also led to the 
stabilisation of producer income. Meanwhile, investment decisions were 
governed by production-related goals. The capital accumulated benefited the 
sector by growing the value of the National Coffee Fund. 
In conclusion, I have shown two important ways in which the rent settlement 
that obtained in Colombia is different from the one in the Philippines.  First, 
even as the principal uses of the levies evolved through the years, the changes 
never went beyond the parameters of promoting the development of the coffee 
economy.  Second, all benefits emanating from the mobilisation of the levies, 
including further income streams generated as a result of how levies were 
mobilised, were retained by the coffee producers through the activities of 
FEDECAFE. As such and in the language of the previous chapter, they were the 
‘subjects’ or the key claimants of the rent settlement. 
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Chapter 5.  Regulating the rent settlement in the Philippine coconut sector: 
capture and contest 
 
 
To what extent did the producers’ associations shape the rent settlement? In this 
chapter and the next, I respond to this question by analysing the means by which 
access to rent streams associated with the levies was regulated and enforced – 
first dealing with the Philippine case here, then the Colombian case in the next.  
By ‘means of regulating and enforcing the rent settlement’, I refer to the rules 
and processes used to assign rents, and control their mobilisation.  
The regulation of the rent settlement associated with coconut levies in the 
Philippines is marked by two periods: one in which rent streams were captured in 
the manner described in Chapter 3; the other, in which the rights to the 
continuing rent streams were contested. The first relates to the period 1970-1982, 
when coconut levies were imposed and actually collected – as previously 
flagged, also a period of authoritarian rule in the Philippines. The second relates 
to the period 1986-2011, when authoritarian rule had ended in the Philippines 
and when the rights to continuing rent streams arising from the mobilisation of 
the coconut levies were contested principally through the Philippine courts, but 
also informally negotiated through backdoor channels to a succession of 
Philippine presidents.  In this chapter, I show that in both these periods, coconut 
producers had a neither a consolidated nor accountable organisation representing 
them in the avenues available for them to regulate the rent settlement. Moreover, 
during the years the rent settlement was captured, COCOFED increasingly lost 
grip of the power to shape rent mobilisation. And in the years the rent settlement 
was contested, COCOFED ultimately lost its rights to the rent streams. In these 
years, coconut producers were highly factionalised and did not have a unified 
voice in the negotiations that ensued. 
In the first two sections of this chapter, I explain the chief means by which the 
rent settlement was regulated, and thereby captured, in the period 1970-1982.  In 
a nutshell, Marcos used the extraordinary scope of executive authority under 
Martial Law to facilitate access to these rent streams, which in turn were 
assigned purely on the basis of executive prerogative. In the first section, I will 
show that the presidential decrees promulgated by Marcos as the legal basis for 
the collection and mobilisation of the coconut levies also codified who had rights 
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to the rent streams associated with the coconut levies. Moreover, the decrees also 
prescribed the funds that were constituted by these levies as owned by ‘coconut 
farmers’. However, I will show that this ‘private ownership’ of the funds had no 
operational meaning. Meanwhile, in the second section, I will explain how 
Marcos also used these decrees to centralise and delimit administrative control of 
the funds. The organisational articulation of administrative control over the funds 
was such that national leaders of the COCOFED shared power with presidential 
associates, who increasingly turned out to be more decisive in the controlling the 
funds.  
In the third section of this chapter, I will describe the struggle over the 
assignment of rights to continuing rent streams, from the time Marcos was ousted 
from power in 1986 up to the end of the presidential term of Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo in 2010. Though coconut levies were no longer being collected during 
this period, agents of the original Marcos-years rent settlement, and factions of 
coconut producers and allied interests excluded from this settlement sought to 
secure rights to rent streams from economic assets acquired through the levies. 
These assets – as I explained in Chapter 3, these included the bank UCPB, 
coconut oil milling facilities under UNICOM, and investments in a blue-chip 
food processing-based conglomerate San Miguel Corporation – yielded income 
and profit streams even after the levies had ceased to be collected. The contest 
for assignation of rent streams associated with these investments took the form of 
a two-track process, whereby courts, on the one hand, tried to resolve the 
question of property rights over the value embodied by the assets and the wealth 
created, while on the other hand, a succession of presidents who followed 
Marcos undertook parallel negotiations with key agents in the rent settlement to 
foster a compromise deal. 
By analysing how the rent settlement was regulated under periods of ‘capture’ 
and ‘contestation’ in this chapter, I draw attention to some of the consequences 
of the organisational weakness of COCOFED, particularly the inability of the 
coconut producers to decisively shape the rent settlement associated with the 
levy funds they were paying into.  
 
  
182 
 
Rent settlement codified by executive fiat in the name of coconut farmers 
Marcos used the extraordinarily concentrated executive power accorded him 
under Martial Law to inscribe the rent settlement in law. The presidential decrees 
promulgated by Marcos as the legal basis for the collection and mobilisation of 
coconut levies also inscribed a rent settlement. For one they embodied an 
assignment of rents: either explicitly or by enabling the uses of coconut levies 
that generated rent streams for specific agents. They invoked ‘coconut farmers’ 
as owners of the funds, but also did not give this principle operational meaning.   
 
Presidential decrees assigning rights to rents 
I present below three sets of instances in which relevant presidential decrees may 
be interpreted as assigning rent streams to specific agents. 
First, the decrees penned by Marcos to enforce price subsidies also 
legitimised what were effectively income transfers from coconut farmers to 
consumers and exporters of coconut-based products, respectively. PD No. 276 of 
August 1973 ("Establishing a Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund," 1973), 
which authorised the collection of the CCSF levy to finance a price stabilisation 
scheme for consumers of coconut-based goods at a period of abnormally high 
market prices for coconut oil, effectively assigned rights to redistributive 
transfers from coconut producers paying the levies to consumers of these goods, 
who in turn were shielded from the world market fluctuations in coconut oil 
prices. PD No. 414 of April 1974 ("Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 
232 as Amended," 1974), which authorised the use of CCSF for refunding 
exporters of coconut-based products of premium duties they paid, also 
effectively assigned rights to redistributive transfers from the levy contributors to 
the exporters, who were effectively freed of obligations to pay said duties to the 
government.  These presidential decrees can thus be interpreted as embodying a 
formal assignation of rights to a specific type of rent streams: in this first case, 
income transfers to cushion their recipients from the effects of extraordinary 
price movements in the world market for coconut oil.  
Second, specific coconut levy-related presidential decrees were also used to 
facilitate the generation of rent streams for a specific individual, Eduardo 
Cojuangco. 
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The first of the two,  PD No. 582 ("Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 
232, as Amended," 1974b), made possible the use of coconut levy funds that 
generated redistributive transfers and monopoly rents for Cojuangco, as I 
explained in Chapter 3. In particular, this mode of levy mobilisation yielded two 
types of rent streams for Cojuangco. First, he was effectively awarded rights to 
monopoly rents as the sole provider of coconut seed nut to be distributed to 
coconut farmers under the nationwide replanting programme. Second, later on in 
1982 when collection of levies were suspended and thus government could not 
purchase seedlings from Cojuangco’s farm, he was awarded redistributive 
transfers in the form of payments for seedlings he did not deliver but, under the 
guarantees of the contract, government was obligated to pay for. The presidential 
decree, by providing the basis for this specific government contract to be drawn, 
can thus be interpreted as having facilitated an assignment of rent streams – in 
this case, monopoly rents and redistributive transfers granted to Cojuangco.  
The second decree that directly benefitted Cojuangco was PD No. 755, which 
authorised the use of coconut levy collections to purchase what came to be the 
United Coconut Planters Bank.  Marcos signed into law in July 1975, which 
specifically directed the Philippine Coconut Authority to execute an “agreement 
for the acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers” and 
to use collections under the CCSF levy to “pay for the financial commitments of 
the coconut farmers under the said agreement” (Sections 1-2, "Approving the 
Credit Policy for the Coconut Industry as Recommended by the Philippine 
Coconut Authority and Providing Funds Therefor," 1975). However, negotiations 
had already taken place about the sale of the First United Bank, a floundering 
commercial bank owned by Cojuangco’s uncle, Jose Cojuangco at least a year 
before PD No. 755 was signed into law.
141
   As discussed in Chapter 3, 
Cojuangco brokered a deal that allowed PCA to buy, ‘on behalf of coconut 
farmers’, a majority stake in FUB, which was re-organised to become the UCPB. 
For brokering the deal, Cojuangco was awarded a 10 per cent stake in the bank 
and a management contract that effectively gave him control of bank operations.  
                                                 
141 Using a pamphlet circulated by Cojuangco as his source, Parreño (2003, p. 135) suggest that 
Jose ‘Don Pepe’ Cojuangco requested a meeting with his nephew in December 1974 to offer his 
stake in FUB. 
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In this light, the use of coconut levy funds to consummate this deal could thus be 
interpreted as giving rise to rents for capital accumulation for Cojuangco. 
What is germane to my analysis in this chapter is the timing of the passage of 
these two decrees: both were promulgated after the deal between Cojuangco and 
Marcos were already in place. Quoting a close associate of Cojuangco as his 
source, Parreño (2003, p. 132) suggests that Cojuangco met with Marcos six 
months before PD No. 582 was signed into law and directly presented the 
president with the idea for a nationwide re-planting programme that he could 
carry out.  Meanwhile, Marcos promulgated PD No. 755 after the agreement for 
purchasing a bank ‘for and in behalf of coconut farmers’ had already been 
negotiated. Both suggest that the decrees were passed expressly for the execution 
of the specific deals that Cojuangco had already brokered. 
Third, the claim of COCOFED on the rent streams were also established 
through PD No. 961 ("An Act to Codify the Laws Dealing with the Development 
of the Coconut and Other Palm Oil Industry and for Other Purposes," 1976), 
hereinafter the Coconut Industry Code and which codified all laws pertaining to 
the coconut levies under one decree. The financing of the operating expenses of 
COCOFED, including projects such as scholarship grants to deserving children 
of coconut farmers, was specified as expressed purpose of the CCSF levy in this 
decree.
142
 These rights to the coconut levies where reiterated in PD No. 1841 
("Prescribing a System of Financing the Socio-Economic and Developmental 
Program for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers and Accordingly Amending the 
Laws Thereon," 1981), the decree that re-instated the collection of the coconut 
levies after it was suspended in 1980 and that renamed the CCSF levy as CISF 
levy. These decrees thus inscribed COCOFED’s rights to direct transfers. In 
Chapter 3, I explained that this was a mode of mobilising coconut levies could, 
on one hand,  be interpreted as not having generated ‘pure rents’, in as far as 
COCOFED projects could be interpreted as  being merely ways of spending 
coconut farmers’ own contributions. However, I also showed that the direct 
access given to COCOFED to the coconut levy collections generated rents in the 
form of redistributive transfers from the corrupt implementation of legally 
mandated uses of the funds by COCOFED.  
                                                 
142
 Already specified in RA NO. 6260, where yet unnamed COCOFED was even more central 
than in subsequent PDs. However, these CIC collections were miniscule… 
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What I have established so far is that the rent assignments associated with the 
coconut levies were largely meted out by Marcos through the power of 
presidential promulgations under Martial Law Philippines. The presidential 
decrees ordained the formal grammar of the rent settlement: facilitating the 
access to rent streams of consumers and exporters of coconut products, a 
presidential associate and COCOFED leaders. From this inventory of rent 
settlement beneficiaries invoked in the Marcos period presidential decrees, it 
should be immediately obvious that the levy contributors were not necessarily 
assigned as the main beneficiaries of the rent settlement.  
 
Public authority, private control: ‘for the benefit of coconut farmers’ 
Even if I have shown that coconut producers were formally assigned as neither 
the sole nor main beneficiaries of the embedded streams of rents, they were 
universally invoked in the relevant presidential decrees as the ultimate ‘reason 
for being’ of these levies: both as the target beneficiaries for their uses and as the 
owners of the funds. 143 ‘Coconut farmers’ were broadly cast as beneficiaries of 
                                                 
143 For example, the preamble of PD No. 414 ("Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 232 as 
Amended," 1974), the decree promulgated by Marcos for the collection of the CCSF levy for the 
purpose of price stabilisation, explicitly recognised coconut farmers as ultimate beneficiaries of 
investments made into industrial enterprises in the sector: 
“Whereas, there is a need to maintain domestic prices of coconut-based consumer products at reasonable 
levels without eliminating the benefits of high export earnings and unduly reducing farmers’ incomes; 
and to redirect inflationary excess profits into developmental investments by directly capitalizing 
industrial enterprises for and in behalf of the mass producers” (author’s underscoring) 
The preamble of PD No. 582 ("Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 232, as Amended," 
1974b) , the decree promulgated by Marcos to authorise the collection of the CIDF levy and 
carving out part of the CCSF collections for the purpose of establishing a hybrid coconut seednut 
farm, justified such a use of the levies in the following terms: 
 “Whereas, to attain the objective the Government should channel part of what the coconut farmers are 
presently paying as coconut consumers stabilization levy to their ultimate direct benefit” (author’s 
underscoring) 
The preamble of PD No. 755 ("Approving the Credit Policy for the Coconut Industry as 
Recommended by the Philippine Coconut Authority and Providing Funds Therefor," 1975), the 
decree promulgated by Marcos to legalise the use of coconut levy funds for the procurement a 
commercial bank, similarly invoked the proposed benefits of establishing a bank for coconut 
farmers: 
 “Whereas, an operating commercial bank owned by the coconut farmers will accelerate the growth and 
development of the coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers 
will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development” (author’s underscoring) 
Finally, a section of the preamble PD No. 961 ("An Act to Codify the Laws Dealing with the 
Development of the Coconut and Other Palm Oil Industry and for Other Purposes," 1976), the 
presidential promulgation that unified all decrees pertaining to the coconut levies under one act 
and hereinafter referred to as the Coconut Industry Code, also indicated the state’s intention to 
allow coconut farmers to own investments arising from the mobilisation of the coconut levies. It 
says: 
“Whereas, to make more meaningful the participation of the coconut farmers in the resulting benefits 
from the growth and development of the industry and to re-affirm the intention of the Government in 
restricting its role therein to the performance of purely governmental functions and in allowing the 
coconut farmers to own coconut commercial and industrial enterprises there is an imperative necessity 
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the funds’ uses in the ‘statements of state policy’ embodied by preambles of said 
presidential decrees. In particular, levies were mostly pitched in these preambles 
as a means of raising long-term financing for the coconut sector and were to be 
mobilised in ways that ultimately benefitted coconut farmers.  This could be seen 
as signalling a contradiction about the rent settlement inscribed in law. On one 
hand, these provisions could be interpreted as underpinning the claims of the 
levy contributors on the rent settlement and prescribing their rights to returns on 
investments made in their behalf.  On the other hand, this broad claim is negated 
by the fine print of rent assignments embedded in the same presidential decrees. 
Moreover, the evidence I have presented in Chapter 3– showing that coconut 
farmers were not the ultimate beneficiaries of the monopsony rents, redistributive 
transfers and rents from capital accumulation arising from the ways in which 
coconut levies were mobilised during the Marcos years – suggest that the 
coconut farmers’ legally inscribed rights to the rent settlement were never truly 
realised. Why then were they invoked at all?  
While in Colombia state power was deployed to collect levies from coffee 
producers to strengthen the FEDECAFE, the privatisation of coconut levy 
collections, in the Philippines merely provided the smokescreen for the capture 
of rent settlement during the Marcos years. Marcos also rendered the coconut 
levy funds largely beyond the ambit of public audit and other formal institutions 
enforcing accountability through a presidential decree. And although when he 
revised the Coconut Industry Code in 1978 he specified his authority to call for a 
public audit 144, he never used this authority during the time he was in power. 
                                                                                                                                    
of accordingly re-structuring the various laws that have been enacted to promote the rapid development 
of the industry…” (author’s underscoring) 
144 Section 5, Article III of the Coconut Industry Code (PD NO. 961) declared that coconut levy 
funds were not any form of government funds and that ‘coconut farmers’ owned them in their 
private capacity, to wit:   
“The Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund as well as all 
disbursements of said Funds for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall not be construed or interpreted 
… as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of national government … ; nor as 
subsidy, donation, levy government funded investment [sic] or government share …, the intention being 
that said Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers 
shall be owned by them in their private capacities…” (author’s underscoring) 
This section of PD No. 961 also rendered coconut levy funds “beyond the contemplation” 
of other presidential decrees expounding on the scope of the national government’s 
auditing functions. In particular, the funds were specifically exempted from the effects of 
the presidential decrees that reverted all ‘special’ and ‘fiduciary’ funds to the ‘general 
funds’ of the government, and that defined the scope of powers of the Commission on 
Audit, the national agency tasked with auditing all government funds. 
Meanwhile, Section 5, Article III of the Revised Coconut Industry Code (PD  No. 1468) 
reiterated this provision, with the proviso that the president may authorise its audit, to wit: 
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This resulted to hardly ever any reports being published under the Marcos regime 
about how coconut levy funds were expended145, as I have noted in Chapter 3.   
Even more significantly, the coconut farmers’ avowed ‘ownership’ of the 
funds and the investments thereof was ultimately given no operational meaning 
because it was made systematically difficult for individual farmers to lay claim 
on these. For one, the farmers’ claim on the funds was dependent on receipts 
issued to them as proof of payment.  As I have explained in Chapter 3, no 
receipts were ever issued for payments of the CCSF and CIDF levies.  It did not 
help that, as David (1992, p. 17) asserted, a vast majority of the farmers did not 
really know they were paying levies because the payments were automatically 
deducted by traders from the farm gate price.  The claim that receipts tended not 
to be issued in connection with these levies seems to be borne out by the fact 
that, when UCPB stocks of shares were ‘distributed’ to farmers, CIF levy 
receipts were used as a means to validate claims on ownership shares rather than 
CCSF levy receipts.  This was despite the fact that the funds used to purchase 
UCBP were actually not from CIF but CCSF/CIDF collections.  
Meanwhile, even for CIF levy payments for which receipts were issued, 
transactions costs involved in the attainment of said receipts were a disincentive 
for famers to actually secure them. In Chapter 3, I explained that CIF levy 
receipts were issued by PCA to coconut end-users, who then issued them to their 
dealers, thence to buyers and traders. Coconut farmers received their receipts 
from their first sale buyers. The farmers were then required to register their 
receipts with COCOFED town chapters (David, 1992, p 16) – a requirement that 
invoked costs in terms of time and transportation fare. David suggested that 
farmers thus found it impractical to have their receipts validated and registered 
                                                                                                                                    
“The Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund and the Coconut Industry Development Fund, as well as 
all disbursements as herein authorized, shall not be construed or interpreted, under any law or 
regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of the general funds of the national government 
within the contemplation of PD 711; nor as subsidy, donation, levy government funded investment, or 
government share within the contemplation of PD 898, the intention being that said Fund and the 
disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by 
them in their private capacities: Provided, however, That the President may at any time authorize the 
Commission on Audit or any other officer of the government to audit the business affairs, 
administration, and condition of persons and entities who receive subsidy for coconut-based consumer 
products…” (author’s underscoring) 
145 David (1977) had estimates of collections from 1973-1977, having collected and -- more 
crucially -- access to relevant data as the assigned military advisor in the sector under Martial 
Law. Clarete and Roumasset (1983) also cited a newspaper report (Business Day, 1980), which 
showed estimates of collection as of 1980.
 
 But there were no official consolidated reports on the 
coconut levy funds – neither their collection nor their disbursements – until after 1986, when 
Marcos was booted of power and levies were no longer being collected.  
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with COCOFED and that plenty of receipts stayed in the warehouses of traders 
and big end-users. Validating this claim, David undertook a nationwide survey of 
coconut farmers, and estimated that in 1973, 1974 and 1975, only 17 per cent, 27 
per cent and 32 per cent, respectively, of the farmers registered their CIF 
receipts. (David, 1992)  David’s estimates are supported by the government’s 
own Ministry of Agriculture,  which undertook a similar survey in 1975 that 
found an even lower estimate of CIF receipt registration rate. They found that 59 
per cent of their sample coconut farmers received their levy receipts, of which 
only 49 per cent went to have their receipts registered. This translates to a 
registration rate of 28 per cent in 1975. (Valiente et al in Clarete & Roumasset, 
1983, p. 35) 
In Chapter 3, I have already noted the irregularities the Sandiganbayan found 
in the distribution of receipts, upon which UCPB stock shares were distributed. 
Aside from this, Joey Faustino, executive director of the Coconut Industry 
Reform Movement (COIR) and a key figure in the struggle to recover coco levy 
funds for coconut farmers in the post-Marcos period, suggests additional 
anecdotal evidence of irregularities. He said that some farmers did register their 
CIF levy receipts and thus obtained UCPB stock certificates of ownership. 
However, these were later on sold to COCOFED officers.  Faustino says that in 
Bicol
146
, where he undertook research, farmers called their stock certificates, 
'tseke' (cheques). He says they were asked to queue up by COCOFED, who then 
encashed the certificates, as if they were cheques, at par value.
 147
 
To further obfuscate matters, changes in Marcos’ coconut decrees made it 
appear that what was at first levied on farmers at first sale of copra was later on 
charged to exporters.
148
 This happened when coconut decrees were consolidated 
into the Coconut Industry Code in 1976.
149
 This decree already clearly indicated 
that the CCSF levy was to be charged to coconut end-users. This probably 
explains why coconut farmers were not issued receipts for their payments of 
CCSF and of CISF levy collections.   
                                                 
146
 Bicol was one of the key coconut-producing provinces in the Philippines. 
147
 Interview undertaken by author in April 22, 2009, in Manila, Philippines. 
148
 The relevant provisions in PD No. 276 were cited in a pamphlet, widely attributed to 
Cojuangco and reproduced in David (undated), as a basis for claiming that the CCSF levy was a 
voluntary expense borne by millers and exporters for the benefit of farmers (p 48) 
149
 Section 1, Article III of the PD No. 981 specifies that copra exporters, oil millers, and other 
end uses are to pay the levy. 
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Having said this, the Revised Industry Code, which was enacted in 1978, also 
recognised that coconut farmers ultimately carried the burden of the levy. In 
particular, a section of this decree justifies that only oil mills ‘owned by the 
farmers’ shall be compensated for consumer subsidies by stating that “coconut 
farmers in effect shoulder the burden of the levies imposed”. (PD No 1468, 
Article III, Section 2a)  
But more importantly, economic analysis bears out the conclusion that 
coconut farmers bore the burden of the levies.  Clarete and Roumasset (1983, pp. 
38-32) examined the extent to which Philippine government interventions in the 
coconut sector drove a wedge between the border price of copra and the producer 
price. They find that the imposition of the CCSF, along with the export tax and 
marketing regulations imposed in the 1970s, combined to lower the price 
received by coconut producers. Because the coconut decrees also legitimised the 
purchase of coconut mills and trading companies ‘in the name of the farmers’, 
the levies helped set-up monopoly power in the marketing sector of the coconut 
industry. The monopoly power of copra end users meant that the levies could be 
easily passed on to farmers. The coconut levies were ultimately a tax on 
producers. 
In summary, what transpired was that an authoritarian president designated 
the coconut levy funds as privately-owned funds. Such a designation meant that 
funds could be collected and spent without being audited and subjected to public 
scrutiny. And while ‘coconut farmers’ were invoked as the beneficiaries and 
owners of the funds, their claims of ownership were made difficult because of 
how the levies were collected and accounted for, and also by changes in the 
decrees that implied they did not bear the burden of the levy.  
 
Delimiting administrative control 
It was not only the designation of coconut levy collections as funds privately 
owned by coconut farmers that facilitated capture of the rent settlement but also 
the centralisation of administrative control of the funds to a delimited set of 
individuals. By ‘administrative control’, I refer to the authority to release legally 
mandated disbursements of the coconut levies – including, most importantly, the 
power to make investment decisions and to manage these investments, when the  
uses of the coconut levies were expanded to allow for the mobilisation of funds 
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beyond price stabilisation. It constitutes a central aspect of the rent settlement’s 
regulation because it has to do with its day-to-day implementation and 
enforcement. 
 
Interlocking directorates 
The centralisation and delimitation of administrative control of the coconut levy 
collections was achieved through the entrenchment of interlocking directorates – 
governing boards represented by the same set of people – commanding the three 
organisations that emerged as the main enforcers of the rent settlement: the PCA, 
COCOFED, and UCPB.  Table 5.1 illustrates how ‘linked’ the governing boards 
of these organisations were in 1980. It shows that all members of the PCA board 
of directors were also members of the UCPB board. Four directors of COCOFED 
– including the chairman and president – were also directors of either PCA or 
UCPB, or both. Cojuangco, shown in Chapter 3 as one of the key beneficiaries of 
the rent settlement, was both director of PCA and president of UCPB. 
 
Regulatory infrastructure ordained by Marcos 
Marcos used the same set of presidential decrees that effected the privatisation of 
the coconut levy funds to put in place an organisational infrastructure regulating 
the rent settlement featured by intimately linked governing boards. The process 
of setting up the organisational infrastructure for administrative control of the 
rent settlement began with the establishment of PCA through the promulgation of 
PD No. 232 ("Creating a Philippine Coconut Authority," 1973) by Marcos in 
August 1973. PCA was originally established with the broad mandate of 
coordinating the development of the coconut sector and regulating, when 
necessary, trade and export of its products. The decree effectively centralised the 
governance of the industry under on agency as it abolished and transferred to 
PCA the functions and budgets of other coconut-related government agencies 
like the Coconut Coordinating Council (CCC), the Philippine Coconut 
Administration (PHILCOA) and the Philippine Coconut Research Institute 
(PHILCORIN).  
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Table 5.1 Governing boards of COCOFED, PCA and UCPB, 1980 
Persons COCOFED PCA UCPB 
Ma. Clara Lobregat President Director Director 
Rolando de la Cuesta Chairman Chairman Director 
Eduardo Cojuangco Jr  Director President 
Jose Eleazar, Jr. Director Director Director 
Iñaki Mendezona Director  Director 
Hermenegildo  Zayco  Director Director 
Juan Ponce Enrile   Chairman 
Domingo Espina Secretary   
Eladio Chatto  Treasurer   
J. Reynaldo Morente  Vice-President for Luzon   
Eusebio Moore Vice-President for Visayas   
Anastacio Emaño Vice-President for Mindanao   
Magin Belarmino Director   
Moises Escueta Director   
Jose Gomez Director   
Sulpicio Granada Director   
Jose Martinez, Jr. Director   
Bienvenido Marquez Director   
Jose Concepcion   Director 
Emmanuel Almeda   Director 
Narciso Pineda   Director 
Danilo Ursua   Director 
Source: COCOFED and UCPB board from Hawes (1987b, pp. 78-79), PCA Board from PCA (1999) 
 
Between its promulgation in June 1973 and December 1974, this decree was 
amended four times – through the promulgation of other presidential decrees – 
with the purpose of defining the powers of PCA in the administration of coconut 
levy funds and also progressively delimiting the size and constitution of the 
board of directors. By July 1976, Marcos had promulgated the Coconut Industry 
Code, in which the role of PCA in regard to the administration of the levies was 
consolidated; and the size of the PCA’s board of directors, delimited to a group 
of seven individuals. The speed and frequency in which the laws were 
manipulated by Marcos within a span of five years from 1973 to 1978 provides a 
good indication of the central role played by the executive in shaping this rent 
settlement. 
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Three sets of the aforementioned amendments were enforced to reconstitute 
the PCA Board. The first was promulgated in August 1973, just two months after 
the original decree creating the Philippine Coconut Authority was passed. 150 It 
had the effect of whittling down the size of the PCA board to nine members, and 
removing the role therein of three government functionaries. Marcos gave 
himself the power to handpick the chairman of the board, and created a new 
position: that of the vice-chairman, a position reserved for the PCA 
administrator, who was also to be a presidential appointee. A seat was also 
reserved for a representative from the Coconut Investment Company.  
Meanwhile, the second set of amendments151  was promulgated just eight months 
after in April 1974.  This reconstituted the governing board of PCA by bringing 
in two government representatives: one from the Department of Finance and the 
other, from the Board of Investments. This would have signalled a revised 
commitment to enhance the powers of government officials within the board, but 
the board was reconstituted again by the end of the year. This third set of 
amendments152, enforced in December 1974, took back the enhanced powers 
given to state representatives in PCA’s governing board, which was decreased in 
size to seven individuals. All previous state functionaries were no longer given a 
role in this reconstituted board. Instead, two seats were given to the Philippine 
National Bank, at that point in the government-owned bank where the levies 
were deposited: its chairman was to be PCA’s chairman of the board; another 
PNB representative, the board’s president. The number of COCOFED 
representatives was increased from one to three. A seat was given to the United 
                                                 
150
 PD No. 271("Amending Presidential Decree No. 232 Creating a Philippine Coconut 
Authority," 1973) was signed into law by Marcos in order to amend PD No. 232 ("Creating a 
Philippine Coconut Authority," 1973). PD No. 232 originally provided for the establishment of 
an eleven-member board of directors constituted by five representatives of relevant government 
agencies – a representative from the National Science Development Board, who was to be the 
chairman of the board; undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; undersecretary of 
Trade; director of the Bureau of Plant Industry and director of the Bureau of Agricultural 
Extension – and six, from the private sector: three to be handpicked by the president from the 
private sector at large; the chairman of COCOFED; and the chairman of the United Coconut 
Associations of the Philippines. In the amended law, the representatives from the National 
Science Development Board, Bureau of Plant Industry and Bureau of Agricultural Extension 
were removed from the board. 
151
 Embodied in PD No. 414 ("Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 232 as Amended," 
1974), which  authorised the PCA to implement what was at first a temporary price stabilisation 
scheme, and to  collect the CCSF levy for this purpose. 
152
 Embodied in PD No. 623 ("Further amending Presidential Decree No. 232, as Amended," 
1974a) 
  
193 
 
Coconut Associations of the Philippines, and the ‘owner and operator of the 
coconut seed nut farm’ – Cojuangco – was expressly given the power to 
recommend one representative.  This PCA board configuration was retained in 
the Coconut Industry Code, except that the two PNB seats were reverted back to 
two representatives of the government appointed by the president. In a nutshell, 
the three sets of amendments had the effect of shoring-up of the position of 
coconut industry representatives and appointees of the president within the 
board. 
The remaining set153 of the aforementioned four amendments was promulgated 
by Marcos to enable PCA to exercise new powers in relation to the coconut 
levies. In particular, the amendments related to authorising the PCA to collect a 
new and – unlike the CCSF levy – permanent levy to finance investments into 
the coconut industry, including the establishment and operation of what would be 
Cojuangco’s coconut farm. 
In a nutshell, the presidential decrees promulgated by Marcos between 1973 
and 1978 helped lay down the regulatory infrastructure governing the rent 
settlement in two significant ways. First, they fostered the deepening of PCA 
powers from being an agency with a broad coordinative and regulatory mandate, 
to one empowered to exercise the licit power of the state to expropriate surplus 
from producers through the imposition of coconut levies. Second, they 
progressively delimited the role of state functionaries in the governing board of 
PCA and centralised control of the agency to representatives of the coconut 
industry and associates of Marcos.  
The second point is best illustrated by analysing the PCA board composition 
from 1974 to 1984
154
, as shown in Table 5.2 In a nutshell, data presented in the 
                                                 
153
 Embodied in PD No. 582 ("Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 232, as Amended," 
1974b) 
154
 While levy collections were suspended from 1982, I chose to observe the PCA composition 
until a few more years after this because even after 1982, the economic entities funded by 
coconut levies were still in operation. UNICOM, the processing monopoly was not dissolved 
until 1985. This make 1984 a good end-point, being just two years before Marcos’ downfall from 
power – he was unseated by a popular uprising in 1986.  
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Table 5.2 PCA Board Composition: 1974-1984 
 
Board members 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Coconut industry representatives 
Ma.Clara 
Lobregat 
(COCOFED) 
          
Hermenegildo 
Zayco (UCAP) 
          
Jose Eleazar Jr 
(COCOFED) 
          
Rolando dela 
Cuesta 
(COCOFED) 
          
Presidential associates 
Eduardo 
Cojuangco 
(Presidential 
associate) 
          
Benjamin 
Romualdez 
(Presidential 
associate) 
          
State functionaries 
Juan Ponce Enrile 
(Defence minister) 
          
Panfilo Domingo 
(PNB) 
          
Cesar Villariba           
Cesar Lanuza 
(BOI) 
          
Eduardo Corpuz 
(NEDA) 
          
Florencio  Medina 
(NSDB) 
          
Mario Reyes 
(DOT) 
          
Jose Drilon 
(DANR) 
          
Victor Macalincag 
(DOF, alternate) 
          
Rolando Goetina 
(DOF) 
          
Eduardo Gopez           
Salvador 
Escudero III 
          
Vicente 
Valdepeñas 
          
Source: PCA, 2009 
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table shows that in the eleven years that I reviewed, it was only in 1974 when 
there was significant representation from agencies of the government. In seven of 
these years, COCOFED had three representatives in the board. From 1978 to 
1984, one could even surmise that coconut industry representatives dominated 
the board as COCOFED’s three votes plus the vote of their allied organisation, 
UCAP, constituted majority of the seats. Other than the representatives of the 
sector, the only other central figure in the board is presidential associate 
Cojuangco, who served as board director for ten out of the twelve years reviewed 
in the table. 
 
COCOFED: power diminished 
Given such an organisational configuration governing the rent settlement, it is no 
wonder that the relevant series of presidential decrees have been interpreted as a 
means used by Marcos to cede control of PCA to COCOFED.
155
 However, an 
analysis of the share of the coconut levies administered by PCA cannot lead one 
to conclude that COCOFED was decisive in regulating the rent settlement 
through its role in the PCA board. I will show that the while national leaders of 
COCOFED were key figures in said interlocking directorates, as shown in Table 
5.1, evidence pertaining to the fund allocations directly administered by each of 
these organisations indicate that the producers association was neither the sole 
nor dominant force in the administrative arrangement that emerged. To be sure, 
PCA administered a significant portion of the coconut levy collections: as shown 
in Table 5.3, PCA was responsible for 40 per cent of the disbursements. 
However, as also shown in the table, PhP 3.29mn of the PhP 3.86mn (or 85 per 
cent) administered by PCA was earmarked for specific purposes: consumer and 
exporter subsidies and Cojuangco’s replanting programme. In other words, there 
was little room to shape the expenditures of PCA around the objectives of 
COCOFED as the uses of the fund had already been determined by fiat. As has 
already been shown in Chapter 3, the price subsidies were effectively transfers 
from producers, whom the COCOFED were supposed to be representing, to 
consumers and exporters. Moreover, it was shown that the replanting programme 
benefitted Cojuangco without contributing to the productive goals of the sector. 
                                                 
155
 See for example Hawes (1997, p. 74) 
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If COCOFED’s pronounced role in the board of PCA cannot be interpreted as 
evidence of coconut producers’ power to shape the rent settlement, what about 
the direct role the organisation played in mobilising a portion of the collections? 
The evidence suggests that even the direct control exercised by COCOFED to 
administer a portion of the levy collections could not be plausibly interpreted as 
indicative of the power of levy contributors to shape the rent settlement around 
their goals.  
First, COCOFED ended up administering only about PhP 1.04 bn, at 11 per 
cent of the total amount relatively small portion of total collections. This is small 
relative to the share that FEDECAFE controlled in Colombia, and relative to the 
share controlled by the UCPB and PCA boards.  
Second, there is no evidence to indicate that the choice of how these funds 
were used were subjected to democratic processes within COCOFED, as they 
were in FEDECAFE. As discussed in Chapter 3, COCOFED leaders later on 
faced charges of corruption related to how these funds were mobilised.  
 
Table 5.3 Uses of coconut levy collections, by administrator 
Items Amount (in PhP) Share in total (in %) 
UCPB-Administered Collection 4,795,791,001.32 49.46 
Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) 2,572,143,884.69 26.53 
Insurance Fund 994,941,396.29 10.26 
Debt Service 38,970,509.40 0.40 
UNICOM 1,189,735,210.94 12.27 
PCA-Administered Collection 3,855,599,959.06 39.77 
Subsidy 2,147,207,603.38 22.15 
PCA Research and Development [R and D and operating expenses] 242,892,132.30 2.51 
Premium Duty 173,142,231.78 1.79 
Fertiliser Distribution Program 52,521,977.03 0.54 
Donation to Children's Hospital [Lungsod ng Kabataan] 50,000,000.00 0.52 
Ang Tahanan Maharlika 40,000,000.00 0.41 
Hagenmaier Aqueous Coconut Processing Project 2,659,959.82 0.03 
Replanting 1,147,176,054.75 11.83 
Cocofed-Administered Collection [and Others, jointly and severally] 1,044,048,789.29 10.77 
Distribution of Stock Certificate of UCPB to Coco Farmers 694,833.81 0.01 
Copra Price Stabilization Fund (CPSF) 144,922,065.14 1.49 
Development and Socioeconomic Projects for Coco Farmers 759,911,891.34 7.84 
Acquisition of controlling interest at UCPB 115,520,000.00 1.19 
Census Committee 23,000,000.00 0.24 
Total collections 9,695,439,749.67 100.00 
Source: SAO, 1997 
 
What the evidence supports is that UCPB ultimately emerged as the most 
important regulatory conduit of the rent settlement. As shown in Table 5.3, 
among the three organisations administering the funds, the bank ended up 
  
197 
 
administering the biggest share of the collections: PhP4.8bn or 50 per cent of the 
total coconut levy collection.  Moreover, while PCA and COCOFED 
administered coconut levies for use in ‘one-off’ projects – like price subsidies, 
and welfare and income transfers – UCPB administered investments of the funds 
that created further rent streams. These investments, in turn, were nominally 
owned by UCPB – all on behalf of the coconut farmers, of course. As can be 
seen in Table 5.3, UCPB administered the mobilisation of coconut levies for the 
vertical integration of the coconut industries – and for this purpose the 
establishment of the United Coconut Oil Mills (UNICOM) and procurement of 
various coconut oil milling facilities as financed by the CIIF. As could be 
recalled from Chapter 3, this specific mode of using the funds generated 
monopsony rents as market power was shored up the top-end of the value chain 
in the coconut sector.  
The role of UCPB in administering the rent settlement, like that of PCA and 
COCOFED, was also established by presidential fiat.156 The first important step 
Marcos took to strengthen the role of UCPB in administering the rent settlement 
was to make it the depository of all coconut levy collections. The monies were 
deposited in the UCPB, interest-free and were to service the credit requirements 
of coconut farmers.  The Coconut Industry Code also gave the bank full authority 
to invest the funds in enterprises involved in commercial and industrial activities 
related to the coconut and palm oil sectors.  
In UCPB, it was Cojuangco and not COCOFED representatives that reigned 
supreme. The COA team that audited UCPB operations in 1986  indicated that 
Cojuangco “controlled the UCPB for more than ten years” (Commission on 
Audit, 1986b, p. 9). Cojuangco was the president of the bank from the time it 
was purchased in 1975 to 1986. Again as explained in Chapter 3, Cojuangco was 
not only awarded personal shares of stocks in the Bank, but also awarded a five-
year renewable management contract and the right to appoint three members of 
the board of directors – all these, by virtue of brokering the deal that led to the 
purchase of UCPB.  Hawes (1987, p. 79) also suggests that while COCOFED 
was represented in the board of the bank, it was outnumbered in the bank’s 
                                                 
156
 PD No. 755 ("Approving the Credit Policy for the Coconut Industry as Recommended by the 
Philippine Coconut Authority and Providing Funds Therefor," 1975) was promulgated for this 
purpose. 
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executive committee, which was constituted by five members: COCOFED’s 
Lobregat, Cojuangco, and three individuals who represented the stakes of the 
bank’s former major stakeholders before UCPB was procured for the coconut 
farmers. A COCOFED official interviewed by Hawes (1987, p 82) said that it 
was in the management team set up at the UCPB where “landlord politicians of 
COCOFED felt they were losing out to the political associations of the president 
[Marcos]”. 
In summary, out of the flurry of presidential decrees promulgated by Marcos 
between 1973 and 1981, the administrative infrastructure for regulating and 
enforcing the rent settlement that emerged was one in which power resided in 
three organisations: PCA, COCOFED and UCPB. These organisations were 
governed by boards of interlocking directorates, with significant participation by 
COCOFED representatives. The presidential decrees initially strengthened 
COCOFED position within the PCA. But when Marcos authorised the purchase 
of what became UCPB and gave this bank the power to mobilise coconut levies 
for investments to effect the vertical integration of the industry, a power shift in 
terms of the regulatory control of the rent settlement ensued. In the end, a 
presidential associate trumped the powers of COCOFED representatives – 
resulting in a rent settlement in which the producers association controlled and 
received a relatively thinner stream of rent assignments. 
 
Rent settlement contested: the post-Marcos period 
The regulation of the rent settlement associated with the coconut levies took an 
interesting turn in 1986, soon after Marcos was deposed from power.157  Among 
                                                 
157 Marcos fled the Philippines in February 25, 1986 following a peaceful popular uprising 
usually referred to as the “people power revolution” or the “EDSA revolution”, after the name of 
a major highway in Metro Manila. Amid protests over allegations of cheating in the presidential 
elections held a few weeks earlier in February 7, a group of military forces took refuge in military 
camps in the capital in February 22 after a botched plot against Marcos. The camps were 
surrounded by thousands of civilians to prevent an assault by Marcos’ loyalist military forces. 
Over the next few days, more military units defected to the rebel side even as the civilians 
gathered in EDSA rapidly swelled to massive numbers. Marcos, along with his immediate family 
and some of his closest associates, were flown to Hawaii by the US government. Marcos 
remained in the US state until his death in 1989. 
   Hours before Marcos fled the country, Corazon “Cory” Aquino, the opposition candidate 
believed to have won the elections, was sworn in as President. Aquino was a self-described 
housewife but had gained prominence as the widow of popular opposition senator Benigno 
“Ninoy” Aquino, who was assassinated in 1983 at Manila’s airport upon his return from exile in 
the US. 
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the very first acts158 of the newly installed government of president Corazon 
Aquino, who took over from Marcos, was to sequester ‘ill-gotten wealth’159 
deemed to have been amassed by the deposed president, his relatives and close 
associates by exploiting access to public authority during the 20 years that the 
president was in power. Among those sequestered in 1986 were the assets 
acquired using the coconut levies including, as explained in Chapter 3: 
COCOFED and Cojuangco’s shares of stocks in the bank UCPB; COCOFED 
and Cojuangco’s shares of stocks in the San Miguel Corporation, the investments 
made by UCPB through the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (including the oil 
mills and the oleo-chemical manufacturing plant discussed in Chapter 3), the 
Coconut Investment Company, and COCOFED’s copra trading company, 
COCOMARK.160 As alluded to in Chapter 3, a case –docketed as Civil Case No. 
0033 – was subsequently filed by the Philippine government in 1987 at the 
Sandiganbayan against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr, and sixty other. Among the sixty 
other individuals were all the members of interlocking directorates, and national 
officers of the COCOFED cited in Table 5.1. As also noted in Chapter 3, the case 
was later subdivided (in 1995) into eight separate cases, collectively called the 
‘coconut levy cases’, which contested the legality of mobilising the levies for the 
following: the purchase of the UCPB161, the creation of the CIIF companies162, the 
creation and operation of the coconut seed farm by Cojuangco163, the purchase 
                                                 
158
 The first executive order Aquino issued, EO No. 1, was the establishment of the Presidential 
Commission on Good Government tasked with recovering ‘ill-gotten wealth’ under the Marcos 
government. This commission issued the sequestration order 
159
 Aquino’s second executive order, EO No. 2, specified ‘ill-gotten wealth’ to include  “assets 
and properties in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of sticks, buildings, 
shopping centres, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and 
persona properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world.” 
160
 Information from court document: ("Republic of the Philippines versus Sandiganbayan, etc. 
(Re: Sequestration Orders Revoked by Sandiganbayan)," 1995). Based on this document, 
Cojuangco’s shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation were similarly sequestered, as were 250 
other corporations in which he had a stake 
161
 Civil Case No. 0033-A, regarding the Anomalous Purchase and Use of First United Bank, now 
‘United Coconut Planters Bank’ 
162
 Civil Case No. 0033-B, regarding the Creation of Companies out of Coco Levy 
163
 Civil Case No. 0033-C, regarding the Creation and Operation of Bugsuk Project and Award of 
PhP 998 mn Damages to Agricultural Investors, Inc ding the Creation of Companies out of Coco 
Levy. 
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and settlement of the debts of oil mills described in Chapter 3164, and the 
acquisition of the San Miguel shares of stocks.165
,166  
The sequestration of the coconut levy assets and filing of above-described 
cases by the Philippine government meant that, when Marcos was ousted from 
office in 1986, two things were set in motion: first, a legal challenge to the 
assignment of rights to rent streams associated with the coconut levies or the rent 
settlement prescribed when Marcos was in power, particularly the rights 
appropriated by Cojuangco and COCOFED; and second, the undermining of the 
regulatory infrastructure that Marcos set up to control the mobilisation of 
coconut levies.  In other words, both the ownership of coconut levy-funded 
assets, and control of the returns from these became open to contestation. 
Therefore, in the post-Marcos period, the regulation of the rent settlement related 
to the adjudication of this contest. 
After 1986, the contested rent settlement revolved around the claims that, on 
one hand, Marcos-nominated rent settlement beneficiaries, and on the other hand, 
emergent groups purporting to represent the interest of coconut producers had on 
the coconut levy-funded companies and their investments. Altogether what was 
being contested was valued at somewhere between PhP 50 to100 billion in 
2012.
167
 This figure is equivalent to a five- to ten-fold increase of the total 
estimated levy contributions of coconut farmers.  
To provide a better picture of the contested continuing wealth streams, I 
present data obtained from a COA audit of the CIIF oil mills (Commission on 
Audit, 1997, p. 13) in Table 5.4. The table shows that the net worth of the 
original PhP 2.57 million-allocation of the coconut levy collections for CIIF had 
grown to PhP 13.36 billion by 1996.    The report also indicates that the 
controlling interest in UCPB, for which PhP 115.52 million of the levies was 
                                                 
164
 Civil Case No. 0033-D, regarding the Disadvantageous Purchases and Settlement of the 
Accounts of Oil Mills out of Coco Levy Funds ding the Creation of Companies out of Coco 
Levy. 
165
 Civil Case No. 033-F, regarding the Acquisition of San Miguel shares of stocks. . 
166
 The three other cases are: Civil Case No. 0033-E regarding, Unlawful Disbursement and 
Dissipation of Coco Levy Funds; Civil Case No. 0033-G, regarding the Acquisition of Pepsi-
Cola; and Civil Case No. 0033-H, regarding Behest Loans and Contracts. The last two do not 
directly involve the mobilisation of coconut levy funds, but loans given by the UCPB during 
Marcos’ time. The list of cases are from "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo M. 
Cojuangco Jr, et al, Re: Acquisition of San Miguel Corporation Shares of Stock" (2007, p. 4)  
167
 This figure was quoted to me in an interview with Oscar Santos on May 1, 2009, former PCA 
administrator and president of the Coconut Industry Reform Movement (COIR).The range has to 
do with the fact that the total value fluctuates with the market valuation of the SMC stocks. 
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invested, was valued at PhP 366.55 million, as of 1996. (Commission on Audit, 
1997, p. 5) In an interview I had with a CIIF official
168
, the figure of PhP 13 
billion was quoted as the value of CIIF companies; but PhP 14 billion, as the 
value of the bank shares. The interview was done in 2009, which should give a 
sense of how the value of the UCPB shares had grown from 1996 to 2009 – and 
also of the fact that the valuation of most coconut-levy enterprises had stagnated, 
while that of the bank had grown dramatically. Moreover, one could also deduce 
that the lion’s share of the estimated value of coconut levy-associated 
investments – as suggested above, this could be as high as PhP 100 billion in 
total – is accounted for by the value of San Miguel stocks. 
 
Table 5.4 Original CIIF investments and net worth as of December 1996 
Companies Original investments 
Net worth, as of December 
1996 
Oil mills and subsidiaries  732,715,801.55 10,138,815,000.00 
United Coconut Chemical Inc. 864,250,000.00 1,215,554,000.00 
United Coconut Planters Life Assurance Corp 16,250,100.00 1,354,080,000.00 
United Cocoa Plantation Inc. 90,000,000.00 -72,270,000.00 
Iligan Bay Express Corp 9,000,000.00 21,337,000.00 
United Coconut Planters International 147,610,000.00 418,133,000.00 
CIIF Finance Corp 0.00 182,314,000.00 
United Coconut Planters Management 10,000,000.00 dissolved in 1988 
Seven Copra Trading Companies 158,000,000.00 dissolved in 1986 
United Coconut Oil Mills Inc. (UNICOM) 544,200,000.00 dissolved in 1985 
Total 2,572,025,901.55 13,257,963,000.00 
Source: SAO 97-10, 1997 (Commission on Audit, 1997) 
 
Meanwhile, there were two nodes through which the contested rent settlement 
was adjudicated: judicial court rulings and presidential action during the course 
of what obviously was a long drawn out process of litigation. 
Court rulings on aspects of the court levy cases had the effect of regulating the 
post-Marcos rent settlement by prescribing who had property rights over the 
contested assets acquired through the coconut levies, and the income streams 
these assets generated. Court decisions ruled on the issue of whether and how 
coconut producers who paid the levies had a rightful claim to the assets acquired 
through their contributions. But it must also be underlined that the rulings took a 
while to decide, and indeed, enforce. And even after the rulings had been 
promulgated, it also took time for the rulings to be final and executory. All these 
                                                 
168
 Interview requested anonymity. Interview undertaken on May 15, 2009 in Manila, Philippines. 
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meant that the process of the long drawn out and costly litigation itself provided 
the possibilities for a negotiated settlement. 
The drawn-out judicial litigation process provided the successive presidents 
after Marcos the latitude to regulate the rent settlement while the courts were in 
the process of deciding on issues of ownership. The exercise of presidential 
authority came in the form of executive orders containing formulations of how 
the income and profit from the coconut levy assets were to be mobilised and 
controlled. Moreover, because the corporate boards of the UCPB, San Miguel 
Corporation, and the CIIF group of companies controlled the mobilisation of said 
income and profit streams, appointments in these boards was also a means for the 
regulation of the rent settlement. These appointments, in turn, were made by the 
president through the Presidential Commission on Good Government, first 
formed in 1986 to oversee the sequestration of ill-gotten wealth during Marcos’ 
presidency.  Thus, the choice of PCGG commissioners and head had significant 
consequences on the rent settlement. Finally, because the Philippine government 
was the plaintiff in the coconut levy cases and the enforcer of the sequestration of 
assets, decisions on legal strategies in the pursuit of these cases ultimately rested 
on the sitting president, including the decision to enter out-of-court settlements. 
What is interesting about all these presidential actions is that they also reflected 
the configuration of interests that held sway under the term of a given president – 
i.e., who the given president was favouring among those contesting the 
settlement. An enduring quality of the rent settlement in the Philippines was thus 
that, even under conditions of a formal democracy, executive prerogative 
underpinned its regulation.  In the post-Marcos period, the exercise of executive 
authority was influenced by outcomes of negotiations presidents fostered with 
beneficiaries of the Marcos period rent settlement, keen on maintaining their 
claims on the assets; and emergent groups, purporting to represent the interest of 
coconut producers in the contest for the rent settlement. 
In a nutshell, if during the time of Marcos, the rent settlement was regulated 
through the articulation of concentrated executive power and the establishment of 
a centralised regulatory infrastructure, the ouster of Marcos led to a key change: 
opening up the rent settlement to contestation in decentralised arenas. The 
contest for the rent settlement was played out in courts of law, in corporate 
boards, and in attempts to influence presidential authority. 
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Court decisions assign property rights to the state 
From 1989 to 2011, jurisprudence on some aspects of the coconut levy cases had 
vital consequences on the rent settlement.  In a nutshell, through court rulings, 
COCOFED lost their rights to assets acquired through the coconut levy funds – 
particularly shares of stocks in UCPB and the San Miguel shares, as described in 
Chapter 3 – while Cojuangco also lost his claims on UCPB, but not on his shares 
in San Miguel. These were effected through two sets of court decisions, that 
weighed in on the nature of the coconut levy funds as public funds, and on the 
ownership of assets said to have been acquired using said funds (i.e., UCPB 
shares) or assets acquired by companies set up through the funds (i.e., San 
Miguel shares).169   
The first set of decisions relate to three resolutions released by the Supreme 
Court in response to petitions filed by either (1) beneficiaries of the Marcos years 
rent settlement against the sequestration orders on the coconut levy-funded 
assets, and the consequences thereof (i.e., the voting rights in the corporate 
boards of the coconut levy-funded corporations that were ceded to the Philippine 
government as a result of the sequestration orders) or (2) the Philippine 
government seeking to nullify earlier decisions of the Sandiganbayan lifting 
some of the sequestration orders. In general, the Supreme Court upheld the 
decision to sequester the coconut levy-funded assets, and to allow the 
government to continue exercising the right to vote their shares in the corporate 
boards. These decisions effectively weakened the claims of private agents, like 
Cojuangco and the COCOFED, on assets that could be shown to have been 
acquired through the use of the funds. 
Two of these rulings affirmed that the coconut levy funds used to acquire the 
contested assets were “imbued with public interest” As a basis for upholding 
government’s sequestration of the assets. The first one was made in 1989, when 
the Supreme Court dismissed the petition of COCOFED to nullify the 
government’s sequestration orders, affirming that the coconut levy funds used in 
the procurement of shares in said corporations as being “affected by public 
                                                 
169
 I was directed to these rulings by Royandoyan (2007), whom I also interviewed on May 15, 
2009 in Manila, Philippines. Royandoyan was one of Arroyo’s appointees as UCPB Board 
member as one of the NGO representatives. 
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interest”.170 The second one was made in 1995, when the Supreme Court 
overturned a 1990 Sandiganbayan decision suspending the sequestration of 
coconut levy-funded shares in the UCPB. Again the ruling affirmed that the 
funds used to procure said shares were “affected with public interest, [hence,] it 
follows that the corporations formed and organized from those funds and all 
assets acquired therefrom should also be regarded as ‘clearly with public 
interest’”.171   
Meanwhile, the third relevant ruling was made by the Supreme Court in 2001, 
overturning an earlier court order given by Sandiganbayan earlier that allowed 
COCOFED and Cojuangco, among others, to continue voting their shares in 
UCBP while the relevant case was still being tried.  In this ruling, the Supreme 
Court was even more categorical in classifying the coconut levy funds as public 
funds, saying “the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest, 
they are, in fact, prima facie public funds”.172 The court cited, among others, the 
following as reasons for such a classification: coconut levy funds were raised 
with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State; they were levies 
imposed by the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers; and 
the very laws governing coconut levies recognized their public character.  
The second set of decisions relate to rulings issued by the Sandiganbayan on 
two of the subdivided coconut levy cases: Civil Case No. 0033-A, regarding the 
use of coconut levies for the procurement of UCPB; and Civil Case No. 0033-F, 
regarding the use of the same for the procurement of shares of stocks in the San 
Miguel Corporation.  Of interest to my analysis is a series of partial summary 
judgements173 made by the Sandiganbayan in 2003, 2004 and 2007.  These 
rulings were more significant than the first set of decisions because they ruled on 
issues of ownership of UCPB and the contested San Miguel shares and thus 
                                                 
170
 From the Supreme Court Decision dated October 2, 1989, ruling on the petition of COCOFED 
to annul the sequestration orders on their assets. ("Philippine Coconut Producers Federation 
(COCOFED), et al vs. PCGG (RE: Petition to annul sequestration orders) ", 1989) 
171
 From the Supreme Court Decision dated January 23, 1995, a ruling overturning 
Sandiganbayan decision to revoke sequestration.  ("Republic of the Philippines versus 
Sandiganbayan, etc. (Re: Sequestration Orders Revoked by Sandiganbayan)," 1995).   
172
 From the Supreme Court Decision dated December 14, 2001, ruling on the right of 
government to vote the sequestered shares ("Republic of the Philippines vs. COCOFED, et al. 
(RE: Right of government to Vote Sequestered Shares)," 2001). 
173
 According to Herminigildo Dumlao, from the Philippines’ Office of the Solicitor General and 
whom I interviewed on June 3, 2009 in Manila, a partial summary judgment is a judgment on the 
undisputed aspects of the case. It is not final and executory. 
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effectively ascribed property rights over the coconut levy-funded assets that had 
greatest remaining and continuing value.  
In a 2003 Sandiganbayan ruling on the UCPB case, the court declared that the 
Philippine government owned both the shares claimed by COCOFED and that of 
Cojuangco. As I have explained in the first section of this chapter and in Chapter 
3, the legal basis for the procurement of the bank that became UCPB, which was 
executed by the Philippine Coconut Authority but negotiated by Cojuangco, was 
a presidential decree (PD No. 755). The specific provision174 that explicitly 
referred to the purchase agreement arranged by Cojuangco was deemed 
unconstitutional by the court, which ruled that: 
 “the use of the CCSF to benefit private interest through the outright and 
unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares … to 
the undefined ‘coconut farmers’… negated the public purpose…to 
accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve 
the vertical integration” 175 
 
This presidential decree was also the legal basis for COCOFED’s claims on a 65 
per cent share of UCPB, purchased using coconut levy funds on behalf of the 
“1.6 million coconut farmers”. In effect, the court ruled that the COCOFED’s 
shares were thus obtained illegally and consequently declared these shares owned 
by the Philippine government. Meanwhile, as could be recalled from Chapter 3, 
Cojuangco’s shares in the UCPB refer to the 7 per cent share in the bank that he 
acquired for negotiating the deal to procure the bank FUB, in which his uncle 
Peping Cojuangco had majority shares. Again on the basis that the agreement 
between PCA and Cojuangco was undertaken under the invalidated PD No. 755, 
the transfer of these shares were deemed void; and the Cojuangco shares, also 
owned by the Philippine government.176 This partial summary judgment was 
                                                 
174
 Section 1 of PD No. 755, the ‘Declaration of National Policy’, stating that:  
“It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available credit facilities to the 
coconut farmers at preferential rates; that this policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by the 
implementation of the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of the 
Coconut Farmers" executed by the Philippine Coconut Authority, the terms of which "Agreement" are 
hereby incorporated by reference; and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby authorized to 
distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules 
and regulations it may promulgate.” 
175
 From the Sandiganbayan Partial Summary Judgement dated July 11, 2003 ("Republic of the 
Philippines versus Eduardo M. Cojuangco, et al, COCOFED, et al, Ballares, et al,  Re: The 
Anomolous Purchase and use of the First Union Bank, now United Coconut Planters Bank," 
2003, p. 81). 
176
 From the Sandiganbayan Partial Summary Judgement dated July 11, 2003. ("Republic of the 
Philippines versus Eduardo M. Cojuangco, et al, COCOFED, et al, Ballares, et al,  Re: The 
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declared final but appealable in a separate ruling made by the Sandiganbayan in 
May 2007. (Royandoyan, 2007, p. 179)  
On the matter of the contested San Miguel shares – the procurement of which, 
as I have explained in Chapter 3, was also negotiated by Cojuangco and resulted 
in CIIF mills owning 31 per cent of San Miguel shares, and Cojuangco himself 
securing 16 per cent in 1983 – the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment in 2004 
declaring the CIIF block of San Miguel shares, which were being claimed by 
COCOFED, were owned by the Philippine government “on behalf of coconut 
farmers”, as were the CIIF oil mills and holding companies used to buy those 
shares.177 In this ruling, the unconstitutionality of provisions in the presidential 
decrees penned by Marcos – particularly in the Coconut Investment Code and the 
Revised Code – declaring the coconut levy funds as privately owned by ‘coconut 
farmers’ was also upheld. Following the same logic used in the UCPB case, the 
court questioned whether the use of the coconut levies for the establishment of 
the aforementioned CIIF oil mills and holding companies – and by extension the 
San Miguel shares they acquired – served a public purpose. This judgment was 
also declared by the Sandiganbayan as final but appealable in 2007. 
(Royandoyan, 2007, p. 180) 
While the government won its petition for partial summary judgment on the 
COCOFED shares of SMC, it lost the petition it filed on the Cojuangco shares, 
thus lifting the government sequestration of these shares. In 2004, 
Sandiganbayan denied government’s petition essentially on grounds that the 
following issues remained unresolved: (1) whether Cojuangco used coconut levy 
funds to procure his shares; and (2) whether Cojuangco served in the governing 
bodies of PCA, UCPB and/or  CIIF oil mills at the time the SMC shares were 
bought; and (3) whether he took advantage of his close ties with Marcos to 
secure concessions for the loans he took to acquire his shares in SMC.178 In 2007, 
                                                                                                                                    
Anomolous Purchase and use of the First Union Bank, now United Coconut Planters Bank," 
2003, pp. 82-83) 
177
 From the Sandiganbayan Partial Summary Judgement dated May 6, 2004 ("Republic of the 
Philippines versus Eduardo M. Cojuangco, et al Re: Acquisition of San Miguel Corporation 
Shares of Stock," 2004, pp. 65-67). 
178
 From the Sandiganbayan Resolution on the Republic’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgement dated December 10, 2004 ("Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo M. 
Cojuangco, et al Re: Shares in San Miguel  Corporation Registered in the Respective Names of 
Defendants Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr and the defendant Cojuangco Companies," 2004).  In 
2005, the Philippine government filed an appeal against this ruling in the Supreme Court 
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Sandiganbayan rendered a summary judgement on the case, deciding in favour 
of Cojuangco and ruling that the Philippine government was unable to establish 
that Cojuangco  illegally acquired his San Miguel shares.179 This was upheld by 
the Supreme Court in 2011180, a decision explained in Chapter 3.  It could be 
construed from the 2007 Sandiganbayan and 2011 Supreme Court rulings that 
the courts deemed that the government failed to provide evidence to support its 
case on the three unresolved issues that would have proven that Cojuangco 
directly and illegally used the coconut levies to finance his purchase of San 
Miguel shares.181 
In a summary, these court rulings established the following: (1) that coconut 
levy funds were public funds; and (2) assets shown to have been unquestionably 
acquired through the mobilisation of coconut levy funds (i.e., majority shares in 
UCPB, COCOFED shares in San Miguel Corporation and the CIIF group of 
companies) were owned by the government, on behalf of coconut farmers”. With 
these rulings, the mobilisation of the continuing income streams from the 
coconut levy investments, and the operation of the CIIF companies were put in 
direct control of the state, which now had the prerogative to interpret what it 
meant to act in behalf of those who contributed to make these investments 
possible. COCOFED also lost their claims on these. Meanwhile, while 
Cojuangco lost his claims on UCPB, he retained ownership of his San Miguel 
shares. 
                                                                                                                                    
(Royandoyan, 2007, p. 178). This was one of the issues resolved in the 2011 Supreme Court 
Ruling, a decision favouring Cojuangco ("Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (First 
Division), Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., et al. Re: Acquisition of San Miguel Corporation Shares of 
Stocks ", 2011). 
179
 Sandiganbayan Decision dated November 29, 2007 ("Republic of the Philippines versus 
Eduardo M. Cojuangco Jr, et al, Re: Acquisition of San Miguel Corporation Shares of Stock," 
2007). 
180
 Supreme Court Decision dated April 12, 2011,  ruling on ownership of Cojuangco’s shares in 
the San Miguel Corporation ("Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 
Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., et al. Re: Acquisition of San Miguel Corporation Shares of Stocks ", 
2011). 
181
 As could be expected, the government filed a motion for reconsideration of this decision in 
November 2011 (Lopez, 2011).  Meanwhile, various farmers’ organisations also voiced their 
opposition to the court decision (Ubac, 2012).  After the Supreme Court issued a ruling in 2012 
("Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED) et al vs. Republic of the Philippines 
(Re: Sandiganbayan Partial Summary Judgements dated July 11, 2003  and May 7, 2004)," 2012) 
upholding  the 2004 Sandiganbayan partial summary judgement granting the state ownership of 
UCPB and San Miguel shares that were claimed by COCOFED, Joey Faustino, one of the leading 
personalities from civil society advocating for the ‘recovery’ of the levies, issued a statement 
urging a re-opening of the case. He said that,  
“The UCPB decision clearly shows that the bank was a public corporation all along. Therefore, Cojuangco was 
holding public office when he borrowed money to buy the shares for himself.”(Faustino, 2013) 
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Negotiating the post-Marcos rent settlement outside the courts of law 
In the process of these judicial rulings being decided, promulgated, and 
contested, executive authority was also exercised with the effect of regulating the 
rent settlement. As the court rulings were increasingly favouring the Philippine 
government to have the rightful claim over the contested assets, the adjudicating 
power of the state in this contested rent settlement – as articulated in presidential 
decisions implementing court rulings – also gained strength. Contending 
claimants to the rent settlement struggled to influence presidential action, and 
through this, their claims on the coconut levy funded-assets. In what follows, I 
present, in a synoptic fashion, actions of a succession of presidents after Corazon 
Aquino,182 and analyse what these reveal about the influence exercised by the 
contending claimants to the rent settlement.183 
I begin with Fidel Ramos, who was president of the Philippines from 1992 to 
2001 and promulgated two executive orders of interest during his term. In 1995 – 
notably a time when Supreme Court rulings affirming that coconut levy funds 
were ‘imbued with public interest – Ramos promulgated EO No. 277, which 
upheld the principle of ‘coconut levy funds’ being ‘public funds’, and ordered 
that they be utilised and managed as such.184  He ordered the setting up of an ad-
hoc committee that was mostly made up of government actors185 to oversee fund 
utilisation. This committee was tasked with consulting with “coconut farmer’s 
                                                 
182
 I am excluding from the analysis what happened during the time of Corazon Aquino, who was 
president of the Philippines from 1986 to 1992. Court cases related to the coconut levies were 
filed during her term of office and I would argue that the contest for the rent settlement was thus 
happening in the courts of law at this point. In particular, beneficiaries of the Marcos years rent 
settlement were, at this period, fighting the sequestration orders and their right to continue 
participating in the boards of the CIIF companies, UCPB and San Miguel Corporation. 
183
 Accounts of presidential actions described here are chiefly from Royandoyan (2007) and 
Faustino (2003). I interviewed both Royandoyan and Faustino (See Appendix 1 for details). As 
with Royandoyan, Faustino was one of Arroyo’s appointees to the UCPB Board, also a 
representative of the NGO sector. 
184
 In particular, Ramos ordered the following through EO No. 277("Directing the Mode of 
Treatment, Utilization, Administration and Management of the Coconut Levy Funds," 1995, p. 
3): 
 “The coconut levy funds, which include all income, interests, proceeds or profits derived therefrom, as 
well as all assets, properties and shares of stocks procured or obtained with the use of such funds, shall 
be treated, utilized administered and managed as public funds consistent with the uses and purposes 
under the laws which constituted them and the development priorities of the government, including the 
governments’ coconut productivity, rehabilitation, research, extension, farmers organizations and 
market promotions programs, which are designed to advance the development of the coconut industry 
and the welfare of the coconut farmers.” (underscoring mine)   
185
 In particular, Ramos ordered the Secretary of Agriculture to chair the committee, constituted 
by heads of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Philippine Coconut Authority, 
United Coconut Planters Bank and the Coconut Industry Investment Fund.(EO No. 277, p.3) 
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organisations” and devising a ‘master plan’ for the years 1995 to 2000. In 1998, 
right before the end of his term, Ramos promulgated EO No. 481, which called 
for lifting of sequestration orders on coconut levy assets, with the purpose of 
liquefying these assets for use in the ‘master plan’ devised under EO No. 277.  
The order directed the constitution of a committee, made up of heads of the 
Presidential Commission on Good Government, the PCA, and UCPB to 
administer the disposition of the ‘unlocked coconut levy funds’. The executive 
order also affirmed that these funds would be treated as public funds. 
In effect, even before the Supreme Court had categorically classified the 
coconut levy funds as ‘public funds’ in 2001, Ramos already declared through 
these executive orders that they were as such. Seen in this light, they signified 
Ramos’ posturing against COCOFED and Cojuangco, who of course at this point 
were battling against the classification of the funds as public in character. 
Considering that Cojuangco ran against Ramos in the presidential race of 1992 
partly explains this posturing – Cojuangco was obviously not a presidential ally. 
However, the symbolic significance of these presidential orders did not 
translate operationally. As noted by Royandoyan (2007, p. 34), the Pambansang 
Koalisyon ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan (National 
Coalition of Coconut Farmers and Labourers, PKSMMN), a coalition of 
organisations formed in 1994 to campaign for the recovery of the coconut levies, 
was complaining about the lack of implementing mechanisms for EO No. 277.  
Another organisation, the Coconut Industry Reform Movement (COIR), a 
coalition of non-government organisations and coconut farmer’s organisations, 
was noted as echoing a dissatisfaction that nothing came out of the executive 
order two years after it had been promulgated. (Royandoyan, 2007, p. 41) 
Meanwhile, EO No. 481, having been promulgated right before the elections in 
1998, was seen as ploy to shore up the campaign of Ramos’ supported candidate, 
Jose de Venecia, and woo the votes of coconut farmers. (Royandoyan, 2007, p. 
43) 
As it turns out, Ramos’ candidate lost the election, and the president who took 
over from him from 1998 to 2001 was Joseph Estrada. Estrada, who was the 
vice-president under Ramos’ term, was the running mate of Cojuangco in the 
1992 elections. Unsurprisingly, the presidential actions of Estrada reflected a 
posturing that was the polar opposite of Ramos’. As could be deduced from the 
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discussion on court rulings, above, this was a period when the crucial rulings on 
ownership of coconut levy-funded assets had still not been handed down, and so 
the reconstitution of the Marcos period rent settlement was still very much at 
play. There were two presidential actions that are emblematic of how nearly this 
happened under the watch of Estrada. 
First, Estrada appointed known allies of Cojuangco and COCOFED to key 
positions soon after he was sworn into office in 1998.  Eduardo Escueta, a lawyer 
of the COCOFED, was appointed as the administrator of PCA. Felix de Guzman, 
an aide to Estelito Mendoza, the legal counsel of Cojuangco was appointed head 
of the PCGG. With a ‘friendlier’ PCGG, government representatives in the San 
Miguel Corporation voted Cojuangco back as chairman of the board. 
(Royandoyan, 2007, pp. 45-46). 
Second, Estrada promulgated two executive orders in November 2000 that 
ordered the establishment of private trust funds, capitalised by coconut levy-
funded assets. The first of these was EO No. 212, which ordered the 
establishment of a one billion-peso fund, to be financed by the sale of coconut 
levy-funded assets186, managed by a committee of five presidential appointees. 
This executive order reverted back to how Cojuangco and COCOFED preferred 
to treat coconut levy funds: as private funds.187 The fund was to finance a 
programme called ERAP’s188 Sagip Niyugan (Save Coconut Lands), which was to 
provide assistance to supplement the income of coconut farmers and encourage 
the creation of local demand for coconut oil and other coconut products. The day 
after this executive order was issued, Estrada promulgated EO No. 213. This 
executive order called for the establishment of a perpetual trust fund to be 
capitalised by the shares of CIIF in the San Miguel Corporation. The fund was to 
be managed and administered by a committee of ten189, of which one was from 
COCOFED. Only the interest income from the trust fund was to be mobilised for 
                                                 
186
 In compliance with the Office of the Solicitor General was directed to undertake what was 
necessary to implement the purpose (Section 4, EO No. 212) thus implying ordering the 
sequestration orders to effect the sale of the assets. 
187
 Section 5 of the executive order calls for the audit of the fund to be undertaken by a ‘reputable 
auditing firm’, not the Commission on Audit, which audits all public funds. 
188
 Erap is a moniker Estrada is more popularly known by. 
189
 Four of these were to be representatives of government (including the secretaries of 
Agriculture and Agrarian reform), four from coconut farmers’ organisations, one from the CIIF 
and one from a non government organisation involved in agricultural development (Section 6,  
EO No. 212). 
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use by the committee. This trust income was to be allocated such that: 20 per 
cent was disbursed to COCOFED, 30 per cent to four other coconut farmers’ 
organisations,190 30 per cent for ‘agricultural programmes’ not limited to the 
coconut sector, 3 per cent for administration costs, and the remaining balance 
reverted to the trust fund. Again, audit was to be undertaken by an external 
auditor, as if it were not a public fund. 
These executive orders immediately reveal a clear departure from the Ramos 
executive orders. Aside from the reversal back to treating the coconut levy funds 
as private funds – it is also easy to see the deal that seems to have been struck 
with COCOFED and Cojuangco in these orders: the implied lifting of 
sequestration orders on coconut levy assets, the shares of the trust fund income 
that were to be allocated for COCOFED, along with the seats in the trust 
committee that were given to the organisation, all in exchange for COCOFED 
letting go of its claims on the SMC shares and the other assets. Note also that no 
mention is made of Cojuangco’s SMC shares for capitalising the trust fund. 
Royandoyan (2007, pp. 45-78) offers a fascinating account of the negotiations 
that happened before the promulgation of these orders. Based on accounts in the 
newspapers in the Philippines, Royandoyan says negotiations between 
Cojuangco and the Estrada government on the ‘unlocking’ of the coconut levy 
assets and talks on an executive order promulgating this began in 1999. In a 
newspaper interview, Cojuangco’s lawyer spoke of the establishment of a fund 
suspiciously similar to what was described in Estrada’s EO. No 213: “a self-
sustaining trust fund”, capitalised by the COCOFED shares that at that time was 
worth PhP40 bn, to be used by “legitimate farmers”.191 Talks of a deal with 
Cojuangco, especially one that gave concessions to COCOFED, were opposed by 
some farmers groups, leaders of churches and Wigberto Tañada, a congressman 
from the coconut-producing province of Quezon, whose family also figured 
prominently in the political struggle against the Marcos dictatorship. A multi-
sectoral formation – the Multi-sectoral Task Force for Coconut Levy Recovery 
(MSTF, but from here on the Multi-sectoral Task Force) – was consequently 
                                                 
190
 The four included PKSMNN and COIR, whom I have previously introduced and two others: 
the National Federation of Small Coconut Farmers Organisations (NFSCO) and the Nagkaisang 
Ugnayan ng Maliliit ng Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan (United Front of Small Coconut 
Farmers and Labourers). 
191
 “P100-B coco levy deal in the work’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 July 1999, p. 14 in 
Royandoyan, 2007, p. 50 
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organised – chiefly composed of those opposing said deal – and  became a key 
organisation figuring from then on in the negotiations for post-Marcos period 
rent settlement. 
The 10-member council leading this group is indicative of the forces aligned 
against the original claimants to the rent settlement. Of the ten, only three192 were 
directly involved in the coconut sector, the rest were politicians193, leaders of 
churches194 in the Philippines, and NGO leaders195. (Royandoyan, 2007, pp. 53-
54) Under the leadership of this council, the task force drafted its own version of 
an executive order that it presented to the Estrada’s Secretary of Agrarian 
Reform, Horacio Morales.196  Their draft order also called for the creation of a 
trust fund, but was different from EO No. 313 on the following points: it 
affirmed the public character of the coconut levy funds, and subjected their 
disposition to the Commission on Audit; and it excluded the participation of 
COCOFED in both the proposed governing committee and in the allocation of 
funds.  (Royandoyan, 2007, pp. 59-60) 
Meanwhile, before EO No. 313 was promulgated, other coconut farmers 
groups also emerged, in contraposition to the Multi-sectoral Task Force, 
expressing support for the Estrada order. These included a Quezon and Bicol-
based coconut farmers group called the Nagkaisang Ugnayan ng Maliliit ng 
Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan (United Front of Small Coconut Farmers 
and Labourers), the National Confederation of Small Coconut Farmers197, and the 
                                                 
192
 Including: Oscar Santos, chairperson of COIR (itself a coalition of coconut farmers groups 
and NGOs); Jose Romero Jr, representing the coconut industrial sector; and  Efren Villaseñor, 
leader of PKSMN. 
193
 Including: former Senator Alberto Romulo, and as previously noted, Congressman Wigberto 
Tañada. 
194
 Including: Bishop Fernando Capalla, of Mindanao Interfaith (a Catholic bishop working with 
Muslim ulamas in the Philippines); and Bishop Roman Tiples, secretary general of the National 
Council of Churches in the Philippines.  
195
 Including: Jose Concepcion Jr, chairperson of the Catholic-Bishops-Businessmen’s 
Conference; Ting Jayme, representing the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement; and 
Romeo Royandoyan, representing the Philippine Peasants Institute.  
196
 Morales had links with many members of the council due to their joint involvement in the 
struggle against the Marcos dictatorship. In my own interview with Joey Faustino, a member of 
the Multisectoral Task Force, he shared in the talks with Morales, they exchanged as many as 36 
draft versions of an executive order  (Interview, April 22, 2009). 
197
This organisation was established during the time of Corazon Aquino, and organised by the 
PCA. In my interview with Faustino, he indicated that this probably had the biggest mass base of 
the different farmers groups.  (Interview, April 22, 2009) It was organised when Virgilio David, 
who I have explained in Chapter 3 wrote among the first expose of the irregularities in the 
coconut levies when he was the military advisor in the sector during Martial Law, was PCA 
administrator and expressly to counteract the force of COCOFED.  
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Kalipunan ng Maliliit ng Magniniyog sa Pilipinas (Federation of Small Coconut 
Farmers and Farm Workers in the Philippines).  These three convened the 
National Coconut Farmers Summit in March 2000 to express support for the 
executive order. (Royandoyan, 2007, pp. 63, 66-67) By showing support to the 
Estrada version of the order, it was evident that this faction of coconut farmers 
did not oppose the government striking a compromise deal with Cojuangco and 
COCOFED. 
Royandoyan’s depiction of the configuration of interests and organisational 
formations involved in the negotiations regarding the content of the executive 
order, effectively regulating the post-Marcos settlement, shows that coconut 
producers were factionalised in their representation in these negotiations. One 
line of division clearly had to do with the willingness to enter into a compromise 
deal with the Cojuangco-COCOFED faction. Moreover, it is also interesting that 
those opposing said compromise were led a by a multi-sectoral organisation. 
In the end, Estrada passed the executive order more faithful to the original 
version that was being talked about when he had just begun talks with 
Cojuangco. The only difference is, in the ‘division of spoils’ – the allocation of 
income from the trust fund – the order he issued apportioned shares for coconut 
farmers groups from both those who agreed with a ‘compromise deal’ (i.e., 
NIUGAN and NCSFO) and those who were part of the Multi-sectoral Task Force 
and opposed the same (i.e., COIR and PKSMMN).  
However, during the year that Estrada promulgated the order, he was having 
political troubles of his own, and was facing an impeachment proceeding in 
House of Representatives and charged with bribery and corruption198.  In January 
2001, soon after he issued the coconut levy-related executive orders, he fled 
Malacañang due to large-scale protest action in Manila resulting from perceived 
irregularities in the impeachment trial199, and the Supreme Court declared the 
                                                 
198With the country’s senators acting as judges and presided over by the Supreme Court’s chief 
justice, the impeachment trial of Estrada was held from December 7, 2000 until January 16, 2001. 
Estrada was impeached on bribery and corruption charges for allegedly accepting hundreds of 
millions in pesos worth of pay-offs from syndicates that ran the illegal numbers game called 
'jueteng'. The impeachment trial was aborted when he was ousted from power following “EDSA 
Dos”, a series of protests in Manila that culminated in members of his Cabinet and, crucially, the 
military and defence department leadership announcing their “withdrawal of support”.  
199
Estrada was ousted as President in January 16, 2001, following “EDSA Dos”, a series of 
protests in Manila that culminated in members of his Cabinet and, crucially, the military and 
defence department leadership announcing their “withdrawal of support”. The protests were led 
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presidential seat vacant. His term of office was cut prematurely, and his 
constitutional successor, vice president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, took over 
from him. Estrada’s executive orders related to the levies, like the ones Ramos 
passed, never saw implementation.200 
This leads me to the term of Arroyo, who was president of the Philippines 
from 2001-2010.201 Presidential action affecting the rent settlement under Arroyo 
was characterised by contradictory positioning – belying an attempt to play both 
sides of the contest. 
On one hand, soon after the ouster of Estrada – and swept to power by a 
reform coalition that included some of the organisations and personalities 
involved in the Multi-sectoral Task Force202 – some of the early presidential acts 
of Arroyo related to the coconut levies were reflective of a reversal of the Estrada 
position. She suspended the Estrada executive orders three months into her term, 
and appointed a well-regarded lawyer, Haydee Yorac at the PCGG. In 2002, 
PCGG – through the government representatives seated in these boards – caused 
the elections of a new set of directors to the boards in the CIIF group of 
companies, UCPB and San Miguel Corporation. Out of about 85 seats that were 
to be occupied in the boards of these corporations, 30 were assigned to farmer 
representatives and NGO leaders. These 30 seats were equally shared by groups 
who were known to be supportive of a compromise deal with the Marcos period 
settlement beneficiaries; the other half, for those against the same. (Faustino, 
2007, p. 2-4) For the first time, representatives of claimants to the rent settlement 
other than COCOFED and Cojuangco occupied a node for rent regulation in 
these boards. However, in my interview with Faustino203, who occupied one of 
the seats as UCPB board member, he bewailed that in all the negotiations that 
                                                                                                                                    
by the opposition, key leaders of the Catholic Church, former President Corazon Aquino, and 
leftist groups. 
   Estrada’s Vice-President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, replaced him to serve out the remainder of 
his term through 2004. Arroyo would later be elected by a narrow margin as President in 2004 in 
elections marred by allegations of cheating against her main rival who was a close friend of 
Estrada. After he was deposed from power, Estrada faced plunder and perjury charges before the 
country’s anti-graft court in a trial that lasted from 2001-2007. He was convicted of plunder and 
sentenced to “reclusion perpetua” (a penalty of up to 40 years imprisonment) but was 
immediately pardoned (or granted “executive clemency”) by Arroyo.  
200
 In 2011, they were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.  
201
 When her first term ended in 2004, she ran again and won. Despite the constitutional term 
limits, she was allowed to run a second time because she was not voted into office in her first 
term. 
202
 CBCP and Tanada, were vocal opponents of Estrada.  
203
 Interview undertaken on April 22, 2009 in Manila, Philippines.  
  
215 
 
happened before these seats were taken, there was no real discussion among the 
contending claimants about how to use the funds. The coconut farmers groups 
represented in these boards could be deduced to each bring with them their own 
ideas of rent mobilisation. 
On the other hand, the government under Arroyo continued to show 
indications of being open to negotiating with Cojuangco and COCOFED – even 
as the courts released the crucial rulings described in the previous section during 
her term. For one, government allowed Cojuangco known allies to hold on to 
their seats in UCPB-CIIF boards despite the relevant court rulings awarding 
these to government. (Faustino, 2007, p.5) Part of the compulsion of the 
government to maintain negotiations is the concern for the expeditious release of 
funds, which could not be mobilised while the litigation process was ongoing. 
The process was expected to drag on, as the accused appealed and contested the 
court rulings.  
But, Arroyo’s position must also be understood in relation to the enduring 
power Cojuangco held in national politics. It must be noted that, throughout the 
period that the rent settlement was contested, Cojuangco exerted power in 
Congress as leader of a party holding seats in the house – the Nationalist 
People’s Coalition.  This party was part of the coalition that backed Estrada’s 
presidency. In 2004, it also became part of the coalition that backed Arroyo’s 
presidency.  
Meanwhile, as the possibility for a negotiated settlement remained open, a 
further splintering among the coconut producer claimants was happening. In 
October 2001, presidential advisers Dante Ang (presidential publicist) and 
Norberto Gonzales, are said to have organised a meeting between COCOFED, 
Cojuangco and two erstwhile members of the Multi-sectoral Task Force: Bishop 
Capalla and the chairperson of PKSMMN, Efren Villaseñor. This resulted in an 
agreement that called for the freeing up of the COCOFED shares in the San 
Miguel Corporation, and published in three major newspapers in the Philippines. 
(Faustino, 2007, p. 3) The Multi-sectoral Task Force was thus further 
factionalised.   
The situation took a bad turn for Arroyo in 2005, when early into her second 
term of office, there were threats of an impeachment proceeding in Congress 
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because of her alleged involvement in rigging the 2004 presidential elections.204 
After this, the posturing of her government became even more pronouncedly 
open to a negotiated settlement with Cojuangco and COCOFED, despite the 
described court rulings of 2003 and 2004. This was undoubtedly partly because 
of the importance of maintaining the support of Cojuangco’s party in the House 
of Representatives if there was to be impeachment proceedings.  
Yorac died in 2005 and Arroyo replaced her with Camilo Sabio to head the 
PCGG. Under Sabio’s term in PCGG, Yorac appointees in the corporate boards 
of coconut levy companies were unseated. He fostered a second round of talks 
between Cojuangco, COCOFED and a new formation led by Capalla, the 
Bishops-Ulama-Pastors-Priests-Farmers-Lumad Conference. The Conference 
issued a statement supporting an out-of-court-settlement regarding the 
COCOFED shares.  Sabio was also quoted in a television interview as supporting 
the same out-of-court settlement. (Faustino, 2007, p. 7) 
In closing, in much of the period of contestation, what I have shown is that 
coconut producers were without a consolidated organisation to represent them, 
Various groups of coconut producers emerged, each with their own position 
about the mobilisation of remaining funds. In the course of the negotiations 
under different presidents, these groups aligned with different political brokers 
from outside the sector; some of them, even with Cojuangco and COCOFED.  
 In a nutshell, the contest for the rent settlement in the post-Marcos years was 
consequently marked by: (1) the use of executive authority, mostly to foster 
compromise deals that would free up the coconut levy funds; (2) splintered 
representation of coconut producers, and the participation of non-coconut sector-
based individual political agents like NGOs and church leaders; and (3) attempts 
by beneficiaries of the Marcos years rent settlement – including Cojuangco and 
COCOFED – to divide and rule the splintered groups of coconut producers.  
 
                                                 
204
 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was embroiled in the “Hello Garci” scandal, in which a 
wire-tapped telephone conversation believed to be between her and Virgilio Garcillano, a high-
ranking election official nicknamed “Garci”, was made public in 2005. The conversation was 
interpreted by the opposition and some independent observers to be about collusion to rig the 
2004 presidential elections in her favour.  Impeachment charges, based on possible electoral 
fraud as allegedly exposed by the scandal, were repeatedly brought against Arroyo by opposition 
lawmakers but motions to take up the issue were each time defeated by Arroyo’s allies who 
dominated the Philippine Congress. 
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Conclusion 
I have analysed in this chapter the mechanisms regulating the rent settlement in 
the Philippines during two distinct periods: the first, when Marcos was in power; 
the second, after he had been ousted. I showed the important differences in the 
regulation of the rent settlement under these two periods.  
During the Marcos period, the rent settlement was captured by a configuration 
of agents from within and beyond the coconut sector. The capture was facilitated 
by the way Marcos utilised the concentrated executive authority accorded to him 
under Martial Law. In a nutshell, Marcos used his powers to promulgate 
presidential decrees to establish the grammar for the formal assignment of rights 
to rent streams.  
After had had been ousted from power, and the formal democratic institutions 
began to take hold in the Philippines in 1986, the rent settlement Marcos 
prescribed and the regulatory infrastructure he put in place were challenged and 
partly dismantled. In the post-Marcos period, the rent settlement was thus 
contested: with beneficiaries of the settlement during the Marcos period battling 
it out with emergent claimants. The contest was adjudicated through court rulings 
and presidential action. The court rulings ultimately assigned the contested 
property rights to the state. However, they never caused the closure of the 
possibility for a negotiated settlement. And this was a situation that proved 
problematic for coconut producers as they negotiated their claims on the rent 
settlement in the post-Marcos years. In these negotiations, they were not only 
without a consolidated organisation to represent them, but various groups of 
coconut producers emerged each with their own position about the mobilisation 
of remaining funds.  
In closing, I have shown in this chapter that because of the absence of a 
genuinely consolidated and accountable coconut producers association in the 
Philippines, those bearing the burden of the levies had difficulty in shaping the 
rent settlement around the productive goals of the sector or their welfare needs. 
In the formal and informal institutions and political processes through which 
access to rent streams were determined and/or negotiated, the long-term 
imperatives of production that in Colombia were articulated by the FEDECAFE, 
were in the Philippines largely superseded by the prerogatives of executive 
authority, which in turn were mostly based on political calculations of a 
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succession of presidents from 1970 to 2000. Because of this, the rent settlement 
that emerged in the Philippine coconut sector ultimately had a transient character 
to it; and as shown in this chapter, vulnerable to periods of capture and 
contestation. 
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Chapter 6. State-led, producer association-anchored mechanisms for rent 
regulation in the Colombian coffee sector 
 
 
In this chapter, I examine how FEDECAFE – and through them, the coffee 
producers – shaped, controlled and enforced the rent settlement associated with 
coffee levies. Here, I draw on the richly documented historiography of the 
FEDECAFE, including its role in mobilising the coffee levies, and present an 
original reading of the formal rules governing the sector. I analyse the 
institutions and organisations that permitted the productive regulation of the rent 
settlement in contrast to the Philippines. I show how the FEDECAFE played a 
central role in regulating the rent settlement through institutions that did not only 
have well-defined parameters but were also as stable as the logic that governed 
rent mobilisation was consistent. In Chapter 5, I showed that the COCOFED 
developed neither the legitimacy nor organisational processes to decisively shape 
the rent settlement that obtained around the goals of coconut production. In this 
chapter, I relate the Colombian counterpoint to the capture and contestation in 
the regulation of the rent settlement. 
I focus on three key features of rent regulation in the Colombian case: the 
codification in contractual form of the parameters governing fund use and 
mobilisation; the associational avenues – organisational structures and processes 
– that linked the Federation to the levy contributors; and the role given to the 
Federation in statecraft, particularly in the articulation of coffee pricing policy. 
These will show that in contrast to the COCOFED in the Philippines, Colombia's 
FEDECAFE featured prominently in the means by which the rights to the state-
engineered rent streams associated with the coffee levies were enforced and 
regulated. For one, the inscription of the rent settlement in legally binding 
contracts between the state and the Federation, signed and renewed every ten 
years since 1927, implied that the claim of the federation on the levies was more 
transparent and stable than it was in the Philippines. This institutional 
arrangement meant that the mobilisation of the rents was more an object for 
negotiation between the Federation and the state, and less subject to the whims of 
the state’s executive authority alone.  Meanwhile, the Federation's fully formed 
and functioning organisational processes gave voice to members about how the 
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levies were to be invested, and allowed them to hold their leaders to account. 
This implied that coffee producers exercised not just delegated – like in the 
Philippines – but also direct authority in regulating the rent settlement.  But even 
more crucially, through the avenues of associational life, levy contributors 
directly participated in the regulation of the rent settlement, and thereby also 
aiding in legitimising the rent settlement to an extent that was never achieved in 
the Philippines. Finally, the FEDECAFE also directly participated in 
governmental bodies that decided on policies that had the effect of enforcing the 
key modes of mobilisation of the levies, particularly the use of levies to stabilise 
coffee producer income. In Colombia, the FEDECAFE was at the heart of 
crafting coffee pricing policy, and through that helped determine a distribution of 
income that helped its members weather the usual cyclical patterns of boom and 
bust that afflict commodity markets like that of coffee.  
 However, all these are not to romanticise or overestimate the role of 
‘participation’ in the Colombian ‘coffee story’. Here, the state played a 
tempering influence on the power of the Federation in the organisations 
regulating the rent-settlement. In each of the three features of rent regulation that 
I have chosen to highlight, I will show how the state exercised countervailing 
power – with the effect of defining the limits of the Federation's exercise of 
control. 
 
Rent settlement codified in contractual form 
The parameters of levy mobilisation were inscribed in contracts signed by 
representatives of the government
205
 and the FEDECAFE
206
. There were 
generally two types of contracts entered into by the Federation and the 
government: the ‘contract for services’ (contrato de prestacion de servicios), 
which mostly related to the mobilisation of the general export tax collected from 
1928 to 1972 and also the taxes on international receipts collected from 1935 to 
1939; and the ‘contract for administering the Coffee Fund’ (contrato de 
administracion del Fondo Nacional del Café), which related to the mobilisation 
of coffee levies remitted to the Fund, including the taxes on international receipts 
                                                 
205
 Represented by the president and/or government ministers in Trade, Agriculture and Finance. 
206
 Represented by the general manager of the Coffee Federation, except in 1928, when the 
president of the Federation’s National Committee signed the document. 
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collected in the 1940s, the taxes on low grade coffee, the retention duty, ad 
valorem tax, part of the exchange rate differentials and later on the coffee 
contribution – all of which were explained in the previous chapter. The contract 
for services rendered was first signed in 1928, and renewed, every ten years and 
seven times hence within the period of my study (1927-2000). The contract for 
administering the Coffee Fund was first signed in 1940, when the Fund was 
established, and then renewed in 1970. But the two were merged into one 
contract from 1978 onwards. (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, pp 32-34, 76-80) 
 
Contracts defining 'entitlements to rent streams' 
The 1928 ‘contract for services’ stipulated that the government was to remit to 
the Federation all collections of general tax
207
; the 1938 contract, included the 
tax on international receipts collected in the 1930s.
208
  In exchange for these, and 
for a renewable period of ten years, the Federation was to undertake the 
following ‘services’209 to:  (1) promote Colombian coffee; (2) stimulate good 
practices in cultivation, protecting the health of both workers and fruits of 
production; (3) establish warehouses to stimulate the commercialisation of 
coffee; (4) study coffee production technologies, and sales and promotion 
strategies deployed in coffee-producing and consuming nations;  (5) encourage 
the establishment of national coffee toasting capacity within and beyond the 
country; (6) publish a trade magazine to be distributed for free to all exporters 
and coffee producers and sent out to government functionaries, and to publicise 
information about the Federation, including general plans and budgets; (7) 
generate coffee statistics; (8 ) develop and open up external markets in Europe, 
the Americas and elsewhere. Aside from the right to mobilise the general export 
tax, the Federation was also given the right to all income streams from the 
operation of the warehouses, as long as these were used “for the benefit of the 
                                                 
207
 Provision in Clausula 4o, Contrato Celebrado entre el Gobierno Nacional y La Federación 
Nacional de Cafeteros en Desarrollo de la Ley 76 de 1927 (Gobierno Nacional del Colombia y La 
Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros, 1928). 
208
 Provision in Clausula 2, 1938 Contrato Celebrado entre el Gobierno Nacional y La Federación 
Nacional de Cafeteros en Desarrollo de la Ley 76 de 1927 (Gobierno Nacional del Colombia y La 
Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros, 1928). 
209
 Provision in Clausula 1o, 1928 Contrato Celebrado entre el Gobierno Nacional y La 
Federación Nacional de Cafeteros en Desarrollo de la Ley 76 de 1927 (Gobierno Nacional del 
Colombia y La Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros, 1928)/ 
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industry”.210 These provisions about the Federation’s right to the stipulated 
coffee levies and the authorisation of their specific modes of mobilisation 
remained largely unchanged until the contract of 1968, after which in 1978, as 
has been noted, the service contract was fused with the Coffee Fund-related 
contract. 
Meanwhile, the 1940 contract for the administration of the Coffee Fund 
related to the mobilisation of the levies streamed into the then newly established 
Fund primarily for the purpose of buying the coffee stocks necessary to comply 
with the international treaties in place
211
, including undertaking to store and 
conserve the stocks in a good condition.
212
  The 1940 contract also allowed the 
FEDECAFE to sell coffee stocks it procured within the confines of the 
restrictions on supplies embedded in the international treaties in place.
213
  An 
amendment to this contract in 1943 authorised the investment of revenue streams 
from these sales into government bonds – in an attempt to help sterilise the 
inflationary effects of high external prices of coffee in the 1940s. (Junguito and 
Pizano, 1997, p. 81) This set the precedent for investing Coffee Fund resources 
in support of the purposes of price stabilisation. 
The 1940 contract was to be in place as long as the agreements were in effect. 
But Junguito and Pizano (1997) explain that the contract was extended 
indefinitely, even after the end of the Inter-American Coffee Agreement in 1948 
since the Federation still held significant volumes of coffee stock inventories that 
remained unliquidated (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p 79) and the levies remitted 
to the fund even expanded (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p 33). Between 1948 and 
1970, the Coffee Fund took on a more permanent nature because of the new 
coffee levies assigned to it (as explained previously, part of the coffee exchange 
rate differentials, ad valorem, and the retention duty), and a new contract was 
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 Provision in Clausula 1o(c), 1928 Contrato Celebrado entre el Gobierno Nacional y La 
Federación Nacional de Cafeteros en Desarrollo de la Ley 76 de 1927 (Gobierno Nacional del 
Colombia y La Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros, 1928). 
211
 Provision in Clausula 1o, Contrato Celebrado entre El Gobierno y La Federación de Cafeteros 
sobre Ejecución del Acuerdo de Cuotas (Gobierno Nacional del Colombia y La Federacion 
Nacional de Cafeteros, 1940). 
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 Provision in Clausula 4o, Contrato Celebrado entre El Gobierno y La Federación de Cafeteros 
sobre Ejecución del Acuerdo de Cuotas (Gobierno Nacional del Colombia y La Federacion 
Nacional de Cafeteros, 1940). 
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 Provision in Clausula 2a, Contrato Celebrado entre El Gobierno y La Federación de Cafeteros 
sobre Ejecución del Acuerdo de Cuotas (Gobierno Nacional del Colombia y La Federacion 
Nacional de Cafeteros, 1940). 
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drawn up in 1970. This was a contract for administering the Coffee Fund in light 
of the new regulatory functions – particularly the stabilisation of domestic prices.  
(Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p 78) 
From 1978 onwards, the two types of contracts were merged into one. With 
the abolition of the coffee levies that used to finance the ‘contract for services’, 
the contracts from then on related to the mobilisation of the Coffee Fund, 
particularly in light of its pronounced stabilisation function. The provisions on 
the sources and uses of the Coffee Fund in the 1978 contract give a good 
indication of the changes that this merging embodied. For one, the Coffee Fund 
was for the first time explicitly cast as a permanent facility established for the 
protection, defence and development of the coffee sector.
214
 Said contract 
stipulated that the coffee levies destined for the Fund were to be used by the 
Federation for operations that included: (1) buying and selling coffee at home 
and abroad; (2) facilitating the trading of coffee; (3) stockpiling coffee and 
conserving the inventories in good condition; and (4) investments in companies 
supportive of the coffee industry.
215
 In addition to these market-regulating 
interventions, the Federation was tasked with delivering a list of services that 
while more fleshed-out, did not really diverge much from those stipulated in 
earlier contracts.  The services included: (1) research and experimentation related 
to coffee cultivation, storage, and industrial uses; (2) promotion of good 
cultivation and technical practices, as well as those that improve the quality of 
life in the coffee zones; (3) promotion of programmes of diversification in the 
coffee zones; (4) the promotion of environmental conservation in the coffee 
zones; (5) the promotion of cooperatives as an instrument for the commercial 
activities of the Federation and in support of social needs of coffee communities; 
(6) the regulation of internal and external marketing of coffee; and (7) support 
for government initiatives with links to the sector, especially those related to 
transportation, and the prevention of the smuggling of coffee.
216
 In a nutshell, the 
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 Provision in Clausula Primera, Contrato Celebrado entre El Gobierno y La Federación de 
Cafeteros por la Administración del Fondo Nacional del Café (Gobierno Nacional del Colombia 
y La Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros, 1978). 
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 Provision in Clausula Cuarta, Contrato Celebrado entre El Gobierno y La Federación de 
Cafeteros por la Administración del Fondo Nacional del Café (Gobierno Nacional del Colombia 
y La Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros, 1978). 
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 Provision in Clausula Novena, Contrato Celebrado entre El Gobierno y La Federación de 
Cafeteros por la Administración del Fondo Nacional del Café (Gobierno Nacional del Colombia 
y La Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros, 1978). 
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key change embodied in the contracts from 1978 onwards was the prominence 
given to the marketing board operations of the Federation, and through these the 
mobilisation of the levies for the purposes of domestic price stabilisation. 
However, the required expenditures for fomenting production and enhancing 
producer welfare in the coffee sector were still in place, if expanded and cast in 
more specific terms than in the earlier contracts. 
While the contractual change described above represents an important shift in 
the parameters of fund mobilisation, what remained enduring and stable was the 
principle of the Federation having the sole right to mobilise the coffee levies 
within the limits of what benefitted the development and protection of the sector. 
In effect, these contracts codified the Federation's entitlements to rent streams 
associated with coffee levies. 
 
The tempering influence of the state 
Having said this, there were other key changes in the contracts, as they 
historically evolved, that reflected debates about the ‘public character’ of the 
Coffee Fund (and coffee levies), and related to this the mechanisms through 
which the state enforced fiscal accountability. The evolution of contractual 
provisions reflecting how the state figured in approving and auditing modes of 
levy mobilisation provides a good indication of this. In the 1928 contract, the 
FEDECAFE only needed to submit, for the Ministry of Industry’s approval, a 
plan articulating budgeted expenditures of the levies. But in the 1978 contract, 
the budget of the Coffee Fund needed both the approval of the National 
Committee of the FEDECAFE and the concurrence of the government through 
an executive decree issued by the President. Moreover, in the 1928 contract – 
and in effect until the 1968 contract – a governmental body overseeing financial 
institutions (La Superintendencia Bancaria) was tasked with verifying that the 
investments made of the funds were in accordance with the budget, and auditing 
financial transactions from any commercial operations. But from 1978 onwards, 
these oversight functions were transferred to an independent governmental body 
overseeing government funds (La Contraloria General de la Republica) – 
signalling the recognition of coffee levies as public funds. 
Junguito and Pizano  (1997, pp. 28-31) flag other changes in the contracts that 
signal an increasing role for state oversight of the coffee levies. For one, in the 
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1968 contract, the Federation was directed to provide information to the 
Colombian Monetary Board (La Junta Monetaria) about fund status and projects 
on both a monthly and annual basis, and to send all budgeted expenditures in 
foreign currencies to the Board – in a bid to widen the access of the government 
to information about the operations of the Federation. Both the 1978 and 1988 
contracts have provisions allowing the Ministry of Finance to hire two 
independent consultants to give advice to government on matters of coffee policy 
– again seen as a bid to lessen the dependence of the government on the 
Federation for technical information.  
All these give an indication of a key difference between coffee levies and 
coconut levies. In the Philippines, coconut levies were deemed as ‘owned by 
coconut producers’ in the Marcos administration’s decrees, and this was used as 
justification for their exemption from usual auditing procedures of public funds 
until Marcos was removed from power. In Colombia, the FEDECAFE were 
deputised to be the ‘administrator’ of the coffee levies, and their mobilisation 
subjected to state control and legally binding agreements that defined the 
parameters of the levies’ uses.  
In summary, the contracts between the government and the Federation had the 
effect of codifying the rent settlement associated with the coffee levies by 
effectively specifying: (1) the resources that the FEDECAFE was authorised to 
mobilise; (2) the allowed uses of all these resources; and (3) the means through 
which the power of the Federation to mobilise these resources was supervised 
and controlled. That is to say, these contracts formally inscribed the right of the 
FEDECAFE to the state-engineered rent streams associated with the collection of 
the coffee levies; and regulated these rights by articulating the limits of fund 
mobilisation, along with nodes of state control.  
 
Associational avenues for voice and legitimisation 
If the contracts celebrated between the Colombian government and the 
FEDECAFE lent to the stability of the Federation's claims on the rent settlement 
while at the same time enshrining some of the ways through which the state 
exercised control over its enforcement, the active associational life of the 
Federation could be interpreted as a means by which members of the Federation 
also had a place in regulating the rent settlement. Through a robust organisational 
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structure and processes for exercising voice and extracting accountability, and 
other means by which coffee producers influenced the rent settlement 'from 
below', coffee producers in Colombia played a significant role in shaping and 
enforcing the uses of the coffee levies, a role that coconut producers never had in 
the Philippines. 
 
Functioning organisational hierarchy 
Throughout the period of study, the FEDECAFE had a fully functioning 
organisational structure, counterpart evidence of which I did not find in the 
Philippine case. By ‘fully functioning’, I mean organisational processes that gave 
members the space to exercise voice and extract accountability from 
organisational leaders. Figure 6.1 depicts, in a simplified manner, the 
organisational hierarchy governing the Federation, a structure that has largely 
remained unchanged since the federation’s founding in 1927. 
 
Figure 6.1 Simplified organisational hierarchy: The FEDECAFE 
 
  
At the very top is the National Congress, constituted by two to six 
representatives – depending on the share in national production – elected by 
card-carrying members of the Federation in each of the 51 coffee-growing 
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departments in Colombia. The National Congress has been convened at least 
once a year, although it has also been extraordinarily called to session. In the 
National Congress, the  Federation's budget is debated and approved, as are plans 
for the major initiatives undertaken for the benefit of producers such as those 
outlined in the previous chapter (Junguito & Pizano, 1997, pp. 12-14).
217
   It also 
elects the Federation's General Manager and representative to the National 
Committee (Bentley & Baker, 2000, p. 4). 
But even the Federation's highest authority has a place for interventions by the 
state representatives. For example, from 1935 to 1989, the President of Colombia 
needed to approve all the agreements reached in the National Congress before 
they could be put into action. And until 1997, government representatives sitting 
in the Federation's  National Committee had a voice, though no vote in the 
National Congress.(Junguito & Pizano, 1997, p. 15) However, the National 
Congress was more a place of 'dialogue' between the government and members 
of the Federation, given that their role was consultative rather than decisive. 
Meanwhile, the National Committee comes next to the National Congress in 
the Federation's organisational hierarchy. It is composed of Federation and 
government representatives, and decides on key policy issues confronting the 
coffee sector nationally and internationally.  Some of their most important 
decisions related to the investment of coffee levies – for example the 
establishment of warehousing facilities, and the organisation of ALMACAFE; 
the creation of the Banco Cafetero – and  the management of the price bonanzas 
in 1956, 1977 and 1986, as well as the crisis of the 1990s.
218
   When the Coffee 
Fund was established, the National Committee became the most powerful body 
in all decisions related to the Fund.  
The composition of the National Committee – particularly the number of seats 
held by the government – has always been a subject of debate and underwent 
several changes throughout the period covered by my study. In 1928, the 
government held -only one in seven seats in the Committee. In 1935, the total 
number of seats was expanded to 10, with 5 members chosen by the National 
Congress and 5, by the government.  (Cárdenas & Partow, 1998, p. 7) The 
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 For a complete list of the major decisions made by the National Congress between 1927 to 
1997, refer to Junguito and Pizano (1997, pp 15-18) 
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1997, refer to Junguito and Pizano (1997, pp 18-20) 
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Federation regained the majority of the seats by 1958 (Cárdenas & Partow, 1998, 
p. 9), which is significant because this marks the start of the Fund's more 
pronounced stabilisation function. By 1997, the National Committee was 
constituted by 14 members, of which 8 were elected in the Federation's National 
Congress from candidates constituted by departmental representatives. (Junguito 
& Pizano, 1997, p. 18) However in that year, two non-voting representatives of 
the government – the two consultants of the Ministry of Finance noted in the first 
section of this chapter – were given permanent seats in the Committee. (Junguito 
and Pizano 1997, pp. 18, 28) Thorp (2000) has a comment on the change in the 
composition of the Committee in 1935 that might very well apply to the changes 
that happened down the line. She suggests that the Federation may have 
deliberately deployed the enlargement of the state's voice in the Committee as a 
means to achieve the following: (1) to increase the Federation management's 
ability to negotiate long-term solutions against the short-term instincts of the 
coffee producer members; and (2) to enhance the ascendancy of the Committee 
to coordinate coffee policy, and thereby place the Federation at the heart of the 
crafting of coffee policy. (Thorp, 2000, p. 18) However, Junguito and Pizano 
(1997, p. 29) suggest that in regard to the special seats given to independent 
consultants of the Ministry of Finance, the Federation indicated a level of 
'discomfort' at their perceived interference with the affairs of the association. 
Despite these tensions, Junguito and Pizano (1997, p. 31) nevertheless depict the 
Committee as generally having been an effective permanent forum for the 
coordination of coffee policy—determining among others, the internal support 
price and the rates of retention; and as having been largely effective at putting 
coffee policy above 'partisan politics'.   
The Executive Committee and the General Manager come next to the National 
Committee in the organisational hierarchy. In general, they are responsible for 
the execution of plans approved in the National Congress. The Executive 
Committee is constituted by the representatives of the Federation in the National 
Committee. They organise the work of the departmental committees; authorise 
the permanent investments of the Federation's own resources; prepare and adopt 
the budget of the Federation and approve the planned budgets of the 
Departmental Committees. (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p. 20)  
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Meanwhile, the Federation's General Manager oversees the day-to-day 
operations of the Federation in the execution of the plans approved by the 
National Committee and the Executive Committee. The Manager is tasked with 
keeping the National Committee informed of the market conditions and sectoral 
situation;  proposing policies for key issues confronting the sector; representing 
the Colombian government in international fora related to coffee, like the 
International Coffee Organisation.  The Manager also plays a mediating or 
bridging role between the government and the association. He/she is chosen from 
a list prepared by the National Committee, and needs to be elected by two-thirds 
of the National Congress.  The government has a veto power in the preparation 
of the list, but not the election. Throughout the Federation's 80-year history, it 
has only had eight General Managers – a fact often cited as having a stabilising 
effect, assuring continuity and a steady hand in the implementation of relevant 
coffee policies. (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, pp. 21-22) 
Finally, forming the core of the decentralised aspects of the Federation's 
associational life are the Departmental and Municipal Committees.  
Departmental Committees are operational in all 15 departmental capitals that 
produce at least 2 per cent of national production. These committees are 
composed of 6 members elected by card-carrying members of the Federation, 
and organise and implement the work of the Federation at the local level. They 
are convened regularly, are at the forefront of implementing investments in social 
goods and rural infrastructure in the coffee zone, and intervene actively in the 
formation of cooperatives. I have already shown in Chapter 4 (Table 4.4) that 
they played a very important role in the associational life by directly controlling 
a significant portion of the Federation's budget:  from 1975 to 1997, transfers to 
these committees accounted for more than half of the Federation’s appropriated 
expenditures. In general, these committees exercise a significant degree of 
autonomy to the extent that they are assured a share of the coffee levies through 
their statutory shares in tax on low-grade coffee, exchange rate differentials and 
the ad valorem tax. That is to say local leaders do not need to lobby with national 
leaders of the Federation for a share of the resources because their percentage 
shares in these resources are inscribed in law. Aside from these shares, they also 
receive extraordinary transfers from the Federation, proof of which I have shown 
in the previous chapter: that the budget appropriated to these committees was 
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typically higher than their statutory shares in the coffee levies. Moreover, they 
also get revenue streams from the internal coffee sales undertaken by the 
Federation, aside from income from their own investments. (Junguito and 
Pizano, 1997, p. 23) In comparison to Departmental Committees, Municipal 
Committees – composed of 6 elected members in municipalities within coffee-
growing departments – are not as dynamic, given that they do not proportionately 
control the same breadth of resources as the Departmental Committees. At the 
Municipal level, cooperatives are more visible than these committees. (Junguito 
and Pizano, 1997, p. 24) However, this does not detract from the general point 
that the Departmental Committees constituted a vital part of the organisational 
hierarchy and being fully functional, something that finds not parallel in the 
Philippines.  
 
Control 'from below': means and limits 
But the even bigger point to make is that avenues of associational life available 
to members of the FEDECAFE may be interpreted as a means by which they 
regulated the rent settlement, or controlled it 'from below'.  Through their 
Federation, coffee producers have recourse to predictable and regular 
organisational processes for exercising voice and extracting accountability. For 
example, elections of representatives are an integral aspect of associational life in 
the Federation. ‘Coffee elections’ are held in municipalities and departments to 
choose local-level committee members. In 2010, 214,000 producers – 
representing a participation rate of 65 per cent – took part in elections where they 
chose 364 municipal and 180 principal and alternate members of Departmental 
Committees from about 14,000 candidates. (Federación Nacional de Cafeteros, 
2011, p. 21) Meanwhile, members of these committees then elected delegates to 
the National Congress. National Congress representatives chose the Federation’s 
representatives to the National Committee and the General Manager. 
Organisational bylaws define the term limits of these representatives, to whom 
members delegated the authority to decide on the Federation’s strategic 
priorities, the budget of the Federation and the Coffee Fund. 
Aside from participation in elections, there is evidence for members’ exercise 
of voice in the choice of spending priorities. I have already noted the significant 
portion of the budget that is directly appropriated to Departmental Committees – 
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thus departmental expenditures could be construed to directly reflect the social 
demands of coffee producers on the ground. Bentley and Baker (2000, p. 6) 
provide another good example: the case of the Federation’s work in research and 
development. They relate how, through extension agents, the Federation annually 
administers a questionnaire designed to ascertain the ‘research demands’ of 
coffee producers. The information they generate is then submitted to the National 
Congress and used a basis for the annual research plan of the CENICAFE.  
The existence of avenues of participation like elections and mechanisms for 
the exercise of voice in the spending priorities of the Federation – all of which 
were crucially absent in the comparator case, the Philippines –provided the 
Federation with the means to broadly construct a narrative of democratic 
participation and representation. This was important for two reasons. On one 
hand, this narrative was important for establishing the legitimacy of the 
Federation to represent levy contributors in negotiations with the state about the 
uses of coffee levies and the surplus from marketing operations. On the other 
hand, it lent to fostering loyalty among members – an insight from Thorp (2000) 
– which I have explained was crucial for the Federation to fulfil its regulatory 
functions in the market for coffee. 
However, the extent to which steering and enforcement of the rent settlement 
was participatory should not be overestimated. For one, it must be emphasized 
that the most important use of the coffee levies – embodied in the use of the 
Coffee Fund as a means for the stabilisation of domestic prices – was steered by 
the National Committee, which was constituted by both elected representatives 
of the Federation and appointed representatives of the state. While the Federation 
had a majority of seats in this body for a long time, I have also explained how 
state functionaries had an increasing role in this Committee. However, as argued 
by Thorp (2000), the Federation’s willingness to include the state in this 
important node of rent settlement regulation could be construed as a deliberate 
strategy by higher echelons of the Federation’s management to see through the 
delicate calculus of tending to the short-term social demands of the members and 
asking them to make long-term sacrifices for the exigencies of price stabilisation.  
The more serious questions about the extent and nature of coffee producer 
participation in the associational life of the Federation are to be found in 
historical work by scholars like Koffman (1969) and Palacios (1980).  Koffman 
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(1969, pp. 187-190) asked whether the ‘local leaders’ of the Federation were 
primarily coffee growers. He found anecdotal evidence in some coffee 
departments showing that elected Municipal and Departmental committee 
members were also professionals, local politicians and businessmen – although 
he concedes that they were also coffee growers, only that they were only 
secondarily so. Both Palacios and Koffman underscore the power of the 
Federation as emanating not from its membership, but its working as a ‘top-
down’ ‘semi-officialised bureaucracy.’ Even Thorp (2000, pp. 12-13) suggests 
that decision-making processes in the Federation were “never notable for their 
degree of consultation”; the organisational culture, “never participatory as this is 
understood today”. She describes the organisational culture as “hierarchical, in a 
patron-client mode”, applying to the position of the general manager, enjoying a 
position of authority within and beyond the federation; to members of the 
National Coffee Committee, comprising notable regional coffee personalities, 
managed by the general manager but wielding power in the regions; to relations 
between national, regional, and local committees; and to the relations of small 
producers to their local committees. (Thorp 2000, p 13) These observations 
should temper glowing accounts of the extent to which coffee producers directly 
controlled the rent settlement from below and constrains us from concluding that 
practice of voice and accountability explains differences in the rent settlement 
that obtained in Colombia and the Philippines.  
 
A role in determining coffee policy 
Although the influence of the FEDECAFE in shaping macroeconomic policy in 
Colombia has waned with the declining economic importance of the sector 
towards the end of the 20
th
 century (See Eslava  Mel ndez, 2009; Jaramillo et 
al., 1999; Junguito, 1996 for elaborations on this theme.), for a good part of the 
century – soon after the establishment of the Federation in 1927 up until the 
coffee export market was deregulated in 1989 – the Federation had considerable 
clout in the determination of macroeconomic policies in Colombia. Aside from 
sector-specific policies, the Federation also had a strong influence in the shape of 
Colombia's foreign exchange rate policy, which obviously affects the price of 
coffee as an export commodity.  These policies affecting coffee prices could be 
construed as mechanisms for enforcing the rent settlement associated with coffee 
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levies to the extent that they could be activated as levers for mediating the 
relationship between external and domestic coffee prices or the distribution of 
coffee income through the ups and downs of the coffee commodity cycle. 
Managing this relationship was at the heart of stabilisation, which in turn 
represented the most important goal of the mobilisation of Coffee Fund 
resources.  This is to say that aside from the role vested upon the FEDECAFE as 
a monopsonistic buyer of domestic coffee stocks, its power to shape the state 
policies that reinforced the goals of stabilisation for its producer members is 
indicative of the Federation's rent-regulating role, which again finds no 
resonance in the Philippine case. 
In this the final section of the chapter, I will explain the two most important 
ways by which the FEDECAFE crafted and/or influenced the shape of the 
policies affecting coffee prices, and through these, controlled the distribution of 
producer income in the coffee sector. First, they directly crafted coffee pricing 
policy through the official roles they were given in the governmental bodies that 
were responsible for articulating and enforcing these policies. Second, they 
influenced macroeconomic policy through the channels that tied them to the 
executive branch of government as well as to the most powerful economic 
councils shaping macroeconomic policy in Colombia. 
 
The power to determine coffee prices 
The role given to the Federation's National Committee, which I have signalled to 
be an organisational arena in which the state influence increased over the years, 
but in which the Federation retained majority seats, is a good indication of the 
extent of the power of the federation to shape coffee pricing policy. 
Junguito and Pizano (1997, pp 332-336) document the historical evolution of 
the system of guaranteed floor prices; and based on their analysis of the laws 
governing this evolution, the Federation always played a central role in 
determining the minimum support price. They point out that the system of 
guaranteed floor prices in which the FEDECAFE figured prominently was first 
decreed in 1955 -- Decreto 332 de febrero 15 de 1955 -- a law that directed all 
buying agents to purchase coffee at a fixed set of prices for five different quality-
based 'types' of coffee: café trillado, tipo maragogipe, pergamino limpio 
Federacion, pergamino corriente, pergamino inferior al corriente.  The law 
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further stipulated that the FEDECAFE was to guarantee a set of prices applied to 
these types of coffee at higher – by no more than 10 percent – rates than the fixed 
minimum set applied to the purchases of private individual buying agents, and 
that the Federation's purchase at these rates were to be backed by Treasury. 
Junguito and Pizano (1997, p. 334) explain that the government believed that 
potential losses from the Federation's buying operations that it was effectively 
guaranteeing could be recuperated from the export taxes collected. The 
Federation was empowered to fully determine any changes to these minimum 
prices. In 1967, the system was simplified and the floor price was fixed only for 
one type of coffee, called the 'federation type', a mark of good quality. Under the 
Estatuto Cambiario de marzo de 1967, this minimum price was to be guaranteed 
by the Coffee Fund, and at a rate determined by a committee composed of the 
ministers of Finance and Agriculture, as well as the general manager of the 
FEDECAFE. (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, pp 334-336) This committee is still in 
place today, having been carried over in the new law – Ley  9 de 1991 – 
governing  coffee levies after the end of an international regime of regulated 
world exports of coffee.  While the establishment of this committee suggests that 
the floor prices were from then on jointly determined by the government and the 
Federation, Junguito and Pizano (1997, p. 336) suggest that in reality it was the 
Federation's National Committee that still determined the prices, and the rates 
were just referred to the committee for approval. 
As with the determination of the minimum support price, the Federation's 
National Committee also played a significant role in setting retention duties, 
which I have earlier pointed out as the most important form of coffee taxation 
since 1958 until it was folded into the contribucion cafetera in 1991. Junguito 
and Pizano's (1997, p. 250-253) depiction of the evolution of legal norms 
governing this coffee levy helps substantiate this point. According to them, 
Decreto Legislativo 102 de abril de 1958, the law that put the duty in place 
stipulated that the Federation's National Committee had the power to modify the 
rate of retention, with the approval of the Ministry of Finance. Later, in 1958, the 
rate of retention was fixed by law – Ley 1a de enero de 1959 – at 15 per cent, but 
could be re-adjusted by the government with the approval of the Federation's 
National Committee and an inter-agency council, the Comite Nacional de 
Politica Economica y Social (CONPES), of which the Federation was the only 
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member from the private sector.   In 1960, there were was greater room for 
flexibility in setting the retention duty when a law – Ley 81 de 1960 – was passed 
to amend the 1959 law and authorised the government to determine the rate but 
again with the approval of the National Committee. This was in effect until 1965, 
when a new law was passed – Decreto Legislativo 2322 de 1965 – that did not 
specify that rates of retention required the concurrence of the Federation's 
committee. However, this lasted only for two years and by the time a new law 
was passed governing retention duties in 1967 – Decreto Ley 444 de 1967 – the 
power to approve the retention duty was returned to the National Committee, a 
power they retained until the duty was abolished and folded into the contribucion 
cafetera in 1991.  
With the power to determine the minimum support price and rate of retention, 
the  Federation was then both a commercial agent in – involved in trading 
operations as a marketing board – and a regulator of the coffee market, a dual 
function that Ramirez et al  (2002, p. 117) note as being conflictual. The role 
they played in the determination of the support price – which involved 
processing information about world market conditions – implied that the 
Federation had priority access to market intelligence that they could use to the 
disadvantage of other private agents. Meanwhile, their influence in the setting of 
retention duty rates meant that they also had a means to regulate the 
accumulation of the Coffee Fund's most important asset: the coffee inventories. 
Their role in these policies thus embody not just the technical function of 
regulating coffee markets, but also embeds significant political powers: they 
were means for shoring up the power of the Federation as a commercial operator 
in the coffee market, and for enhancing the value of the Fund they then had the 
power to leverage and mobilise. 
 
Power beyond the coffee sector 
The powers that the Federation exercised in relation to the crafting and 
articulation of state policies went beyond those that affected only the fortunes of 
the coffee sector. This was inevitable because of the economic position of coffee 
as Colombia's top export for much of the twentieth century. This position implied 
that policies affecting coffee prices ultimately had ripple effects on the general 
price levels (inflation) and the price of foreign currency (foreign exchange rates).  
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The power the Federation exerted over these macroeconomic variables came in 
two forms: indirect and direct. The indirect power relates to the consequences of 
Federation-crafted policies that were specific to the coffee sector but nevertheless 
influenced the comportment and/or management of these variables. The direct 
power relates to the influence they exercised over foreign exchange policy, as 
well as in broader development strategies.  
The indirect power of the Federation over the management of inflation is most 
evident during periods of rising external coffee prices. Junguito and Pizano 
(1997, pp 360-362) explain some of the mechanisms through which periods of 
coffee price bonanzas affected general price levels. All things being equal, they 
could lead to inflationary pressures through their expansionary effect on 
aggregate demand, particularly when the price increase leads to increased real 
producer incomes. They could also be inflationary when the increased foreign 
exchange earnings expand the country's reserves, and through that its monetary 
base, and is unaccompanied by an appreciation of the domestic currency. 
Following this, there are two important ways in which the Federation helps 
manage inflation in Colombia. First, by seeing to the use of the minimum 
support price as a countercyclical tool – in particular by transferring the windfall 
from periods of rising external prices to the Fund, rather than producers – the 
Federation helps decrease the inflationary pressures of rising coffee prices via the 
aggregate demand channel. Second, by allowing the windfall to be saved in the 
Fund or in bonds issues by the Central Bank, they prevent the expansion of the 
monetary base. (Junguito and Pizano, 1997, p 362). 
Meanwhile, Jaramillo et al (1999) write of the Federation's indirect influence 
over foreign exchange policy and a way by which the Federation may be 
interpreted to contributing to the ability of the Colombian state to manage 
rationally foreign exchange movements. In particular, because the Federation had 
the power to control some of the policies that determined the income of 
producers – particularly through the system of guaranteed support price and 
retention duty rates – the Colombian government had the space to pursue an 
exchange rate policy that curtailed some of the windfall of extraordinary external 
price increases. That is to say, the Federation concentrated on non-exchange rate 
related variables to influence the coffee income distribution policy. Jaramillo et 
al observe that in the period 1962-1991, when the Federation's ability to perform 
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regulatory functions was at its peak, the Federation did not resist the real 
appreciation of the peso.
219
  
However, in periods of falling external coffee prices, the Federation also 
successfully lobbied for devaluation – an example of the direct way coffee 
producers shaped macroeconomic policies. Bates (1997, pp. 64-67) provides an 
account of how the Federation did this in the aftermath of the Great Depression 
in the 1930s. In the face of falling external coffee prices, the depreciation of the 
national currency would mean that the fall in local currency prices could be 
partly cushioned relative to the fall in dollar prices. The government obviously 
initially bucked the call because it would have meant an increase in the cost of 
repaying its dollar-denominated public debts. The situation for the sector was 
aggravated by the fact that this was all happening under a regime of fixed 
exchange rates, at a level that represented an overvaluation of the currency. In 
response to this situation, the Federation formed a delegation to lobby the 
Ministry of Finance, Chamber of Deputies and Office of the President. They 
pressed their demands through meetings with the press and leaders of the 
political parties. Bates suggests that it was due to the sustained pressure of the 
Federation that the government relented. By 1934, the official exchange rate had 
converged to the market rate. Bates' depiction of the power of the Federation to 
influence exchange rate policies during times of crises is echoed by Junguito 
(1996) in his analysis of how the government managed periods that were adverse 
for coffee producers. For example, in the period of 1956-1968, which was 
characterised by falling external coffee prices, the government managed the 
foreign exchange situation through measures that devalued the currency, 
including: the elimination of multiple exchange rates in 1957, the nominal 
devaluation of the currency in 1962, and the establishment of a crawling peg 
system in 1967.(Junguito, 1996, p. 10) The recourse to a currency  devaluation to 
help sustain the real income of coffee producers also happened in the period 
1980-1985, when the coffee sector faced a crisis not because of falling external 
prices, but in the aftermath of the generalised economic crisis in the region, 
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 In contrast, by the end of 1991, when further adjustments to non-exchange rate variables were 
rendered impossible with the breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement, the Federation 
became more resistant to currency revaluation. This concern was raised in 1993, when the Coffee 
Fund balances had already deteriorated. By 1996, the Federation was openly opposing 
appreciation, casting it as the" most serious threat" to the coffee industry (Jaramillo et al., 1999, 
p. 13). 
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kicked off by the Mexican debt crisis. (Junguito, 1996, p. 16) Junguito (1996) 
thus concludes that these indicate how the Federation was successful at 
demanding currency devaluation during periods of crisis. 
As a final point, the direct influence of the Federation on policies with 
macroeconomy-wide consequences is also shown by the concrete channels it had 
access to and through which it was linked to arenas of 'high politics'. The 
Federation's General Manager has been described as Colombia's "second most 
powerful man", because of his direct access to the President and Finance 
Minister. (Urrutia, 1983, p. 116) Urrutia also emphasizes that the FEDECAFE 
also had the distinction of being the only private sector group represented in the 
most important advisory councils in Colombia:  one coordinating economic and 
social policy (Consejo Nacional de Politica Economica y Social), the other trade 
policy (Consejo Superior de Comercio Exterior). Another way of demonstrating 
the coffee sector's direct influence on macroeconomic policy is suggested by 
Jaramillo et al (1999), who examine the regional origins of Ministers of Finance 
and Governors of the Central Bank in Colombia from 1930-1998. They find that 
the coffee growing departments, which account for less than 25 per cent of the 
national population, have accounted for 42 per cent of all of the Ministers of 
Finance Colombia has ever had, and 40 per cent of Governors of the Central 
Bank.  
 
Conclusion 
I have laid out in this chapter the final piece of the Colombian counterpoint to the 
Philippine case study: the ways by which the FEDECAFE – and through them, 
the coffee producers – shaped, controlled and enforced the rent settlement. In this 
chapter, I explained the key features in the regulation of the rent settlement that 
show how FEDECAFE played a more decisive role in regulating the rent than 
COCOFED. First, the codification of FEDECAFE’s right to mobilise the coffee 
levies and the rent streams obtaining proved to be more stable, and less a subject 
of presidential prerogative that it was in the Philippines, where presidential 
orders – both those made under an authoritarian and democratic conditions – 
were prone to reversal and manipulation. Second, coffee producers had access to 
associational avenues that were not available to coconut producers in the 
Philippines. A working organisational hierarchy, and regularised processes and 
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predictable arenas for the exercise of voice, performed at the very least, the 
function of legitimising the FEDECAFE as the representative of coffee producers 
in Colombia, a status never achieved in the Philippines – although it does not 
completely explain the differences in the rent settlement that obtained. Third, 
while the state had a means to define the limits of the Federation's power and 
articulate the exigencies of economy-wide developmental objectives, the 
Federation was at the heart of the making of coffee policy – playing a role that 
was never obtained by the Coconut Federation in the Philippines. The 
articulation of the FEDECAFE's – and by extension the coffee producers – 
indirect and direct power over the determination of both sector-specific pricing 
policies and economy-wide macroeconomic policies has very important 
implications about the enforcement of the rent settlement associated with coffee 
levies in Colombia. With the economic fortunes of the sector deeply implicated 
with that of the country's, the FEDECAFE acquired the political muscle to see 
through the mobilisation of coffee levies with the interests of the sector at heart. 
Through the direct means of influencing both coffee pricing policies and 
macroeconomic variables affecting the distribution of coffee incomes, the 
Federation also had the means of enforcing the desired ends of this rent 
settlement: the stabilisation and maximisation of producer income through the 
ups and downs of the coffee commodity cycle. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I set out to contribute to an understanding of some of the 
political conditions that allowed for the emergence of production-promoting 
state-engineered rents, proceeding from an analytical framework critical of the 
conclusions of neo-classical economic models of rent-seeking220, and sympathetic 
to literature cognizant of the potential role state-mediated rents may play in 
addressing specific challenges of late development.221 Towards this end, I 
investigated an institutional framework deployed by the state ostensibly to 
develop key agricultural export sectors in Colombia and the Philippines, which 
are two middle-income economies that have largely failed to launch dynamic 
development trajectories against the metric of successful late development set by 
East Asian tigers. The institutional framework effectively deputised private 
agents with the authority to extract, regulate and use state-engineered rents: it 
authorised the associations of Colombian coffee producers (FEDECAFE) and 
Philippine coconut producers (COCOFED) to mobilise resources generated 
through the use of the state’s coercive power to tax:  levies paid by the producers.  
The Philippine ‘coconut story’ would seem to confirm the worst predictions of 
neo-classical economics’ models of rent-seeking and its developmental 
consequences. In particular, coconut levies in the Philippines and the 
participation of the COCOFED in their mobilisation are associated with negative 
accounts of rent capture.222 Private gains were captured by the leaders of the 
federation and associates of President Ferdinand Marcos, who legislated the 
collection of the levies under Martial Law in the Philippines. These gains were at 
the expense of depressed producer incomes.223 But, the Colombian ‘coffee story’ 
flouts the same predictions. The coffee levies in Colombia and the participation 
of the FEDECAFE in their mobilisation are associated with positive outcomes, 
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 As surveyed in Chapter 1, the classic works on these are Krueger (1975) and Posner (1975). 
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 As surveyed in Chapter 1, these include literature on the developmental state in East Asia 
(Amsden, 1989; Amsden and Hikino, 1994; and Wade, 1990); on alternative lenses with which to 
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2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005a, 2005b); and the role of state-mediated rents in engendering stable 
and peaceful conditions for production (North et al, 2007; Putzel and di John, 2009)   
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 See for example, Aquino (1999); Manapat (1991); Parreño (2003); Hawes (1997); Boyce 
(1993) – all of which I surveyed in Chapter 1. 
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 See for example, Clarete and Roumasset (1983); Intal and Power (1990) – all of whom I 
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such as growth-enhancing investments in coffee production and marketing224 and 
welfare improvements in the lives of coffee producers.225  I sought to explain 
these contending outcomes by looking at an important variation in the political 
organisation of rent-seeking in Colombia and the Philippines: whereas 
FEDECAFE directly mediated the rent settlement between the state and the 
producers; COCOFED shared this role with individual political agents from 
outside the sector. I then deployed a research strategy that sought to locate the 
basis of this variation in political economy; and its implications on the rent 
settlement that obtained. In a nutshell, I sought to answer three empirical 
questions. To explore the basis of the variation, I asked the ‘political economy 
question’: ‘What can a historical view of political economy teach us about the 
variation in the power exercised by Colombian coffee producers and Philippine 
coconut producers in the determination and regulation of rent streams?’ To 
explore the implications of the variation, I asked two interrelated questions: ‘the 
rent settlement question’: ‘What are the key features of the rent settlement 
associated with coffee levies in Colombia and coconut levies in the Philippines, 
in terms of the mobilisation of the levies, the associated rent entitlements and the 
claimants to these?’ and the ‘regulatory question’: ‘To what extent did the 
producers associations shape the rent settlement in these countries?’  
In the first section of this concluding chapter, I will synthesize my key 
findings on these three questions. As I have already summarised the country-
specific findings in each of the concluding sections of Chapters 2 to 6, the focus 
of the synthesis here will be on the comparative insights generated by my 
research. In the second section, I will explore the significance of these findings, 
as well as the methodological approach that I developed to research the 
developmental impact of state-engineered rents in terms of their theoretical 
implications and an agenda for further research that is suggested by my work. 
Here I will situate my work in the theoretical terrain involving the study of the 
‘politics of rents’, and suggest an agenda for research within this terrain utilising 
the analytical lens of ‘sectoral rent settlements’. 
                                                 
224
 See Junguito and Pizano (1991, 1997); Thorp (2000); and Bates (1997).  . 
225
 See Thomas (1985); Grievance (2002); and Bentley and Baker (2000) -- works I surveyed in 
Chapter 1. 
  
242 
 
On the ‘power and the peril' of producers associations seeking rents 
By answering the questions of ‘political economy’, ‘rent settlement’ and 
‘regulation’ – as described above – I sought to offer a political lens through 
which to dissect the experience of two producers associations in securing rights 
to and mobilising rent streams. Below, I synthesize my findings, with a focus on 
the implications of the comparative empirical evidence I generated in the course 
of my research on the developmental consequences of state-engineered rents 
being allocated to and mobilised by producers associations. 
 
On the power of producers and the possibilities for collective action 
The set of evidence that I gathered in researching the ‘political economy 
question’ reveals the conditions governing the exercise of organisational power, 
the prospects for producer collective action, and the establishment of the rent 
settlements in Colombia and the Philippines.  
The economic base of power of FEDECAFE was stronger than that of 
COCOFED. For one, the coffee sector generated the single most important 
stream of foreign exchange revenues for much of the twentieth century in 
Colombia. While coconut exports were also important in the Philippine context, 
they were never as dominant over such a long period of time. Moreover, while 
both sectors have been characterised by smallholding production, coffee 
producers had a more significant land base, in terms of land size and ownership. 
Conditions for producers’ collective action were also more encouraging in 
Colombia than the Philippines. The initial terms with which Colombian coffee 
producers engaged in international trade required them to band together to solve 
bottlenecks in production that inhibited their competitiveness. In contrast, the 
Philippine coconut export sector was established and indeed flourished under 
conditions that did not require them to compete: privileged access to a protected 
market by a former coloniser, the US. 
Finally, the variations in the political origins of the rent settlement associated 
with the levies – particularly characteristics of the original coalition that backed 
the settlement when first established – hint at the broader political constrains that 
conditioned the ability of producers associations to shape the rent settlement. In 
Colombia, it was a coalition of Conservative local politicians and coffee growers 
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and businessmen in the smallholding coffee regions, whose goal of political 
stability was virtuously aligned and linked with fostering production in these 
regions. In the Philippines, an authoritarian president’s ambition to consolidate 
his political base, which governed the establishment of the rent settlement in 
coconuts, did not rely on enhancing production, just on giving limited access to 
rent streams to his chosen associates. Moreover, Colombian coffee producers 
were the central fulcrum in the original coalition that saw to the establishment of 
the institutional framework for levy collection.  The Conservative local 
politicians in Colombia needed their support in ways that Marcos did not require 
the political support of coconut producers in the Philippines. 
In general, the conditions in Colombia led to a more politically powerful and 
robustly organised producers’ association, in a rent settlement that from the 
beginning was backed by a coalition whose political goals were virtuously 
aligned with the goals of enhancing coffee production. In the Philippines, 
conditions led to an association with a comparatively weaker economic base, 
whose incentives for collective action were dampened by the colonial legacies of 
the US and whose access to the rent settlement was governed by the 
particularistic goals of an authoritarian president, which in turn were not 
crucially dependent on enhancing the productive capacity of the coconut sector.  
These findings suggest the difficulties of replicating the Colombian ‘coffee 
story’ both in other sectors in Colombia, but also in other developing countries. 
The historical specificities that underpin the power of FEDECAFE and the 
developmental potential of the rent settlement it figured in are difficult to 
replicate – particularly, the dominant role the sector played in terms of 
generating export earnings, and conditions in political economy that allow for the  
serendipitous alignment of the productive and political goals of the coalition 
backing the settlement. These also warn about the ease with which the Philippine 
‘coconut story’ could be replicated within national political economy contexts 
where political organisations play a less significant role in intermediating and 
articulating interests. However, the political challenge for economic development 
here is not the eradication of rents but an understanding of sectors where, 
because of the configuration of organisational power and political interests, 
robust producers organisations could be expected to shape rent settlements 
around productive goals. 
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On variations in the rent settlement and its regulation 
The set of evidence that I gathered in researching the ‘rent settlement question’ 
confirms my proposition that the same institutional arrangement, which allowed 
private agents to appropriate public power and thereby access rent streams, 
yielded different rent settlements. By closely analysing audit reports and court 
documents in the Philippines, and published secondary data on coffee levies and 
their uses in Colombia, I showed the two important ways in which the rent 
settlements varied: first, in terms of the claimants, second, in terms of the 
governing logic of rent mobilisation. In Colombia but not in the Philippines: 
producers from the sector contributing the levies were the chief claimants of the 
rent settlement; and the enhancement of productive capacity was the governing 
logic of rent mobilisation. 
In Colombia, I showed that levies were historically used to address specific 
production bottlenecks, and to provide goods enhancing the welfare of coffee 
producers. But the chief use of the levies has been to stabilise producer income 
through interventions in the domestic and international markets, with 
FEDECAFE engaging in the buying and selling operations characteristic of a 
marketing board. The rents from marketing board operations were used for the 
coffee producers to weather the cyclical peaks and troughs of international coffee 
prices.  They were also used in investments, but mostly undertaken to strengthen 
the capacity of FEDECAFE to perform its regulatory functions in the coffee 
markets.  
In contrast, the rent settlement associated with coconut levies was 
characterised by significant re-distributive transfers benefitting agents outside of 
the sector, in modes of rent mobilisation ungoverned by the logic of enhancing 
production in the sector. These transfers were effected through both legal and 
illegal uses of the levies. A significant portion of re-distributive transfers were 
captured by a presidential associate, who did not only obtain purposively 
allocated rent transfers, but was also able to accumulate capital by leveraging his 
authority to control the levies.  Meanwhile, COCOFED also enjoyed access to 
rent streams that were relatively thinner than what FEDECAFE had access to. 
But, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that COCOFED acted in the best 
interests of its members and systematically ploughed back rents it had access to 
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in order to enhance the productive capacity of the sector. The welfare and 
productivity programmes represented a miniscule portion of levies disbursed, 
tainted by charges of corruption. The bank that was set-up to provide credit to 
farmers became the node for administering a monopoly that extracted surplus 
from them. Coconut levies were also similarly used – if in a less transparent, 
more cumbersome process than in Colombia – to shore up concentrated market 
power in the industrial end of the sector. But rents generated therein, again unlike 
in Colombia, were not used to stabilise producer income. Finally, this rent 
settlement is associated with a deal that generated the most value of all 
investments made of the levies: shares of stocks in a blue-chip corporation. 
While coconut producers bore most – if not all – of the burden of this investment, 
their rights to the returns were something they had to contest in the end. 
Meanwhile, the set of evidence that I gathered from researching the 
‘regulatory question’ provides insights about a potential political explanation for 
the variations in the rent settlements that obtained from similarly designed 
institutions. By analysing the means through which the respective rent 
settlements were determined and enforced in Colombia and the Philippines – as 
reflected in relevant presidential decrees and court documents in the Philippines; 
and contracts governing the coffee levies as well as an original reading of the 
relevant secondary literature – I showed that FEDECAFE had a more stable base 
from which to decisively shape the rent settlement than COCOFED.  
In Colombia, the coffee producers’ claims on the rent settlement were 
embodied in contracts, subjected to bargaining between, and signed by, 
FEDECAFE and the state. These claims were transparent and the assignment of 
rights was stable. In the Philippines, these were embodied in presidential decrees 
and/or executive orders subjected to bargaining between COCOFED, other 
intermediary interests and the state.  These claims were so tenuous that the 
courts, under the period of democratic transition in the Philippines, ruled that it 
was the state and not the producers that ultimately had rights to the levies and 
resources generated from their mobilisation.  
In both periods of authoritarian rule and of formal democracy in the 
Philippines, it was executive authority articulated by the president that proved 
decisive in regulating the rent settlement. The presidential decrees during the 
time of Marcos performed the same regulatory function as the executive orders 
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issued by the succession of presidents after him. The only difference is that 
executive orders under the democratic period were underpinned by negotiations 
of the state with both new claimants to the rent settlement – constituted by highly 
factionalised coconut producer groups and their political backers from outside 
the coconut sectors – and the beneficiaries of the settlement under Marcos. These 
negotiations, and the executive orders that they produced, mirrored a ‘division of 
spoils’ among the claimants and in regard to the coconut levy-funded assets with 
continuing value, but no clear indication of how the ‘spoils’ were to be used to 
incentivise production.  
In contrast, while state control was also exercised in the regulation of the rent 
settlement in Colombia, FEDECAFE was able to steer the rent settlement around 
the goals of production. FEDECAFE’s working organisational hierarchy and the 
associational avenues it offered for the exercise of voice and the extraction of 
accountability provided coffee producers with the means to practice direct 
authority over the rent settlement. Moreover, I also showed how FEDECAFE 
exercised direct and indirect influence in the determination of coffee pricing and 
macroeconomic policies.  This aided in the enforcement of a key objective of the 
rent settlement: the stabilisation and maximisation of producer income through 
the ups and downs of the coffee commodity cycle. 
The comparative views I proffer on the rent settlement associated with coconut 
levies in the Philippines and coffee levies in Colombia, and the role that 
producers associations played in their regulation, reveal ‘the power and the peril’ 
of state-engineered rents, and of producers association seeking them. 
The perils of state-engineered rents for the prospects of development may well 
be borne out in polities where producers groups are too politically weak to 
promote the productive use of rents – this is what is revealed by the Philippine 
case.  But the Colombian case illustrates the striking possibilities for 
development where producers associations operate under conditions where their 
authority to mobilise rents is backed by political power. In such a setting, the 
collective goals of the sector, as articulated by the FEDECAFE, motivated the 
uses of the rent In the Philippines there was a constant tension between 
particularistic goals (of the brokers and political leaders) and those of the sector. 
The weakness of COCOFED in the Philippine political economy meant that the 
particularistic goals of political entrepreneurs won out in the end. 
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Moreover,  access to rents secured by producers associations aids in building 
conditions for a polity where interest articulation is done by producer groups 
rather than intermediary individual agents. While my analysis of the political 
economy conditions would seem to suggest that FEDECAFE was, as also 
suggested by Schneider (2004) ‘born strong’, they were also made strong by the 
access they had to the coffee levies, and more crucially, by their use of the same 
for productive ends. 
Finally, the participation of producers associations in regulating the 
mobilisation of state-engineered rents may help build developmental capacities 
of the state. For example, in Colombia, it helped build the capacity of the 
Colombian state to coordinate production goals in the coffee sector. It also led to 
the establishment of long-lived private organisation with parastatal functions, 
thereby shoring up the capacities of Colombia’s agro-bureaucracy. In the 
Philippines, neither state capacity nor long-lived organisations arose as the rent 
settlement was underpinned by dyadic negotiations between political 
entrepreneurs and the state. Also, as a result of the state’s direct links with the 
coffee sector through the coffee producers association, the rent settlement was 
inscribed within the framework of a time-bound contract that shored up 
capacities for state monitoring of rent outcomes in Colombia. In the Philippines, 
the rent framework rested on the wheeling and dealing of power brokers and the 
practice of the politics of privilege by the executive. 
 
On the study of ‘rents’ and their role in development 
In Chapter 1, I explained the four competing approaches in the study of the 
‘politics of rents’, particularly the conditions that allow state-engineered rents to 
perform developmental functions contrary to the predictions of neo-classical 
economic models of rent-seeking, that I arrayed myself against. These four 
included approaches developed by political economists and development 
scholars anchoring their explanations on: (1) the agency of political leaders226; (2) 
the nature of state power227; (3) the incentives engendered by pre-existing 
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structures of political competition and rent-taking228; and (4) specific conditions 
that allow the emergence of state capacities to foster and manage production-
promoting rents.229 I explicitly cast my lot with the fourth approach, choosing it 
as my starting point, but utilising the approach through a methodology that looks 
at sectoral rent settlements. In what follows, I will explain how my research 
findings and the methodology I developed to generate them square against my 
observations about the weaknesses of the first three approaches, and how they 
contribute to strengthening the fourth. In the final section, I suggest ways by 
which the ‘sectoral rent settlement’ approach that I developed may be used to 
test, validate and further develop my work’s findings as they apply not only to 
Colombia and the Philippines, but other late developers like them. 
 
Theoretical implications 
The theoretical implications of my work can be categorised into three: ways in 
which my empirical findings temper the critique of some of the approaches that I 
discussed in Chapter 1; the way they confirm and add a new dimension to the 
critique I have already articulated in that chapter; and the new insights in 
understanding or studying the role of rents in development generated by my 
research. 
First, I recognise that the explanatory power of some of the approaches that I 
criticised cannot be totally discounted. For one, there are ‘agency’-related 
explanations to the variations in the rent settlements that obtained. This is 
strongest in the Philippine case, where the agency of presidents was absolutely 
key, in as much as the exercise of executive authority was a significant node of 
rent regulation. But the Colombian case could be similarly interpreted, albeit 
agency there refers not to the political calculations of the holder of executive 
authority, but to the motivations uniting the coalition that backed the 
establishment of the rent settlement benefitting smallholders. However, in both 
the Philippine and Colombian cases, agency was exercised not by utility 
maximising political agents based on considerations of time horizons (as 
suggested by Olson (1993) – but for considerations of establishing political 
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stability. This is true for Marcos trying to build a political base for his 
authoritarian rule; for the succession of presidents that followed him – 
particularly Arroyo and Estrada – who used the post-Marcos rent settlement to 
enhance their chances for surviving the periods of political crisis they faced; and 
for the coalition of coffee growers and businessmen and Conservative politicians, 
who promoted smallholding production in coffee to counter the tendencies of 
political conflict inherent in large coffee estate-based production.  These are akin 
to the actuations less of self-interested political agents keen on extracting the 
most surplus during the time they are in power, and more of political agents in a 
limited access order (as in North et al, 2007, 2009) who want to provide 
privileged access to rents to engender cooperation from key segments of the 
polity. 
Second, my empirical findings strengthen the critique against strict 
conceptions of the developmental state that look at state capacity in terms of 
power and autonomy.  I suggested that the rent settlement associated with coffee 
levies in Colombia built state capacities through a process whereby the state 
established direct links with the coffee producing class and regulated the coffee 
rent settlement. This lends credence to Khan’s argument that state developmental 
capacities are built in the process of development and are not a pre-requisite for 
development (Khan, 2004a). Moreover, providing FEDECAFE with the means to 
regulate the rent settlement –in the process of which the Colombian state can be 
said to have given up some autonomy – was part of the condition that enabled 
FEDECAFE to become a long-lived sustainable organisation, articulating 
productive interests. This again, could be seen as a way by which conditions 
existed in Colombia for taking an intermediate step in between the primitive 
limited access order towards an open access order, where productive interests are 
articulated by long-lived organisations (North, et al, 2007, 2009, 2013).  
Third, my method for analysing the politics of rents through the lens of 
sectoral rent settlements opens up new ways of interrogating well-established 
ideas in development studies. 
Viewing the way coffee levies in Colombia were mobilised to enable 
FEDECAFE to function as a marketing board as a feature of a politically-
determined ‘rent settlement’ also engenders a re-engagement with the 
conclusions of Bates (1981) about marketing boards in Africa. For one, dispersed 
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coffee producers in Colombia were able to build a strong and accountable 
association, defying the predictions of Olson’s (1961) logic of collective action, 
as I suggested in Chapter 2. But more importantly, this made possible the rise of 
a marketing board in Colombia – run by a producers association – that did not 
just extract surplus from rural producers to subsidise urban consumers. This 
means that when the operations of a marketing board are established through a 
‘rent settlement’ whereby a producers association is involved in surplus 
extraction and the mobilisation of rents, it is entirely possible that market 
interventions can buttress and support productive goals in agriculture. 
Finally, viewing the mobilisation of coconut levies in the Philippines through 
the lens of a ‘rent settlement’ suggests that the ‘coconut story’ is  more than just 
a story about the excesses of a thieving president, which has characterised most 
previous accounts. That the contest for rent settlement after Marcos had been 
deposed from power redounded to negotiations for the division of the continuing 
rent streams among contending claimants, rather than their productive uses, 
shows that the graver problem lies in the organisation of rent-seeking in the 
Philippines. And this has persisted across different political regimes in the 
Philippines: the failure of productive classes to engage in contests for rent 
streams through consolidated political organisations. This insight, in turn, offers 
a more nuanced view of the developmental consequences of rent-seeking in 
countries like the Philippines: one that looks beyond the lens of corruption and 
instead focuses on the way rent-seeking is politically organised. 
 
An agenda for further study utilising the lens of ‘sectoral rent settlements’ 
By way of concluding this dissertation, I now suggest ways by which the lens of 
‘sectoral rent settlements’ may be used to test, validate and further develop my 
main claim that state-engineered rents assigned and mobilised in rent settlements 
intermediated by producers associations could promote developmental goals. 
First, further research could be undertaken in Colombia to ascertain whether 
producers associations in other key economic sectors have been able to negotiate 
their own rent settlements. There are associations among rice farmers, cut flower 
growers, and cattle ranchers in Colombia – sectors of varying economic 
importance. If they were able to successfully negotiate rent settlements, did they 
benefit the growers and also advance the productive goals of the sector? Did they 
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perform the same regulatory functions that FEDECAFE did for coffee? Research 
on other rent settlements in Colombia could test the proposition that when it is 
producers associations who seek rents, this could be supportive of the productive 
mobilisation of rents. But such a study could also begin to answer the question of 
why – despite the preponderance of producers associations in Colombia relative 
to the Philippines – over-all indicators of economic growth, rate of industrial 
transformation and savings rates remain similar in both countries? Alternatively, 
why did success in coffee not translate to other sectors in the economy? 
Second, further research in the Philippines could be undertaken in sectors that 
are closer to Colombian coffee in terms of the dominant role in the country’s 
export sector. One such sector is the sugar sector, which though now a shadow of 
what it used to be, was the sector that played the historical role that coffee did in 
Colombia, both as a means of integrating with the world market, but also as the 
singularly dominant export crop before the ascendance of coconuts. Marcos also 
fostered a rent settlement with sugar planters, who had a more expansive land 
base and established presence in the industrial end of the sector. (See Boyce, 
1993; Hawes, 1997) Another sector is the micro-electronics sector, which 
currently stands as the single-most important export sector of the Philippines. 
This sector also received state-engineered rents in the form of tax breaks enjoyed 
by firms, located in export-processing zones, where operations of firms 
producing these are based. Did these ‘rents’ foster production in this sector and 
did it matter that there were no producers associations in the sector? 
The view to sectoral rent settlements ultimately allows for the examination of 
the fine gradients between failure and success among late developers. This 
dissertation thus contributes to a gaping hole in the literature on the 
developmental state, which tends to only have explanations for two phenomena: 
states that fail and states that succeed.  Countries like Colombia and the 
Philippines—in failing to see to processes of industrial upgrading—will be both 
classed in this broad literature among those that failed. But in this dissertation, I 
showed that there are lessons learned too from the finer gradients of failure and 
success.  In the story of the development of the coffee sector in Colombia, there 
was a state that exhibited developmental rent management capacities.  A key 
political condition that was absent in the Philippines, the wider political 
organisation of rent-seeking that enabled organised producers to shape the rent 
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settlement decisively, made possible the emergence of these capacities.  The 
success of the Colombian coffee story provides a view of the political conditions 
that enhance the possibilities for failed late developers to break free from patterns 
of rent-seeking detrimental to development. But the failure of Colombia to 
exhibit long-term economic development patterns significantly different from the 
Philippines also indicates the difficulty and complexity of converting sectoral 
successes into a generalised story of development. 
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Appendix 1. List of Interviewees 
 
Name Designation Date of interview 
Place of 
interview 
Agustin, Yvonne Executive Director, 
United Coconut 
Associations of the 
Philippines (UCAP) 
May 12, 2009  Pasig City, 
Philippines 
Anonymous ‘CIIF Company’ May 15, 2009 Makati City, 
Philippines 
Capalla, Fernando Archbishop of the 
Catholic Church in 
Davao City  
June 1, 2009  Davao City, 
Philippines 
Cárdenas, Jorge at 
FEDECAFE 
 
 
Former General 
Manager, National 
Coffee Federation 
(FEDECAFE) 
March 5, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
David, Virgilio Board Member and 
Former 
Administrator, 
Philippine Coconut 
Authority (PCA) 
May 9, 2009 Quezon City, 
Philippines 
Dumlao, Herminigildo Lawyer, Office of 
the Solicitor General 
(OSG) 
June 3, 2009 Makati City, 
Philippines 
Espinoza, Rodolfo President, RACAFE 
& CIA, S.C.A. 
(exporting company) 
February 12, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
Faustino, Joey Executive Director, 
Coconut Industry 
Reform Movement 
(COIR) 
April 22, 29 and 
May 9, 2009 
Quezon City, 
Philippines 
Fernández , Juan 
Pablo  
Political Adviser, 
Office of the Senator 
Jorge Enrique 
Robledo 
February 2, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
Guhl, Andrés 
 
Professor, 
Universidad de Los 
Andes  
Centro 
Interdisciplinario de 
Estudios sobre 
Desarollo (CIDER)  
January 25, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
Junguito, Roberto Academic and 
Former Minister of 
Finance 
February 15, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
Leibovich, José Academic and 
Executive Director, 
Centro de Estudios 
Regionales 
Cafeteros y 
Empresariales 
(CRECE) 
February 9, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
(continued in the next page)  
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Appendix 1. List of Interviewees (continuation) 
 
Name Designation Date of interview 
Place of 
interview 
Liquete, Arturo Deputy 
Administrator, PCA 
May 3, 2009  Quezon City, 
Philippines 
Lozano, Jorge President, Asosacíon 
Nacional de 
Exportaciones de 
Café de Colombia 
(ASOEXPORT) 
February 16, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
Mejía, Rafael President, Sociedad 
de Agricultores de 
Colombia (SAC) 
January 28, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
Misas, Gabriel Professor and 
Director, Instituto de 
Estudios Políticos y 
Relaciones 
Internacionales 
(IEPRI), 
Universidad 
Nacional de 
Colombia 
February 4, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
Pizano, Diego Academic and 
Consultant, 
FEDECAFE 
February 15, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
Reyes, Camila Government adviser 
to the Ministry of 
Finance, 
FEDECAFE 
National Committee 
Feburary 11, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
Espinoza, Rodolfo President, RACAFE 
& CIA, SCA 
(exporting company) 
Feburary 12, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
Royandoyan, Romeo Executive Director, 
Centro Saka, Inc 
May 15, 2009 Quezon City, 
Philippines 
Santos, Oscar President, Coconut 
Industry Reform 
Movement and 
former Congressman 
May 1, 2009 Manila, 
Philippines 
Silva, Santiago Researcher, 
FEDECAFE 
National Office 
February 10, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
Steiner, Robert Executive Director, 
Centro de 
Investigacíon 
Económico y Social 
(FEDESAROLLO) 
January 29, 2010 Bogotá, Colombia 
 
 
